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Abstract
This thesis examines the role which marketing plays in the planning process o f small 
indigenous companies in the electronics sector in the Republic o f Ireland. In particular it 
attempts to identify the main influencing factors which shape the particular approach 
adopted by such firms.
The research involved a comprehensive review of the literature on small business policy in 
Ireland, entrepreneurship, growth and the small firm, and also strategy and planning. A 
pluralistic approach to the design of the research programme was adopted. This involved 
three phases; consisting of in - depth interviews, telephone interviews and final seven 
detailed case studies of electronics firms.
The quantitative phase showed that there was a strong relationship between the size of the 
customer base and the tendency to adopt an informal, intuitive approach to planning. 
Likewise there was evidence to suggest that the size o f the company (defined as the 
number o f employees) also influences the approach to planning. There was no evidence to 
suggest that the length o f time a company was established, the propensity to export, or the 
category of product manufactured, had any significant impact on the approach to planning.
The case studies identified a number of critical variables and influencing factors on the 
approach to planning. The most salient issues were the approach to customer 
management, the way in which relationships are managed, the ability to manage critical 
events effectively, the dichotomy between strategic decision - making and operational 
decision - making and the ability to delegate the latter decisions to other personnel in the 
company. The cases revealed that there is a strong tendency to formalise the annual plan; 
usually in the form of a budgetary exercise.
The thesis concludes by noting that these issues need to be more fully understood before 
adopting a prescriptive approach to planning; as is the case in much o f the extant 
literature.
IX
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Rationale for the Research
The question o f how businesses plan their development has exercised the minds o f many 
academics and practitioners over the years. While there has been a veritable plethora o f 
articles and textbooks advising companies as to how they might best address this issue; 
comparatively little o f any merit has been directed at the small firm sector, given the 
complexity and heterogeneity to be found there. Much o f  what has been written has 
adopted a prescriptive, normative approach, i.e. a sequential, rational structure for 
planning that can be adopted by the company. It is debatable whether or not companies, 
particularly those in the small firm sector would agree with such a viewpoint. It is from 
this initial prejudice that the topic for this thesis emerged.
A brief perusal o f the literature, before the commencement o f this thesis supports the 
suspicion that there is a tendency to assume that what is deemed to be appropriate for the 
large corporation also will w ork for the small, evolving firm. However the commonly 
cited lack o f resources, skills and competencies and specialist expertise surely means that 
this is a dangerous presumption, without supporting evidence. Authors such as Piercy and 
Giles (1989), McDonald (1984) and Greenley (1982) have produced worthwhile material 
which outlines the structure and procedure for planning. Again however, the suspicion 
remains that it is grounded on the basis o f a prescriptive, normative philosophy. Does 
such a step - by - step, rational and sequential approach w ork for companies, particularly 
the evolving one, in reality? It is submitted at the outset o f this thesis that the smaller 
enterprise tends to operate in an environment which is embedded in the realms o f 
uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos. If  there is such a discrepancy between theory and 
practice, then there is a need for a greater understanding and insight into the topic. 
Carson (1985, 1991) has undertaken useful research already, particularly into planning in 
the context o f the marketing and entrepreneurship interface. However further work needs 
to be carried out: hence the prime motivation for this project.
The electronics sector in the Republic o f Ireland was chosen as the focus for the study. 
This was because o f the strategic significance which has been placed on this industry by 
successive governments since the mid 1960's. Initially foreign - owned companies were 
targeted for inward investment and since the 1980's, a concerted effort has been made to
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establish linkages between these firms and local companies in terms o f supply and 
procurement. People have also been actively encouraged to establish their own 
enterprises. It was felt therefore that this sector would present a good opportunity to 
research how such start - up enterprise have developed, and in particular, how they have 
utilised marketing within their planning activities.
1.2. Objectives
Within the broad remit o f the project which has been outlined in preceding paragraphs, the 
overall objectives were as follows:
a) To gain an initial insight into general planning practices and procedures across 
industries. This phase was designed to enhance the preunderstanding about the topic 
under investigation and provide a broad framework for designing the next stage.
b). To identify the parameters o f planning practice among indigenous companies in the
electronics sector. This was designed to provide an assessment o f the general principles 
and procedures o f planning within such firms.
c). To isolate specific cases and examine the internal mechanisms and influences
affecting the context o f planning, thus providing patterns (be they convergent or 
divergent) for subsequent evaluation. This allows for more closer interaction with the 
respondent and provides for a "richer" depth o f understanding about the subject under 
investigation.
A  more detailed description o f the specific objectives is laid out in chapter five.
1.3. Research Approach
The gap between theory and practice suggests that a number o f  considerations need to be 
taken into account when designing the research study. Given the questionable validity of 
previous research which is identified in chapters three and four, it is submitted that a 
phased approach is required: starting with a general overview o f planning practices and 
moving to an industry specific sector. It is also strongly argued that there is a need for a 
balanced approach between deductive and inductive research methodologies. A purely 
positivistic methodological approach would be unduly simplistic, given the need to more
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fully comprehend the underlying patterns and influences on planning activities. This in 
turn calls for a pluralistic approach; where a number o f different methods o f data 
collection and analysis can be used. A total dependence on one single tool or technique 
renders the research method - bound and ignores the fact that the strength o f each 
particular method is flawed in some way or other. A pluralistic approach allows the 
researcher to counterbalance the strengths and weaknesses o f each method. The research 
approach adopted for this study is outlined in figure 1.1.
FIGURE 1 RESEARCH APPROACH
LITERATURE REVIEWS EXPERIENCE
u
PHASE ONE: UNSTRUCTURED DEPTH INTERVIEWS
U
PHASE TWO: HYBRID TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS;
COMBINING CATI (COMPUTER AIDED TELEPHONE 
INTERVIEWING) WITH OPEN - ENDED QUESTIONS
JJ
PHASE THREE: HYBRID - DEPTH INTERVIEWS, 
OBSERVATION, FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERVIEWS,
INPUT FROM RESEARCH COLLEAGUE, CASE STUDIES
1.4. Structure of Thesis
The structure o f the remainder o f this thesis is as follows:
Chapter two examines the extent o f small firm support in the Republic o f Ireland. It adopts 
a partly historical perspective, tracing the various policy measures and initiatives instigated
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by successive governments. It also contrasts the developments in Ireland with those in 
other countries within the EU. The appropriateness o f  these measures is assessed in the 
light o f the specific characteristics o f the small, evolving firm. The reader is urged to 
review this material in conjunction with the content o f  appendix one, which assesses 
overall industrial policy in Ireland since the inception o f the state.
Chapter three reviews the literature on entrepreneurship, growth and the small firm. The 
role o f the entrepreneur needs to be assessed in light o f any attempt to examine the way in 
which companies utilise planning in their growth and development. The various schools o f 
thought with regard to entrepreneurship are assessed and focus is also given to the 
alternative perspectives on how growth within the small firm is achieved.
Chapter four assesses the role o f strategy, marketing, planning and the firm. Focus is given 
to the relationship between marketing planning and overall strategic or business planning. 
Empirical studies are reviewed and assessed with regard to their relevance to the case o f 
the small firm,
Chapter five reviews the different philosophies o f research design; both deductive and 
inductive and argues strongly for a pluralistic approach to reset design. The methodology 
employed for this study is laid out in this chapter together with detailed discussion on 
sample design, the development o f hypotheses for the second phase o f the study and 
subsequent administration o f the interviews.
Chapter six presents the results o f phase one o f the study; consisting o f depth interviews 
with a number o f companies, with the overall objective o f identifying alternative 
approaches to planning in general terms.
Chapter seven analyses the main findings from phase tw o o f the study: the quantitative 
telephone survey o f indigenous companies from the electronics sector.
Chapter eight sets out the detailed case studies o f seven companies which made up phase 
three o f the study. Each case is presented and analysed separately and the reader is 
directed to assessments which were made after the relevant data from each individual 
company was analysed. These are to be found in appendix 3.
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Chapter nine synthesises the main findings and recommendations from phases two and 
three o f  the research project . This chapter also examines some o f the possible limitations 
o f the research and highlights potentially fruitful areas for further research in this area. 
The key learning outcomes are examined and the view is taken that this survey is a 
continuing journey; not a destinat ion.
CHAPTER TWO
THE SMALL FIRM IN THE IRISH ECONOMY: 
PERFORMANCE AND APPRAISAL
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The material which presented in appendix A (see part 2, page 358) reviews the 
development o f industrial policy in Ireland since the foundation o f the State in 1921. 
While it is necessary to present such an analysis, it is felt that it is not central to the 
main focus o f this dissertation Because this research study is on the small, indigenous 
firm within the context of the electronics industry it is argued that this sector of the 
manufacturing base should be examined in more detail than would otherwise be 
possible in a general assessment of industrial strategy. This analysis and appraisal will 
help to gain a clearer insight into the specific problems and issues which ultimately 
affect the small firms' ability to contribute to the manufacturing sector.
The specific programmes and strategies introduced by the State are evaluated in the 
first part of the chapter. While the indigenous sector has featured as a key element of 
industrial policy for many years, appendix A highlighted that more success was 
achieved in the twin area of encouraging inward investment from overseas companies. 
That analysis also demonstrated that any initial success deriving from the contribution 
of the overseas sector is limited and ultimately constrained if there are inefficiencies 
and weaknesses within the indigenous base. One o f the main conclusions arising from 
the evaluation of industrial policy was that o f an imbalance in the allocation of 
resources between the indigenous and foreign sectors - weighted heavily in favour of 
the latter. Of course it would be disingenuous to suggest that a series o f programmes 
for boosting the contribution o f the indigenous sector did not exist. On the contrary, a 
number of initiatives were undertaken by successive governments to stimulate growth 
in this area, and these are appraised in some detail.
The middle section considers the policy of the European Community with regard to the 
smaller firm and examines the comparative approaches of countries within the EU This 
is deemed to a useful exercise to undertake because it helps to provide an overall 
framework for examining Irelands' approach to industrial policy with regard to the 
smaller firm and allows for some subsequent bench - marking at the end of the 
chapter.
This chapter concludes by identifying the inherent weaknesses of present policy with 
regard to the small firm and examines alternative approaches, drawing on the 
experiences o f other EU member states. It is submitted that the chapter complements 
the theoretical issues concerning small firm growth and development which are 
discussed in chapter three.
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2.2. SMALL FIRM POLICY IN IRELAND: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
While a fuller discussion on the difficulties o f defining what actually constitutes a " 
small " firm takes place in the next chapter, it is necessary at this early juncture to 
clarify the operational framework which will be utilised within this chapter. The 
standard definition of a small firm as used by the Industrial Development Authority is 
one which employs up to fifty  people with fixed assets o f not more than £0.8million
(1). This differs from the Small Firms Association - a group established within the 
Confederation o f Irish Industry to look after the interests of small firms. They cater for 
firms employing upwards of one. hundred people. By contrast the Bolton Report (2) 
categorises as small, companies in the United Kingdom, employing less than two 
hundred people. In Japan small industry is classified as companies engaging less than 
three hundred people (3). Beckler (4) identifies variations in many European countries; 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland - less than fifty, Germany and Italy - less than one 
hundred. This contrasts with the standards employed within the European Community. 
In this case, the European SME sector (excluding agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing) is classified under the following categories ;
micro - enterprises 0 - 9 employees
small enterprises 1 0 -9 9  employees
medium enterprises 100 - 499 employees (5)
There are clear limitations arising from a reliance on the "numbers employed" criterion. 
Kennedy and Healy (6) use the example of the anomalies which can occur where two 
companies each employ one hundred people: one may employ highly skilled 
technologists, while the other may be relying on a large pool of untrained workers. As 
a consequence it can be reasoned that "persons" does not constitute homogeneous 
units of labour.
The discrepancies arising from the above definitions demonstrate that there is no 
universally accepted definition. It can also pose problems when interpreting data from 
different countries within the EU In addition it creates a "grey area" between the small 
and medium sized firm. In Ireland the demarcation line is drawn at fifty employees. By 
contrast the EU identifies one hundred employees as the separation point. The reader is 
advised to refrain from adopting a rigid approach to defining small firms purely on the 
basis of the number of people employed. That said, caution must be exercised when 
undertaking comparative analysis. Kennedy and Healy (7) argue that it is not necessary 
to establish a single dividing line when separating small from medium and large
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companies. Instead they put forward the view that gradations o f size should be 
adopted.. For their analysis (which shall be examined in this chapter), they accord with 
the IDA category (less than fifty people employed) but express interest in other rages 
of size and they use the following classification format
(1) Small - less than fifty persons engaged
(2) Small - medium 50 - 199
(3) Medium - large 200 - 499
(4) Large 500 and over
In the subsequent analysis which will be presented in this chapter it is worth pointing 
out that much of the available data leaves a lot to be desired when it referring to the 
small firm sector. In the case of companies employing one or two people, they can be 
hard to locate and indeed much of the statistical returns which they make are 
unsatisfactory. Therefore the Irish Central Statistics Office ignores establishments with 
less than three people employed.
2.3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SMALL INDUSTRY - THE PARAMETERS
Much of the available data pertaining to the size and structure o f the Irish 
manufacturing sectors derives from the Census o f Industrial Production (produced by 
the Central Statistics Office and the Annual Employment Survey (generated by the 
IDA).
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the available data on the number of establishments 
and employment in various categories within the manufacturing sector for selected 
years from 1929 - 1975. They show that the total number of companies was fifty two 
per cent higher in 1975 than in 1929. The small firm sector (defined as less than fifty) 
as of 1975, makes up almost three quarters of the total number of firms, but in terms of 
employment levels, it accounts for just over twenty per cent. This latter figure 
represents a decline from thirty four per cent in 1929. As might be anticipated, the 
firms employing more than five hundred people, although accounting for less than two 
per cent of the total number of companies, account for almost a quarter of total 
employment as of 1975.
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TABLE 2.1 SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF IRISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 1929 - 1975
ESTAB. SIZE 1929 1938 1946 1958 1968 1975
NO. OF ESTABLISHMENTS
SMALL 1912 2716 2376 2511 2305 2464
SMALL - MEDIUM 263 425 384 452 576 661
MEDIUM - LARGE 83 112 142 143
LARGE 11 15 21 31 51 52
TOTAL 2186 3156 2864 3106 3074 3320
EMPLOYMENT NUMBERS ( 000)
SMALL 22.2 32.8 32.5 37.5 38.2 39.8
SMALL - MEDIUM 32.0 53.4 34.7 42.3 56.5 63.8
MEDIUM - LARGE 23.9 32.4 42.1 43.1
LARGE 11.8 14.2 18.9 29.6 47.2 48.1
TOTAL 66.1 100.2 110.0 141.8 183.9 194.8
EMPLOYMENT SHARES (%)
SMALL 33.6 32.7 29.5 26.4 20.8 20.4
SMALL - MEDIUM 48.5 53.2 31.5 29.8 30.7 32.8
MEDIUM - LARGE 21.7 22.8 22.9 22.1
LARGE 17.9 14.2 17.2 20.9 25.7 24.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Kennedy and Healy, p52.
Kennedy and Healy (8) also present alternative data generated by the Industrial 
Development Authority for the comparative years 1973 and 1980. These are outlined 
in Table 2.2.
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TABLE 2.2 SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF IRISH MANUFACTURING 1973 AND 1980 (IDA DATA)
ESTABLISHMENT
SIZE
NO. OF 
ESTABL.
EMPLOYMENT
(000'S)
EMPLOYMENT SHARES
(%)
1973 1980 1973 1980 1973 1980
SMALL 3913 4451 50.7 57.4 23.3 23.7
SMALL - MEDIUM 686 836 66.2 81.6 30.4 33.6
MEDIUM - LARGE 170 180 51.1 54.0 23.5 22.2
LARGE 60 61 49.7 49.5 22.8 20.4
TOTAL 4929 5528 217.8 242.5 100.0 100.0
The data generated by the IDA includes many more companies than that of the Census 
of Industrial Production. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that many of the 
very small firms did not appeal- to have returned information in the case o f the latter 
survey. The IDA statistics however do indicate a significant increase in the number of 
small firms over the seven year period. There has been a negligible increase in 
employment levels in this sector.
These figures send some conflicting signals. The vast bulk of companies in Ireland as 
of the mid - 1970's (seventy five per cent) is accounted for by small companies. Their 
overall contribution to employment however is not as significant.
More up to date information on the parameters of the small firm sector Is contained in 
the Review o f Industrial Performance, 1990 (9). As o f 1989, it was estimated that 
there were approximately 6,500 firms in this sector, employing 60,000 people and 
accounting for eighty per cent of total industrial establishments, representing twenty 
five per cent of industrial employment. Small industries' contribution to industrial 
output is calculated at fifteen per cent. Sixty per cent o f these firms depend exclusively 
on the domestic market for their survival. The review also estimâtes that the average 
employment o f each enterprise in this sector is less than ten, with a wide geographic 
dispersal and a large concentration in rural areas - where employment opportunities are 
scarce.
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Table 2.3 presents data on the levels of employment within the small firm sector for the 
period 1983 - 1989.
TABLE 2.3
EMPLOYMENT IN SMALL INDUSTRY 1983 -1989
Year Gross Gains Losses Net Change
1983 8,520 8,039 481
1984 7411 6858 553
1985 8421 7264 1157
1986 8655 8960 -305
1987 9429 7859 1570
1988 9247 7156 2091
1989 9903 6216 3687
Source: Review of Industrial Employment, 1990, p80. (The data was compiled from IDA, SFADCo, and 
Udaras na Gaeltachta employment surveys)__________________________________________________________
Overall there is a positive net change in employment over these years. A superficial 
glance at table three reveals small net increases in the first three to four years (apart 
from 1986) with a steady increase in the positive net changes in the latter years. Two 
reasons can be put forward at this stage of the analysis for these changes. The 
contributions o f the "modem" cohort o f manufacturing industries (such as electronics, 
chemicals, metals and engineering) began to outweigh the contributions of the 
traditional sectors (such as food, drink and tobacco, textiles and clothing, timber and 
furniture and printing), in line with the emphasis being placed by successive 
governments on the former sectors. The Review of Industrial Performance 1986 (10) 
identifies this trend and the main findings are summarised in table 2.4. While the data 
contained in this table refers to output from both overseas and indigenous companies 
and does not identify the small sector explicitly, it still reflects the contributions of the 
new start ups in these "modem" sectors. Secondly, the small firms sector will clearly 
exhibit a high level of births and deaths. The review estimates for example that almost 
twenty five per cent of new start - ups during the period 1980 - 1983, closed within the 
same period. Likewise it is reasonable to assume that companies which survive the 
hazards associated with the initial phase will gradually (and then more quickly) be in a 
position to seek extra employees. Thus companies which commenced operations in the
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early part of the 1980's would be more prone to recruiting extra staff towards the end 
of the decade.
TABLE 2.4
GROWTH IN OUTPUT (%)
YEAR ELECTRONICS CHEMICALS ALL MANUFACT.
1983 41.8 16.0 7.6
1984 54.2 23.8 12.5
1985 3.6 2.5 2.7
1986 (EST) 23.5 -1.6 2.0
Sou re
e : CSO : Volume of Production Indices
One aspect of the 1990 Review of Industrial Performance (11) alluded to earlier is the 
reliance o f over sixty per cent of the 6,500 companies on the domestic market for their 
business survival. While this appears at first glance, to be a major weakness, it does 
point up a problem which has to be acknowledged when examining the small 
indigenous sector in the Republic of Ireland; namely the smallness o f  the home market. 
While more specific causes of restriction to growth will be examined in next chapter, it 
is submitted that small firms seeking growth are prevented from reaching a position 
where they can cultivate a competitive advantage because o f the size of the domestic 
market. Kennedy and Healy (12) further develop this point by noting that
"In larger economies, small firm s are able to attain a position o f viability by 
supplying an extensive or domestic market, whereas Irish small firm s are often 
hampered by the limited home market opportunities”. (p66)
As a consequence of this observation, it is argued that it is unrealist ic to expect short 
to medium term success in terms o f employment generation from the small firm sector. 
The initial start - up phase is typically characterised by problems relating to establishing 
the business on a relatively sound footing. This may include issues relating to working 
capital, developing a customer base, gaining extra finance to invest in additional plant 
and /  or equipment and cultivating a reputation in the industry. The need to address 
these considerations, often in a reactionary, unplanned mode of operation, can mean 
that inevitably, the thought of recruiting extra personnel is often placed down the list in 
the order of priorities.
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2.4. DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL FIRM POLICY
The 1990 Review of Industrial Performance (13) identifies the objective o f the 
programme for small industry development as one of encouraging
"employment growth and wealth creation in the regions in a cost - effective 
manner by fostering the growth o f  sound, commercially viable enterprises 
capable o f  competing successfully in internationally traded m arkets”
This view of what is expected from the small industry sector once again explicitly 
reiterates the primacy o f employment generation alongside the implicit development of 
what might be loosely called, a culture which encourages the concept of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Added to this is the expectation that over time, the 
firms which survive the early phase of development, will seek out opportunities in the 
international arena and ultimately trade successfully there. It also recognises the social 
need to develop enterprises throughout the regions ( some of which are economically 
disadvantaged) rather than concentrate them solely in areas of high density population.
This suggests that any examination and appraisal of policies and strategies should be 
measured against three criteria: the ability to generate extra employment, the ability to 
trade internationally and the ability of the State to foster a climate which positively 
encourages entrepreneurship and enterprise development. The social objective is more 
difficult to measure and can only be gauged from an appraisal o f location and dispersal 
of grants /  incentives. Each criterion in turn must be evaluated against the costs 
involved - e.g. in creating one new job from this sector. These factors will be used to 
appraise the small firm policies and strategies which have been introduced over the past 
number of years.
Kennedy et al (14) suggest that although no formal measures were instigated by the 
State to stimulate development within the small firm sector before 1967, it was clear 
that the protectionist policy favoured by governments prior to 1959 explicitly favoured 
the local, indigenous manufacturers. The analysis presented in the previous chapter 
however reveals that this policy encouraged complacency at best, and inefficiencies at 
worst, which meant that this sector was singularly ill - equipped to tackle any potential 
export opportunities which may have existed in Europe, or further afield. Many of 
these inefficiencies related to basic inadequacies in areas such as marketing, quality 
standards and manufacturing equipment.
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In line with the range o f financial incentives which were provided for the overseas 
sector, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was given responsibility for 
processing and accessing proposals received from Irish sources in 1966. This was 
formalised in 1967 with the establishment of a Small Industries Division within the 
IDA. They were charged with the task of launching the Small Industry (SI) 
Programme which was designed to provide aid and assistance to existing indigenous 
enterprises and with the development of new ones.
Initially this programme was addressed to designated areas in the country such as the 
West, Mid - West and South - West and North - East. These were regions which were 
deemed to be under - developed and as a consequence in need of investment to 
stimulate employment opportunities. However the SI programme was gradually 
extended to all regions, excluding Dublin, by 1969. The IDA administers the 
programme for all regions except the Mid - West, which is handled by the Shannon 
Free Airport Development Company ( SFADCo) and for Gaeltacht areas which are 
dealt with under separate programmes by Udaras na Gaeltachta. Following a rapid 
decline in manufacturing levels in inner city areas during the mid 1970's, (mainly 
caused by the economic fall - out from the 1974 - 1975 oil crisis), the programme was 
eventually extended to the Dublin area in 1977.
A differentiation in the level o f grants was a feature o f the programme, with grants 
negotiable up to a limit o f sixty per cent of fixed asset investment being available in the 
designated areas, and forty five per cent elsewhere. In addition the programme 
provided for the option o f rent subsidies and leasing grants for machinery and plant. 
The IDA also has developed a broad range of advance factories and units for start - up 
entrepreneurs. Grants are also available for the training o f workers and for feasibility 
studies and for product and process development.
In addition to the basic diet o f grants and incentives, the programme developed a 
number of "add - ons" to the basic package. For instance in 1981, SFADCo instigated 
Matchmaker Programmes, designed to promote the sale of products from local firms 
in the mid- west to the rest of the country. An innovation centre was also established 
in the (then) National Institute for Higher Education in Limerick to help local firms 
design and test new product concepts. In 1975, the IDA set up a Project Identification  
Unit to identify import substitution opportunities and also to promote potential 
linkages with established overseas branches located in Ireland. In 1978, the Enterprise 
Development Programme (EDP) was launched. This scheme was designed to
14
encourage professional managers already working in semi - state, private or overseas 
enterprises, to make the transition to entrepreneurship. In addition to the normal 
package of grants and incentives, guaranteed loans for working capital purposes were 
also made available.
These initiatives took place prior to the influential Telesis Report (15) which is 
examined in appendix one. While that report and the subsequent White Paper on 
Industrial Policy affirmed the need to concentrate more fully than had been the case 
heretofore, on the small indigenous firm, views are mixed as to their success in 
adequately recognising the differences and unique characteristics of such companies.
O'Farrell (16) is explicit in his reservations about the contribution of the Telesis Report 
to the future success of the small firm arguing that
" (its) approach is inadequate to overcome the wide range o f  biases and 
problems confronting the. small firm  sector, many o f  which derive from  their 
small size and require, explicit recognition in policy form ulation" (O'Farrell 
P  2 5 1 )
This is further supported by Conniffe and Kennedy (17) who point to the need for the 
range of advisory support activities in the areas of marketing and management training 
to reflect the inevitable differences which exist, when compared to the those required 
by the medium to large firms.
This reluctance to explicitly separate the approach to the small firm sector from the 
medium to large indigenous companies in the Telesis Report is also identified by 
Keenan(18) who argues that it clearly favours the development o f small industry "as 
part of an integrated indigenous development charter" rather than dealing with them 
through a specific agency or division.
In similar vein, Kennedy and Healy (19) express the view that as of the early part o f the 
1980's, there existed a large "critical mass" of small firms which need to seek 
improvements in efficiencies in order for them to grow any further. The onus in their 
view should be on developing specific programmes which take into account the 
differences (once again) between small and larger companies.
The subsequent White Paper on Industrial Policy (20) as noted in appendix one, was 
reluctant to veer away radically from the emphasis on the overseas sector of industry.
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Perhaps the most severe criticism of the proposed policies was levelled by Ruane (21) 
who argues that the White Paper only considered direct policies which fell under the 
direct responsibility of the Minister for Industry and Commerce. Therefore important 
issues such as training, fiscal incentives, labour legislation, pay related social insurance 
(PRSI) are not featured in any aspect of policy change. In short an overly narrow 
perspective was applied, which ignored fundamental issues which could have direct 
relevance for the small firm sector and as in the case of fiscal policy, act as a negative 
influence in terms of recruiting extra personnel.
O'Farrell criticises the White Paper proposals and the subsequent Economic and Social 
Plan - Building on Reality 1985 - 1987 (22) on the basis that neither outlines an overall 
industry budget which would "enable the allocation of resources to reflect the new
strategic shift of manufacturing policy as betw een  indigenous and foreign firms and
between capital grants and other types of aid, to be evaluated and monitored". This is 
instanced in the White Paper which suggested that expenditure on marketing was 
projected to increase from four per cent in 1983 to 9 per cent by 1988 and expenditure 
on research and development to rise from five per cent to ten per cent over the same 
period. However no absolute values are provided to indicate the level of State 
expenditure under the different categories (small, medium, large indigenous firms). The 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) (23) state th a t :
" the projected changes in the patterns o f  State aid to industry..............amount
to a fram ework fo r  resource allocation which is loose, flexible and lacking in 
rigour".
The prevailing consensus would appear to unite around the view that the policies were 
lacking in specificity and preciseness. However the White Paper did contain a number 
of specific programmes which were designed to address some o f the perceived 
problems or weaknesses associated with the smaller firm. A Sectoral Development 
Committee Report (24) highlighted many significant weaknesses in the area of 
marketing within the indigenous sector. In response, the White Paper proposed a 
number of initiatives designed to address those areas.
This included grants o f up to fifty per cent of the cost of acquiring technology from 
abroad. I likewise a market entry and development scheme was introduced to help 
offset costs associated with travel expenses, promotion and warehousing facilities 
overseas. The Irish Export Board (Coras Trachtala) also designed a market research 
programme to help the small firm contemplating entry to foreign markets. The same 
agency also was charged with the responsibility for setting up group marketing
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programmes to help small firms access markets exporting complementary but non - 
competing products. Lennon (25) identifies such an approach as being beneficial for 
smaller companies because it helps reduce marketing costs, identifies new market 
outlets for products, establishes closer market contacts with end users and middlemen, 
provides more accurate and frequent market feedback and lead ultimately to increased 
efficiency and proficiency in exporting ; an area clearly identified as weak in the small 
firm sector. Another scheme involved Coras Trachtala covering fifty per cent of the 
cost of a full - time graduate with a proficiency in export marketing and languages who 
would spend a year working in the company to help with the development of sales and 
marketing for the export market. Other initiatives included the establishing of incubator 
factories in association with third level colleges.
To address the weaknesses associated with exporting, Coras Trachtala was given 
responsibility to develop a Company Development Programme which was designed to 
help selected companies with potential to exploit opportunities to penetrate such 
markets through various export initiatives. Under this scheme the various State 
agencies stimulate the companys' management team to come up with well thought out, 
internationally oriented business plans.
The National Linkages Programme (1985) was one of the more significant 
developments arising from the White Paper because it sought to specifically address 
weaknesses in the local indigenous sector identified in numerous studies (for example, 
see McAleese and Foley, 26). These related to product quality, price competitiveness, 
quality control standards, late delivery, inadequate financial control and all round 
marketing expertise. This programme had twin objectives. Firstly to seek the active 
support o f overseas companies, given that it would be in their best interests with the 
move towards just - in - time, to cultivate a strong local supply base, and secondly to 
bring the indigenous companies "up to speed" in terms of improving their capabilities in 
the areas of weaknesses identified by the various studies.
By year end 1988, over seventy indigenous companies had established relationships 
with over two hundred and twenty overseas firm. Kennedy and Healy (27) note that 
given its short time span it is too early to make a confident judgement about its 
success. However by 1988, they estimate that over £130 million worth o f new sales to 
overseas companies was generated, o f which £27 million was won by firms included in 
the linkages programme. It would be fallacious however to attribute all o f the sales to 
the results of the programme.
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Kennedy and Healy (28) are of the opinion that the Linkages Programme represents " a 
more hands - on and selective approach to industrial development than was customary 
in the past" and as such needs to be judged in the longer term. This is encouraging 
given the criticism levelled in the previous chapter that much of the industrial policies 
introduced in the past have sacrificed potential long term benefits for political 
expediencies. This phenomenon is evidenced by numerous pressure groups who in the 
words of McHugh (29) seek "immediate and highly visible signs of success".
2.4.1. Assessment of Small Firm Policy
The preceding discussion in both this chapter and the last has outlined and examined 
the range of strategies employed by successive Governments with regard to industrial 
policy in general and small firm policy in particular. O f necessity, the treatment o f this 
discussion has been largely descriptive in nature. The next section of the chapter makes 
an assessment o f the success or otherwise of such initiatives and makes 
recommendations as to how future policy with regard to the small firm sector can be 
improved.
2.5. COSTS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION
The statistical information underlying this issue has been considered earlier in the 
chapter and only a brief summation will be presented here. These figures reveal a 
positive net change in employment levels from the small firm sector up to 1989. When 
making an assessment of policies and strategies it is prudent to consider the costs 
associated with stimulating growth and employment generation among small firms. 
Table 2.5 presents the cost per job for the period 1980 - 1989. In addition to the actual 
cost per job, it is necessary to examine the grant payments made to the small industry 
sector. Table 2.6 provides some details in this regard.
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TABLE 2.5
COST PER JOB (CREATED AND SUSTAINED) 1980 - 1989 
CONSTANT 1989 PRICES
1980-86 1981-87 1982-88 1983-89
Cost per Job per Programme £ £ £ f
Irish and Overseas Business 26870 27470 24480 19830
Small Industry and Enterprise 
Development 11350 12180 10820 9773
International services 10570 9680 9050 8528
Cost per Job per Sector 
International Services, Chemicals & 
Engineering 20900 24250 23510 19249
Food, Drink and Tobacco 16570 15860 14970 12284
Furniture, Timber,Clothing & 
Footwear 18020 18020 14090 11405
All Programmes / Sectors (inc. Mid 
West Region) 20360 21010 n/a n/a
All Programme Sectors (excl. Mid 
West Region) 19330 20180 18610 15564
Notes: 1982-88 and 1983 89 data excludes the Mid West Region ; n/a - not available
Source: IDA in Review 1990 pi 56
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TABLE 2.6 GRANT PAYMENTS TO INDUSTRY (IDA A ND SFADCo ONLY)
EFA (1) TOTAL GRANTS FIXED ASSET
GRANTS
NON - FIXED 
ASSET GRANTS
CAPITAL % EFA
(2)
Payments
1985 39710 30242 21229 9013 53.5%
1986 28314 26662 17428 9234 61.6%
1987 25305 23828 14038 9790 55.5%
1988 29733 24460 13361 11099 43.6%
1989 26237 24586 10563 14023 39.3%
CAPITAL % TOT. 
GRANTS
EMPLOYMENT EMP. GRANTS 
GRANTS % OF TOT. GRANT
R&D G
(3)
Payments ctd
1985 70.2% 851 2.8% 323
1986 65.4% 1407 5.3% 325
1987 58.9% 3482 14.6% 551
1988 43.6% 6130 25.1% 516
1989 43.0% 9516 38.7% 481
NOTES : (1) ELIGIBLE FIXED ASSETS (2) EXCLUDING RENT SUBSIDIES (3) INCLUDES
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION GRANTS__________________________________________________________
The data contained in these tables raises some interesting issues. Table 2.5. reveals that 
the cost per job has declined over the period under investigation. Table 2.6. presents a 
synopsis of the more detailed data in table 2.5. The Review of Industrial Performance 
(30) attributes the improvements in the grant cost per job to the introduction of more 
rigorous project analysis and tighter grant criteria - in line with the recommendations 
set out in the White Paper. The measurement of the cost per job Is calculated by 
relating the cost of all grants paid over a seven year period against the number of jobs 
created and still in existence at the end of the period. The formula therefore provides a
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measure of the average cost to the Exchequer in constant prices over a long run period 
of those jobs created and sustained.
Source: IDA
TABLE 2.7,
£19330
AVERAGE COST PER JOB CREATED AND SUSTAINED (1989 PRICES)
1980-86
£20180
1981-87
£18610
1982-88
£15564
1983-89
These estimates o f costs however do not take into account the promotional costs 
associated with generating jobs or the tax concessions. This is a serious omission as 
such costs are extensive. While the 1990 review does acknowledge these omissions - 
justifying it on the grounds that such costs cannot be directly correlated to jobs, it 
makes the resulting calculations o f the average cost per job in table eee very suspect. 
Clearly leaving out any allowances for tax relief, such as Section 84 loans, considerably 
underscores the true cost per job. This latter cost rose from £58 million in 1883 / 1984 
to £128 million by 1988 / 1989. The overall estimated net exchequer cost of tax reliefs 
for an average year in the period 1985 - 1989 was calculated to be £295 million.
The question o f whether value for money is being obtained for grant aid is therefore 
difficult to answer with any confidence, given the suspicion surrounding the direct 
grant cost per jobs presented above. The Culliton Report (31) is sceptical, given that 
there was a net loss 2,000 jobs for Irish - owned firms and a net increase o f only 9,000 
jobs for the foreign - owned sector during the period 1981 - 1990, despite an 
expenditure o f over £1.6 billion (in 1990 prices) on direct grants alone. They also make 
the valid, but often ignored, point that the direct grant cost per job figures generated by 
the State assume that such jobs would not have existed without grant aid in the first 
place. While it is impossible to calculate how many jobs would have been in place, it is 
equally simplistic to assume that all jobs were generated by grant aid.
O'Malley et al (32) are more sanguine about the contribution of the grant - aided 
sector to employment generation, noting that "there was a statistically significant 
positive correlation between grant payments and employment change in all three 
sectors - foreign - owned, medium / large indigenous and small indigenous.
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However Barrett and Purdy (33) are quite scathing about the reliance o f industry on 
grant aid. They point to an ESRI survey of four hundred chief executives conducted by 
Fitzpatrick in 1986, which concluded that the high proportion of firms in receipt of 
State aid points to
" a high level o f  grant mentality among Irish companies with either little investment 
or initiative occurring without State aid or to grants being available where 
investments might have occurred anyway. (Business and Finance p i 8)
These criticisms would appear to be valid as they yet again indicate the reluctance, 
indeed intransigence, o f the State bodies to be more discriminatory and selective in 
their allocation of support to the indigenous sector. Although table 6 reveals that a 
shift occurred in the allocation of grants from fixed to "soft" assets such as training, the 
movement was not dramatic and certainly not to the extent envisaged by the Telesis 
Report in 1984. It is also noticeable that the level of employment grants given to the 
small firm sector has risen dramatically from 2.8 per cent of the total grants in 1985 to 
38.7 per cent of the total by 1989. It is submitted that this notion of handing out 
general employment grants is a simplistic and ultimately counterproductive approach, 
given the characteristics associated with the small, growing firm. Focusing exclusively 
on employment generation as the mechanism for judging success is overly simplistic 
when applied to a new start - up company or indeed firms in the early phase of growth 
and development. Kennedy et al (34) notes that while new firm formation rates are 
high in Ireland, seventy five per cent of the companies under the Small Industry 
Programme employ ten persons or less, only four per cent employ over thirty persons 
and only one per cent grow to eventually employ more than fifty persons. If this is 
combined with the statistic that sixty per cent o f small firms in Ireland are not engaged 
in export activities, then it is clear that more fundamental issues need to be addressed 
when providing support activities from the State, than simply focusing on employment 
generation. Indeed it can be argued with some degree of force, that it is wrong to "fire" 
general employment grants at small firms that are not in a position at present to 
generate meaningful employment because of fundamental deficiencies in areas such as 
marketing, financial management, product development and so on. In essence, 
employment generation should be viewed as a longer term objective which has a far 
greater likelihood of happening if small firms are helped in the early stages, to improve 
their capabilities in the above mentioned areas. As such companies develop and expand 
their activities, the quality and viability o f the extra jobs generated will improve 
accordingly. Under the present regime of employment grant aid one can seriously 
question the type of work being generated i.e. in some cases companies will "create" a
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job in order to qualify for the grant, but have no prospects of sustaining that job over a 
prolonged period and will let that person go as soon as is practically possible.
2.6. SMALL FIRM POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE "SOFT ASSETS”
It was submitted, in the preceding section, that the policy of giving employment grants 
and fixed asset capital grants is inappropriate, unless increased support is provided in 
other fundamental areas. This is particularly relevant for the small firm sector. We now 
need to consider the specific way in which industrial policy has addressed the so called 
"softer" areas such as marketing and training. Table 2.8 provides a breakdown of 
industry budget distribution over a seven year period.
TABLE 2.8.
INDUSTRY BUDGET DISTRIBUTION (%)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
CAPITAL 61.4 59.4 57.7 54.0 52.9 52.7 47.3
MARKETING 11.0 11.7 12.7 14.4 11.4 12.7 14.3
Sc & TECH. 10.8 11.1 12.9 12.9 16.8 17.3 20.1
TRAINING 10.6 10.5 8.3 7.2 6.5 5.7 7.3
OTHER (NON F/A ) 6.3 7.3 8.4 11.5 12.4 11.6 11.1
AL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Department of Industry and Commerce ESRI ¡>30.
This reveals that a significant decline in the share o f the budget going to support capital 
investment took place, and it has been concluded that this only partially addressed the 
main recommendations set out in the influential Telesis Report. While it would appear 
at first glance that expenditure on marketing has increased (rising from 11% to 14.3%) 
it needs to be acknowledged that in the context o f an overall decline in the total budget 
(from £297million in 1985 to £293million in 1991, with a dip to £250million in 1988, it 
represents a negligible increase in expenditure. The "other" figure refers mainly to 
employment grants, which have been examined in detail earlier.
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O'FarreU (35) in a seminal study o f the founders of new manufacturing firms in Ireland, 
carried out in 1983, identified new product development, marketing, financial 
management and control as key problem areas for small firms. This points to a need for 
serious attention to be paid to the issue o f providing management training in these 
areas for such entrepreneurs. It is one thing to take an idea on board and start up an 
enterprise; it is quite something else to shape that company into a vibrant operation 
capable of developing into a medium sized and ultimately large company.
The Consultative Committee on Marketing (36) pointed to many weaknesses in the 
area of marketing within indigenous companies. Apart from obvious problems such as 
product quality, late delivery and so on, it concluded that many of these companies 
lacked an overall strategic focus for taking advantage o f marketing opportunities and 
needed much support in developing capabilities in areas such as market research, 
developing a professional approach to selling and penetrating export markets.
O'FarreU and Hitchens (37 ) in a comparative study of sixty four small Irish firms and 
forty four companies from the south o f England pinpoint the failure of many Irish 
companies to view training expenditure " as an investment rather than an overhead cost 
to be minimised". This comment applies equally to management and employee training.
The Advisory Committee on Management Training (38) provides some damning 
evidence of the lack of emphasis given to management development ; indicating that 
over twenty per cent of the top thousand companies spend nothing on management 
development , with over fifty per cent spending less than five thousand pounds (in 
1987) on such issues. Likewise they indict the State for spending only three million 
pounds on management development, usually through subsidy of providers, on an ad 
hoc basis and with no strategic focus.
A survey of marketing practice among companies in both the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland (39 ) reveals some alarming incidences o f poor understanding of both 
the marketing concept and marketing functions. More worryingly, from the point of 
view of the contribution of State agencies to development of marketing within Irish 
firms, the survey identified major confusion among companies in the Republic as to 
who is responsible, within the realms of State infrastructure for marketing. Indeed the 
respondents would appear to hold the view that " ultimately there is no responsibility 
for marketing function in the State infrastructure - because everybody is responsible, 
nobody is responsible."
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An OECD survey (40) o f marketing performance in twenty two countries provided 
graphic evidence of Ireland's deficiencies in this area. Measured over a number of 
criteria ranging from company attitude to marketing to product design, delivery and 
after - sales service, Ireland ranked in the last quartile. While this survey is somewhat 
dated and of a general nature, it is indicative of a deep malaise within indigenous 
companies in the mid 1980's with regard to their utilisation of the marketing concept.
Ward (41) in an influential article written in 1987, accuses economic policy of being 
myopic in its focus on the indigenous sector. His views are summed up in the following 
passage
" The short term need to increase employment by producing job s resulted in 
the neglect, fo r  many years, o f  the need fo r  integrated fu ll  - function industries, i.e. 
industries which produced, marketed and serviced customers from  Ireland." (p99)
These studies point, in a converging fashion, to weaknesses in the general area of 
management development and in the specific realm of marketing all indigenous firms 
operating in Ireland. When the findings are discussed in the context o f the small, 
growing firm, then it becomes more disturbing. Given the constraints which such firms 
typically face, such as bureaucracy, negative perceptions of entrepreneurs, access to 
funding for development, adverse taxation, lack of professional management input and 
lack of knowledge of specialist skills and functions, it becomes a strategic imperative 
for industrial policy to put in place a series of policies which are designed to drive 
improvements in these areas. Clearly issues such as bureaucracy and the fostering of a 
climate which is positive about entrepreneurship cannot be created by simply spending 
State money: although, over time, a proactive approach to the small firm sector would 
undoubtedly establish a more conducive entrepreneurial environment. However the 
issue of management development can be addressed through industrial policy.
One such initiative, called the M entor Programme, makes available a panel of 
experienced retired business executives to a selective number of small firms who 
demonstrate development potential. The mentor will assess the business and provide 
some preliminary advice. If the company decides that he should provide ongoing 
advice then the mentor will help the companies in areas such as strategic planning, 
general management advice, marketing, quality control, finance and industrial relations.
This concept addresses the need to help small companies develop their business while 
at the same time learning specific skills from experienced business executives. However
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Iit is submitted that, like so many other initiatives, it only goes a bit of the way to 
addressing the problem. For instance the onus is on the company to pay the mentor for 
the most time consuming part o f what can be offered e.g. the development o f a plan, at 
a time when it may not be in a financial position to absorb such costs. That there is a 
need for such help is undeniable. While the efficacy o f using retired business people is 
not challenged, it does smack o f a "piecemeal", "make - do" approach on the part of 
the State. This is an area where the allocation of greater resources would reduce the 
cost to companies who may be experiencing cash flow problems and more importantly 
move the company along the "learning curve" to greater levels of expertise.
2.7. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter has presented an appraisal of initiatives undertaken by the State with 
regard to seeking improvements in the small firm sector. The overall verdict on the 
effectiveness of industrial policy in this area has to be mixed. On the positive side there 
is evidence that the State has re - orientated policy away from the high levels of grand 
aid to fixed assets to the "softer" areas. There is also a recognition in the 1990 Review 
of Industrial Performance (42) o f the need to be increasingly more selective and 
discriminating in relation to supporting small companies. This means a move away 
from developing companies which cannot achieve the minimum scale of operation 
required to survive. Likewise the review acknowledges that the quality o f employment 
is largely dependent on the size of the firm: small firms tend to pay low wages and 
provide fewer fringe benefits than large firms and in many cases the nature and 
duration o f the jobs is temporary. As a consequence there is an indication that the State 
agencies are looking at the need to be more rigorous in their assessment of initial start - 
up proposals and likewise where proposals are received from sectors that are already 
well catered for.
On the other hand however a number of major reservations exist about the efficacy of 
much of the small firm policies. They largely centre on the failure o f the State agencies 
to recognise the unique characteristics of small growing firms. These characteristics are 
not taken into account when the State subsequently judges the performance of small 
firms. The short - term measure of employment gains is still used, and is reflected in the 
level of employment grants given to this sector. It is submitted that this is unduly 
simplistic when applied to the small firm sector and is ultimately counter productive 
because by definition, growing firms will need time to develop and overcome the many 
barriers which are in the path o f growth. They also suffer from deficiencies, particularly 
in the general area o f management skills. If these weaknesses are not redressed then
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they may not survive in the longer term. Put simply, more resources should be 
reallocated to these areas, than has been the case in the past.
There is also a need to rationalise the number of State agencies which are currently 
retaining an input into the small firm sector. A Survey of Business Attitudes carried out 
for the 1986 Review of Industrial Performance indicated that eighty six per cent o f the 
respondents felt that there were too many agencies and fifty per cent believing that 
there should only be one agency. The attempts to subsequently rationalise the agencies 
could best be described as limp: characterised by a reluctance to infringe on the various 
"empires" created by the various bodies. The Coalition government o f Fianna Fail and 
Labour has managed to increase the number of bodies, in spite o f the advice of the 
recent Culliton Report in 1992 (42). On a more fundamental level there is still no single 
agency with responsibility for marketing: a situation which was highlighted as being a 
major weakness in a number o f studies reviewed earlier in this chapter. Until this 
"nettle" is grasped, the issues of bureaucracy and duplication of services remain.
The Culliton Report (44) has identified an under supply of available equity capital for 
small companies to enable them to grow. While the IDA provides equity, it has been 
viewed as a way of ensuring repayability to the State and reducing the cost per job.
Equity stakes have also been held at around the ten per cent mark in order to avoid 
issues of control. The Culliton team recommend a much more proactive approach by 
the State institutions with greater consultation and co-operation between the financial 
community and venture capitalists. While the medium sized firm is likely to be unhappy 
with the potential loss o f control, it can be argued that the IDA, by taking equity stakes 
in the small firm, can help to move it along the learning curve more quickly. This of 
course is a radical proposal because the level of risk associated with start - up and 
infant projects is high and the State agencies would have to take this as a "given". It 
would also place greater demands on the managerial and counselling aspects o f their 
workload.
On a macro level, it is submitted that the recommendations o f the Culliton report need 
to be addressed with regard to the seeking of improvements in the infrastructure. Small 
firms are particularly vulnerable if the costs of telecommunications, energy, postage 
and transportation services are uncompetitive relative to other countries. The 
Government have implemented changes in the telephone charges to the business sector 
in September 1993. It is too early to judge the impact of this policy. The report puts 
forward a strong argument for achieving a balance between technical /vocational skills 
and the liberal arts at all levels of education. This again is a radical proposal because if
I
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implemented, it will necessitate a change from the present emphasis in education which 
is heavily concentrated in the arts and social studies area. By giving greater recognition 
to technical and vocational skills allied to enterprise development courses, it can be 
argued that an enterprise culture will gradually enter into society resulting in 
entrepreneurs being viewed in a more positive light.
The financial community also needs to be encouraged to become less risk - averse than 
is the case at present. There is patchy evidence to suggest that the small firm is 
disadvantaged by being charged higher interest rates than larger firms. This represents 
yet another obstacle to growth. The likelihood o f banks altering their position is 
regarded however as low (to say the least).
In summary it can be seen that the initiatives in the area o f the small firm sector has had 
mixed results. The Review of Industrial Performance in 1990 identifies the role o f an 
active industrial policy as one o f accelerating the emergence o f a number of small 
companies to a point where they can "make the leap into the internationally trading or 
skilled sub supply areas" (45) allied to its contribution to net sustained industrial 
employment. It is contended that the evidence presented in the preceding discussion 
indicates that at best, small firm initiatives have only partially succeeded. Specifically it 
is argued that the State, by once again locking into the "employment generation" 
equation, has not understood the unique characteristics o f the smaller firm: in particular 
to realise the need to invest in the "softer", less tangible elements o f an enterprise such 
as management development. As a consequence the benefits which might accrue : 
increased employment levels, a greater propensity to export and a move to being a 
medium sized company will be long term in nature. This unfortunately is not seen as 
attractive by politicians who look for quick - fix, short term solutions. This appraisal 
would suggest that political expediency takes much greater precedence over rational 
thinking.
2.8. SMALL FIRM POLICY : INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The final section of this chapter places small firm policy in Ireland in the context of 
policies implemented by other countries in the European Community. This is perceived 
to be necessary because it discourages a myopic, inward - looking stance which would 
be the case if focus was only given to the policies which pertain in Ireland.
Before examining the relevant data, it is worth re- appraising the definitions which are 
used by the EU to delineate small from medium and large enterprises.
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micro enterprises : 0 - 9  employees
small enterprises : 1 0 -9 9  employees
medium enterprises : 100 - 499 employees 
large enterprises : over 500 employees
The most recent statistical information on enterprises in the European Community is 
for 1988. A recent study analyses the implications of this information for the SME 
sector within the European Community. (46) Table 2.9 provides some general 
parameters o f SME's.
TABLE 2.9
MAIN INDICATORS OF MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM - SIZED ENTERPRISES 1988
Description 0 - 9 1 0 -9 9 100 - 499
Number of Enterprises (000's) 13600 920 70
Employment (millions) 26.2 22.2 14.0
Employment per Enterprise 1.9 24.1 210
Turnover per Employee (by 000's ECU) 69 101 140
Source : European Observatory for SME's (1993) p54.
Table 2.10 provides some key indicators relating to how and where the enterprises are 
located by sector. It confirms that the extraction / energy sector has by far the largest 
average firm size while at the same time, it is the only major sector where SME's 
account for less than fifty per cent o f employment. By all criteria, the trade and 
construction sectors are the realm of SME's in the European Community. The 
employment share of these firms is about ninety per cent.
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INDICATORS BY SECTOR : 1988
TABLE 2.10
Description
Number of 
Enterprises 
(000)
Employment per 
Enterprise
Employment 
Share 
( 0 - 9) %
Employment
Share
(10-499) %
Extraction 150 29.4 7 31
Manufacturing 1710 15.7 14 49
Construction 1920 4.2 44 47
Trade 3830 4.5 45 41
Services 6990 4.6 35 34
Total 14600 6.1 30 41
Table 1.11 examines the vexed question of the rates o f new business survival across 
the European Community. While such statistics have to be treated with caution ; due to 
the possible different interpretations o f survival, they do serve to provide some
tentative parameters for consideration.____________________________________________
TABLE 2.11
SURVIVAL AND DEATH RATES ON NEW FIRMS BORN IN 1985 IN SELECTED EU STATES*
YEAR B. DK F D IRL NL U.K.
Death rates 
1985 0.1 17.0 14.0 10.1 . 12.0
1986 0.1 - 12.0 10.0 9.7 16.0 14.0
1987 0.2 - 10.0 6.0 10.2 - 10.0
1988 0.6 31.0 7.0 4.0 7.2 16.0 9.0
1989 1.2 11.0 6.0 3.0 4.9 4.0 6.0
Survival
ALIVE 97.8 58.0 48.0 63.0 57.9 64.0 49.0
Source : Conservatory pl50
* Countries not included did not have comparable statistics.
B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, F = France, G = Germany, Irl = Ireland, NL -  Holland, UK = Britain
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These figures reveal some wide variations, although it must be pointed out that this 
data only refers to firms that started with employees. However in Belgium no sanction 
is given to firms that do not cancel the registration when closing. Hence the number of 
surviving firms is considerably overstated. When this is taken into account it would 
appear that Ireland performs slightly better than some and not much worse than others 
in this area.
2.9. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SME POLICY IN THE EU
The 1993 study undertaken by the European Network for SME research (p403) puts 
forward the view that in general Member States are "converging on the creation o f a 
favourable business climate in combination with specific measures to support specific 
SME needs". It identifies Germany the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark as broadly pursuing policies such as the creation 
of employment, support of existing companies, and the support of business start - ups 
to enhance business dynamics in the small firm sector. By contrast a more 
interventionist approach has been observed in Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
Italy ; although Ireland has not formulated a specific SME policy as "almost all Irish 
enterprises are SME's. The latter cohort of companies identify a number of specific 
objectives l ik e :
* attraction of foreign companies
* modernisation of manufacturing companies
* innovation and revitalisation of traditional sectors
* adoption of innovation
* creation of employment
* removal of discrimination
It is pertinent to note that there is a correlation between the degree to which certain 
Member States are marginalised (in a peripheral sense) and the levels of intervention 
which takes place.
2.9.1. Pattern of Supporting Measures
All member States have developed a wide variety of measures consisting o f different 
measures to encourage people to start their own business. This is illustrated in table 
2.12. Both financing, information and counselling and training are the instruments
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favoured by governments in their policy implementation. Each State offers financial 
support for starting an enterprise. Several types are in evidence such as state 
guarantees on loans, the provision of loans and the provision o f grants to assistance in 
obtaining equity capital from Venture Capital funds. Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom provide a detailed range of support measures in this 
area.
TABLE 2.12.
POLICY FIELD: START -UPS
COUNTRY
INSTRUMENTS
FINANCING FISCAL INFO &
COUNSELLING
TRAINING OTHERS
Belgium X X X X X
Denmark X X X
France X X X X
Germany X X X
Greece X X X
Ireland X X X
Italy X X X X
Luxembourg X X X X
Netherlands X X X
Portugal X X X
Spain X X
United Kingdom X X X X
The Research Institute (p 59) draws some tentative conclusions from these statistics.
Technology and R & D : very intensive policies for SME's have been developed in 
France, Germany, Greece and Ireland, while in Luxembourg, no real support in this 
field exists.
Start - u p s : in Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg limited attention is paid to start - ups ; 
France and the U.K. both have extensive programmes for new business formation.
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Financing : strong financial incentives have been developed in Greece and Ireland ; in 
the Netherlands, and the U.K. there are fewer financial instruments
Exports : apart from Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg where 
hardly any incentives are developed, there seems to be a wide coverage in this field. 
Ireland supports exports more strongly than average, when compared to other Member 
States.
These statistics indicate that, comparatively, Ireland comes out very strongly in terms 
of instrument utilisation. Again, caution is urged because the information contained in 
table 13 is very general in nature, simply "counting" general policies which feature in 
any given country; instead of evaluating the content, structure and quality of such 
policies and programmes. As has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter, a wide 
ranging series of policies have been implemented by the Irish State agencies over the 
past couple of decades. The relative success o f these programmes has been mixed and 
the major criticism levelled at them revolves around the lack o f sensitivity to the 
specific characteristics o f small firms when designing and implementing such strategies. 
In particular, the approach to management development programmes is questioned. 
The maxim of "quality not quantity" is recommended as the principle to be applied in 
this case. The thoughts of Carroll (47) might be considered in the context of small firm 
policy development where he expresses the opinion that perhaps the single biggest 
weakness is not the tangible evidence of proliferation o f policy instruments but rather " 
the absence of an adequate and sophisticated business philosophy. " This "philosophy" 
will be a focus for examination and assessment in the next chapter.
2.10. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the evolution and development of small firm policy in 
Ireland. The assessment has highlighted a number of weaknesses within the general 
area of management development and within the specific remit o f marketing in 
indigenous firms. It has been argued that while successive governments have been 
relatively successful in attracting foreign firms to locate in Ireland, they have been 
driven by short - term, "quick - fix" issues, rather than the longer term implications of 
their decisions. This is reflected in the bureaucratic obstacles which entrepreneurs face 
when seeking to initiate, develop or expand their business; adverse taxation legislation; 
lack of professional management input to the development o f the business. It therefore 
becomes a strategic imperative for policy makers to implement small policies to 
address these deficiencies.
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The Culliton Report has been commended for its insightful approach to addressing 
these issues. The indications, since its publication in 1992 however would suggest that 
the Fianna Fail /  Labour government and the "Rainbow Coalition" have sought to 
largely ignore many of the recommendations which were contained in the body of this 
text. While without wishing to be cynical about the matter, it is argued that political 
expediency will inevitably take precedence over decision which may make sense in the 
longer term, but which have negative connotations for decision - makers. This is 
perhaps best highlighted by the need to streamline many of the state agencies involved 
in supporting enterprise. Such a move however would have the effect o f eliminating a 
large number o f public servants: a decision which politicians tend to avoid where 
possible.
To some extent the problems which entrepreneurs have traditionally faced in such 
areas as telecommunications, transportation, road infrastructure, postage costs and 
banking charges have been partially addressed over the past three years or so. 
Whether this is due to the dedication and / or the farsightedness of politicians, or their 
ability to utilise the large funding from the EU is a moot point.
When Ireland is compared with its fellow members of the EU, it can be seen from the 
evidence that it comes out quite strongly in terms of its ability to utilise a broad range 
of instruments which are designed to support industrial enterprise in general. A strong 
word of caution is proffered in respect of interpreting too much from such research as 
that provided by the EU. A mere check - list of measures in no way reflects the 
sensitivity o f government agencies to the specific needs and requirements of small 
business - owners. It is the task o f the next chapter to provide an understanding 
entrepreneurship and whether the theoretical perspective which exist in the literature 
equate to what happens in reality.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: GROWTH AND THE 
SMALL FIRM
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Given that the main focus o f the study involves an investigation into how small firms 
plan for their business growth and development, and in so doing, how they utilise 
marketing in such activities, it is important to consider the relationship between 
entrepreneurship, growth and the smaller firm.
The initial section o f this chapter examines precisely what is meant by the term 
"entrepreneurship" and its relationship to the concept o f the owner - manager. The 
subsequent analysis and discussion is carried out in the context o f  the environment o f 
the "enterprise culture" which emerged in the United Kingdom in the 1980's and 
spawned a number o f initiatives and support programmes which were designed to 
encourage the fostering o f small business creation and development. While the 
subsequent research undertaken in this dissertation focuses on the electronics sector in 
the Republic o f Ireland, it is submitted that much o f the empirical research into small 
firm development has been carried out in the United Kingdom and inevitably will have 
relevance for similar firms operating in its closest, neighbouring country. It will also be 
recalled from the previous chapter, that successive Irish Governments, since the late 
1960's have also embarked on a strategy o f cultivating the small firm sector with the 
ultimate aim o f making the indigenous firm more competitive within the domestic arena 
and in the longer term, in export markets.
Because o f the difficulties in interpreting what exactly constitutes a small firm, the next 
part o f the chapter reviews and assesses the various attempts o f researchers to  define 
what is meant by such a term. While this issue was discussed in the context o f small 
business policy, in the previous chapter, no attempt was made at that stage to consider 
the conclusions which can be drawn from the literature.
The latter part identifies and assesses the literature and empirical research which 
addresses the manner in which a company evolves and grows over time. In view o f the 
focus on the role o f planning within the smaller firm, it is argued that this section 
provides an essential pre - understanding o f the concepts, models and approaches 
which have been posited by researchers in this field. It is also submitted that this is a 
critical exercise, because such an examination will more clearly identify the influencing 
factors surrounding evolution and growth. M ore importantly it will allow for a 
framework to developed which can be subsequently utilised in the design o f the 
research methodology for the study o f small, indigenous firm in the electronics sector 
in the Republic o f Ireland.
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This chapter concludes by placing the alternative theories o f small firm evolution and 
development in context. It highlights potential shortcomings o f the work in the area 
and identifies issues which need to be addressed in further research in the area.
3.2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT
In placing this examination o f entrepreneurship in context, the background o f the 
"enterprise culture" which sprung up in Britain in the 1980's, cannot be ignored. This 
period is reflected in statistics produced by Curran and Blackburn (1), which identified 
that self - employment during this decade rose from under two million in 1979 to 
almost three and a half million in 1989. During the same period, the number o f  firms 
registering for VAT rose by 285,000. Many reasons have been advanced for this 
upsurge, ranging from the major restructuring o f traditional industries, leading to 
recession and the subsequent release o f resources into the economy, through to the 
emphasis placed by the Thatcher - led government on a free enterprise economy. 
Likewise it has been argued that advances in technology, such as computer - based 
flexible production systems have encouraged a more adaptable approach, ideally suited 
to small - scale manufacturing. It has also been argued, that government initiatives, 
mainly through advice and aid, have led to substantial rises in self - employment. This 
view is not universally accepted, and indeed some o f the claims are frankly spurious. 
What cannot be ignored however is the fact that the term "enterprise culture" has 
become a very popular icon to describe the 1980's.
The use o f terminology such as "enterprise culture" can be somewhat disingenuous. It 
conveys an impression o f clarity in so much that it identifies a behavioural 
phenomenon, but on closer inspection, can lead to numerous interpretations o f  what it 
actually means. In this respect, Richie (2) goes some way towards venturing an 
explanation. He suggests that rather than using an all - encompassing term such as 
"enterprise culture", it might be more accurate to explore a wider range o f ideas which 
can help to provide a deeper understanding. He puts forward the view that there may 
be a number o f such enterprise cultures in existence which identify different standpoints 
and assumptions in relation to the term "enterprise culture". Four such examples are 
provided by Richie
1. Believer - Revivalism. An interpretation o f enterprise culture which 
suggests that the enterprise is the key to making a new Britain whose economy will be 
dynamic, expansionist, innovative, risk - taking and successful.
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2. Sceptics Versions. This puts forward a negative view o f enterprise 
culture, which portrays a naive romanticism o f the past or a visible demonstration o f 
"the greed economy of the 1980's or finally as a way o f symbolising particular political 
viewpoints e.g. "Thatcherism".
3. Analysts Versions. Advocates o f  this approach attempt to identify 
the essential elements o f the enterprise culture and express them objectively. Thus, 
values, attitudes and beliefs are isolated and measured if at all possible against 
behaviour and performance and / or interpreted as an aspect o f wider social, economic 
and political processes.
4. Subject - Driven Versions. This reflects the views o f those who 
operate and run the enterprise. Ritchie is a strong advocate o f the view that the 
overwhelming evidence on small business owners suggests that they have what he calls 
a culture o f "steady state survivalism" or what might be referred to in a more 
colloquial fashion, as "street wisdom writ large".
Ritchie's views are realistic in that they explicitly recognise the possibility that there 
may be numerous interpretations o f the term "enterprise culture". While the categories 
developed by him can only be described as being "rough" and approximate attempts to 
reflect what these differences are, they do provide an underlying starting - point for any 
researcher attempt to probe further into the area o f entrepreneurship and the small 
business sector.
Burrows (3) suggests that individualism; independence; flexibility; anti - collectivism; 
privatism and self - help were dominant themes o f the enterprise culture during the 
1980's. It is difficult to argue however that this phenomenon will continue to the same 
extent through to the end o f this century. Certainly, the first three years o f  the present 
decade would appear to indicate that considerable disaffection with the concept o f  the 
enterprise culture, is evident in the United Kingdom. This may be due in part to the 
recessionary climate which has prevailed since the onset o f the 1990's and also because 
o f the demise o f the person credited with developing the concept (M argaret Thatcher). 
However it is outwith the scope o f this study to engage in prolonged debate on these 
issues.
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3.3. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
It has to be accepted that at the outset o f any attempt to gain an understanding o f 
entrepreneurship there is no harmonious agreement on a universally accepted 
definition. This is perhaps most graphically (and amusingly) highlighted by Kilby (4) 
who likens the search for an entrepreneur to hunting the Heffalump ( a character from 
A.A. Milne's book Winnie - the - Pooh)
"The Heffalump is a rather large and very important anim al He has been 
hunted by many individuals using various ingenious trapping devices, but no 
one so fa r  has succeeded in capturing him. A ll who claim to have caught sight 
o f  him report that he is enormous, but they disagree on his 
particularities", (p i)
This analogy, whilst superficially appearing to be glib, in fact highlights the confusion 
and potential misinterpretation which exists in the minds o f many commentators and 
researchers in the area. Indeed it could be argued that the entrepreneur can be likened 
to a chameleon : capable o f appearing in different guises to different people, depending 
on their interpretation o f what is meant by an entrepreneur and indeed how the so 
called "entrepreneur" decides to be presented.
Chell and Haworth (5) and Ginsberg and Buchholtz (6) have undertaken extensive 
reviews o f the literature on entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship and a representative 
selection o f definitions is presented here. It is argued that the range and diversity o f 
interpretation is very evident
Hull et al (7) utilise the definition given in the 1972 Webster's New World Dictionary 
which states that an entrepreneur is:
"a person who organises and manages a business undertaking, assuming the 
risk fo r  the sake o f  profit".
They extend this to include:-
"individuals who purchase or inherit an existing business with the intention 
o f  (and effort toward) expanding it".
This integrated definition, while short and simple, in fact encapsulates much o f  the 
conventional wisdom which many commentators attribute to the terms "entrepreneur"
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Iand "entrepreneurship". This is demonstrated in the emphasis on business expansion, 
the implied notion that risk is involved and the profit motive.
Harwood (8) elaborates further by proposing that an entrepreneur is one who : -
"takes initiative, assumes considerable autonomy in the organisation and  
management o f  resources, shares in the asset risk, shares in an uncertain  
monetary profit, and innovates in more than a  marginal w ay”.
While this interpretation reiterates much o f what is contained in the Hull et al 
definition. It introduces the notion that an entrepreneur needs to demonstrate a level o f 
independence, self - motivation and innovation which is not to be found within the 
majority o f people in society.
In similar vein, Meredith et al (9) argue that entrepreneurs are people who
"have the ability to see and evaluate business opportunities; gather the 
necessary resources to take advantage o f  them', and to initiate appropriate 
action to ensure success".
Chell et al (10) note that this definition is representative o f many people's perceptions 
in that it implies that the entrepreneur is somehow assured o f success and that the 
possibility o f failure is ignored. This poses a number o f problems o f both a practical 
and indeed cultural nature. Some authors such as Timmons (11) argue that many 
entrepreneurs only succeed after firstly going through a learning curve which can 
involve one, some or many failures. This highlights a cultural influence in that the term 
"failure" can take on different connotations depending on which country or geographic 
region the entrepreneur is operating within. Chell et al (12) observe that in the United 
States, business failure is regarded as a learning experience. This allows for the 
entrepreneur to develop the necessary skills to subsequently establish a venture. It 
could also be argued that the support institutions such as the banks and lending bodies 
also reflect this positive, constructive environment. By contrast, they argue that in the 
United Kingdom, failure has a stigma attached to  it, with many negative connotations 
surrounding the collapse o f a business enterprise. It is also submitted that this line o f 
argument can be extended to the Republic o f Ireland: partially due to the closeness o f 
both countries, but also due to a tendency on the part o f  many Irish people to adopt a 
"begrudger's mentality" which reflects itself in the adage that an underdog is always 
supported strongly, but when success is achieved he or she becomes a target for
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criticism and abuse. In both countries it can also be argued that the lending institutions 
adopt a more stringent approach in their support o f small firms. This is reflected in 
higher bank charges and lending rates.
O f perhaps more critical importance is the need to  examine the distinction (if any) 
between the terms "entrepreneur" and the "entrepreneurial venture", the "small 
business owner" and the "small business venture". In this regard, the work o f Carland 
et al (13) is noteworthy in its attempt to provide some illumination. They suggest that
"An entrepreneur is an individual who establishes and manages a business 
fo r  the principal purposes o f  p ro fit and growth. The entrepreneur is 
characterised principally by innovative behaviour and will employ strategic 
management practices in the business......
An entrepreneurial venture is one that engages in at least one o f  
Schumpeter's categories o f  behaviour : that is, the principal goals o f  an 
entrepreneurial organisation are profitability and growth and  the business is 
characterised by innovative strategic practices".
In contrast to these observations : -
"A small business owner is an individual who establishes and manages a  
business fo r  the principal purpose o ffurthering  personal goals. The business 
must be a prim ary source o f  income and will consume the majority o f  one's 
time and resources. The owner perceives the business as an extension o f  his 
or her personality, intricately bound with fam ily  needs and desires.
A small business venture is any business that is independently owned and  
operated, not dominant in its field, and does not engage in any new marketing 
or innovative practices".
This perception provides for an important distinction between an entrepreneur and the 
small business - owner manager and demonstrates the dangers associated with using 
the two terms in an interchangeable, loose manner. It provides the first learning point 
in this chapter : namely that a division exists in that entrepreneurs are characterised by 
innovative behaviour and an ability to operate strategically in pursuit o f their business 
goals. By contrast, owner - managers are characterised by more short - term, day - to
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- day issues such as generating an income for their family with the long term growth 
potential o f the business not being at the forefront o f their thoughts .
Chell et al (14) while not necessarily disagreeing with the sentiments expressed by 
Carland et al, do inject a cautionary note into the proceedings by highlighting a number 
o f pitfalls which can accrue from not placing the distinction between an entrepreneur 
and an owner - manager under closer scrutiny. For instance they note that it is assumed 
both entrepreneurs and small business owners are founders o f  the business. Clearly the 
act o f creating a business venture does not necessarily mean that a person can be 
termed an entrepreneur. This is view is supported by Gartner (15) who argues that 
many studies o f  small business owners demonstrate that they would only be 
entrepreneurial at the business initiation and start - up phase o f business development 
They also note that many of the distinctions which are drawn by Carland et al do not 
stand up to close scrutiny and need further development before they can be confidently 
accepted. This is highlighted in the observation that entrepreneurs in developing their 
business objectives, are not primarily pursuing their personal goals, whereas small 
business owners are. I f  indeed they are not pursuing personal goals, then what are the 
main motivating factors ? These are not specified by Carland et al and clearly need 
further substantiation.
Drucker (16) is more precise and pragmatic in his attempts to define entrepreneurship 
and reinforces the arguments expressed by Carland et al. He notes that in the United 
States in particular, an entrepreneur is often defined as one who "starts his own new or 
small business”. However he argues that this simple act alone, does not demonstrate 
evidence o f entrepreneurial behaviour or entrepreneurship. He cites the example o f a 
couple who invest their savings in a Mexican restaurant in a typical American suburb. 
While clearly taking a risk in opening such a venture, Drucker argues that they are 
replicating a concept which has already been tried many times before by other 
individuals.
By contrast, he argues that McDonalds - the hamburger chain, was entrepreneurship in 
action. While not necessarily inventing anything unique to the world, the McDonalds 
phenomenon applied management concepts and management techniques such as basing 
itself around the principle o f asking the question "What is o f value to the customer ?", 
standardising the product, designing process and tools and by basing the training o f 
management and operatives on an analysis o f the work to be done and setting the 
standards demanded from the results o f such an analysis. Thus by upgrading the yield 
from its resources, it succeeded in creating a new market and a new breed o f customer.
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IDrawing on this example, among others, Drucker makes a persuasive argument 
supporting the view that entrepreneurs are in many respects, a minority among new 
business ventures. They create something which is new and different to that which has 
been on offer before. They also change or transmute values ; thus acting as catalysts 
for change in society. The use o f the word "change" in this context, should not be 
underscored. The typical entrepreneur, in Drucker's view:-
"always searches fo r  change, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity 
(17 p25).
This definition reflects the perception that the entrepreneur by implication, needs to 
adopt a proactive  approach to the establishment and subsequent development o f the 
business venture.
In this respect, Chell et al (18) suggest that the following characteristics o f 
entrepreneurs can be used to distinguish them from owner - managers; opportunistic, 
innovative, creative, imaginative, ideas - people, proactive and agents o f change.
The foregoing examination o f the various definitions and interpretations o f what 
constitutes entrepreneurship has revealed a wide discrepancy in understanding. Chell et 
al (19) summarise the situation by noting that the key problem o f defining the 
entrepreneur exists at two levels : the first arising from the tendency to apply the term 
loosely in everyday usage to all business owners. On the other hand, it may be used 
quite narrowly to define a specific subset o f business owners (as evidenced in the 
approaches o f Carland et al and Drucker), thus raising the spectre o f how to identify 
the distinguishing features which ultimately separate the entrepreneur from the small 
business owner.
The views o f Curran and Stanworth (20) on entrepreneurship take account o f the 
problems of definition identified by Chell et al and capture the correct balance between 
applying a broad versus narrow approach. They argue that entrepreneurship, "if 
rigorously defined", refers to
" the creation o f  a new economic entity centred on a novel product or service 
or, a t the very least, one which differs significantly from  products offered  
elsewhere in the market. "
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This definition, it is argued, reinforces the need for differentiation rather than 
sameness, but also recognises that the creativity and innovation identified as being 
important in other definitions, does not necessarily have to emanate from the product 
or service content or process. Instead, it can derive from imaginative approaches 
within other areas o f the marketing mix, aside from the product area, or from a novel 
approach to the organisation structure o f the firm.
In summary, this section has examined the various interpretations o f entrepreneurship 
and has identified a lack o f uniformity as to an accepted, agreed definition. It is argued 
that a distinction can be made between an entrepreneur and the small business owner. 
This is crystallised in the view that many people can start an enterprise but very few 
bring something unique and different to the market - place.
3.4. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
While the preceding discussion highlighted the variation and potential for confusion 
and misinterpretation which can occur, it does not place entrepreneurship in any form 
o f historical evolution or development. It is submitted that such an exercise will help to 
identify some o f the reasons at to why such obfuscation exists and more importantly 
help the reader to gain an understanding o f the role which entrepreneurs play in present 
day economies.
Any investigation into the historical evolvement o f the entrepreneur must begin by 
recognising the role which various economists have played in placing an interpretation 
on their contribution to society. Chell et al (21) identify the French economist Richard  
Cantillon as the first individual to recognise the role o f the entrepreneur. He 
distinguished between three categories in the early market economy which prevailed at 
that time - the Mid - Eighteenth Century: the landowner, the entrepreneur and the 
hireling. He suggested that the primary function o f the entrepreneur was to  engage in 
exchanges for profit in the face o f an unknowable uncertainty. A number o f subsequent 
French economists attempted to  differentiate between a capitalist and an entrepreneur. 
For instance, Turgot viewed a capitalist as someone who has a choice as to how he 
invests his money ; in either land or in a business enterprise. I f  he opts for the former, 
he is classified as a capitalist and landowner. I f  his money is invested in a business, he 
is deemed to be a capitalist and an entrepreneur if he subsequently manages and 
operates the business himself. Thue entrepreneurship, under this early interpretation is 
deemed to be synonymous with labour.
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Hebert and Link (22) quote the views o f Jean - Baptise Say, a French economist o f the 
early 19th century who argued that entrepreneurship can be equated to the broad 
management function. This is amplified in the following quotation
" The entrepreneur is called upon to estimate, with tolerable accuracy, the 
importance o f  the specific product, the probable amount o f  the demand, and  
the means o f  its production : at one time he must employ a great number o f  
hands ; a t another, buy or order the raw material, collect labourers, f in d  
consumers, and give a t a ll times a rigid attention to order and economy ; in 
a word, he must, possess the art o f  superintendence and administration".
Hebert and Link posit the view that Say was the first person to accord a role for the 
entrepreneur in society. They note however that Say did not go far enough by 
neglecting to recognise the key role o f the entrepreneur as a force o f change in the 
economy.
In contrast to the French economists, Chell et al (23) argue that the British school o f 
eighteenth century economists, most notably led by Adam Smith (1723 - 1790) did not 
credit the entrepreneur with much o f a role. In his acclaimed w ork The Wealth o f  
Nations, Smith observed that a manufacturer might expect not only to make a profit 
from his undertaking, but also the profit might be expected to bear some relation to the 
extent o f the investment. This view is captured in the following quotation
" He could have no interest to employ them, unless he expectedfrom  the sale 
o f  their work something more than that what, was sufficient to replace his 
stock to him ; and he could have no interest to employ a  gi'eat stock rather 
than a smaller one, unless his profits were to bear some proportion to the 
extent o f  his stock”. (Chell et al p i 5)
Thus it can be seen that Smith saw that the profits accruing to the entrepreneur (or 
projector) are as a direct result o f the investment made - therefore equating the 
function o f the entrepreneur with that o f the capitalist. Other British economists such 
as Ricardo and Mill also to a large extent reiterated the views o f Smith. Chell et al (24) 
credit Alfred Marshall (1842 - 1924) as being one o f the later economists who 
recognised the need for the entrepreneur to be innovative and imaginative in his 
approach to business creation and development. He identified two types o f business 
owner: those who will seek out new, improved methods for engaging in business and
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in so doing, cannot avoid taking some form o f risk, and those who stick to  the tried 
and trusted methods for doing business.
Chell et al (25) in their review o f the German School o f  thought in this area, point to 
the fact that economists such as Thunen (1785 - 1850 addressed the fundamental 
question o f how the entrepreneur should be compensated for his activity? Their 
arguments rested on the premise that if entrepreneurial talent is a scarce commodity in 
society then profit should be regarded as a special kind o f  payment. Thunen 
distinguished between the return to the entrepreneur from that o f  the capitalist by 
emphasising a residual which is the return to  entrepreneurial risk - that risk which is 
uninsurable.
Mangoldt (1824 - 1858) drew a distinction between businesses which make products 
to order, thus reducing the level o f risk entailed, and those which produced for the 
market, which inevitably is a more speculative exercise, given the level o f uncertainty 
and unknown prices. Mangoldt's attempt to differentiate between the two categories o f 
business venture is useful because it highlights different types o f entrepreneurial 
behaviour : the innovative, creative category and the opportunistic business operator.
Attention is also drawn by Chell et al to the Austrian School, most notably led by Carl 
Menger (1840 - 1921) who introduced the need for the entrepreneur to obtain 
information about the general economic situation. This would help address the issue o f 
reducing the level o f uncertainty associated with business operations.
American economists such as Amasa Walker (1799 - 1875) made a clear distinction 
between the entrepreneur and the capitalist by positing the view that the former must 
be regarded as a creator o f  wealth. His son, Francis A. Walker (1840 - 1897) 
reinforced this view and categorised four types o f  entrepreneur: the rare, gifted 
individual, those with high - ordered talent, those that do reasonably well in business 
and the ne'er do wells. While such a distinction appears to be superficial and simplistic, 
it is not that far removed from some o f the contemporary approaches. It can also be 
argued that it represents one o f the earliest attempts to introduce personality variables 
into the discussion on entrepreneurship.
Much o f the review so far, o f the contributions o f various economists from different 
countries, whilst revealing geographical differences which can be explained by the 
prevailing economic conditions experienced in that country, nevertheless indicates a 
commonality in that they represent the entrepreneur as an individual who responds or
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reacts to outside forces which impact on the market. This perspective o f the 
entrepreneur does not appear to countenance the concept o f  that individual as a 
proactive, dynamic, change agent within society. N or does it portray the entrepreneur 
as someone who revels in change and the resulting economic disequilibrium which may 
follow as a consequence.
In this respect, the work o f Joseph Schumpeter (26, 27) (in particular his book - The 
Theory o f Economic Development, 1911) radically altered people's thinking about the 
role and function o f the entrepreneur. He argued that the disequilibrium brought about 
by the proactive innovative entrepreneur is the norm o f a healthy economy, in contrast 
to the notion o f equilibrium and optimisation o f existing resources as propounded by 
the classical economists. The term "innovation" is central to Schumpeter's thesis. He 
contends that the entrepreneur drives change though the ability to innovate. This can 
be achieved in a number o f different ways : -
* The creation o f a new product or alteration in its supply
* the development o f a new method o f production
* the opening o f a new market
* the capture o f a new source o f supply
* a new organisation o f industry
He further contends that : -
"Everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually carries out new 
combinations, and loses that character as soon as he has built up his 
business, when he settles down to running it as any other people run their 
businesses"
Drucker (28) adopting the views o f Schumpeter, argues that entrepreneurship is not 
confined to the economic sphere. The entrepreneur exists in other fields, such as 
education and health care. He suggests that the entrepreneur "always searches fo r  
change, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity".
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In terms o f placing the work o f Schumpeter in context, it can be stated that as well as 
perceiving the role o f the entrepreneur to be proactive instead o f passive, he forced 
contemporary researchers to entertain the notion that in order to  more fully understand 
the entrepreneur, it was necessary to study the psychological influences which lie 
within the recesses o f entrepreneurs and which motivate them to  create and develop 
business ventures. The work o f Herbert and Link (29) reinforces and builds on this 
perspective where they generate a taxonomy o f entrepreneurial theories based on their 
assessment o f the historical perspectives o f the entrepreneur. They make a sharp 
distinction between those authors who portray the entrepreneur as a static, passive 
individual and those which identify him as a dynamic, proactive agent o f  change.
Chan and Lau (30) in their assessment o f the review o f definitions provided by Chell et 
al (31) put forward a framework which they label COSI - change oriented, 
opportunistic, .strategic and /nnovative. This serves as a useful pedagogical tool as 
well as an aide memoir. However they unfortunately adopt an uncritical tendency to 
"list" a number o f attributes under each heading, leaving the reader with the impression 
that if an individual was proficient in all o f these categories and in all o f  the attributes 
identified, then he or she could assume a "God - like" status in the community. In 
effect, there is too much o f a disposition on the part o f  many researchers to provide 
long lists o f attributes without the necessary attempt to provide rigorous analysis and 
evaluation o f each factor listed. It is submitted that it is sufficient at this stage o f  the 
investigation to accept that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the entrepreneur 
and the small business owner. It is further contended that the early w ork o f 
Schumpeter and the subsequent philosophy as propounded by Peter Drucker serve as a 
useful guideline for identifying the defining characteristics o f the entrepreneur.
3.5 THE ENTREPRENEURIAL PERSONALITY
The preceding discussion has defined the term "entrepreneurship and also considered 
how it has developed historically. Much of this analysis has identified the tendency o f 
researchers to "pigeon - hole" or differentiate entrepreneurial behaviour from that o f 
non - entrepreneurial activity according to whether or not a set o f traits, attributes, 
skills and competencies exist. In this respect, it is necessary therefore to evaluate the 
literature and empirical research which has been carried out in this area. As is the case 
with the evaluation o f the various approaches to defining the term entrepreneur, the 
evidence suggests that much conflict exists with regard to the influence o f personality 
attributes in shaping entrepreneurship.
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McClelland (32, 33)) carried out some research in the 1950's which had a far - reaching 
and profound influence on subsequent work in the field o f entrepreneurship. The basic 
tenet o f his findings was that the key to entrepreneurial behaviour lies in the area o f 
achievement motivation. In other words, this is reflected in a drive to  succeed and 
excel and that this trait is reflected in the amount o f time and effort the individual 
spends examining how they can perform a particular task more effectively. McClelland 
suggested that individuals who exhibited such characteristics were "high achievers".
Chell et al clarify this categorisation in the following manner
" High achievers are said to like situations where they can take personal 
responsibility for find ing  solutions to problems. They like rapidfeedback on 
their performance so that they can judge whether they are improving or not. 
They avoid what they perceive to be very easy or very difficult tasks and they 
dislike succeeding by chance. (3 4 ,Chell et a lp37)
While McClelland's w ork undoubtedly proved to be seminal in its influence on 
subsequent researchers, it also has incurred much criticism. In essence this opprobrium 
centres on a number o f areas. Sexton and Bowman (35) express disquiet on the basis 
that McClelland relied too much on the Thematic Apperception Test as the research 
tool. Brockhaus (36) suggests that the predictive power o f  McClelland's theory can be 
challenged. In particular he questions whether the need for achievement can positively 
be linked with the desire to establish and subsequently manage a business venture. Hull 
et al (37) actually provide empirical evidence to suggest that it is in fact a weak 
predictor; noting that there are a variety o f reasons which motivate an individual to 
start a business, ranging from those who seek a challenge (which would broadly fit in 
with McClelland's thesis) to a simple desire to move to an alternative lifestyle ( in this 
respect, the individual may be "pushed" into the decision by the wife /  husband or other 
members o f the family).
He has also been criticised on the grounds that his research attempted to link economic 
development to the prevalence o f achievement. Ray (38) suggests that underdeveloped 
countries were represented in the economic development literature o f the 1950's (the 
period when McClelland carried out his research), as reflecting extreme poverty and a 
scarcity in factors o f production and were shaped by a prevailing sense o f fatalism. Ray 
observes that since fatalism was perceived as a major cause o f underdevelopment, 
developed societies were obviously achievement oriented and the antidote to fatalism 
was the recognition o f a need to succeed. Chell et al (39) also raise the question o f
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how cultural influence can distort McClelland's findings, in particular, whether his 
thesis has equal relevance for different countries. They note, and not without some 
justification, that historically in Britain, high achievers were "hived off' to  top jobs in 
the civil service. Likewise it could be argued that in the context o f Ireland, such 
individuals were steered towards "safe", "respectable" professions such as banking, 
medicine and the judiciary. In further development o f  cultural differences Shina (40) 
demonstrated that in a country such as India, which experiences, with regard to 
resources, a high need for establishing co - operation with Government agencies and 
politicians, it will produce more entrepreneurs than those who exhibit a high need to 
achieve.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, some tentative research has indicated that 
entrepreneurs have a higher need to  achieve than people in general. (See Hornaby and 
Aboud (41) and Begley and Boyd (42). McClelland (43) has demonstrated that training 
courses, designed to develop achievement motivation in business people have led to 
significant improvements in performance, specifically in increased sales, profits and 
numbers o f  people employed. Chell et al (44) however raise the critical issue as to 
whether such findings can be replicated. In this respect they refer to research carried 
out by Begley and Boyd (45) who found very little correlation between various 
psychological characteristics o f founders and non - founders and measures o f business 
performance.
It can be argued quite forcefully that much o f the inconclusiveness which has emanated 
from empirical research in this area has occurred from the simple fact that there has 
been no uniform agreement as to a definition o f the entrepreneur - this, it will be 
recalled, is a constantly recurring theme running through the discussion to date. 
Ray(46) is also critical o f the tendency o f researchers to  focus on one particular trait 
while giving insufficient attention to a set o f attributes. He also notes that by relying on 
a list o f attributes it assumes that the attributes which lead to the formation o f a new 
venture are synonymous with those which subsequently cause new ventures to  be 
successful. Ray notes that the opposite may be the case, citing the example o f an 
individual who has a high internal locus o f control, i.e. someone who believes that they 
are in control o f their own destiny. This person is most likely to feel uncomfortable 
working in the role o f an employee, where they are subject to  the authority o f others. 
This can lead to a situation where a new business venture will be formed. 
Paradoxically, the desire to retain control o f the situation may very well lead to a 
situation where there is a marked reluctance to delegate responsibility to  other people 
within the venture, leading as a consequence to  bad decisions and ultimate failure. Ray
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He can be supported insofar that what he says has solid appeal on the grounds o f logic 
and intuition. The road to becoming an entrepreneur is infinitely more complex than 
the manner in which it is represented by many o f the researchers. This is compounded 
by the use o f faulty, inadequate research techniques which do no justice to the level o f 
complexity i.e. the thematic apperception test, or the testing o f questionnaires within a 
non - representative sample. Ray (47) cites the example o f the most widely quoted 
study in the area o f risk - taking, using the choice dilemmas questionnaire technique, 
which was based on a sample o f forty applicants for business licences in St Louis, 
Missouri, in the autumn of 1978. The main criticism is reserved for the fact that the 
author generalises from what is clearly (at best) a marginal, non - entrepreneurial 
sample in universal terms and purports to depict the findings as if it were speaking 
about a universally entrepreneurial phenomenon. In addition therefore to the confusion 
which arises when interpreting empirical research in the area, due to the myriad o f 
perceptions as to what constitutes entrepreneurship, the concentration on one or a 
small number o f traits (to the exclusion o f other perhaps equally important ones) and 
questionable research techniques which do not allow for generalisation, also point to 
severe criticisms which can be levelled at much o f the work in this area.
The above comments create the impression that much o f the research in the area o f 
entrepreneurship and traits is at best, questionable, and at worse, severely flawed. 
However an amount o f revisionist thinking has taken place about the trait approach 
which has led to research during the last decade which is worthy o f consideration.
Chell et al (48) identify the following areas where such revisions have taken place
1. M ore radical ways o f conceiving o f entrepreneurial traits.
2. The revision o f instruments for measuring entrepreneurial traits.
3. The development o f instruments to measure situational variables so that
the interaction between entrepreneurial traits and pertinent situations 
can be examined.
notes that virtually every personality trait can be both  positive or negative in relation
to  som e aspect o f  entrepreneurship and new  venture developm ent.
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4. The development o f models o f the entrepreneurial process whereby 
entrepreneurial behaviours exhibited in the business context and 
performance outcomes can be measured.
A major study was carried out by McClelland (49) in 1987 which sought to address the 
question whether or not there are key competencies which are needed for 
entrepreneurial success. The researchers distinguished between a group o f twelve 
"successful" entrepreneurs and twelve "average" entrepreneurs in each o f three types o f 
business, in each o f three developing countries (India, Malawi and Ecuador). The 
technique known as the Behavioural Event Interview (BEI) was utilised. This is similar 
to the Critical Incident Technique developed by Flanagan (50) in 1954 (See Chell et al 
p45) and requires the respondent to outline critical events which have influenced and 
shaped the direction o f the business since its inception. These are recorded on tape and 
a panel o f "judges" then identify the competencies which have been revealed during the 
interview. The following areas were identified as being more characteristic o f 
successful than o f average entrepreneurs, and are outlined in table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1. A C H IEVEM EN T ORIENTATIO N
PROACTIVITY A C H IE VE M EN T ORIENTATIO N C O M M IT M EN T TO O THERS
Initiative The ability to see and act on A commitment to the work
Assertiveness opportunities contract
Efficiency orientation recognition o f  the importance o f
Concern fo r  high quality work business relationships
Systematic planning
Monitoring
Source : Adapted from  Chell et al. p45
While the study is more complete and detailed than his earlier pioneering w ork in the 
1950's, it defined the entrepreneur as encompassing all types o f small business owners, 
thus remaining at odds with many researchers who draw a sharp distinction between 
both categories. This is reflected in a set o f six attributes which McClelland felt were 
not more characteristic o f successful than o f average entrepreneurs. These were : self - 
confidence, persistence, persuasion, use o f influence strategies, expertise and 
information - seeking. Unfortunately no attempt was made to make a comparison with 
non - business owners and as Chell et al note, these six characteristics may typify 
owner - managers in general.
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non - business owners and as Chell et al note, these six characteristics may typify 
owner - managers in general.
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This laxity with regard to research design and selection of methodology is also 
evidenced in work undertaken by Meredith et al (51) who put forward the view that 
there are nineteen traits which provide a working profile of the entrepreneur. Of these 
nineteen, five can be identified as core traits: self - confidence, risk - taking ability, 
flexibility, a strong need to achieve and a strong desire to be independent. Much of 
these traits, in fact would appear to simply replicate or reinforce earlier work. 
However this list of traits was developed at a workshop on entrepreneurship, and 
although it has been widely cited by contemporary researchers, Chell et al note that it is 
not clear from the article, how this list was compiled or more alarmingly, whether or 
not it was tested in any way.
Timmons et al (52) have been one of the few teams of researchers who have provided 
a comprehensive attempt to grasp an understanding of entrepreneurship. Their concept 
of what goes into the "make - up" of the entrepreneur centres around the belief that 
entrepreneurial skills and behaviours can be nurtured and developed over time. They 
also argue that the younger the individual, the higher the levels of energy and drive. 
These latter characteristics can provide a counterbalance to the fact that the younger 
individual will be lacking in areas such as management experience, wisdom and 
judgement. Many of these behaviours such as persistence in problem solving, seeking 
and using feedback, calculated risk - taking and decisiveness, they argue, can be 
learned. They do however identify four types of behaviours which may not fall into this 
category : -
* high levels of energy, health and emotional stability
* creativity and innovativeness
* high intelligence (defined as being "street - wise" and having a "nose" 
for business) and conceptual ability
* Vision and capacity to inspire.
They argue that the motivation of the entrepreneur is achievement oriented, which 
supports the earlier arguments put forward by McClelland. They do point out however 
that an achievement orientation is situation specific, in the sense that there must be a 
perceived opportunity in the first place, with perceived goals which can be achieved. 
This is an important line of argument, because much of the earlier trait theorists
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assumed that people not only behave in the same way in the same (or similar) 
situations, but that they should behaviour similarly across a broad range of situations. 
Clearly this can only be described as an unduly idealistic position which is unlikely to 
occur with much frequency in reality.
They are also one of the few researchers to identify characteristics which can be 
attributed to the "non - entrepreneurial" mind. These are depicted in table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTREPRENEURS
1.
----- ------------  - -  ■ ■■ — . .
INVULNERABILITY ; -likely to result in unnecessary risk - taking.
2. MACHISMO : - goes beyond over - confidence and outlines people who try to prove
that they are better than others.
3. ANTI - AUTHORITY ; - the rejection of outside help, advice and feedback.
4. IMPULSIVENESS ; - the marked absence of reasoned decision - making and a failure
to "tease out" the implications of the resulting actions.
5. OUTER - CONTROL ; - (as opposed to an internal locus of control)
6. PERFECTIONISM ; - a persistent state of unhappiness with what has been achieved.
7. KNOW - IT - ALL ; - a failure to recognise what they do not know
8. COUNTER - DEPENDENCY ; - an extreme case where the individual tries to achieve
everything on his own.
Source tadapted from Timmons, J.A.(53,1989) The Entrepreneurial Mind.
It can be argued that the theory of entrepreneurship put forward by Timmons has 
appeal on the grounds that it makes sense from a practical viewpoint - particularly in 
the implicit line of argument which suggest that the entrepreneurial process is 
comprised of that which the individual brings to a particular situation and the specific 
demands which that situation places on the individual, if he or she can take up the 
challenge and obstacles presented, and achieve success. It recognises that the 
probability of any one individual initiating a business venture and subsequently 
achieving a level of success in not dependent on a fixed set of attributes or variables. 
Situation - specific factors, be they cultural or otherwise will always influence any 
given variable and create a negative or positive effect. It is argued therefore that a 
more realistic understanding of the entrepreneur will allow for such contingencies.
This view is substantiated by Gibb (54) who argues that the strength of enterprising 
skills (e.g. problem solving, creativity, persuasiveness, planning, negotiating and
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decision - making), attributes (e.g. self - confidence, autonomy, achievement 
orientation, versatility and resourcefulness) and behaviours (e.g. acting independently 
of others, coping with and enjoying uncertainty, opportunity seeking and commitment 
to making things happen) as well as the mix, will vary between individuals. Likewise, 
Gibb argues for an acceptable balance between the degree to which an individual is 
influenced by genetic, innate influences as opposed to environmental considerations. Of 
greater significance is his view that if enterprise can be acquired by experience and 
exposure, then it can be enhanced by means of education and training.
The preceding discussion has arrived at a general conclusion which suggests that 
entrepreneurial behaviour can be identified by a display of certain traits and attributes. 
However rather than adhering to a philosophy which suggests that a fixed, rigid set of 
traits can be applied to the identification of entrepreneurial behaviour, it is more 
realistic to argue for a contingency - based approach which must relate to the specific 
situation and the background and experience of the individual concerned.
3.6. THE SMALL FIRM  - REVISITED
Thus far the focus of attention has been given over to an investigation of 
entrepreneurship and in particular, the role of the entrepreneur. This exercise has 
deemed to be necessary because any examination of the small firm and the patterns of 
growth attaching to it, assumes that somebody instigated the formation and initial 
development. It should be stressed at this stage that the primary objective of this study 
is not to solely examine the entrepreneur. While it is anticipated that some of the 
companies which will be investigated will identify with entrepreneurial practice and 
entrepreneurship, others will provide opportunities to study how owner - managers 
instigate and develop enterprises. In particular the study focuses on the question of 
how small firms develop, and in so doing, utilise marketing in their planning activities. 
It is argued therefore that it is equally necessary to identify and evaluate the literature 
on small firm growth patterns, in the belief that what may constitute entrepreneurial 
behaviour in the initial stages of development may not be appropriate as the firm seeks 
new markets, introduces new products and copes with the associated problems 
resulting from such expansion. In essence, a review of the literature on 
entrepreneurship only partially addresses small firm growth and is overly simplistic, 
focusing on the initial stage of company formation.
It will be recalled that in the previous chapter which examined the small firm sector in 
the Republic of Ireland, considerable discussion took place as to what exactly
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constituted a "small firm". That discussion focused specifically on the various 
categorisations which are utilised by State agencies in various countries. It is not the 
prerogative of this section to re - investigate the issues raised earlier. Suffice to say that 
there is a general lack of agreement and indeed confusion when attempting to define a 
small firm according to the number of employees which exist in a particular firm. It is 
however maintained that by taking a uni - dimensional definition of the small firm, such 
as size, many essential characteristics and relevant features of the small firm are 
ignored. This stance endorses the views of Mendham and Bannock (55) who note that 
"the most significant difference between big and small firms is not their size”. Instead 
Carson(56) argues that the main differences can be revealed when objectives, 
management style and marketing considerations are investigated.
Schollhammer and Kurilof (57) put forward five qualitative attributes which help to 
identify small businesses
* Scope o f Operations Small firms serve predominantly a local or 
regional market rather than a national or international market.
* Scale o f Operations Small firms tend to have a very limited share of a
given market ; they are relatively small in a given industry.
* Ownership The equity of small firms is generally owned by one 
person or, at most, a very few people. Small firms tend to be managed 
directly by their owner or owners.
* Independence Small firms are independent in the sense that they are
not part of a complex enterprise system such as a small business 
division of a large enterprise. Independence also means that the firm's 
owner / managers have ultimate authority and effective control over the 
business, even though their freedom may be constrained by obligations 
to financial institutions.
* Management Style ; - Small firms are generally managed in a 
personalised fashion. Managers of small firms tend to know all the 
employees personally ; they generally participate in all aspects of 
managing the business, and there is no general sharing of the decision - 
making process.
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Clearly it is easy to find fault with such a classification. For instance it is fundamentally 
wrong to make the generalisation that the scope of a small firm's operations is to be 
predominantly found in local / regional markets. While this may be so for some 
enterprises in the services sector, it is a common characteristic of many electronics 
firms that they achieve a high degree of penetration within international markets at the 
very earliest stages of their development. Scott and Bruce (58) for example, recognise 
that while the area of operations may be local, the markets served need not be so. It is 
acknowledged however that this will only apply in the case of innovative enterprises 
which are typically entrepreneurial in their behaviour.
Similarly, it is not always the case that small firms are confined to a very limited share 
of a given market. It is possibly more accurate to suggest that in many cases, they may 
have a very large share of a specialised or niche market.
In relation to the question of ownership it is accepted that certainly in the early phases 
of a firm's existence, it will, in all likelihood, be owner - managed. However as the firm 
expands its operations; by widening its product range, acquiring new customers, 
moving to new markets and increasing the number of employees, it is surely unrealistic, 
at best, and an example of bad management at worst, to expect the owner to continue 
to make all of the key decisions, without delegating responsibility to professional 
managers.
Carson (49, p8) adopts the definition put forward by the Committee for Economic 
Development which is more realistic in its attempt to categorise the small firm. It 
suggests that such a firm is one which possesses at least two of the following four 
characteristics
1. Management of the firm is independent. Usually the managers also the 
owners.
2. Capital is supplied and the ownership is held by an individual or small 
group
3. The area of the operation is mainly local, with the workers and owners 
living in one home community. However, the market need not be local.
4. The relative size of the firm within its industry must be small when 
compared with the biggest units in the field. This measure can be in
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Iterms of sales volume, number of employees or other significant
comparisons.
While this approach reiterates the earlier definition proposed by Schollhammer and 
Kuriloff, it adopts a more pragmatic stance, recognising that it is unrealistic to expect 
every small firm to fulfil all of these criteria.
Stanworth and Curran (60) give cautious support for the definition put forward by the 
Bolton Committee(61) which carried out a major study of the small firm sector in the 
United Kingdom, in 1971. This group perceived the small firm to be a socio - 
economic unit with the following characteristics :
1. Economically, a small firm is one that has a relatively small share of its 
market.
2. Managerially, the small firm is administered by its owners or part - 
owners in a personalised way, rather than through the medium of a 
formalised management structure.
3. Finally, it is independent in the sense that it does not form part of a
larger enterprise and owner - managers are free from outside control in
taking their principal decisions.
Stanworth and Curran's reservations about this definition revolve around the lack of 
available data on ownership, management structures and market shares which 
precludes any comprehensive operationalisation of the Bolton Committee definition. In 
this respect they draw attention to the fact that this committee adopted a statistical 
definition for small firms in the manufacturing sector of two hundred employees or 
less. Drawing on their own empirical work with small firms, Stanworth and Curran 
argue that this is not a satisfactory approach, as many of the characteristics of the small 
firm are dissipated long before the figure of two hundred employees has been reached.
Their criticisms are well founded. In the intervening years since this article (1976) there 
is little evidence to suggest that researchers have "grasped the nettle" and attempted to 
provide support for such definitions. This review of attempts to define the small firm 
does indicate that a reliance on "size" as a means of differentiating a small company 
from a medium or large enterprise is simplistic at best and does not do justice to the
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complexities associated with attempting to understand the central question as to how a 
firm develops and grows over time.
Carson (62) identifies the issue of management style, and in particular, management 
weakness, as the key factor which has dominated the literature and which has been 
often cited as the most significant factor in influencing the development of a business. 
Chief among the proponents of this argument are Tate et al (63) who highlight the fact 
that one of the most significant characteristics which appear in any study of small 
business managers, is the limited standard of business education. Broom et al (64) also 
identify the related characteristics of lack of managerial skill and depth allied to a 
general misuse of time.
In addition to weaknesses in the area of management, Carson (65) points to other 
constraints such as a general lack of financial resources and the related "catch 22" 
situation where small businesses are denied the services of specialists precisely because 
of a lack of finance. This latter point is of crucial significance, as it will undoubtedly 
influence the subsequent patterns of growth and development which can be achieved 
by the company. It also provides the first clue to support the view that because the 
owner - manager has to become an expert in many areas (from telephone receptionist 
to financial controller to the generator of new business), such growth patterns will not 
necessarily occur in a smooth, orderly fashion, as is so often portrayed in conventional 
textbooks.
3.7. GROWTH AND THE SMALL FIRM
The preceding sections of this chapter have examined the concept of entrepreneurship 
and small firm definition. In many ways, this assessment has taken a static approach: in 
other words, they have not been related to the critical issue of how enterprises evolve 
and grow over time.
In a recent review of the literature which examines small and medium enterprise 
growth, Gibb and Davies (66) identify four very different approaches to understanding 
the growth process. They are as follows:-
* Personality Dominated Approaches
* Organisation Development Approaches
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Business Management Approaches to Growth
* Sectoral and Broader Market Led Approaches
3.7.1. THE PERSONALITY SCHOOL
The initial category - personality dominated approaches, refers to researchers which 
have focused on exploring the impact of the entrepreneurial personality and capability 
on growth, including the owner manager's personal goals and strategic vision. Gibb and 
Davies (67) are sceptical of those researchers who pursue the belief that it is possible 
to produce a typology of the entrepreneur which will facilitate the prediction of growth 
potential within a particular firm or which will identify competencies which might be 
enhanced to encourage growth within the firm. They reinforce the view that a 
contingency based approach is the only realistic route, focusing not upon the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur, social, psychological or economic, but on his / her 
behaviours. As has been demonstrated earlier, the more logical view suggests that 
different types of entrepreneurial behaviour and different traits will be required to 
achieve growth, in different markets, depending on the levels of uncertainty and 
complexity experienced in each situation.
3.7.2. THE ORGANISATION DEVELOPMENT SCHOOL
The vast majority of the work in the area of growth and the small firm is to be found in 
what Gibb and Davies term the "organisation development approach" (68). This in turn 
can be broken down into three sub - categories : -
a). the relationship between personal objectives and business goals 
including also the influence of family,
b). literature which relates to the stages of growth model of the firm with a 
related focus on changing managerial considerations and the changing 
role of the entrepreneur as the firm passes through its phases of 
development, and
c). the influence of networks and the impact of these on entrepreneurial 
behaviour
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3.7.2.1. Personal Objectives and Business Goals.
Haahti (69) provides a thorough examination of the relationship between the 
entrepreneur's personal goals and the goals of the organisation. Simon (70) presents a 
strong argument which suggests that when the firm is small, the entrepreneur and the 
firm's goals are virtually synonymous, and that as organisational development occurs, 
so too does management development. Gibb and Davies pick up on this point to 
expose the single profit objective hypothesis put forward by traditional economists as 
a basis for the theory of the firm, as being wholly unreal. They quote the work of 
Stanworth and Curran (71) which clearly demonstrates entrepreneurs have a wide 
range of different personal objectives which can change over time. Bevan et al (72) 
note that many owner - managers do not have personal objectives to grow the business 
beyond a certain level of operations. This phenomenon can be partially explained by a 
genuine lack of ambition on the part of the individual concerned or more significantly, 
a major reluctance to delegate responsibility to other people, due to a fear of losing 
control of the way in which the company is managed.
Of a related nature, but outwith the scope of this study, is the influence of the family 
and the resulting conflicts which may ensue. This may cause a situation where 
opportunities for further growth potential may be passed over, in favour of certain 
family members.
3.7.2.2. Stages of Growth.
The vast majority of the work in the area has tended to focus on the notion that as a 
firm grows and expands its operations, it will pass through a series of stages. 
Stanworth and Curran (73) identify this as being a dominant theme running through the 
literature. Because of the prevalence (if not necessarily importance) of such models, it 
is argued that some time should be spent examining and evaluating the most significant 
of them.
Larry Greiner (74) can be credited with the earliest and perhaps most influential 
attempt to conceptualise the development of an organisation. Prior to the appearance 
of his framework, McGuire (75), Steinmetz (76) and Christensen and Scott (77) put 
forward basic models which were largely intuitive, and sought to delineate the various 
stages of growth experienced by firms.
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For example, Steinmetz (79) proposed a four stage approach, characterised in the 
following fashion
1. Direct supervision: the simplest stage, at the end of which the owner 
must become a manager by learning to delegate to others.
2. Supervised supervision: where in order to move on, the manager must 
devote attention to growth and expansion, manage increased overhead 
and complex finances and learn to become an administrator.
3. Indirect control: in order to grow and survive, the company must learn 
to delegate tasks to key managers and to deal with diminishing absolute 
rate of return and overstaffing at the middle level.
4. Divisional organisation: at this stage, the company has "arrived" and 
has the resources and organisational structure that will enable it to 
remain viable.
Steinmetz explicitly stated that each stage ended with a critical series of decisions 
which had to be addressed before the company could enter the next stage. It could be 
argued however that his model exclusively focused on managerial considerations and in 
particular how issues of control and delegation alter over time. This ignores other non 
- managerial factors such as the nature of the product(s) offered and market(s) served. 
Christenson and Scott (81) considered this latter issue in their model. However while 
their framework makes a faint appeal to logic, it can be challenged on the grounds that 
it does not reflect the true nature and characteristics of the small firm, equating, for the 
most part, to what one be referred to a a large company, by many non - American 
researchers.
Greiner (81) while essentially providing a re - working of the thoughts espoused by 
Steinmetz, did succeed in developing the ideas to a greater level of detail and clarity of 
explanation. He contended that growing organisations move through five 
distinguishable phases of development, each of which contains a relatively calm period 
of growth that ends with a management crisis. Based on cases which he collected at the 
Harvard Business School, he identifies five key dimensions which are essential for 
building a model of organisation development
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1. Age o f the organisation ; identifying the time span of an organisation 
as being an essential dimension for any model of development.
2. Size o f the organisation; resting on the belief that a company's 
problems and solutions tend to change markedly as the number of 
employees and sales volume increases.
3. Stages o f evolution; most growing companies do not expand for two 
years, then retreat for one year; rather, those that survive a crisis, 
usually enjoy four to eight years of continuous growth without a major 
economic setback or severe internal disruption. These quiet periods are 
labelled evolutionary periods or stages
4. Stages o f revolution; recognises that it cannot be assumed that 
organisational growth is linear. A study of numerous case histories 
reveals periods of substantial turbulence spaced between periods of
evolution. They are typically characterised by a serious upheaval of
management practices and as a consequence, demand a change of
approach.
5. Growth rate o f the industry; the speed at which growing firms 
encounter such phases of evolution and revolution is closely related to 
the market environment of its industry.
Greiner, in his summary of the model, acknowledges the need for more rigorous testing 
of his stages. He recognises that they are only approximations, but points out that one 
should not sit back and wait for conclusive evidence to emerge: rather managers 
should be educated to "think and act from a development point of view" (82, p73).
In assessing this contribution to knowledge, it should be acknowledged at the outset 
that Greiner created an awareness among researchers and practitioners of the need to 
consider the critical dimension of time and its impact on decision - making. Many 
management theorists still treat discourse on planning and strategy as though it exists 
in a vacuum, separated from the influence of time and history.
His model can be criticised on the grounds of the absence of even a superficial attempt 
to empirically test it. Thus it is normative in nature and reflects the distilled wisdom of
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one (albeit experienced and learned) individual. It could also be argued that even basic 
research with small companies is not sufficient to test out the framework. Rather there 
is a need to carry out a longitudinal study so that the various changes experienced by 
companies, and their responses, can be tracked over a period of time.
It can also be argued that Greiner's concept of a small firm reflects an "Americanised" 
perception which almost certainly does not relate to the typical European view - a 
common criticism of many of the "stages of growth" models. This in most noticeable 
when he refers to "profit centres” and "plant managers". Even if definitions of small 
firms of employees such as "less than 100 employees are accepted, it is difficult to 
envisage strategic business units emerging in such an organisational stmcture.
However the model does have some positive points; mainly in the shape of a strong 
intuitive appeal to common sense, in its favour. The "acid test" of course, is determined 
by its influence on the approach adopted by contemporary researchers.
In this respect, the frameworks for growth developed by Churchill and Lewis (83), 
Flamholtz (84), Scott and Bruce (85), Tyebjee et al (86) and Clifford et al (87) are 
worthy of evaluation.
Churchill and Lewis (88) present a summation of the work of Greiner and earlier 
researchers, and criticise their frameworks on a number of grounds. The main ones 
revolving around the view that they fail to adequately document the important early 
stages in a company's origin and growth. They are also critical of the tendency for such 
models to use company size as defined in terms of annual sales turnover or number of 
employees, thereby ignoring other potentially relevant factors such as value - added, 
the number of locations, complexity of product lines and the rate of change in products 
or production technology. Based on a combination of experience, a search of the 
literature and the results of research drawn from the responses of one hundred and ten 
owners and managers of successful small companies (in the $1 million to $35 million 
sales range) to a mailed questionnaire, they have developed a five stage model, each 
stage being characterised by an index of size, diversity and complexity and described by 
five management factors: managerial style, organisational structure, extent o f formal 
systems, major strategic goals and the extent o f the owner's involvement in the 
business.
Through their research, they identified eight factors which change in importance as the 
business grows and develops and which play a prominent part in determining ultimate
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success or failure. Four of these factors relate to the enterprise and four to the owner. 
They are as follows:
Company - Related.
1. Financial resources, including cash and borrowing power
2. Personnel resources, relating to numbers, depth, and quality of people, 
particularly at the management and staff levels.
3. Systems resources, in terms of the degree of sophistication of both 
information and planning and control systems.
4. Business resources, including customer relations, market share, 
supplier relations, manufacturing and distribution processes, 
technology and reputation, all of which give the company a 
position in its industry and market.
Owner - Related.
1. Owner's goals for himself or herself and for the business.
2. Owner's operational abilities in doing important jobs such as marketing, 
inventing, producing and managing distribution.
3. Owner's managerial ability to delegate responsibility and to manage the 
activities of others.
4. Owner's strategic abilities for looking beyond the present and matching 
the weaknesses of the company with his or her goals.
They suggest that as the business moves from one stage to another, the relative 
importance of the factors changes and that these factors can be viewed as alternating 
among three levels of importance: first, key variables that are absolutely essential for 
success and must receive high priority; second, factors that are clearly necessary for the 
enterprise's success and must receive some attention; and third, factors of little 
immediate concern to top management.
How useful then is the framework proposed by Churchill and Lewis? In terms of 
placing it in perspective, it should be recognised at the outset that it is mainly a "re - 
working" of earlier concepts put forward by Steinmetz and Greiner. Thus it does not 
present a significantly different approach. That said, it does serve as a useful 
pedagogical tool which can be used to illustrate to would be owner - managers,
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academics and Government industrial support agencies, the critical success factors 
necessary for the development of an enterprise.
Flamholtz (89) has developed a similar framework which identifies seven stages of 
growth in a company's life cycle: new venture, expansion, professionalisation, 
consolidation, diversification, integration and decline and revitalisation. It is worthy 
of review however because he explicitly pinpoints the need for such a company to 
make the transition from an essentially entrepreneurial mode in the initial stage, 
through to a professionally managed mode, leading eventually to possible 
diversification into unrelated products and markets.
Flamholtz advocates that there are four steps by which senior managers of a rapidly 
growing entrepreneurial company can assist the company to make a smoother 
transition from one stage of growth to the next. He suggests that there is a need firstly 
to perform an organisational evaluation or audit of the company's effectiveness at its 
current stage of development; secondly formulate an organisational development plan; 
thirdly implement the plan through action plans and programmes; and finally to monitor 
those programmes for effectiveness.
The value of Flamholtz's model lies it its appeal to common sense. It is easy for the 
reader to relate to the concepts contained in the model, particularly the teething 
problems which he identifies as being symptomatic of the early stages of business 
development. It is also easy to see how this model could be used as a clear guideline to 
follow for would be owner - managers at workshops or seminars.
However, in common with many of the writers in this area, Flamholtz does not appear 
to back up his thoughts with any empirical evidence to lend credence to them. While 
this in itself, does not mean that his model should be rejected out of hand, it means 
that such deliberations are of a speculative nature, and this cannot be glossed over. Yet 
again, many of the examples utilised in his book do not equate to the typical "small 
firm" to be found in the Irish context. As a result, the specific, as opposed to the 
general, features of the model need to be questioned. In particular while Flamholtz's 
suggestions for managing the transition between the various growth stages make sound 
sense, experience would suggest that many small Irish companies are not in a position 
in the first place to be able to carry out such activities as organisational audits or 
organisational development plans. The issue here is not one of querying their 
usefulness or validity; rather it has to be considered in a situational context. This latter 
point would appear to be the main criticism to be made of Fromholtz's work : its
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specific contents do not "sit easily" with the Irish experience, and its general 
prescriptions, whilst making sound sense from a logical point of view, are not specific 
enough to have direct relevance, apart from their pedagogic value.
Scott and Baice (90) have drawn heavily on the work of Churchill and Lewis (91) and 
Greiner (92) and essentially re - work the stages proposed by these earlier authors into 
a five stage process:-inception, survival, growth, expansion and maturity. A detailed 
examination of these stages is deemed to be repetitive in nature and as a consequence it 
warrants a brief mention only. Likewise the criticisms which have been levelled to 
earlier models apply equally to this approach. Scott and Bruce are quite specific and 
realistic about the usefulness of this model, stating that
"The model is not intended as a panacea for strategy formulation. It is rather 
a diagnostic tool to assist in analysing a firm's present situation. It is also 
meant to be an indicator o f what strategies appear suitable at various stages 
in an organisation's growth. It is however a tool, and cannot make the 
decisions for management. They must, rely on their judgement for that (93, 
p5l).
Tyebjee et al (94) conducted interviews with senior managers of several rapidly 
growing companies and conclude that the key to building up an effective enterprise is 
through the development of a formal marketing organisation. It is one of the few 
"stage of growth" models which explicitly recognises the need to acknowledge the role 
which the marketing function plays in the evolution of a firm.
Clifford et al (95) provide an excellent appraisal of the influence of management 
succession within the stages of small business development. In particular they broaden 
the discussion away from the preoccupation of many of the authors of the stages of 
growth models on the product life cycle concept to account for the size o f the 
enterprise at different points in time. They acknowledge (quite rightly) that this 
emphasis is important as it recognises the role which exogenous factors such as 
market demand and industry structure play in determining the potential scope for small 
business growth.
They also examine the influence of structure of the enterprise as it evolves over time. 
This refers specifically to the notion that the various crises and stresses which emerge 
from time to time, force the founder to reconsider his or her role : in particular, the 
need for some sort of formal management structure through which the owner gradually
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delegates a number of management functions to others. This is a theme which is 
explicitly recognised in the models put forward by Greiner (96) Churchill and Lewis 
(97) and Steinmetz (98).
In addition to these two common strands of size and structure which pervade many of 
the theories of small firm growth and development, Clifford et al recognise a third 
strand; self, an issue which was originally developed by Stanworth and Curran, in 
1976. This term refers to a number of "latent social identities which exist and influence 
small firm growth. It adopts a social action view of the small firm; concentrating 
heavily on attempting to understand the internal social logic of the small firm as a 
social grouping. In particular Stanworth and Curran argue that
"  the key to growth lies in the meanings attached to participation in the
firm by the actors involved.. The small firm, in this view, is an ongoing social entity 
constructed out o f the meanings and actions o f those who participate in the firm or 
who are "outsiders" in relation to the firm as social groupings but nevertheless 
interact with the participants. (99 p45).
Their message steadfastly revolves around the acceptance that the very strong 
influence of the owner - manager on the small firm's organisational style calls for an in - 
depth examination of this role. Of particular importance are the specific reasons for the 
owner - manager's decision to "go it alone". This, they argue, helps to provide an 
understanding of subsequent attitudes to growth at later stages in the firm's life.
They observe (based on their own research and the research of others) three latent 
social identities which appear with some frequency in relation to the role of small firm 
entrepreneur
1. The "artisan" identity. Here the entrepreneurial role centres around 
intrinsic satisfactions of which the most important are personal autonomy at 
work, being able to pick up the persons you work with, status within the 
workplace and satisfaction at producing a product quality product
with personal service.
2. The "classical entrepreneur" identity. This identity most closely 
resembles the classical economists view of entrepreneurship (which has been 
examined extensively in an earlier section of this chapter). Earnings and profit
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become a core component in the entrepreneur's definition of his role and hence 
in the way he acts out his role.
3. Ihe "manager" identity. Here the entrepreneurial latent social identity 
centres on meanings and goals concerned with the recognition, by significant 
others, of managerial excellence. The entrepreneur structures his role 
performance to achieve this recognition from fellow members of the firm but, 
more, especially, from outsiders such as other businessmen.
Thus, following Stanworth and Curran's line of argument, the artisan identity is not 
overly concerned with growth, being more preoccupied with survival. It clearly relates 
to the initial stages of a business's development. As the firm survives this formative 
period, the goals associated with the artisan identity will largely have been fulfilled and 
the entering of a period of sustained profitability is more conducive to the "classical 
entrepreneur" identity. Likewise as the firm continues to grow, forces (both internal 
and external) tend to push it towards a more formalistic, bureaucratic structure. Thus 
social relationships between the actors involved in the firm become less personal and 
skills will be required which are, in the vast majority of cases, largely outside the 
repertoire of the entrepreneur.
Stanworth and Curran are forthright in their view that
"The emergence o f these "growth factors" depends on a variety o f factors, and 
may not occur until the firm has grown to be o f some size. But what is more important 
is whether the entrepreneur comes to perceive the likely outcomes o f these changes 
and the decisions he makes concerning their desirability as well as his ability to cope 
with them in the kind o f person he has now become. So, again, we return to the 
internal logic o f the firm, seen from the point o f view o f its main actor, and the 
possible outcomes which can develop”. (100. p47)
This rather lengthy quotation in fact crystallises the philosophy put forward by 
Stanworth and Curran. They argue for the need to study growth patterns not from the 
point of view of an exclusive focus on the external factors such as industry structure 
and market forces, but a balanced approach which takes into account the internal logic 
of the firm, largely shaped and influenced by the key actor, i.e. the business founder. 
Thus it is most likely that the role of the entrepreneur / owner - manager will be 
reconfigured and redefined during the course of the firm's development.
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This alternative view of business growth makes a number of significant improvements 
on the earlier theories. Firstly it provides a reasonable explanation as to why the 
seeking of growth may not necessarily be the main motivating force for many owner - 
managers. This is in contrast to many of the earlier theories which have been reviewed 
in this chapter, which implies an uncritical, automatic acceptance that growth is an 
inevitable "driver" to guide the development of the company from its inception.
It clearly recognises that if an entrepreneur defines his role in relation to his self - 
identity, then a lot can be said about the way in which the firm is likely to perform in a 
wide variety of situations. This supports the contingency based notion which has been 
examined earlier and also recognises the idiosyncrasies of the small firm which make it 
difficult to assess if the standard stages of growth are applied. This latter point is 
critical in attempting to understand their line of argument. Stanworth and Curran have 
been highly critical, and quite rightly so, of many of the stages of growth models 
because they portray the small firm moving sublimely through a sequence of growth 
without investigating whether this is a necessary progression for many firms or whether 
certain stages can be missed out or variations in sequence can occur.
Their main criticisms of earlier work centre around the view that the overall theoretical 
perspective of these authors is a highly positivist one which is reflected in the fact that 
the underlying paradigm for theoretical development is a "highly idealised version of 
that used in the natural sciences" (101). The small firm is seen as a "behaving entity 
whose elements are related in quantifiable, systematic and highly predictable ways and 
the object of theory construction is the generation of law - like propositions concerning 
the growth process" (102). Given this perspective, they argue that due to poorly 
constructed samples, in terms of numbers included and skewedness in the distribution 
of levels of size, the resulting models do not in any way allow for law - like 
propositions to be arrived at.
Instead of this highly positivistic approach to research design, they argue for an 
inductive approach which will provide for better understanding of the internal logic of 
the firm and in particular, the owner - manager. The net results of their deliberations 
are to be found in the earlier review of the three latent social identities - the "artisan", 
"classical entrepreneur" and the "manager".
Clifford et al (103) observe that the contribution of Stanworth and Curran is 
particularly noteworthy because their insight "brings in self - actualisation as a driving
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force behind observable developments in small firms: it is not the whole story but no 
story could be complete without it".
Stanworth and Curran succeed in heightening people's awareness of the need to 
consider the internal factors which help to shape the growth patterns experienced by 
many small firms. This is in contrast to the focus on external factors which has been the 
main preoccupation of many of the earlier stages of growth models.
Gibb and Scott (104) provide a comprehensive summary of those external and internal 
factors which are thought to influence the process of change in the small firm. The 
main issues are identified in table 3.3. They put forward the view that the processes by 
which decisions are made in small firms are far more informal and based on less 
sophisticated techniques that would be common in larger firms. It is argued that the 
original focus of much of the prior research in the area was to be located within the 
external factors and that Stanworth and Curran have succeeded in redressing the 
imbalance, by encouraging researchers to consider the internal, latent social identities 
of the entrepreneur / owner - manager.
This analysis of the literature by Gibb and Scott also reveals the potential dangers 
associated with designing a research methodology which will allow for an effective 
study of how small firms plan their business growth and development, which is drawn 
from the positivistic approach to research. The list of internal factors generated in 
figure five and their influence on the shaping of growth highlights the broad range of 
possible idiosyncrasies associated with the small firm. This does not allow for an 
orderly, systematic, quantitative appraisal. The influence of the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur on the decision - making process allied to the nature of small business 
development also calls into question of how relevant and realistic the traditional, 
classical concepts of management (revolving around planning, organising, controlling 
and staffing) are, when considered and applied to the smaller business. It is introduced 
at the end of this section on the stages of growth models, because it reinforces the 
perception that the impression of small firms developing in an orderly, sequential and 
logical fashion, as represented by discrete, neatly defined stages, is simplistic at best, 
and grossly inaccurate, at worst.
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TABLE 3.3. INTERNAL / EXTERNAL FACTORS
EXTERNAL FACTORS
1. Existing product range and position in 
the market.
2. Pressures for change form competition and 
stage of product life cycle
3. Age and development profile of the firm's 
major products
4. Dependency on a few customers
5. Market uncertainty and complexity
6. Rates of change in the economy
7. Existence of particular institutional 
"block" to progress
8. Wider environmental factors - social, 
legal, and political
INTERNAL FACTORS
1. The owner - manager : personal 
and leadership characteristics
2. The presence or absence of 
qualified staff
3. Extent of functional specialisation
4. The control system : degree of 
formality
5. The managerial capability of the 
workforce
6. The financial situation of the 
company - liquidity
7. Age and quality of the physical 
assets
8. The extent to which managerial 
time is available
9. Levels of managerial motivation 
and commitment
Source : adapted from Gibb Allan and Scott, Michael. (1986) "Understanding Small Firm's Growth", in 
Small Firm Grtmih and Development. Scott, Michael (Ed.) Gower Press. Aldershot. pp86 - 87.
3.7.2.3. The Network Approach
A burgeoning literature has emerged throughout the last decade on the role which 
networks play in establishing, cementing and developing business relationships. Much 
of this has emanated from the interaction approach to business - to - business 
marketing. This philosophy has shifted the focus from a view of suppliers and 
customers as independent, autonomous actors, free to act as they wish within the 
market - place, to one of two entities which "over time develop interdependencies and 
a veritable relationship via exchange processes of various kinds (105). This basic, but 
far - reaching view of business relationships, has been developed and refined by authors 
such as Hakansson (106),Easton and Araujo 107), and most recently by Axelsson and
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Easton (108). The definition of an industrial network is borrowed from social exchange 
theory and Hakansson (109) describes it as a set of two or more connected exchange 
relations. Exchange is defined in turn as consisting of a voluntary transaction involving 
the transfer of resources between two or more actors for mutual benefit. The term 
resource is further defined by Cook (110) as "any value (sic) activity, service or 
commodity". Thus, industrial networks presuppose the establishment of exchange 
relationships and any changes in the established relationship occur through 
investments in tangible assets capable of appearing on the balance sheet, or through the 
acquisition of skills or knowledge in areas such as research and development, 
marketing, etc. It is not deemed to be relevant for the purposes of this study to 
undertake an extensive review of the general literature: this would be beyond the 
scope of the subsequent study and would deflect from the crucial issues under 
investigation. However a review of network theory as it applies to the small firm is 
presented, because it represents an alternative view of how such firms develop and 
cultivate growth.
At the heart of any assessment of the role of networks in the formulation of business 
relationships is the underlying assumption that "companies are interwoven with 
heterogeneous actors through a vast amount of inter - organisational relationships" 
(Gemunden and Heydebreck, 111) and that the establishment of such relationships will 
prove to be a major asset over a period of time. This statement, while identifying the 
concept of a series of relationships as central to the concept of networking, is not 
strong enough in its attempt to pinpoint the variety of relationships which exist in any 
business activity framework. Curran et al (112) make the valid observation that 
networks and the act of networking have both compulsory and voluntary aspects, 
which can be seen on a continuum. At one extreme are the compulsory range of 
business activities which have to be engaged in and without which the business cannot 
be sustained. For example, every company has to liaise with a bank, in order to ensure 
that bills are paid and customer payments are lodged. Further along the continuum, 
participation becomes increasingly voluntary, for example, it is optional (although not 
necessarily evidence of best practice) for companies to carry out marketing research. 
At the end of this continuum are such optional activities as joining the local golf club, 
or becoming a member of the chamber of commerce. Very few theorists highlights 
such areas as being crucial to the success of a business, although many companies 
would perceive such contact points as being appropriate for making contact with 
potential customers or facilitators. While this view applies to all firms, irrespective of 
size, it can be argued, quite forcefully, that it has a fundamental importance for the 
smaller company.
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Perhaps of greater significance to the smaller firm is the potential which networking 
allows for them to become more innovative, through their relationships with other 
firms. Much of the empirical research in this area has been conducted with firms which 
operate in the high - technology sectors (Oakey 114). In a later article (115) Oakey 
also points out that in many cases, the precise nature of the relationships between small 
and large firms in such sectors is often of the subser\nent kind; in which sub - 
contractors or niche producers (the small firm) sell to a large population of industrial 
producers. In such cases, while in the short - term, there is mutual benefit for both 
parties, the longer term benefits to the small firm may dissipate in the "maze" of over - 
dependency which may inevitably result from a situation where it may have a very 
narrow customer base. A study by Oakey (116) of small biotechnology firms 
maintained (reluctantly, in most cases) a single customer base. It should be noted that 
this tends to occur in industries which are embryonic or at the early stages of growth. 
By contrast, in mature high - technology sectors, such as certain sub - sectors of the 
electronics industry, small firms can cultivate a larger customer base, although not 
without some difficulty.
The level of empirical research in the area of personal networking and the entrepreneur 
is limited. Johannisson (117) one of the main authors in this field, acknowledges this, 
but does offer some preliminary statements which are in need of empirical testing. They 
can be summarised as follows
1. The self - image argument: Where the entrepreneur has a need to reinforce his
/ her self image in order to be able to impose it on others.
2. The existential argument: In contrast to role relationships, personal ties
relate to the person as a whole i.e. include shared values as well as effective 
and instrumental strands.
3 The learning argument: Entrepreneurs are experiential learners, not
necessarily because of lack of management competencies but mainly due to the 
very notion of the entrepreneurial event: structural change in the market place 
cannot be recalled from history.
4. The appropriateness argument: Since personal networks are tailored to fit
both the provider and the recipient, the opportunity costs associated with time 
and other investments in he exchange are negligible.
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5. The flexibility argument: Although individual network ties are even more 
difficult to replace than resources controlled by ownership, the personal 
network as a whole provides flexibility.
6. The stretchability argument: Network resources can be expanded in two 
ways with only marginal investment: with respect to the direct linkages 
and with respect to the network as a whole. In a personal network, services 
in return can be postponed by way of delayed reciprocity and barter 
replaces money as an equaliser through general reciprocity.
7. The holistic argument: Since the personal network of the entrepreneur is 
egocentric, it helps the entrepreneur to focus his / her efforts. In order 
to identify new business opportunities, the network must operate as a 
scanner and when a venture is subsequently launched, the network 
provides needed resources.
8. The political argument: The personal network has a political potential in the 
sense that control through business is difficult for outsiders. The total 
(perceived) network is only known to the entrepreneurs themselves.
Johannisson's views are a distillation of many concepts which have yet to be tested 
empirically. As such, their contribution to knowledge has to be judged with caution. 
However it has to be acknowledged that the inclusion of network theory does reinforce 
the view that it is insufficient to examine the issue of growth and entrepreneurship from 
the sole perspective of internal expansion. Network theory broadens out the discussion 
to include the economic and social contexts. Given the initial limitations and 
constraints facing owner - managers, particularly in the early stages of the company's 
development, it can be argued that it is imperative that a personal network be built up 
by them, to facilitate growth. That said, there is an opposing view which suggests that 
the underlying premise of the need for continued growth may not be strictly accurate. 
Hackett (118) as early as 1974 for example, noted that three major disadvantages can 
accrue from pursuing a policy of growth : an inability to achieve adequate financial 
control and planning, the difficulty of maintaining a responsive and timely decision - 
making process and a possible decline in the ability to realise the creative and 
innovative potential of individuals in larger organisations.
Another issue which does not appear to have been adequately addressed in the 
mainstream literature on networking is the potential for predatory behaviour; resulting
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from the unalterable fact there are two or more parties who are not equivalent in terms 
of power, size and monetary value. Thus while a large firm may be prepared to provide 
help in the form of contracts, help with research and development or functional 
expertise, they may do so with a view to acquisition. Some work by Smith (119) and 
Balfour (120) provides evidence of this practice occurring in high technology 
industries. Oakey (121) also argues strongly that altruism does not exist in the forging 
of a network link, noting that irrespective of whether one firm wishes to take over 
another at some time in the future, both parties enter into such a relationship because 
they seek an advantage in establishing such a bond.
Yet another distinguishing characteristic of the small business sector is the desire on 
the part of many owner - managers / entrepreneurs for independence as to how they 
run their lives generally and in particular the extent to which they can control their 
working environment. Thus if this view is accepted, it casts some doubt on the logic 
for such companies to establish a large number of relationships, with the possible effect 
of diluting the amount of independence associated with running their own businesses. 
A veiy recent study by Curran et al (122) would appear to support the view that such 
owner - managers tend to have small and non - extensive networks with little resort to 
external contacts such as accountants and bank managers, except for basic, routine 
transactions. This situation has been influenced by such pragmatic issues as the heavy 
demands placed on the owner - manager's time and the costs associated with using 
professional services such as accountants, marketing research agencies etc. This helps 
to ensure relatively small networks.
The work of Curran et al is recent and has to be deemed as significant in its 
contribution to further knowledge in the area of networking. The overall results point 
away from the original notion that the small business owner embraced the concept of 
networking in a proactive manner. It highlights the need for further studies in the area, 
before an adequate theoretical base can be developed.
Any concluding evaluative comments on network theory can best be summed up in the 
words of Gibb and Scott who note that while there is evidence to suggest that;-
" the nature o f the networks o f the entrepreneur change as the business 
develops ....there is little hard evidence as to how these changes occur as the business 
grows and how the changes impact upon the potential for growth (123,p22).
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Networking theory undoubtedly has been one of the main areas which researchers have 
focused on over the past number of years in the context of industrial marketing. Clearly 
more work needs to be done on networking as relating to the smaller firm, before any 
firm conclusions can be drawn. This is because the particular characteristics of the 
small firm may mean that it is more difficult for them to establish strong networks with 
larger firms. This might occur in situations where small firms struggle to convince 
other companies of their capability, trustworthiness and perhaps, long - term viability. 
While these issues may act as constraints, it is equally plausible to argue that the 
flexibility and close personal attention which the small firm can provide to other 
partners, may facilitate the establishment of such networks.
These latter issues are conjectural at present, in the absence of any substantive base of 
empirical research and much of what has been written has been based on largely 
anecdotal evidence.
3.7.3. BUSINESS MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TO GROWTH
Gibb and Davies (124) identify a school of thought which relates the growth of a firm 
to its performance in the marketplace and in particular its financial performance and its 
ability to operate at maximum efficiency levels. Under this train of thought, it is 
assumed, not unreasonably, that all growth must emanate from the marketplace, and as 
a consequence, has at its epicentre the Ansoff matrix (125) which identifies four 
possible routes to growth under the product / market scope : market penetration, 
product development, market development and diversification. This schema is placed 
in the context of the firm's desire to improve its competitive position.. Gibb and 
Davies (126) suggest that this approach is frequently adopted in management teaching 
programmes as a "pseudo - scientific model of planning approaches to product / 
market development and business goal setting, including the business plan as the main 
means of assimilating the path to successful growth".
Clearly the popularity of Ansoff s approach, as evidenced by the frequency with which 
it appears in textbooks and articles, is a testament to its effectiveness as a "teaching 
tool", which in turn provides an understanding of how firms can achieve growth. 
Unfortunately, while it is clear and unambiguous in its intent, it does not attempt to 
examine the underlying factors which can positively or negatively influence a firm's 
growth potential. It provides a useful guideline as to how growth can be achieved, 
without "peeling off the layers" to reveal the underlying patterns and interconnecting 
issues.
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Gibb and Davies (127) also refer to business management approaches which focus on 
upon financial performance. This is demonstrated by the attempt to predict the future 
performance of the firm, based on financial ratios and their changes over time. Thus 
past performance is used to predict future capability. In this respect, the approach 
resembles the philosophy adopted by the banker or accountant, as they apply general, 
expected or predictable standards to assess future performance. Allied to this is the 
notion that the banker or accountant expect "well managed" businesses to be in a 
position to generate financial and other related information on a regular basis. The 
capability of the firm to do this is deemed to be evidence of a capability to control the 
business.
The logic of this approach can be seriously questioned. The use of indicators to 
predict future performance is fallacious because they are essentially outputs deriving 
from the performance of the firm, rather than actual inputs, which can directly 
influence performance. While this criticism may be justified, it has also to be 
acknowledged that this concept resides very firmly in the minds of those members of 
the financial community. Given their emphasis on cost and efficiency as general 
principles for dictating the growth potential of firms, it can be said that this influences 
their judgement when deciding whether or not to provide financial assistance. Thus the 
peculiarities of the small firm and the difficulties which it can experience in areas of 
cash flow management, the failure of customers to pay on time and so on, can receive 
an unsympathetic response from the financial community. As is the case with so much 
of the concepts reviewed in this chapter, the evidence is tentative and anecdotal in 
nature.
3.7.4. SECTORAL AND BROADER MARKET LED APPROACHES
This last series of approaches towards an understanding of growth refer to a wide 
ranging and disparate range of studies which have focused on the external constraints 
and problems associated with small firm growth. Clearly such studies are too numerous 
to examine in detail. Gibb and Davies (129) cite a wide range of issues which have 
been addressed by such studies in the United Kingdom. They can be summarised as 
follows : -
* The impact of various regional counselling, training and assistance 
schemes provided by various support agencies.
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I* The potential effects of (perceived) bureaucratic constraints (e.g. 
taxation levels, interest rates on loans) availability of suitable labour.
* Sectoral studies e.g. the high technology area, focusing on building 
marketing into design and quality from an early stage, and keeping 
abreast of the latest developments in the area of technology.
* The development of a professional management competence and the 
correlation between the educational attainment of managers and the
growth performance of firms.
It can be argued that many of these studies have contributed to a furthering of 
knowledge- particularly in relation to specific problems and constraints which small 
firms experience as they develop. Clearly the wide variety of such studies precludes 
them from becoming predictive models of small firm growth. This is compounded in 
many cases by the common feature of very small samples, unrepresentativeness in 
sample selection and sub sectoral studies which are too narrow in focus to allow for 
broader generalisation.
3.8. Summary
This chapter has examined the relationship between entrepreneurship, growth and the 
small firm. The basic logic for this approach is grounded in the belief that the three 
areas are inexorably linked. The main purpose of this review has been specifically to 
examine the various approaches emanating from the literature which have put forward 
theories as to how the smaller firm grows. Clearly the role of the entrepreneur / owner 
- manager impinges to a significant extent on the development of a firm's business 
activities. As a consequence, the early part of this chapter reviewed the relevant 
literature on entrepreneurship. The main conclusion from this analysis has been that 
much of the empirical research has suffered from some weaknesses, mainly arising 
from a tendency to ignore the view that any attempt to identify personality traits and 
characteristics must be contingency - based. This allows for the various idiosyncrasies 
associated with the small firm and the fact that any findings tend to be situational in 
nature.
The analysis of the various growth models has also identified a number of weaknesses : 
chief of which are, the emphasis on formalistic, deductive methodological approaches - 
very firmly grounded in the positivist tradition, an over - emphasis on concepts which
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appeal to common sense but are not empirically tested at all, a tendency to use research 
constructs and paradigms which are drawn from work carried out with large firm (and 
a rather simplistic view that they are equally valid for a study of the small firm) and an 
arbitrary view of what in fact constitutes a "small" firm. It is submitted that by far the 
most glaring weakness lies in the relative paucity of qualitative, inductive research 
methods which have been used by researchers in the area. This is evidenced by the 
quest for large numbers of companies to be examined in survey design While this 
allows for subsequent quantitative analysis, it is argued quite forcefully that it does not 
necessarily provide for an in -depth understanding of the internal forces and influences 
which are present in the small firm. This is an issue which will be addressed at length in 
a later chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
STRATEGY: MARKETING, PLANNING AND THE SMALL FIRM
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the actual process of achieving growth 
within the emerging firm. The initial section clarifies the associates range of terms 
which appear in the literature and are used to examine and explore the issue of strategy 
development and implementation. It is submitted that the preponderance of 
terminology in this area can lead to confusion and misinterpretation and as a 
consequence, obfuscate the challenge of planning for the practising manager. The term 
"strategy" is certainly an over - used word in the business vocabulary and the looseness 
of interpretation which surrounds it needs to be clarified in the context of a detailed 
study of how small companies utilise strategies and plans in their business activities.
The next part of the chapter identifies the specific components of strategic planning 
and examines the relevance of such an activity for the smaller company. This is deemed 
to be an important contribution to the subsequent design of a research methodology for 
the study, as there would appear to be an underlying assumption that planning is 
automatically " a good thing to do" for any organisation. However there is also 
compelling evidence emanating from some researchers that a blind acceptance of such 
a philosophy ignores much of the reality of what happens in practice. This apparent 
discrepancy between theory and practice is examined in greater detail.
The precise nature of the marketing planning process and its relationship to corporate, 
business or strategic planning is then reviewed. This section begins to address one of 
the fundamental considerations of this thesis: the role which marketing planning plays 
in the small firm's business planning activities. It is argued that many of the researchers 
and authors in this field use such terms interchangeably and in a loose manner, without 
giving much thought as to how marketing interacts with corporate decisions. In similar 
vein much of the discussion which exists in the literature tends to focus on large or 
multinational firms; with little corresponding focus on the small firm. This apparent 
inconsistency is redressed, with a review of the relevant literature and an attempt being 
made to relate to the characteristics of the small firm. This exercise indicates that much 
of the conventional theories regarding planning have little applicability or indeed 
relevance for such companies.
The final part of the chapter examines the relatively few attempts to put forward a 
framework for understanding how small companies can utilise the marketing function 
and integrate it into overall planning activities. As well as reviewing these concepts,
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some alternative views are identified and put forward for subsequent testing in the 
subsequent study of small, indigenous electronics companies.
4.2. STRATEGY DEFINED.
At the outset of any detailed discussion on strategy, and in particular its antecedents, it 
is maintained that it is dangerous to put forward a standard definition or interpretation 
of strategy. This is for the valid reason that even a superficial examination of the vast 
literature reveals many interpretations and definitions which are adopted by both 
authors and researchers. Clearly not all of the interpretations are accurate or indeed 
correct. However it is felt that it is more relevant when reviewing the literature, to 
broaden the various perspective of strategy, as opposed to imposing a narrow focus. 
This does not make the task of achieving clarity any easier, but nonetheless, allows for 
a realistic appraisal.
Evered (1) identifies the word strategy as deriving from the Greek word strategos. 
This in itself, is a combination of two words : stratos, meaning army and agein, 
meaning, to lead. Placing the discussion in relation to business, it can be interpreted as 
concerning the leading of the overall organisation.
Ansoff (2) identifies a number of basic functions which strategy performs for the 
typical organisation. They are as follows
* Giving direction to the company as opposed to immediate action
* Stimulating the search for business opportunities
* Providing a link between objectives and resources
* Generating information, as well as requiring information for its 
formulation
* Monitoring changes in objectives and their subsequent impact on 
changes in strategy
Day (3) offers a view of strategy which suggests that it:-
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" Describes the direction the organisation will pursue within its chosen 
environment., and guides the allocation o f resources. A strategy also 
provides the logic that integrates the parochial perspectives o f functional 
departments and operating units and points them in the same direction".
In similar vein, Aaker (4) postulates that the strategy concept can be:-
" encapsulated into two core elements: the product - market investment
decision which encompasses the product - market scope o f the 
business strategy, its investment intensity and the resource allocation 
in a multiple - business context.
The development o f a sustainable competitive advantage to compete in 
those markets. This core concept encompasses underlying distinctive
competencies or assets, appropriate objectives, functional area politics and the 
creation o f synergy".
Luck and Ferrell (5) offer the view that strategy is>
" a scheme or principal idea through which an objective could be achieved".
From this brief foray into the thoughts of the above authors, it becomes readily 
apparent that a number of terms such as objectives, resources, opportunities and action 
begin to emerge. This in turn raises a particular problem facing researchers in the area 
of strategy: namely the looseness with which many authors and researchers use 
terminology. In this respect, Greenley (6) identifies the possible confusion which 
results as the tendency of such writers to refer to strategy without any differentiation 
by levels of planning. The operative word in this sentence is levels.
These perspectives are helpful to the extent that they identify a number of broad 
outcomes which one might expect to accrue from the implementation of a broad 
strategy:- the product(s) - market(s) to be targeted, the level of investment associated 
with such moves, related to available resources and allied to the specific core 
competencies which allow a firm to initially develop and (hopefully) sustain a 
competitive advantage.
Wensley (7) notes that if the above definitions are accepted as being an accurate 
portrayal of what strategy is all about, then it recognises that strategy is a formal.
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explicit exercise which the typical firm undertakes. This indeed is the most commonly 
held view of how strategy is formulated. But is it the only perspective ? Indeed is it a 
correct perception ? In response to the former, it can be stated that it is not the only 
view. Mintzberg and Waters (8) have articulated an alternative outlook which suggests 
that there are various kinds of strategies ranging from those that reflect a deliberate, 
rational approach, to those which emerge without necessarily reflecting any pre - 
ordained intentions on the part of an individual or a department.
This multi - dimensional view of strategy contributes significantly towards a greater 
understanding of the issue. It immediately casts some doubt on the belief that strategy 
is a pre - ordained, formalised exercise. Instead it advocates a more flexible 
perspective; based on the notion that it is more accurate to adopt a contingency - based 
stance. This acknowledges that what might be appropriate for one company might be 
singularly irrelevant for another. It also puts forward the intriguing view that a strategy 
can emerge without any pattern or advance thinking. In a later article, Mintzberg (9) 
reinforces this view of the need for flexibility in defining strategy by offering the 
opinion that explicit recognition of multiple definitions can help people to gain a clearer 
insight into the issue. Accordingly, he suggests five definitions of strategy
Strategy as Plan : In this case two essential characteristics are evident; strategies are 
made in advance of the actions to which they apply, and they are developed 
consciously and purposefully.
Strategy as a Ploy : Where strategy can be used as a specific manoeuvre to outwit a 
competitor. For example a company may threaten to expand plant capacity to 
discourage a competitor from building a new plant. In this scenario, the real strategy is 
the use of the threat, not the expansion itself. Hence it can be deemed as a ploy.
Strategy as Pattern : Defining a strategy as plan is not sufficient; it is also necessary to 
put forward a definition that encompasses the resulting behaviour. Thus strategy may 
be viewed as a pattern - specifically a pattern in a stream of decisions. Viewed in this 
context, strategy is consistency in behaviour, whether or not it is intended.
Strategy as a Position: Specifically a means of locating an organisation in what 
organisational theorists like to call an "environment". Thus, strategy becomes the 
mediating force, or match between the internal and external context.
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Strategy as Perspective : In this case, the content of strategy does not just consist of a 
chose position, but also of an ingrained way of perceiving the world. Strategy in this 
context is to the organisation what personality is to the individual.
The key to understanding Mintzberg's thinking lies in his emphasis on the need for 
eclecticism in defining strategy. By this he means that within the five definitions which 
he puts forward, various relationships exists among them; with no one relationship, nor 
any single definition taking precedence over the others. He also argues that in some 
ways the definitions compete (in that they substitute for each other), but in other, more 
important ways, they complement.
This distillation of Mintzberg's ideas may appear at first glance to be over - 
emphasised. However it is argued that they represent a realistic attempt to understand 
the practical dimensions of strategy. He does not provide a bland, uni - dimensional 
definition. Rather, he presents a broad range of contingency - based views, which are 
not mutually exclusive. While he might be accused of being vague and imprecise in his 
approach, it can be equally argued that this accurately represents what strategy is all 
about in any case.
In order to provide a balanced assessment of the alternative perceptions of how 
strategy is formulated, it is necessary to further explore Mintzberg's views on the 
traditional school of thought which advocates a prescriptive approach to strategy 
formulation, emphasising the process as consisting of formal planning and of analytical 
positioning (relative to the competition). In a later article Mintzberg (10) associates 
the Business Policy Group at the Harvard Business School as being the prime 
advocates of such an approach. The essence of this school of thought is that strategy 
formation is viewed as a process of informal conception i.e. the use of a few essential 
concepts to design the "grand strategy". Mintzberg notes that the most essential 
elements of these concepts is that of congruence or match. This is best described in the 
work of Christensen et al (11) who suggest that "economic strategy will be seen as the 
match between qualification and opportunism that positions a firm in its environment".
The pioneering work of Learned et al (12), Andrews (13), Chandler, (14), and 
Newman (15) are good examples of how the thoughts of this school are articulated. 
The contribution of the ideas developed by Igor Ansoff (16) can be added, although a 
perusal of his work quickly identifies that it places much greater emphasis on planning 
as the main driving force behind strategy formulation. This contrasts somewhat with 
the more conceptual approach proffered by the prescriptive proponents.
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Proponents of the design school reinforce the view that strategy development consists 
initially of an internal appraisal of a firm's position allied to an assessment of the 
external environment within which such a firm operates. This exercise is crystallised 
into what has been referred to as a SWOT analysis - a standard feature of any basic 
lecture to both undergraduates and postgraduates on the topic of strategy. In this 
context, a matching up of the key success factors ( which are basic requirements for 
establishing a presence in a given market) and the distinctive competencies (identified 
from the internal appraisal of the company's operations) takes place.
In creating a particular strategy, two other considerations also come into play: the 
basic beliefs and values of those individuals who lead the organisation and are 
responsible for shaping its future, and the ethics of the society in which the 
organisation is embedded and which need to be taken into account when developing 
strategy.
Mintzberg (17) identifies a number of basic premises which underpin the process of 
strategy formulation as advanced by this school of thought. They are worthy of 
explanation and evaluation. The first premise which he detects is that:
" Strategy formation should be a controlled, conscious process o f thought”.
This line of argument firmly places the exercise of strategy formation in the context of 
a deliberate, rational, fully thought out category. Clearly this approach dismisses the 
notion that strategy development has any positive benefits to gain from a reliance on 
intuition (which could be deemed to be the direct opposite of rational deliberation) 
This is reinforced by the views of Andrews (18) who argues that " if strategy is 
implicit in the intuition of a strong leader, the organisation is likely to be weak and the 
demands the strategy makes upon it are likely to remain unmet".
The second premise noted by Mintzberg (19) is that:-
Responsibility for that control and consciousness must rest with the chief 
executive: that person is the strategist".
This view advocates the primacy of the chief executive as a shaper of a firm's destiny, 
where he / she is perceived as the central architect of organisational purpose.
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Premise three notes that:-
This view is best summed up by Andrews who suggests that "this (strategy formation) 
is not a theory attended in the rigorous sense by elegance or vigor (sic), nor is it really 
a model, for the relationships attended by the model are nor quantifiable: rather it 
serves as an informing idea". (20)
Of the premises outlined so far, this particular one does raise some problems of 
interpretation. On the one hand, proponents such as Andrews argue for a level of 
formality and rationality to be associated with strategy development. Yet, in deference 
to practitioners who have to carry out such an exercise in "the real world", they stress 
the fact that a rigorous approach can pose a threat to effective implementation.
Premise four: -
"Strategies should be unique: the best ones result from a process o f creative design".
This underlies the view that strategies have to relate to the specific situation facing an 
organisation and not to any generic set of variables which can be applied unilaterally. 
This contingency based view is supported in the work of Hoefer and Schendel (21). 
Because of this argument for specificity, much of the work of the design school 
concentrates on the process by which strategies are developed.
Premise five : -
Strategies emerge from this design fully formulated".
This highlights the fact that this school of thought advocates the big picture or grand 
strategy which results from the process. In particular it argues that the strategist will 
have before him a range of alternative strategies to choose from which the most 
appropriate (in the mind of the strategist) will be chosen. Interestingly this is an 
approach which would appear to have originated with the Harvard Business school in 
their approach to teaching strategy by using the case study method. It is still strongly 
utilised in the vast majority of business schools throughout the Unites States and 
Europe.
"The model o f  strategy’ formation must be kept simple and informal".
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P rem ise  6
"These strategies should be explicit and, if  possible, articulated, which also 
fa\>ors (sic) their being kept simple
This expresses the belief that if the strategy is not articulated to the rest of the 
organisation, then it cannot be adequately tested or challenged and as a consequence is 
likely to be intrinsically weak. In line with this is the notion that strategies must be 
adhere to the basics of simplicity to allow it to be communicated clearly and without 
the potential dangers of distortion that can inevitably accrue, if it is unduly lengthy.
Premise seven
"Finally, only after these unique, fu ll - blown, explicit and simple strategies 
are fully formulated can they then be implemented".
This raises an ever - recurring theme running through this dissertation: namely the 
distinction between strategy formulation and strategy implementation. While the issue 
will be fully debated at a later stage, it is necessary to pinpoint the underlying premise 
of this school of thought which clearly separates thinking from acting. This classical 
view of rationality - diagnosis, prescription then action is articulated very succinctly by 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (22). It also supports the view put forward by Chandler (23) 
as far back as 1962, that structure must follow strategy: the design of strategy must 
dominate the thinking of the organisation, and only after a strategy has been 
formulated, does the company begin to address the question of how the company 
needs to organise itself to implement the strategy.
While Andrews does make some subsequent modifications to his original perception of 
strategy (24), in particular the need to achieve a balance between flexibility and focus 
and between a sense of direction within strategy formulation and the need to respond 
to potential opportunities in the environment, he is a firm proponent of the traditional 
model of strategy as represented in the design school of thought.
Mintzberg (25) raises the question of how closely this model resembles the reality as 
being the "acid test" for assessing the validity of the approach of the design school. His 
critique of the model is based on a consideration of a number of specific aspects 
associated with the model: the need for a conscious assessment of strengths and
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weaknesses and the assumed sequence of strategy followed by structure, the need to 
explicitly articulate the strategy, and finally the dichotomy between formation and 
implementation as assumed by the model.
In relation to determining the strengths and weaknesses, Mintzberg highlights the 
problem associated with the expectation that executives in a company can carry out 
such a conscious task and ensure that their deliberations are free from potential biases, 
hopes and aspirations, thus being able to assure reliability and objective detachment 
from such influences. It also identifies a potential problem of being able to achieve a 
broad agreement, among the participating executives, at to what constitute the precise 
strengths and weaknesses. A study by Stephenson (26) actually pinpoints these 
problems, based on an exercise with managers, where he asked them to assess their 
companies strengths and weaknesses in general. The latter two words were to prove 
significant, because the single recurring theme emerging from this study was that 
managers felt that such an exercise would only be appropriate if such strengths and 
weaknesses were to be defined in the context of a particular problem facing the 
organisation. By contrast such an activity is an academic exercise without a particular 
focus. Hofer and Schendel (27) also query its usefulness on the grounds that it is 
difficult for any organisation to be really sure of its strengths before it tests them 
empirically in the field. In essence this puts forward the not unreasonable view that 
many of these internal self - assessments are based on the past behaviours and 
experiences of the organisation, and may not necessarily apply to future behaviours. 
Given that any strategic changes affecting a company involve new experiences, 
ranging from minor to radical, allied to a similar continuum of risk, then it can be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the company to be able to anticipate, in advance, 
whether a core competence which it has identified in its appraisal exercise, will stand 
up under this alteration to established behaviour.
The claim that structure follows strategy as propounded originally by Chandler in 1962 
(28) is debunked by Mintzberg on the grounds that an internal self assessment of 
corporate capabilities is central to the traditional design school and since structure is a 
key component underscoring this exercise, then structure has a major role to play in 
determining strategy, by constraining and conditioning it as well as providing guidance. 
This implies that past structures cannot be blithely set to one side when embarking on a 
new strategy. Thus neither strategy or structure take precedence; they both support the 
organisation.
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On a superficial level, Mintzberg is on less firm ground when critiquing the view that 
strategy needs to be explicitly articulated within an organisation. The arguments for so 
doing, prove to be persuasive: it allows for the strategy to be discussed and debated by 
the relevant executives, it helps to integrate the executives with a common purpose and 
it can boost morale. He accepts these arguments - providing the conditions facing the 
company are right. The most important of those being where the strategist is sure 
about the direction the company is going in, and has no doubts about the viability of 
that direction. However for this condition to exist, it assumes that the company is 
operating in an environment which exudes stability and unpredictability. Given that it is 
rare for any company or organisation to operate in such "friendly" conditions, 
Mintzberg argues that the explicit articulation of strategies in situations of turmoil can 
lead at best, to blinkers being placed on the thought processes which has the net effect 
of preventing the ability to think creatively, laterally or innovatively. Likewise the more 
clearly articulated the strategy, the more firmly embedded and interwoven it becomes 
into the company's stream of consciousness. This can lead to major problems at a later 
stage, when the company has to contemplate a change to its previously held beliefs. 
The danger of blindly articulating strategy is that it ignores the inescapable fact that 
strategies do not appear fully formulated overnight, they are part of a learning process 
and typically evolve gradually over time.
Mintzberg reserves his strongest criticism for the formulation - implementation 
dichotomy which is central to the design school's philosophy. He argues that this line 
of thinking broadly reflects traditional western thinking: that to act you must first know 
what you want to accomplish. In other words, think first, then do. This is evidenced in 
many different ways. For example in the field of military strategy (which provided 
many of the initial frameworks for subsequent business strategists), Feld (29) noted the 
sharp distinction drawn between the traditional officers in the rear, of the battle, who 
draw up the plans and direct their execution, and the front - line troops who are 
expected to carry out the plans given to them. This approach can be criticised because 
it explicitly suggests that the individuals who have no direct front - line experience 
have full knowledge and are able to devise plans which can anticipate the likely moves 
of the enemy, and that information provided by the front - line "foot soldiers" can 
trickle back to the grand strategists without any distortion or loss of accuracy or 
relevance.
Mintzberg argues forcefully that many contemporary western organisations have 
adopted the approach as outlined by Feld, and not necessarily for the better. 
Interestingly this has not been the case with many Asian companies. Ohmae (31), a
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seminal author in the area of strategy has castigated many western companies for 
creating a division from those at the top and the ordinary worker at the bottom. He 
quotes the example of an executive from a "blue - chip" company who in discussions 
with him, was very talkative and knowledgeable about his specialist area - pricing 
strategy and competitive cost analysis, but noticeably less cheerful when asked to 
comment on problems encountered in the area of poor production technology and 
procurement practices, and even more so when witnessed having discussions with 
factory floor workers. He notes that in sharp contrast:-
" Japanese top managers, having started out. "where the rubber meets the 
road", never tire o f reminding the employees that they, the workers, know the 
business best and that innovation and improvement must, come from the genba 
(where the action is)" (32)
It can be seen from this brief insight into Japanese management practices that there is 
no visible dichotomy created within the hierarchy of a company - between management 
and workers.
Mintzberg (33) identifies such behavioural patterns (where formulators implement and 
implementors formulate) as a situation where the organisation is in a learning mode. 
This, in his view is the major weakness of the design school: that by assuming that 
strategic learning somehow takes place in one head for a limited period of time and 
then stops, so that strategies can be articulated and implementation can begin, it denies 
processes that have often proved to be critical to the creation of novel and effective 
strategies.
Quinn (34) has taken on board this issue in an earlier study and concluded that the 
formal systems paradigm, as enunciated by the design school does not adequately 
characterise the way successful strategic processes operate in organisations. Rather, 
effective strategies tend to emerge from a series of "strategic subsystems", each of 
which attacks a specific strategic issue facing the company (e.g. an acquisition move or 
a product elimination exercise) in a disciplined way, but "which is blended 
incrementally and opportunistically into a cohesive pattern that becomes the company's 
strategy".
This opposing viewpoint reinforces the belief that a systematically planned strategy, 
based on a logical, sequential process, does not necessarily relate to the practical 
experiences of organisations. Both Quinn and Mintzberg have articulated a perception
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of strategy which suggest that more focus needs to be given to the qualitative, "softer", 
non - measurable issues which so often determine strategy in an organisation. Of 
course it is precisely because of the difficulties associated with measuring such 
variables, that such a view has incurred the opprobrium of many people who are more 
comfortable with the so called systematic approach to strategy.
A considerable portion of the preceding discussion has focused on the views of two 
opposing schools of thought: that which suggests a formalistic approach to strategy 
and one which advocates a more flexible, experiential approach. Before other related 
issues are examined, it is important to form a view as to the relative merits and 
demerits of each view. The approach as outlined by authors such as Andrews, Aaker, 
and Day have a number of positive outcomes to recommend them. It provides clear 
direction and guidance to a company and in so doing, presents a logical, sequential 
process which can be easily understood and adopted. It clearly adopts a prescriptive, 
normative approach. This implies that it reflects reality and as a consequence, 
represents the single best means of depicting strategy development. It is on this 
premise that serious questions can be asked.
This latter observation is taken up in a more recent article by Mintzberg (35) where he 
introduces the notion of crafting as opposed to planning strategy. This distinction 
creates the image of strategy being formulated and implemented in a fluid manner as a 
result of experience, knowledge of the industry, a level of psychological comfort with 
the issues to be addressed, and leading to a position where creative strategies evolve. 
This is in sharp contrast to the image of the chief executive or senior manager sitting in 
his or her office, poring over a "raft" of documentation, and developing a serious of 
steps and procedures to be implemented by others on schedule - thus epitomising the 
rational thinker.
It is submitted that these views have much to commend them. They present a picture 
which does not hide behind a cloak of superficiality. This latter point is evident with 
the rather simplistic tendency of much of the design school writers to portray strategy 
formulation and implementation as a series of sequential stages. This ignores the many 
imponderable factors which can influence such an exercise. Once again there is a 
strong argument which suggests that a contingency based approach is more effective 
and above all, a more realistic means of reflecting the situation.
Criticisms can be levelled at the work of Mintzberg and Quinn in that they articulate a 
view of strategy which suggests that somehow or other it consists of a tendency for
101
company to stumble or muddle their way to a developed strategy, and that as a 
consequence it does not represent a coherent or logical means by which a strategy can 
be achieved. This however does not stand up under close scrutiny. On the contrary, it 
calls for a set of skills which mean that the so called strategist needs to be able to 
manage the complex set of patterns and inter - relationships which exist in the 
organisation and which ultimately shape strategy.
The research methods used by Mintzberg which have enabled him to arrive at his 
conclusions can be challenged on the basis that they were not drawn from large, 
representative samples. For instance, one of his early, seminal articles (36) was based 
on interviews with five chief executives. In short, this type of approach does not 
conform to the positivistic, deductive research paradigm which has been at the 
forefront of research design for a number of decades. However the suitability of such 
an approach can be seriously questioned if a deep understanding of the influencing 
factors and forces is not grasped initially. In other words, the deductive approach to 
research design will provide quantitative data for the researcher to analyse. It will also 
present the opportunity to generate statistics. However the psychological comfort 
which can be attained from large scale quantitative surveys is severely weakened if 
there exists only a superficial knowledge in the first place. Thus, while Mintzberg has 
sacrificed scale and volume in his research design, he has more than compensated for 
this by acquiring a much richer depth of knowledge and understanding about strategy 
development.
It can be concluded from this section of the chapter that it would be erroneous to 
dismiss one or each of these alternative philosophies as to how strategy develops in the 
organisation. As Mintzberg has demonstrated, such development can be either 
deliberate (reflecting the rational school) or emergent; depending on the particular 
mode of operations existing within the specific organisation. Certainly such an 
exercise has to be viewed as a learning process by which the company goes through an 
iterative, experimental process. In this respect strategy can be examined in the light of 
Davies's (37) definition which suggests that it is simply "a coherent pattern of actions 
to improve the organisation's long term competitiveness". This is very close to the 
approach as outlined by Mintzberg and views strategy as a continuous improvement 
process. This is very significant as it moves away from the notion that strategy 
development is solely about working through a serious of sequential stages. In the 
words ofDavies:-
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"strategy serves as the bridge that. provides a means o f access from the
firm's current resources and capabilities to the future competitive reality 
expressed in its vision (3 8)
Thus, the preceding discussion calls for a balance to be applied when examining 
strategy development. On the one hand recognising the benefits associated with a 
broad, prescriptive framework to help a company formulate and implement strategy, 
and on the other, a recognition that greater attention needs to be given to the 
requirement for a more flexible, experiential approach to planning, which takes account 
of the practical difficulties associated with operating a formalistic, rational framework.
4.3. STRATEGIC PLANNING CONCEPTS W ITH  RESPECT TO 
STRATEGY
This section examines what is meant by the term "strategic planning" and its influence 
on the overall task facing any company, irrespective of size: that of having to plan for 
the future, in an uncertain environment and with constraints operating on the resources 
available to it. The task of trying to gain an understanding of this term is not helped by 
the veritable "minefield" which exists in the form of the range of terms used by authors 
when writing and researching in the area of strategy and planning.
Greenley (39) makes a serious effort to provide some clarity by proposing a planning 
framework. He starts by presenting some discourse on the exact nature of planning, 
suggesting that most of the discussion in the literature, places the concept of planning 
in the context of the overall management function. Much of the current knowledge 
base relative to the management task emanates from the work of Henri Fayol (40). In 
his pioneering work in the late 1940's he observed that management is based on the 
following :-
* Planning:-Examining the future and drawing up a plan of action
* Organising:- Establishing a human and physical frame to enable the 
undertaking to achieve results.
* Commanding:- Activating the organisation
* Co - ordination:- Drawing together all activity and effort.
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* Controlling:- Seeing that everything occurs in conformity with 
establishing rules and expressed command.
Fayol's work has subsequently become (either consciously or sub consciously) the 
basic framework for most textbooks and articles on management. Much of this work 
has followed the principle of "variations around a central theme". A good example of 
this is the work of Hussey (41) who classifies the tasks of management into three 
areas
* Deterministic:- Those tasks concerned with the creative, planning and 
arranging functions, including the determination of objectives, policies, 
procedures and organisational structures.
* Motivational:- Tasks which motivate the organisation, including 
communication, leadership and personal development.
* Directing:- Implementation, co - ordination and control.
In relation to explaining the nature of planning, as distinct from the overall task of 
management, Steiner (42) identifies a number of different roles that planning can fulfil 
in a company. They are
* Generic planning:- which systematically examines future alternatives 
and decisions are made, based upon these alternatives.
* Planning as a process:- starting with objectives, defining strategy and 
policies to achieve objectives, prescribing sub - plans in detail, and
establishing an organisation to implement the plans.
* Planning as a philosophy:- holding the view that the company creates 
patterns of logic and managerial attitudes for a review of performance.
* Planning as an integrating framework:- placing the emphasis on a 
comprehensive and uniform programme of plans for the entire 
organisation, over a long period of time.
This approach provides a useful attempt towards an understanding of planning insofar 
as it places it in a multidimensional context: representing it as both a philosophy which
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an organisation should embrace and as a framework for helping it to achieve its 
predetermined goals.
Greenley (43) identifies a number of features of planning which are developed in much 
of the literature on this subject. . He observes that the main thrust of the nature of 
planning has been relative to its role as a function of management. In particular the 
discussion focuses on its relationship to current activities and decisions about future 
actions which affect the company. The need to create a working environment which 
has committed, motivated personnel is also stressed. This in turn helps to ensure that 
planning activities can be developed and implemented in an atmosphere of 
understanding and co - operation. As a corollary, planning can help to create motivated 
personnel. Virtually all of this discussion stresses the "systematic and disciplined 
approach to the manager's role within the company". This is a view which has received 
much support from both practitioners and academics. It also has engendered much 
debate about the practicality of practising managers being in a position to work in such 
an organised way.
4.4. LEVELS OF PLANNING W ITH IN  THE FIRM: STRATEGIC VERSUS 
OPERATIONAL
Thus far the discussion had focused on the nature of planning relative to the overall 
management task. It is also necessary to focus on levels or categories of planning 
which exist in the organisation. This is deemed to be important because such 
discussion will help to clarify how the decision - making process operates and in 
particular how they can be implemented.
Hofer and Schendel (44) suggests that three levels of strategy (sic) can be identified:-
1. Corporate strategy - the level at which decisions are made about the 
range of businesses in which the organisation will compete.
2. Business strategy - the level which concentrates specifically on the 
manner in which the company is to compete with respect to each 
business, where the latter is situation specific to industries and 
product - market scopes.
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3. Functional strategy - the level which concentrates on maximising the 
resource productivity of each of the functions, such as marketing and 
manufacturing.
This approach has the benefit of being conceptually simple to comprehend. However it 
could equally be argued that it raises more questions about the nature of strategic 
planning than it answers. Specifically, it fails to adequately explain the many conflicting 
ways in which companies organise their hierarchical structures to allow for such an 
approach to be implemented. Greenley and Aaby (45) pinpoint a lack of consensus on 
definitions and terminology within the literature; resulting in a myriad of labels such as 
organisational strategy, generic strategy, SBU strategy, strategic management, 
strategic planning, strategic marketing, master / grand strategy, operational strategy, 
composite strategy, root strategy, strategic posture and marketing strategy. Faced with 
such a range of alternatives, one could be excused for pleading a high degree of 
confusion. To compound the problem, authors such as Jain (46) provide a persuasive 
argument to suggest that there is a great degree of overlap between the marketing 
literature on strategy and the general literature on strategic management. This is an 
issue which is taken up in a later article by Slater and Aaby (47).
Within the range of terms identified in the preceding paragraph, one clear isue emerges. 
This refers to the need to distinguish between the terms "strategic" and "operational" 
respectively. Thankfully this is an aspect of the literature which has been clarified 
reasonably clearly. For instance Ackoff (48) notes that strategic planning can be 
differentiated from other aspects of planning in that its impact has an enduring effect 
on the organisation, being broad issues which relate to the longer term.
Because of the substantive nature of such decisions, allied to their impact on resources 
and the concomitant requirement for financial outlay, writers such as Denning (49) and 
Higgins (50) place the responsibility for such decision - making firmly in the hands of 
top management as opposed to middle ranging, functional managers.
Taylor (51) posits the view that strategic planning not only allows the company to 
tackle adverse situations which may arise from general environmental conditions: it 
also allows the company to exploit opportunities which also appear. If the former view 
is accepted, it can suggest that strategic planning is nothing more than "fire fighting" or 
staving off problems which could not be predicted in advance. This is not what the 
basic nature of strategic planning is about. Rather, it allows the firm to identify and
106
select opportunities which it can pursue; the actual planning process helping to dictate 
the determination of the desired direction in which the firm wishes to go.
Greenley (52) identifies a number of specific features which can be associated with 
strategic planning. These are outlined in table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1. The Nature of Strategic Planning__________________________________________________
Strategic planning is concerned with:-
- Exploiting opportunities
- The future shape, size and posture of the firm
- An examination of the firm as a whole
- Assessing the effects of environmental variables
- The responsibility of top management
- Developing overall objectives and strategy
- Enduring consequences for the firm's future
Thus it can be seen that strategic planning very clearly takes a long term perspective of 
the firm's future: specifically addressing the related questions of what markets and 
products it should be addressing.
The strategic planning process is represented in this case as a detailed exercise which 
has the overriding task of bridging the strategic gap (presuming that no company 
irrespective of size, can hope to be in a position to automatically meet the changes 
necessary to drive change) between a company's desired position i.e. where it wishes to 
be, vis - a vis its current position i.e. where it is at present.
An extensive review of the literature reveals a wide discrepancy as to how authors 
define the time frame for strategic planning. This can range from a three year focus to 
anything up to twenty years. Any discussion on the efficacy of pinpointing a suitable 
time frame has to placed in historical context. For instance, Carpenter (53) suggests 
that the 1960's were characterised by an emphasis on long range planning which was 
perceived as a fancy term for five year forecasts and financial projections and 
objectives. Whereas the 1970's led to the emergence of strategy consultancies which 
developed a series of concepts that led to a move away from simple extrapolation of 
figures and towards issues of business economics and competitive interaction. In the 
1980's there was a definite swing away from the "designer " approaches to strategy 
development as promulgated by the Boston Consulting Group, the Arthur D. Little 
Consultancy firm and many others. Stubbart (54) argues strongly that the "increasingly
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volatile, complex and interactable environments" facing long - range planners, allied to 
an accelerating rate of social, political, technological and economic change, have 
rendered the conventional strategic planning exercise (which is more suited to 
incremental change as opposed to convulsive change) "futile in such conditions". By 
implication therefore, the longer the time frame used by companies, the greater the 
likelihood that errors and inaccuracies, at best, will occur. In the worst possible 
scenario, it can be argued that a company can be guided to a course of action which 
will lead to extinction.
By contrast, operational planning concerns itself with planning the existing areas of 
business and not directly concerning itself with the broad changes in direction which is 
reflective of strategic planning. The typical features of operational planning as 
identified by Greenley (55) are identified in table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2. Thu Nature of Operational Planning
Operational planning is concerned with :
- projecting current operations into the future
- projections into both the long and short run
- labelling short - range operational planning as tactical planning
- manufacturing and marketing current products
- deploying the current base of resources
- modifications of business functions only
- the responsibility of functional managers.
The various features of operational planning as identified by Greenley is relevant 
because it does not suggest that it only concerns itself with the short - term. Rather, it 
reflects the view that looking into the long term future not only necessitates the 
development of strategic plans, but recognises that in order for such plans to be 
implemented, it is dependent upon the business functions within the company. This is 
very much within the domain of operational planning.
4.5. THE M ARKETING / STRATEGY INTERRELATIONSHIP
The preceding discussion has attempted to clarify the generic term " strategic 
planning". It identified, in the process, that a vast number of terms exist in the 
literature which does not help to make it easy to achieve such clarity.
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However further clarification does need to be made. This is because of the tendency of 
many writers to use terms such as strategic marketing (56) and strategic market 
planning (57). As a consequence there is a need to examine the precise relationship 
between marketing strategy and strategic management. In particular this section will 
address the question as to whether major differences exits and if this is the case, then 
what the resulting implications are. As has been already indicated in the earlier 
discussion, it is clear that a lack of consensus exists on the various definitions which 
appear in the literature. Wind and Robertson (58) note that this presents difficulties in 
that "sound and consistent definitions are needed in order to advance research". If their 
view is accepted, then it is clear that there is little evidence from the literature to 
suggest that this is the case. Gardner and Thomas (59) in their review of the emergent 
themes in relation the strategic marketing, highlight the fact that while it is important to 
separate marketing strategy from corporate strategy, it is a difficult exercise.
Before examining the precise nature of the relationship between marketing strategy and 
strategic planning, it is a useful exercise initially to examine the contributions of 
marketing to strategic management and likewise to explain what is meant by the terms 
"marketing" and "marketing strategy".
4.5.1. MARKETING DEFINED
There have been numerous attempts to define and place marketing in context. A 
random selection is presented for consideration. While it is necessary to examine what 
is meant by the marketing concept, it is deemed to be more appropriate to consider the 
misconceptions which people have about the term and, more fundamentally, why 
companies have failed to implement much of what has been recommended in the 
literature. The marketing concept has been described as
" A corporate state o f mind that insists on the integration and co - ordination 
of all o f the marketing functions, which, in turn, are welded with other 
business functions, for the basic objective o f producing maximum long - 
range corporate profits". (60)
"The marketing concept means that an organisation aims all its efforts at 
satisfying its customers at a profit ”. (61)
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" The marketing concept....calls for most o f the effort to be spent on 
discovering the wants o f a target audience and then creating the goods 
and services to satisfy them”. (62)
In addition to these definitions, a reprise of the works of Drucker (63) and Levitt (64) 
identifies the purpose of business as that of creating and retaining satisfied customers. 
In achieving this position, the early work of Keith (65) can be identified as one of the 
most effective attempts to explain the marketing concept. In his article he used the 
Pilbury company, as a case study, to trace the managerial phases through which a 
company must go through in order to arrive at what he calls the marketing control 
phase. He suggests that a company moves from the initial production philosophy 
(which places the emphasis on the notion of "selling what we make"), to a sales 
orientation which stresses the need for a large amount of promotional and selling 
effort, through to the marketing philosophy which revolves around the notion of 
"making what we can sell". This approach as articulated by Keith as far back as 1960 
has formed the basis for most opening chapters in introductory marketing textbooks. 
By implication it is prescriptive in nature, suggesting that it is the most appropriate 
avenue to success for every company. It clearly identifies both the production and sales 
orientations as being inferior to the marketing orientation.
It would be wrong to assume that the marketing concept has been embraced avidly by 
everyone. For instance Bennett and Cooper (66) have argued that American companies 
which have claimed to adopt marketing, have diverted attention away from a long - 
term emphasis on product development and quality manufacturing to a short - term 
emphasis on tactical areas such as advertising selling and sales promotions. As a 
consequence, product value has suffered. They cited the cases of the American 
automobile and television industries - once dominated by local companies, but now 
dominated by imports. Their thesis suggests that American companies have become 
seduced by the need to focus on market research to generate new products as opposed 
to basing strategy on the creative insights of the R & D personnel. As a consequence 
they argue that the consumer is only able to provide feedback on products with which 
they are familiar with - leading to "new, improved" products, in contrast to radical 
innovative products. They perceive the "technology- push" approach leads to truly new 
products of superior quality and product value. They are supported in this view by 
Hayes and Abernathy (67). Thus this notion of the product concept begins with the 
ingenuity and inventiveness of the scientists and engineers, not the needs and wants of 
the consumers. This alternative view would appear to be at odds with the established 
definitions of the marketing concept.
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McGee and Spiro (68) present a more balanced assessment and note that such 
criticisms do not contradict the basic tenets of the concept itself. They argue that the 
product concept is "synonomous with customer satisfaction as described by the 
marketing philosophy". They support this stance by noting that the product concept is 
but one implementation of the marketing concept. While in some product categories, 
customers do demand high quality, innovative products, not all categories require 
technical excellence, or indeed should be positioned as premium goods within a 
particular market sector. This is undoubtedly a more balanced, pragmatic position. 
While scientists (under the technology - push theory) may well generate ideas which 
subsequently translate into successful products, there have been many instances where 
this has not been the case. This latter point reiterates a tendency of many writers on the 
marketing concept to adopt an unduly simplistic, prescriptive approach which is then 
applied to all situations, irrespective of the idiosyncrasies and nuances of particular 
market situations. This extends to the view that markets do exist where the production 
philosophy, so derisively dismissed by many advocates of the marketing concept, can 
be an appropriate strategy to pursue.
In the mid 1980's King (69) wrote an influential article portraying his views as to the 
performance of marketing within firms in the United Kingdom. He identified a number 
of false areas of marketing being practised by managers and which have been 
misunderstood as marketing. This has led to British companies under - performing He 
suggests four such routes to failure:-
1. Thrust Marketing : - this reflects a view which focuses almost exclusively on 
price and price - cutting as the main method for achieving sales. It thus makes the 
erroneous assumption that the consumer is looking for cheapness: it fails because the 
consumer is really looking for value.
2. Marketing Department Marketing : - this practice emerged when companies 
recognised that selling and marketing were not the same and therefore two 
departments were created. This encouraged marketers to develop their own arcane 
practices and jargon, bolted on to the typical company bureaucratic structure with all 
its hierarchies and departmental boundaries.
3. Accountants Marketing :- in this particular case, companies have stressed the 
bottom line figure on the profit and loss statement. This approach, of necessity, has 
focused on short - term consideration rather than the longer term .
I l l
4. Formula Marketing this approach holds the view that control is more 
important than innovation. This is reflected in the tendency for companies to recruit 
executives from MBA schools. People from this background are taught to approach 
problems in the same way; typically relying on excessive number crunching and 
analysis. They also tend to move between jobs and companies without spending the 
necessary time to gained the requisite competence in any given area. This approach 
encourage safe, "middle - of - the - road" brands. It leaves such products open to 
attack from competitors on a number of fronts however.
The four false marketing practices outlined above appear to make sense from an 
intuitive point of view. It is easy to cite countless examples of companies who have 
fallen into one, some or all of those traps. King succeeds in making people think about 
the true role of marketing and its basic function in the company. He is on less sure 
ground when it comes to the recommendations for improving marketing practice. 
While it is difficult to disagree with his suggestions: that a) a company should start 
with the company, b) adopt a longer term perspective, c) use all the company resources 
and d) innovate, it is less clear as to how such thoughts might be implemented in such 
organisations.
The views of Bennett and Cooper provide some telling evidence as to why marketing 
has not played as proactive a role in strategic planning as many advocates would 
desire.
Schnaars (70) puts forward the view that the greatest gulf between marketers and 
business strategists exists in the respective attitudes to the competitor. Historically 
much of what has been written on strategic planning has considered the competitive 
effects. By contrast he notes that the traditional marketing paradigms have focused on 
the consumer, not the competition.
The mention of competition and the concomitant need to study competitive 
manoeuvres in essence identifies the link between the marketing concept and marketing 
strategy. The seminal work of Michael Porter in the 1980's, most notably his book 
Competitive Strategy (71) moved competition to the forefront of strategic thinking. 
Although his background is in the area of industrial economics and his work has been 
directed towards the mainstream business strategists, he has succeeded in 
concentrating the minds of marketers on the role of the competition when designing 
marketing strategy.
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Schaars (72) makes the valid observation that marketing strategy requires a balance 
between two separate groups - consumers and competitors. Historically, marketers and 
business strategists have focused on only a single orientation. The requisite balancing 
act is presented in figure 4.1.
f i g u r e  4.1. Consumer versus Competitor Orientation
Consumer Consumer / Competitor
Orientation Competition Orientation
Balance
Examples
Marketing Competitive Corporate
and Consumer Marketing Strategy
Behaviour Strategy
Schnaar's views have some degree of substance in that they suggest that the marketing 
concept by itself, has proved to be an incomplete view of business. He can be 
challenged however on the claim that many of the writers have ignored competition. It 
is more accurate to suggest that they have downplayed the influence of competition. It 
is less accurate, indeed simplistic, to suggest that the competitive factor has been 
ignored. A perusal of many standard textbooks on marketing provides evidence that 
the competitive factor is given attention. A good example is that of Murray's book (75) 
which depicts the marketing function as "managing market needs with company 
resources in a competitive environment to produce products or services that is needed 
at the appropriate time, price and location, and which is clearly communicated to the 
target market."
4.6. MARKETING STRATEGY EXPLAINED
Greenley and Aaby (74) provide a synthesis of the various approaches used by writers 
in the literature to explain the concept of marketing strategy. They present five 
differing schools of thought as to what makes up marketing strategy. These are 
outlined in table 4.3. Their categorisation of the various approaches serves the 
highlight the incremental manner in which marketing strategy has begun to overlap
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with much of the strategic management literature; once again highlighting the 
difficulties of differentiating between the various terms.
TABLE 4.3. EXPLANATIONS OF MARKETING STM  TEGY
FIRST : THE MARKETING MIX SCHOOL
How a company organises the elements of the marketing mix
SECOND: THE TARGETING PLUS MIX SCHOOL
Targeting and positioning in certain segments of the market and how the elements of 
the mix are used in each segment
THIRD: THE SEMANTICS SCHOOL
The establishment of marketing objectives, selecting target market segments and 
developing a mix for each segment
FOURTH: THE HIERARCHY SCHOOL
The utilisation of marketing through the management hierarchy at the corporate, 
business and functional levels
FIFTH: THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
The establishment of product - market spaces, sustainable competitive advantage 
and the commitment of resources
The Marketing Mix School reflects the traditional way of explaining marketing 
strategy. This approach is best summed up in the work of Boyd and Larreche (75) who 
put forward three levels of strategies by which the elements of the marketing mix are 
organised
* marketing strategies - the generalised statement which applies to the 
marketing mix across a set of product - market entries. It is company specific and 
stresses the interrelation of those elements related to the product, its price, the 
distribution system and the communications system.
* marketing element strategies - this adopts a narrower focus, emphasising a 
specific element of the marketing mix such as the particular type of product strategy
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(innovative versus follower), pricing strategy (penetration versus skimming) or 
distribution strategy (selective versus exclusive versus intensive)
* product - market entry strategies - this kind o f  strategy statement sets 
forth guidelines pertaining to a specific product - market relationship. It bears a close 
relationship to corporate strategy, because it focuses on the general product - market 
equation and thus involves decision - making in the areas o f resource allocation, and 
investment.
The second attempt at explanation; the Targeting P lus M ix School, defines marketing 
strategy as the integration o f market choice plus a marketing mix configuration choice. 
For example popular textbooks such as McCarthy (76) and M cCarthy and Perreault 
(77) use the term "target market" extensively, to highlight how a firm will establish 
market share in any given segment. A related term, "positioning", has also featured 
prominently in the works o f Kotler (78), where he uses the concept to establish 
leadership for companies in selected markets. In a similar vein, Greenley uses the term 
in the context o f the decision as to which market segment or segments to participate in.
The Semantics School is best represented by the works o f Cravens (79) and Cravens 
and W oodruff (80) where the objectives are included as part o f  marketing strategy. 
Greenley and Aaby (81) argue that this integration o f marketing objectives with 
strategies and policies is in contrast to much o f the traditional management literature 
which separate means from ends ( strategy from objectives). Cravens (82) states that 
marketing strategy consists o f a target market strategy, objectives and a marketing 
programme positioning strategy. To add to the confusion, another strategy label is 
introduced, where positioning is used in the context o f formulating particular activities 
as opposed to positioning the company in the market - place ( as was the case with the 
previous school)
The Hierarchy School is based on relating marketing to different levels in the 
organisation. This is best evidenced in the writings o f  Jain (83 and 84) where he uses 
the term corporate marketing, strategic marketing and marketing management almost 
synonomously. He suggests that marketing strategy takes place at the business unit 
level and that a number o f inputs from the corporation, customers and competition 
shape the resultant strategy.
Aaby and McGann (85) take up this theme and argue that marketing has a role to play 
throughout the management hierarchy. They identify three levels
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* corporate marketing strategy - the mix elements are applicable 
across the whole company, being part o f the navigational role 
o f the company
* business marketing strategy - the sharing o f certain mix elements, 
such as channels and sales force, where the implementation for 
each SBU is the same
* functional marketing strategy - a specific mix unique to each
business, formulated to address the specific needs o f served 
segments and /  or markets
As a result, Aaby and McCann define marketing strategy as:
 an activity that organises marketing mix efforts and resources relative
to strategic references, such that the resource allocation, in the long run, enhances 
the value o f  the firm  to a ll stakeholder groups. " (86)
The final group as identified by Greenley and Aaby, the Strategic M anagem ent School, 
argues that much o f the confusion in the use o f terminology springs from the fact that 
strategy is used as either a process or the output o f  that process. In attempting to 
explain the term "marketing strategy", Wensley (87) concentrates on the output factor, 
calling this the marketing strategy statement. This focuses on three major components :
* the product - market space - the competitive arena within which 
commercial sellers compete against each other for customers
* sustainable competitive advantage - working on the assumption that 
only those firms which have or are capable o f developing a 
sustainable competitive advantage will realise potential profits and 
thereby maintain and hopefully improve their competitive position.
* commitment o f  resources - typically a firm has to invest in 
specific assets, if they wish to build a sustainable advantage 
in the market - place.
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This synthesis by Greenley and Aaby raises more questions than answers. For instance 
it is debatable whether the five separate "schools" identified in their analysis are as 
clearly separated as they would wish the reader to believe. The hierarchical effect - 
whereby marketing is perceived to operate on a number o f different levels (from 
functional to corporate) would appear to exist to a great extent in each o f the 
categories. The only discernible difference which can be detected is the extent to which 
a particular school overtly advocates the fact that marketing strategy equates with 
strategic marketing and that both terms are used synonomously.
They further identify three contributions which have been put forward in the literature 
to explain strategic marketing. The first approach posits the view that strategic 
marketing represents marketing's contributions to strategic management. As a 
consequence o f this observation, all other aspects o f  marketing are therefore 
operational, including marketing strategy. The seminal influence behind this thinking is 
the work o f Drucker (88) where he advocates the view that marketing is so basic that 
it cannot be separated from the total work o f the company. This is reinforced in the 
later work o f W ebster (89) where he suggests that "marketing is not something that 
can be delegated to a small group o f managers while the rest o f  the organisation goes 
about its business. Rather it is the whole business as seen from the customer's 
viewpoint". Likewise, Bonoma (90) has argued that marketing is "too important to  be 
left in the hands o f marketers".
This split in the role o f marketing in strategic management and operational 
management is a difficult issue to be definitive about. Schendel (91) argues that the 
majority o f marketing work is operational although its role in strategy - making is seen 
to be essential.
Brownlie (92) proffers the view that instead o f looking for clear demarcations between 
strategic management and marketing management, it is more appropriate to consider 
areas o f common ground or shared responsibilities. While much of the work o f the 
marketing manager is concerned with operational issues, he argues that the emergence 
o f marketing as a business philosophy has meant that increasingly, senior marketing 
personnel are contributing to formulation o f long range plans and strategies.
The second category - the Strategic Business Unit (SBU) School argue that strategic 
marketing is only concerned with establishing strategy at SBU level and not at the 
corporate or operational level, The prime advocate o f this line o f argument is Jain (93) 
who observes that " practice o f strategic marketing seeks first to examine each product
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/ market before determining its appropriate role. Further, different product / markets 
are synergistically related to maximise total marketing effort". This appears to be a 
clear-cut delineation, although the tendency to relate it to the strategic business unit 
level is unduly narrow and reflective o f the "American " perspective o f how a business 
operates. Gardner and Thomas (94) dispense with this distinction while putting 
forward the same view as Jain. However they introduce two more labels in their 
discussion : marketing positions and programs, thus adding further to the confusion 
over terminology.
The third contribution - the Interchangeable School, stems from an influential article by 
Wind and Robertson (95) in the early I980's, where they use the terms strategic 
marketing and marketing strategy interchangeably. However while this is the case, a 
closer reading o f this article indicates that these authors support the view that 
marketing management "is most fundamentally concerned with the design o f the 
marketing program (sic) or mix" whereas "marketing strategy forces explicitly on the 
quest for long run competitive and consumer advantage".
Greenley and Aaby's w ork has only served to further add to the confusion surrounding 
the use and application o f these and other terms. However it is submitted that it is both 
pragmatic and logical to use these terms interchangeably, provided a number o f caveats 
are entered into.
Firstly it is prudent to consider the specific category level. For example are we talking 
at the corporate, strategic business unit or purely functional level ? Here, a delineation 
can be made, as many of the marketing activities most commonly associated with the 
elements o f the marketing mix, would clearly be undertaken at a functional, 
departmental level.
Secondly, much o f the discussion and examination contained in the literature fails to 
address the differences which can occur in both the interpretation and utilisation o f 
terms such as marketing strategy and strategic marketing as a result o f company size 
and whether or not a company is a single or a multi - business operation. This is partly 
due to the background o f the academics responsible for promulgating the alternative 
viewpoints and also due to the focus which is given to the large enterprise.
It can be seen from the preceding analysis o f  the literature that marketing has a major 
role to play in the strategic planning process. Wind (96) has identified the development 
o f product and marker opportunities and the preparation o f a detailed marketing plan
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for such ventures as being pre-eminent in this regard. He also suggests that the 
marketing function acts as a motivator o f change within the company and contributes a 
range o f analytical tools and concepts which can aid the strategic planning process. 
This latter observation o f course presupposes that marketing, as a function, is accepted 
unequivocally within the ranks o f senior management and that such recommendations 
which emanate from the marketing personnel will be acted upon and implemented 
within the realms o f the overall corporate plan. It is submitted that this is a rather 
simplistic point o f view which ignores the inter - functional rivalries and prejudices 
which have been discussed in greater detail earlier in this chapter. It is one thing to 
advocate a range o f functions which marketing should be expected to perform; it is 
quite something else to  expect them to be implemented.
It is further argued that there is a great likelihood that much o f the preceding 
discussion needs to  be re - evaluated in a number o f different contexts. Firstly 
discussion needs to take place in the context o f the small, growing enterprise, which 
after all is the primary target for investigation in this study. Likewise it is also 
necessary to present an examination o f the interface between marketing planning and 
strategic planning.
4.7. MARKETING : PLANNING AND THE SMALL FIRM
The characteristics o f the small firm, together with the contribution which it has made 
to the Irish economy have been considered in great detail in earlier chapters. In 
addition the entrepreneur and the growth patterns o f the evolving firm have also been 
examined. One significant area which has not been addressed so far (and which is 
central to the development o f the research methodology for the study) is the way in 
which the small, growing firm utilises and adopts overall business planning and in 
particular how it uses marketing and marketing planning within such a fram ework (if 
one exists in the first place).
The analysis o f the characteristics o f small enterprises indicated a number o f areas in 
which owner - managers differ from professional management in larger companies. 
Carson and Cromie (97) and the earlier w ork o f Cohn and Lindbore (98) note that the 
former tend to adopt a negative attitude to  marketing; perceiving it as a cost to the 
business (in contrast to an investment), treat distribution and selling as uncontrollable 
problems and perhaps more significantly, harbour rather cynical views about whether 
or not general marketing rules and principles can be applied in all cases. By contrast it
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would appear that they believe each case to be so specific and idiosyncratic, that the 
latter practice would be dangerous.
M ore pragmatic considerations also ensure that a different marketing perspective 
prevails in the smaller enterprise. For example, most owner - managers have (by the 
very nature o f the operation allied, to the limited financial resources) to be experts in 
all matters pertaining to the running o f the business; ranging from telephonist to 
accountant to salesperson. Schollhammer and Kuriloff (99) suggest that as a 
consequence, the smaller firms adopt a much more pragmatic approach to the use o f 
marketing techniques and tools as an aid to problem - solving. Given the limited 
resources, expertise and limited impact (due to fewer orders, less customers and fewer 
employees) it is not surprising therefore that Carson and Cromie (100) argues that 
the:-
"sm all firm s ' marketing is shaped by the peculiarities o f  the sm all firm  and  
may well be constrained by them". (p36)
4.8. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARKETING PLANNING  
PROCESS
Piercy and Giles (101) put forward a conventional model o f the strategic marketing 
process which is appropriate because it attempts to delineate the marketing plan from 
corporate goals and the marketing audit. This is represented in table 4.
This approach is typical o f the broad outlines presented by authors such as McDonald 
(102), Greenley (103) and Hopkins (104) although one might seriously quibble with 
the label "marketing audit" being attached to objectives, strategies and tactics. It is 
commonly accepted that a marketing audit refers to the appraisal and evaluation o f 
existing strategies; not the preparation and implementation o f them.
Cousins (105) notes that this sequential, logical model is closely derived from the 
strategic planning model and puts forward a textbook version o f the typical contents o f 
a marketing plan. This is presented in table 4.4.
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TABLE 4.4. THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
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TABLE 4.5. THE TEXTBOOK CONTENTS OF A MARKETING PLAN
The Textbook Contents of a Marketing Plan
Section Purpose
1. Executive Summary A brief overview for management skimming
2. Current Marketing Situation Background data on the market, product, 
competition, distribution and macro environment
3. Opportunity and Issue Analysis The main strengths / weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats, and issues facing the product that 
the plan must deal with
4. Objectives The goals in sales volume, market share and 
profit
5. Marketing Strategies The broad marketing approach intended to meet 1 
the plan's objective
6.
it
Action programs (sic) What will be done? Who will do it? When will 1 
be done? and How much will it cost?
7. Projected Profit and Loss 
Statement
The expected financial payoff from the plan.
8. Controls How will the plan be monitored?
_________________ Source: Adopted from Kotier 1988 in Cousins p36.___________________ 1
She further suggests that the typical process model shows marketing department inputs 
leading to the strategic planning analysis which determines business unit missions or 
objectives. These in turn form the main objectives for the marketing plans which are 
then evaluated and executed and, eventually, fed back into the process by marketing 
department inputs into the strategic plan. This is represented in table 4.6.
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TABLE 4.6. r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  m a r k e t in g  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  p la n n in g
The Textbook Theory of the Relationship Between Marketing and Strategic Planning
Marketing Department Strategic Planning
Department
1. Marketing 2, Strategic
Department Planning
Inputs Analysis
4. Marketing 3. Business
Plans Unit Missions
5. Marketing 6 . Results
Execution Evaluation
This model shows the inputs to  the process divided according to their department o f 1
origin
Source: Kotier 1988, p67
Following the framework proposed in table five, Cousins argues that the theory o f 
marketing management claims that marketing planning is o f central importance, citing 
Kotler(106), who identifies the following activities as accruing from such an exercise:-
marketing strategy development 
marketing objective setting 
action plans
a budget and control system 
integration o f the business functions
4.8.1. MARKETING PLANNING : THE BENEFITS
The benefits which emerge from engaging in marketing planning are well documented. 
For instance Lovelock and Weinberg (107) identify a number o f crucial areas which 
can improve the marketing performance o f an organisation
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* Co - ordinating the activities o f many individuals in the organisation 
whose actions are related over time
* Setting a timetable
* Providing for better communication
* Identifying future developments and trends in advance
* Forcing executives to think through the actions they would take if 
certain events occurred
* Focusing efforts
* Acting as a basis for a control system
* Maintaining organisational integrity - thus preventing a series o f ad hoc
decisions from being made
McDonald (108) and Carson and Cromie (109) crystallise the benefits which accrue, 
by noting that above all else, the process o f marketing planning provides an 
environment whereby management thinking can be clarified and where a sense o f 
purpose and direction is provided to both marketing executives and to managers from 
other functions from within the organisation. Earlier writers such as Boyd and Massey 
( 110) identify further positive considerations such as the probability that there will be a 
reduction in conflicts between individuals which could result in a subordination o f the 
goals o f the company to those o f the individual. Terpstra (111) identifies some 
pragmatic benefits including; the ability o f management to think ahead systematically, 
achieving a better balance between available corporate resources and market 
opportunities, and above all else, providing a unifying framework for a continuing 
review o f operations.
The foregoing discussion tends to create the impression that the benefits are so clear 
and unambiguous that there can be very little doubt that companies would adopt the 
practice o f preparing and implementing marketing plans without any equivocation. 
However this impression would be an incorrect one and certainly is not supported by 
any o f the empirical studies which have attempted to investigate the practice o f
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marketing planning within organisations. Thus, the actual situation is something o f a 
paradox. As Leppard and McDonald note (112), "there is a body o f evidence to 
suggest that there are some very real and worthwhile benefits to  be gained from 
marketing planning. On the other hand, very few British companies appear to invest in 
this process". (p214).
4.8.2. MARKETING PLANNING : THE EVIDENCE
Much o f the empirical research into marketing planning practices has been undertaken 
by Greenley (113, 114, 115). These four surveys undertaken in the early part o f  the 
1980's covered a total o f 240 companies, o f  which 190 were manufacturing and 50 
belonged to the services sector. They encompassed companies which achieved a sales 
turnover ranging from under £500,000 to £100 million and spanned companies which 
employed from under 50 people to those which employed over 5000. The profile o f the 
respondents is given in table 1. For each o f the four surveys, a random sample was 
selected from the Kompass Register, with surveys 1, 2 and 4 being based on 
manufacturing companies, while sample 3 was based upon service companies. Surveys 
1 and 3 utilised the same postal questionnaire, whereas survey 2 involved personal 
interviews with senior marketing personnel and a restructured questionnaire was 
accordingly designed. Survey 4 also utilised a postal questionnaire. In all cases the 
request for a response was directed to the chief executive responsible for marketing, or 
to the managing director where such responsibility was not clearly defined.
The most interesting findings from the analysis o f the four studies revealed that only 
between 31 and 48% o f companies prepare their strategic plan before the marketing 
plan to facilitate the role o f the former. In addition, although 71% o f  companies in 
survey 4 claimed that the strategic plan affects the marketing plan, only 12% explained 
the role o f the strategic plan as giving overall direction, while a further 35% explained 
only partial utilisation o f such a relationship. Finally, although 84% claimed that their 
marketing plan provides inputs to the strategic plan, only 43% were able to explain the 
nature o f these inputs relative to the role o f each form o f planning.
Greenly arrives at the overall conclusion that these results are largely inconsistent with 
the prescriptive approaches to planning that firms are urged to follow in the literature. 
He suggests that this is because the literature was o f little help to these companies, or 
that the executives were either unable or unwilling to follow such prescriptive 
approaches.
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TABLE 4.7. RESPONDENT PROFILE BY PRODUCT TYPE AND RESPONSE RATE
While the overall results suggest that companies do not practice what is preached at 
them, the methodology employed, with the possible exception o f the personal 
interviews utilised in survey 2 , does not allow for probing the respondents as to the 
rationale and logic underpinning such behaviour. On a more positive note, it does have 
to be acknowledged that Greenley's research did represent one o f the few empirical 
attempts in this area. His findings are also supported by McDonald (116) whose 
research revealed that as few as 10% of companies actually use what might be called a 
comprehensive marketing plan.
It can be stated that these earlier studies "scratched the surface" in terms o f providing 
an understanding or insight into the behavioural patterns exhibited by companies with 
regard to marketing planning. This situation is improved upon in relation to later 
studies where the focus has been on carrying out an investigation o f the managerial and 
behavioural issues related to marketing planning. In a later article, Greenley and Bayus 
(117) present a useful synthesis o f the empirical studies in this area. They are presented 
in table 4.8
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TABLE 4.8. OUTLINE OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN THE AREA
By way of explanation, Greenley and Bayus note that their review o f the literature 
failed to identify any empirical studies in the literature which address decision making 
within marketing planning. They defines marketing planning in this context as being a 
stage o f overall planning (which is generally perceived as being subservient to the 
higher levels o f  corporate planning, as discussed earlier in this chapter). The studies 
therefore which are highlighted in exhibit AAA are o f  a fragmented nature, reflecting 
research into both strategic planning and marketing planning areas and concentrating 
on only two or three decision - making methods in each case. Because o f this degree 
o f fragmentation, it is difficult to arrive at any significant conclusions, beyond the 
observation that there is a very low level o f utilisation o f methods such as the product 
life cycle concept, portfolio analysis and conjoint analysis. However it is a moot point
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as to whether the adoption o f a technique such as conjoint analysis has much to do 
with the practicalities o f marketing planning.
In order to redress this lack o f focus on decision making within the marketing planning 
process, Greenley and Bayus undertook a mail questionnaire which was sent to 
members o f the American Marketing Association and the Chartered Marketing 
Institute. Both surveys generated a response rate o f 18% and 11 %, respectively. Four 
specified marketing planning decisions were identified in the literature: pricing 
products, setting advertising budgets, launching new products and eliminating existing 
products. The results showed that few o f the companies which were covered in the 
survey, perceived that they are effective in making such decisions (on a scale from 1 - 
7, 1 = not effective and 7 = very effective), the mean was 4.5. Little differences were 
identified between American and British companies. Relatively few companies 
appeared to utilise the decision making methods which are often prescribed in the 
literature. It has to be acknowledged that the validity such surveys have to be seriously 
questioned, given the extremely low resposne rates achieved.
Yet again Greenley and Bayus raise more questions than answers. In defence o f this 
study, it does identify a reluctance on the part o f  management to adopt many 
techniques and tools which are so beloved by the academics. This calls into question 
the usefulness o f much o f the recommendations put forward by the theorists: there 
clearly is a significant gap between theory and practice. The study does not answer the 
question as to whether this gap is caused by a lack o f understanding among academics 
and theorists as to what actually happens in practice, or because practitioners are 
deliberately ignoring sound and logical recommendations which could benefit them 
substantially as they strive to improve their company's performance in the market - 
place.
Although Greenley and Bayus's work in this area has raised some interesting questions, 
it does suffer somewhat from "fuzzy thinking" with regard to the issues o f sample 
selection, the type o f research methodology employed and the areas which have been 
included (or perhaps more significantly, excluded) in the design o f the questionnaire.
With regard to the issue o f sample selection, it is not plausible to include large, medium 
and small companies in a general survey and expect to draw conclusions which are 
meaningful.
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The use o f a quantitative approach to survey design limits the level o f understanding 
and richness o f information which could have been gleaned from qualitative research 
techniques. Greenley and Bayus's study provides a good example o f the difficulties o f 
adopting a positivistic, deductive approach to research. While much psychological 
comfort can be gained from generating large volumes o f data and statistical analysis, it 
fails to provide an adequate level o f preunderstanding about the complex range o f 
influences which impinge on the marketing planning process.
They can also be accused o f  focusing on a limited number o f decision areas which are 
deemed to be germane to marketing planning. By implication, they would appear to 
use the marketing mix, with the notable exception o f  the distribution decision, as the 
framework for structuring the questions. While it is conceded that this provides a 
"ready - made" and administratively "easy" model, it does ignore a range o f other 
decisions which have to be typically addressed by most companies. Examples o f 
notable omissions include decisions relating to new markets (segments or international 
versus domestic), customer service levels, market access, market coverage and the 
level o f technical, product and sales support to provided to intermediaries.
Within the context o f  the Republic o f  Ireland experience, a major study was 
undertaken for Co - operation North in 1991 (118). This study, among other 
objectives, attempted to identify and assess the extent, status and standard o f 
marketing practice within business enterprises in both the Republic and the North o f 
Ireland. A sample o f two hundred businesses was chosen. Personal interviews were 
conducted with each company. Significantly, the study team did include companies 
employing less than 20 employees. Previous studies such as one conducted by Cooper 
and Lybrand (119) ignored such companies on the grounds that they would be 
unlikely to exhibit any degree o f management structure. The study team notes that this 
would also be the policy o f the Industrial Development Authority. However the study 
team argued (quite rightly) that in such small companies, despite a potential lack o f 
formalisation, there would still be "implicit" marketing o f some kind, albeit 
unstructured and informal in nature. This is a commendable feature o f the study, 
although criticisms will be levelled later as to the interpretation which they have placed 
on the findings.
Section four o f the study examined the extent to which companies were engaging in 
marketing planning and the standard o f planning which tended to prevail in the 
respondent companies. The results are relevant because they represent one o f the few
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attempts to provide a quantitative analysis o f  marketing planning practice in Ireland. 
Tables 4.9. and 4.10. provide a synopsis o f the main findings in this section.
The firms which emerged as the least likely to  have a marketing plan were those in the 
"small" category. This is not surprising given the characteristics o f such firms. 
Approximately fifty per cent o f the Northern companies which claimed to  have a 
marketing plan, could be more accurately described as "sales plans", which although a 
positive feature, reflects a lack o f sophistication and detail which would be the case 
with a marketing plan. The same percentage was identified in the case o f Southern 
companies. The group also make the valid point that the existence o f marketing plans 
did not indicate a commitment to do anything with them.
From the interviews it was clear that the behaviour with respect to the degree o f 
formality associated with marketing planning was broadly in line with the known 
characteristics o f small firm behaviour, where formal documenting o f situations is less 
prevalent than in the case o f medium and large enterprises. In some cases, the 
researchers identified situations where companies prepared very detailed plans,
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commissioned from outside sources, as part o f  the requirement for receiving grant aid 
or other state support. However the plan effectively remained on the shelf in terms o f 
guiding or monitoring the strategic direction o f the company.
The value o f this study lies in the employment o f the personal interview method, which 
allowed for a far higher degree o f probing than would have been the case if a mailed 
questionnaire were employed. In this respect, the findings highlighted in the preceding 
paragraph would not have emerged if the latter tool had been used. As a consequence 
it can be stated that this study begins to provide some insight into the reasons as to 
why many companies do not necessarily practice the "textbook" approach to marketing 
planning.
Unfortunately the report only concentrates on the basic statistics and fails to 
adequately present some o f the more qualitative findings which one assumes must have 
been generated from the personal interviews. These were largely based on an 
unstructured series o f themes which were discussed with the respondents. While the 
rationale for presenting the findings in this manner may have something to do with the 
requirements o f the sponsors o f the study, it is nonetheless a pity that the "richness o f 
detail" was not encapsulated within the main body o f the report.
The work o f McDonald (120), and Leppard and McDonald (121) is also helpful in 
providing an insight into why so many companies would appear to exhibit such a low 
acceptance level o f marketing planning. Earlier authors such as Wills (122) have 
suggested that business schools should operate at a more theoretical level than 
industry. His rationale for this stance is that by so doing, they will find new solutions to 
business problems that the busy executive, preoccupied with the day - to - day 
activities, would have no time to allocate to such an exercise. While there is no strong 
evidence to support or disprove such a view, it would appear to go against the reality 
which suggests that managers have a cynical attitude when it comes to adopting 
something which is conceptual in nature. On the other hand it can be equally argued 
that popular techniques such as those proposed by the Boston Consulting Group have 
been adopted with much enthusiasm; although they have subsequently gone out o f 
favour.
Boydell (123) is more pragmatic in his approach, when he identified a number o f so 
called "barriers" to learning which could perhaps inhibit the acceptance o f marketing 
planning. Among them were the following
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* Perceptual - not seeing that there is a problem.
* Cultural - being trapped within an existing set o f ideas with respect to 
what is right or wrong, good or bad etc.
* Intellectual - not having the "ammunition" to cope.
* Emotional - related to personal security and typified by a reluctance to 
change or take risks.
* Expressive - poor communication skills which limit the ability to 
explain problems and difficulties to others
* Environmental - whether or not the "climate" is supportive or hostile to 
the conditions necessary for improved performance.
In similar vein, Van Boeschoten (124) suggests that if learning is seen as a problem - 
solving process, then marketing planning can be perceived at three levels. At the lowest 
level, it is an unthinking, mechanical process, merely a prescription to be followed. At 
level two, it becomes a complex process which could require a company to develop 
new procedures and systems, even to invest in new resources to sustain these new 
developments. Level three is represented by a situation where a process exists which 
asks fundamental questions o f the company and as a result could affect the nature o f 
the business and its future direction. His basic thesis is that marketing planning is not 
taken seriously enough.
McDonald (125), based on his extensive work with companies (in both a research and 
consultancy capacity), has noted a number o f organisational barriers to strategic 
marketing planning. His observations go some way towards providing an explanation 
for the reluctance o f companies to adopt marketing planning more avidly. They are 
summarised as follows:-
* A preference for "short - termism" - where companies eschew the longer 
term based on the argument that it is difficult to look forward over a three year 
period if the company is operating in a turbulent environment.
* Isolating the marketing function from operations - resulting in a belief that 
marketing is something a marketing person does in their office and not 
something which impinges on other business functions.
* Confusion between the marketing function and the marketing concept -
where a great deal o f confusion exists as to what constitutes marketing i.e. the
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"well worn" perception that marketing equates to sales, to advertising, to 
customer service etc.
* Hostile corporate cultures - this issue indicates that the acceptance o f
marketing planning is largely conditioned by the stage o f  development o f the 
organisation and the behaviour o f the "corporate culture carriers" within.
Thus the influence o f key individuals or an individual (in the case o f a 
small, growing firm) can either positively or adversely affect the acceptance 
and subsequent adoption o f marketing planning process.
This latter barrier has been the focus o f a major study by Leppard (126) and 
subsequently reported on by Leppard and McDonald (127, 128) conditioned by the 
stage o f development o f the company and in particular, the behaviour o f  the corporate 
culture carriers within the organisation. Their 1991 study (which was based on a 
detailed assessment o f 34 case studies o f the marketing planning practices o f British 
companies) demonstrated that where a company has implemented a complete 
marketing process, along the lines o f the "textbook" approach which was outlined 
earlier, it is not just a series o f action steps, it also embodies a set o f values and 
assumptions which, while not being explicit, are nonetheless an integral part o f  the 
whole process.
In addition, they found that as an organisation learn and moves along "its biological 
lifeline", different issues can exercise it at different life phases.(129) This points to the 
fact that the "culture carriers" or the "product champions" can play a significant role as 
agents for change or stability, depending on the circumstances facing the company.
Their research also recognised that change does not come easily to an organisation. In 
particular a company's value system will not alter, unless something very significant 
takes place to  make such a change seem worthwhile.
The work o f Leppard and McDonald can be deemed to be significant in many respects. 
They highlight the "softer", non quantifiable influences. This is especially relevant, 
given that much o f the previous (and indeed present) literature in this area has 
highlighted the rational, sequential approach to marketing planning, whilst ignoring the 
rather obvious fact that issues such as management style, leadership skills, motivational 
abilities and the personality o f the chief executive (or product champion). M ore 
fundamentally they recognise that an organisation is too all intents and purposes, a 
"man - made" product, and as such, is dependent upon the skills abilities, weaknesses
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and foibles o f the owner - manager in the early stages o f a company's evolution. Later, 
this will change as an organisational structure has to be put in place and outside, 
professional managerial specialists appear.
The impact o f these "softer" issues cannot and should not be underestimated. They can 
clearly inhibit (at best) the successful implementation o f a marketing plan and ensure 
(at worst) an unfavourable environment, guaranteed to make any attempt to  introduce 
a plan inoperable. In essence, they recognise that the marketing planning process 
cannot be viewed as simply a cognitive process which companies can "learn" from a 
textbook. It is a political process, shaped by the ability (or inability) o f  influential 
characters in the company to communicate the organisational values which they wish 
to see espoused.
4.9. MARKETING AND THE SMALL FIRM
The essential benefits associated with marketing planning have been well aired in 
previous chapters. However a clear dichotomy between what has been prescribed in 
the literature and what actually happens in practice, with regard to marketing planning 
was identified. This in turn calls into question the level or degree o f acceptance which 
companies associate with the marketing planning process. In this regard the 1991 study 
by Leppard and McDonald (131) has put forward some tentative suggestions as to 
precisely what types o f planning process exist. These are outlined in table 4.11.
This framework is undoubtedly useful because it identifies the fact that the planning 
approach will differ, depending on the stage in the phase o f organisation growth. It 
also demonstrates that a degree o f flexibility is required, in contrast to a rigid, 
formalistic approach (which is often encouraged within the literature).
What then does the relevance o f the above framework have for the small firm? It is 
clear from the empirical studies carried out by Leppard and M cDonald that there are 
great dangers associated with applying a standard framework o f the marketing 
planning process to all companies, irrespective o f  size, length o f  establishment or 
nature o f  the products - markets served. As Carson (132) notes, "marketing planning 
must f i t  the circumstances o f the organisation". It is further submitted that the 
characteristics o f the small firm reinforce this notion and that as a consequence, 
attention needs to be paid to the precise manner in which the marketing planning 
process can be tailored in such a way as to prove to be meaningful to such companies.
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TABLE 4.11. CATEGORIES OF PLANNING
Phase of development Type of planning process Observations
Creative evolution No planning found Planning is counter - culture 
at this stage
Directed evolution Centralised, tightly defined Works well i f  the system
process, with a clear top - down and instruction are clearly
direction communicated and the 
business is not too volatile. 
The leader must demonstrate 
expertise.
Delegated evolution Decentralised, less tightly High quality inputs, high staff
defined process, relying on morale and commitment, but
bottom - up contributions the overall plan can lose focus.
Co - ordinated evolution Centralised planning, Makes good use of company
formal process, with clearly specialists, but the plan can
defined roles and responsibilities. degenerate into a meaningless
Top - down and bottom - up routine.
direction
Collaborative delegation Reduction of bureaucratic Perhaps different planning
processes. Creative solutions processes for different
are found for resolving product groups or markets.
planning problems High concern for both people 
and the task of planning
Source: Leppard John W., and McDonald, Malcolm. (1991) "Marketing Planning and Corporate Culture: A
Conceptual Framework which Examines Management Attitudes in the Context of Marketing Planning". Journal
o f  Marketing Management. 7, p234.
To what extent therefore can the literature on marketing and the small firm help to 
provide a clearer insight ? Yet again, a review o f the relevant w ork indicates a paucity 
o f meaningful research in the area. For instance, Davis et al (133) in 1985 found that 
there was not a single article in the Journal o f  M arketing  which addressed the theme of 
marketing and firm size. This may simply reflect the fact that much o f the research in 
this journal is based on American businesses; where the focus has traditionally been on 
the large company. On the other hand, Cannon (134) observes that much o f what is
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written is largely descriptive or pedagogical. He also notes that the reluctance of 
researchers to examine the smaller firm may relate to the fact that such companies may 
be less accessible than larger firms. This view however can be strongly challenged, 
given the increasing difficulties associated with obtaining interviews with executives 
from the latter companies, due to the number o f academic and commercial researchers 
operating within the business environment.
M ost o f the entrepreneurial models o f behaviour as evaluated in chapter three, 
pinpointed the view that such an individual tends to be a generalist, with responsibility 
for all aspects associated with the running o f a business. This, Cannon argues, would 
appear to conflict with the traditionally held view that marketing is a professionalised 
pursuit and perceived as a functional activitiy. I f  one also accepts the results o f work 
by Chell (135) which shows that proprietors o f small firms tend to operate to very 
short time horizons, allied to the the intuitive approach which many such firms adopt to 
planning, then an alternative view of how marketing is utilised by such firms, begins to 
emerge.
Carson (136) has provided the most recent and comprehensive w ork with respect to 
the way in which the small firm uses marketing. He has put forward six marketing 
models which he perceives as intending to be used in an exploratory assessment o f 
small firms' marketing performance. They are worthy o f evaluation.
Model 1: Marketing Limitations.
This approach takes the view that the small firm's constraints effectively limit the the 
manner in which they can use marketing within their business operations. These 
constraints: limited resources, lack o f specialist expertise and limited impact on the 
market - place all conspire to ensure that in the vast majority o f cases, such companies 
are not in a position to adopt many o f the marketing tools, concepts and techniques 
which have been identified in the literature.
While identifying some pragmatic reasons for not adopting marketing (or utilising it in 
a very limited manner), this model offers only a partial explanation and is too 
superficial, if accepted in isolation, to provide a detailed understanding. Carson, 
however, does caution against this view, suggesting that the six models should be 
considered as an interlocking network.
Model 2: Levels of Generalisation.
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This model argues that while general concepts, theories and approaches to marketing 
are acceptable in the "general" sense, but they need to be adapted for use in the 
"situation specific". Carson cites the work o f Weitz and Anderson (137) who 
constructed a "structure - environment match" model which matches complexity, 
unpredictability and interconnectedness - called environmental characteristics, with 
differentiation and integration, which they call organisational characteristics. In 
essence this model puts suggests a "trickle - down" effect: from the general marketing 
concepts, through to those which reflect particular industry or product sector e.g. 
services, industrial or consumer, eventually ariving at situation specific situations - such 
as small business marketing.
This model makes intuitive, good sense, although it lacks any real depth o f rigour or 
adequate empirical testing to suggest that it is anything more than supposition.
Model 3: Planning versus Operations
This approach identifies two distinctive kinds o f marketing decisions and speculates on 
how difficult it can be for small firms to maintain a balance between the two areas. 
This is perhaps best illustrated in the w orkof Sanderson and Luffman (138) who make 
the distinction between thinking and doing. Thinking referring to planning as a 
response to the environment, whereas doing is self explanatory, focusing on the 
immediate environment.
Thus Carson argues that planning activity in small firms can be viewed as being 
minimal or balanced. "Minimal", refers to a situation where a firm carries out little or 
no planning but instead is concerned with the operations o f marketing. Any planning 
which is carried out, is treated as a loose guideline. Balanced is defined as a 
circumstance where some marketing planning occurs i.e. at least once a period and 
where marketing is "appropriately balanced" between planning and operational 
activities.
This approach (yet again) makes intuitive good sense. However there is a great degree 
o f "fuzziness" associated with terms such as "appropriately balanced". It is difficult to 
pinpoint the demarcation line between operations and planning. It can be argued that 
operational activities are part o f the planning process anyway. Supposition wins out at 
the expense o f empirical evidence.
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Model 4: Marketing Planning Adapted for Small Firm
This would appear to be a "re - working" o f the theme outlined in model two. It 
accepts the general principles o f marketing, but argues that it needs to be applied in a 
simplistic manner, in order to be both workable and attractive to  the owner - manager. 
Two broad components form the nucleus o f the planning process: external 
considerations and internal considerations. He further suggests that two categories can 
be used to describe the small firm's ability to use marketing planning techniques: 
lim ited adaptation, where the company uses techniques which are wholly unsuitable 
for a small firm, e.g. major media advertising, and substantial adaptation, which 
indicates the degree o f refinement o f  marketing planning techniques to suit the 
characteristics o f the small firm and its particular circumstances.
This approach appears to be vague and somewhat repetitive (see model 2). However it 
does make the cogent observation that in all likelihood, a small firm will tend not to 
have a separate marketing plan from an overall business or corporate plan. Instead, it is 
more likely ( if it utilises plan in the first place ) to operate with a standard business 
plan, embracing marketing, financial and production issues. This, allied to the stress on 
the need for adaptability and refinement, reinforces the view that an alternative 
perspective o f small business planning needs to be borne in mind.
Model 5: Stages of Marketing Development
This approach is indirectly based on the "stages o f growth" model identified in chapter 
three. It argues that the actual prpactice o f marketing within small firms is based on 
how it develops from the time it is established through to when it is about to break 
through the threshold to be a medium - sized firm. It follows the line o f argument that 
the form o f marketing which is practiced will vary in terms o f sophistication and 
complexity, depending on the stage o f development o f the company. Carson identifies 
four such stages (based on empirical research ). They are as follows:-
* Stage One - Reactive stage; where the company usually starts with one, 
or a very limited number o f customers and is largely dependent for its survival 
on word o f mouth and personal contacts. M arketing as is commonly portrayed 
in the literature, does not really exist at this stage. If  it does, it is likely to  be 
haphazard and primitive.
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* Stage Two - Tinkering marketing; here marketing activity is still likely 
to be haphazard and carried out spasmodically and spontaneously. A
typical example o f this would be where a company decides to undertake a mail 
shot exercise or atttend an exhibition.
* Stage Three - Entrepreneurial marketing; this is defined as marketing 
which is recognised explicitly by the owner - manager for its value in 
generating sales but which is carried out by the entrepreneur as part o f  his
or her business activities.
* Stage Four - Proactive marketing; this is defined as a methodical, 
controlled approach to marketing. This will be usually carried out by a 
marketing specialist who has been brough into the company from outside, 
when it haas grown beyond a certain level .
This approach is more comprehensive than the preceding models. Carson's research 
demonstrates that the stages identified in the model are replicated by the companies 
which he studied.
Model 6: Levels of Activity
This is a composite model which draws on much o f the content surrounding the 
previous approaches. It examines the techniques and operations o f marketing practice 
whilst still taking account o f the planning dimensions. It argues that small firms will do 
marketing in various degrees o f different levels o f activity depending on a multiplicity 
o f circumstancesa, not least o f which may be their stage o f marketing development (as 
discussed in model five). Carson identifies three such degrees o f marketing: little or no 
marketing - where companies are largely reacting to customers, implicit or simple 
marketing  - where it occurs as a purely instinctive activity and finally explicit and  
sophisticated marketing  - where the marketing activity is part o f  a co - ordinated and 
integrated programme. Classification o f these three dimensions can be made to  both 
external and internal considerations. This is represented in table 4.12.
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TABLE 4.12. LEVEL OF MARKETING ACTIVITY
Marketing Planning None / little 
Considerations
Implicit / Simple Explicit / Sophisticated
Market knowledge
Competitors
Customers
Market information
Competitive advantage
Promotion
Price
Service
Source: Carson 1991, p28.
Carson (139) stresses that the six models which he presents, should be viewed "as an 
interlocking network revolving around the hub o f marketing planning" (p28). He 
further suggests that by considering any firm's marketing planning, using any or all o f 
the models, it should be possible to assess that firm's marketing capability and 
performance.
How then should Carson's work be assessed ? In its defence, it can be argued that it 
represents a major attempt to treat the topic o f marketing planning and its application 
in the context o f the small firm, with a degree o f  pragmatism and realism which is not 
evident in the rest o f  the literature. The interviews which Carson and Cromie (140) 
have conducted with almost seventy small firms would appear to support the view that 
such companies fall into one o f three marketing planning categories: non - marketing, 
implicit marketing and sophisticated marketing.
The six models as proposed by Carson, could be reduced in numbers. There would 
appear to  be a great deal o f overlap and duplication within them; particularly in models 
two and three. Rather than presenting them as six interlocking models, it would seem 
to make greater sense instead, to treat model six as the culmination o f the preceding 
five models.
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Earlier work into the issue o f marketing and the small firm certainly lacked the detail 
and depth o f analysis which Carson and Cromie have managed to generate. For 
instance Kinsey (141), in 1985 interviewed fifty Scottish companies and concluded that 
there was a clear need for improvement in the understanding o f marketing concepts 
and the use o f the marketing function in such firms, with the majority o f the companies 
interviewed, falling into the "production orientation" mode.
Ford and Rowley (142), in 1979, using a similar research methodology found that 
many owner - managers reject the use o f the marketing planning framework because 
they believe it to be incompatible with their objectives and motivations. These included 
issues such as: achieving a satisfactory financial return, acquiring a high level o f job 
satisfaction, retaining maximum personal control, maintaining a minimal reliance on 
external finance and taking pride in the quality o f the product supplied. In essence, they 
reinforce the view that much o f what is written about planning, by academics, does not 
"speak the language" o f the small business owner.
. The results o f the research reported on, in the preceding paragraphs have also been 
replicated in the United States e.g. Shuman and Seegar (143), Kelley and Young (144) 
and Robinson et al (145). Indeed Carland et al (146) suggest that the relative paucity 
o f planning in small firms may be explained by the personality o f  the entrepreneur and 
have conducted research which supports this view.
In a later article (147) Carson has developed a holistic model for entrepreneurial 
marketing development. Under this scheme, Carson identifies three aspects which 
contribute to  the model: formalising the marketing network, developing marketing 
management competencies and maximising education resources.
With regard to formalising the marketing network, Carson argues that it is based on 
the rationale that entrepreneurs have an intuitive understanding o f marketing concepts. 
While not necessarily knowing about such techniques, their "common sense" approach 
to doing business is harmonious with marketing development. The mechanism for 
helping them to develop this approach exists through the personal netw ork o f the 
entrepreneur. While it can be argued that such a framework is already used informally 
and sub - consciously, Carson argues that it should be placed on a more proactive and 
conscious footing. This follows the view that an entrepreneur will introduce an idea to 
one or a number o f trusted individuals within the network, and as a result o f feedback, 
will make the marketing decision. This, he suggests, is more beneficial and more 
relaxing to the entrepreneur, than having to formally present his idea to "forced" peer
141
groups, which are often to be found in action learning programmes, or in seminars or 
workshops sponsored by Government agencies.
The second aspect: concentrating on marketing competencies, addresses the issue o f 
which particular attributes are best suited to entrepreneurs and marketing. Carson 
argues that since the literature has been sparse in its treatment o f the topic, it can be 
inferred that those management attributes which can be deemed to be characteristic o f 
both the entrepreneur and marketing management, are taken into account. His review 
o f the relevant attributes includes; vision, leadership, creativity, intuition, motivation, 
initiative, communication, adaptability and achievement orientation. A  reasonable 
assumption which emerges from this, is that any marketing management decisions that 
incorporate some or more o f these competencies will be sound and consistent 
decisions. Such decisions are made within the context o f the marketing decision 
spectrum. Carson identifies four main headings to encompass such an area: product, 
price, image and service. Under his argument, the various management competencies 
identified earlier, should be viewed as an integrative mix o f attributes, which, when 
used in a balanced manner, will lead to better decision making in relation to the 
marketing spectrum.
The final factor refers to the need to maximis the education resources available. This 
involves creating an environment which is designed to encourage opposite perspectives 
to come together and share their knowledge in the form o f jo in t learning. Carsons 
suggests that there are many benefits to be attained from bringing young managers 
(new or recent graduates) and entrepreneurs together. This is based on the notion that 
in many respects, they reflect both ends o f the learning spectrum.
Carson argues that such a joint approach capitalises on the compatible strengths which 
derive from both parties. In his view, it succeeds in reducing the dichotomy between 
marketing and entrepreneurs while at the same time offering an opportunity to combine 
education and training.
In evaluating Carson's framework, it should be acknowledged that it is in the process 
of being empirically tested within the confines o f his university. The results o f this are 
not yet published, although verbal feedback indicates that it is proving to  be popular 
with both young managers and entrepreneurs. It should also be borne in mind that such 
a programme has been designed in a small open economy (Northern Ireland), which 
has a major priority to  develop and further improve the quality o f marketing activity 
within smaller firms.
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This latest approach by Carson tacitly acknowledges the discrepancy which exists 
between the theoretical perspectives offered by many marketing programmes and the 
specific attributes and characteristics which motivate entrepreneurs to start up a 
business in the first place. It reinforces his previously held view that marketing can be 
used more efficiently and profitably after the company has overcome the initial stages 
o f growth and is about to embark on activities which will have a major impact on its 
future success. Hence the overwhelming need to provide a programme which will 
improve the quality o f marketing decision making in such firms, while at the same time 
avoiding the mistake o f "imposing" a series o f concepts and theories more attuned to 
the needs o f the large or multi - national enterprise.
It is submitted that this type o f approach bridges the gap between theory and practice. 
A constantly recurring theme running through this and the previous chapter has been 
this failure on the part o f many researchers, academics and practitioners to focus on the 
specific characteristics facing entrepreneurs and owner - managers. In this respect the 
work o f Carson is to be commended. It does not o f course provide a solution for those 
owner - managers who are still cynical about becoming involved with academics or 
recent marketing graduates. However it can be argued (albeit without the benefit o f  
empirical evidence) that in technology based sectors e.g. electronics, computers and 
engineering, such owner - managers /  entrepreneurs are most likely to be the recipients 
o f some form o f a degree from a college or university and thus more receptive to  the 
contributions which recent graduates can make to the development o f their business.
4.10. MARKETING AND THE TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN FIRM
Given that the primary research which has been undertaken as part o f the overall 
investigation into the use o f marketing within the small firm is based on the electronics 
sector, it is deemed necessary to consider the nature o f such technology based firms 
and their possible impact with reard to the way in which the marketing concept and 
function is embraced and utilised.
Terms such as "high - tech" can cause problems from the point o f  view o f 
interpretation. It can mean different things to different people. Slatter (148) provides a 
succinct attempt to define such a term. He suggests that the most commonly used 
criteria employed are
* the level o f product or process sophistication,
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* the research and development intensity which prevails in the firm 
and
* the proportion o f technical employees within the work force.
In relation to the level o f product and process sophistication, it is perhaps more 
accurate to talk about a continuum running from "low - tech", through "mid - tech", to 
"high - tech". Under this approach, a company which has developed a "state o f the 
art", or "leading edge" product or process, could be described as a high technology 
operator. By contrast, a firm which is producing a product which has been in existence 
for quite some time and where the level o f sophistication attaching to it, is negligible, is 
more accurately described as a "low - tech" operator. This continuum - based view o f 
technology - based firms does have implications for the manner in which they may 
subsequently utilise marketing in their business planning activities.
Much o f the relevant literature in the area highlights the fact that small firms, due to 
their characteristics, play an important role in the development o f high technology 
industries.(for instance see Morse (149) and Oakey et al (150). There is a danger, from 
reading the seminal articles, o f believing the fallacy that all types o f small firms in such 
industrial sectors, are, or need to be, strongly innovative in nature. In this respect, 
Oakey (151), suggests that the age / maturity o f a particular industry will shape the 
extent to which small firms can exist and seek innovations. Abernathy and Utterback 
(152) observe that as industries age, there is a marked tendency for the establishment 
o f a standardised technological approach to  product design and production process.
Averitt (153) has also observed that the extent to which small firms exhibits a degree 
o f innovation is dependent on the strategy which the management employs. He 
subsequently carried out research with such companies in the electronics sector and 
identified three strategic types o f firms. The most profuse type o f small firm is the one 
who operates as a sub - contractor to a larger firm. This is best evidenced in the case of 
printed circuit board manufacturers (PCB). Because the technology involved has 
largely been developed by the larger firm, the small company doe not require to be very 
innovative: concentrating instead on maintaining a high level o f quality control and 
customer service. The second type o f operator is the "niche" producer - a company 
who meets a market demand o f a size which is not attractive to large firms. Oakey 
identifies products such as a specialist heat exchangers or non - destructive testing 
machinery. The final category o f operator is referred to as the product - based firm, 
which is often founded on a new product idea, and may attract a mass market appeal 
very quickly, based on its "new - to - the - world" technology.
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It is submitted that the behaviour o f firms with regard to how they utilise marketing, 
will be influenced to a large extent, by the "strategic type" to which they belong. 
Oakey(154) has put forward the view that while the sub - contractor and niche 
operators would appear to be ideally suited to the development o f close networks with 
their larger partners, they in fact pursue a passive role, which is largely subservient to 
their paymasters. Research undertaken by Oakey in the biotechnology industry would 
appear to support this latter view, and reinforces the "large firm dominance o f the 
"technology paradigm" as propounded by Kuhn (155).
In terms o f identifying specific influences on strategy formation within the technology 
based firm, Slatter(156) makes the cogent observation that the small high - tech firm is 
the most fragile o f all firms. In support o f this view, he identifies six groups o f factors 
inherent to such companies, which cause fragility:-
* The rate o f technological change;- which is difficult to predict as are 
the concomitant time and costs associated with the development and 
commercialisation o f technology. Allied to this is the short product life cycle o f 
many high - tech sectors.
* M arket volatility and uncertainty;- while generalisations are dangerous 
(niche sectors exist where conditions are relatively stable), the rapid and often 
discontinuous change in demand and rapidly shifting competitive strategies 
produce a market - place in which it is difficult to plan.
* The nature o f competition;- for as long as the small high - tech firm can 
provide superior customer satisfaction it has a competitive advantage.
However, the advantage is often is short - lived, if it is only based on 
technological superiority alone.
* Employee characteristics;- this refers to the motivational characteristics 
o f technical employees, often young, well educated and with a tendency to high 
job mobility. Thus the cumulative expertise which a small, evolving firm builds 
up over time, may be eroded if personnel move elsewhere.
* Resource constraints;-while this is a feature common to virtually all 
small firms, the high - tech category is often regarded as extremely risky by 
the financial community. Such firms also tend to focus on one or a few
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specialised products, aimed at specific customer segments. Thus, they are 
usually characterised by a narrow and highly specialised resource base.
* The high - tech entrepreneur and the founding team;-empirical 
research carried out by Corman et al (157) indicate that most high - tech firms 
are created to achieve intellectual and professional goals as much as the 
more commonly identified financial goals. Many founders are committed to a 
particular technology than to a market, and will sacrifice significant growth 
opportunities in technology and markets they consider to  be peripheral, rather 
than risk losing their chosen technology focus. The presence o f the founder can 
also act as a hindrance or barrier to further development.
Slatter concludes his discussion on the fragile nature o f high - tech firms by putting 
forward the view that managing fragility involves a delicate balancing act between the 
external forces which drive fragility and the firm's internal resources.
What then are the implications o f these observations for the manner in which high, 
medium or low - tech firms might use marketing within the context o f their business 
development ? It should be stated at the outset that all o f  previous discussion which 
took place regarding marketing and the evolving firm still applies to the technology - 
based company, This is evidenced by the pioneering work o f Bullock (158), who 
identified a similar series o f stages in the growth o f a small high - tech firm to those 
examined in chapter three. It is submitted however that those forces which make the 
management o f the small, high - tech firm so fragile, ensure that the development and 
implementation o f a business plan is a more difficult and complex process than might 
be the case in the instance o f a similar size o f enterprise in the services or consumer 
goods sector. Slatter (159) argues that the combined effect o f these six forces which 
drive the fragility o f such firms, is to create a situation where the typical high - tech 
company may exhibit a high propensity for crisis.
The essence o f his thesis, which he bases on empirical research with companies in 
various technology sectors, is that management must develop a decision - making style 
which is fast, analytical and bold. Fast, in the sense that it helps firms to cope with the 
rapid pace o f development and change in their respective technological environments. 
Analytical, from the point o f view o f adopting a more thorough and continuous search 
for strategic alternatives, from which effective decisions can be made, and bold, 
referring to the need for small high -tech firms to constantly differentiate itself and
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'reassert its position to deal with shifting technologies and changing competitive 
strategies.
In many ways this comes down to a trade - off between the speed, flexibility and 
dexterity associated with a reliance on intuition, "gut - feel" and informality, and the 
delay in decision making which can occur as a result o f  taking the time to analyse, 
rationalise and discuss alternatives with other management personnel in the company. 
This forms the basis for the final paragraphs o f this chapter as the relevance o f planning 
for the small firm is considered.
4.11. SUMMARY
It is more relevant to consider the level o f planning and the nature o f the company 
within which such planning activity occurs, rather than be preoccupied with the precise 
meaning o f any one term. Two contrasting perspectives about the efficacy o f planning 
in general have emerged from the analysis o f the literature. The conventional view is 
encapsulated in the belief that planning should follow a logical planning sequence. This 
is based on the belief that the stages o f the planning process are deliberately and 
rationally chosen. The alternative standpoint rests on the assumption that strategies 
tend to emerge from a confused and imperfect process - a tendency to "muddle 
through".
Proponents o f strategic planning almost unanimously agree that the planner is in a 
unique position to  provide leadership, guidance and direction to  an organisation, 
because the planning process effectively drives change. Articulate objectors to this 
view such as Mintzberg (160) argue that there is "no systematic evidence that 
planning does any o f  these things, and no shortage o f  anecdotal (as well as some 
systematic) evidence that it can do exactly the opposite". These diametrically opposed 
views capture the essence about the debate on the efficacy o f planning for the 
organisation.
Mintzberg crystallises the issue by noting that the conventional supporters o f planning 
acknowledge many so - called "pitfalls" associated with planning. He argues however 
that these pitfalls "are to planning what sins are too religion: impediments to be 
brushed aside, perfectly understandable cosmetic blemishes to be removed, so that the 
nobler work o f  serving the almighty can proceed. Except fo r  one fundam ental
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difference: pitfalls are mostly committed by "them," not "us," by managers or by 
organisations, not by planners or their systems. " (161)
This quotation from Mintzberg addresses the defining issues about the efficacy o f 
planning for companies. It reinforces the view that there is a very clear discrepancy 
between theory and practice: that for some reason, companies are failing to practice 
what is preached to them. This is summed up in many recent articles which have 
queried the relevance o f much o f the traditional literature on planning. (For example 
see Reid (162a, 163b), and Mintzberg (164) Perhaps Sarrazin (165) encapsulates the 
conundrum by noting that writers and researchers have two choices when it comes to 
encouraging companies to plan: encourage top management to  "fit their practice to  the 
theory" or else "attempt first to understand the causes o f the discrepancy". Mintzberg 
argues forcefully, that much of literature has almost exclusively focused on the former. 
This has resulted in a prescriptive, normative approach, which expects chief executives 
and senior management to follow the techniques and tools o f  planning as "laid down" 
by the literature.
It is maintained that the assessment o f the literature in this chapter firmly supports 
Mintzberg's view that a wide discrepancy between theory and practice exists with 
regard to strategic planning. In particular it reinforces the belief that conventional 
approaches to planning are based on order, rationality, control and logic. It is clear that 
this philosophy has emanated, in the main, from academics who cultivated such an 
approach, within the confines o f the classroom (through the use o f  the case method, 
pioneered at Harvard). This ignores the reality o f the environment within which most 
companies actually operate. Very few, if any, can claim to do business in a stable, 
predictable environment; instead they face chaos, turbulence and volatility.
The "classroom" approach does not envisage creativity, intuition and flexibility as 
playing a role in the planning process. Rather the focus is on analysis and control.
This is not to suggest that strategy formulation is a waste o f time and something to be 
ignored by the company, irrespective o f size. Strategy formulation must however take 
account o f  the context and type o f company and environment. It must recognise the 
dangers associated with the "how to do it " approach, when it is clear that in many 
cases there is an insufficient understanding o f the manner in which the typical manager 
/ chief executive operates. In short, there is a dearth o f research which sets out to 
investigate the reasons why managers behave as they do. Consequently, only a 
superficial understanding o f the influencing factors which shape such behaviour exists.
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The second main theme to emerge from this chapter has been the relevance o f  planning 
for the small, evolving company. It is argued that the treatment o f  this topic has not 
been well developed within the existing literature. The looseness o f  organisational 
structure, allied to the level o f informality which exists in such enterprises, raises 
serious questions about the most effective and appropriate planning mode.
The role which marketing plays in strategy formulation was extensively examined in 
the latter half o f this chapter. Much o f what has been written: from the perspective o f 
the company in general, has again been largely prescriptive and normative. The 
traditional marketing literature has tended to highlight (not surprisingly) the important 
role which marketing can play in shaping a firm's future. However, a number o f recent 
studies have begun to question its relevance. Brady and Davis (166) have raised a 
number o f doubts about the self - proclaimed importance o f marketing, as a business 
function. In response to these rather negative impressions, the Chartered Institute o f 
M arketing (167) commissioned a study which examined the extent to which marketing 
had entered into a mid - life crisis. The results, based on a survey o f leading academics 
and consultants, coupled with a series o f in - depth interviews with fifteen successful 
British companies, makes depressing reading and reinforces many o f the criticisms 
which have been made in the past about the manner in which companies have misused 
and misunderstood marketing as a concept and function. The main findings indicated 
that many companies still associated marketing with selling and advertising - rather 
than forming an integral part o f  a customer - driven philosophy.
This report concluded that far from being in a mid - life crisis, marketing is 
"somewhere between childhood and adolescence". Yet again, there would appear to 
be a wide discrepancy between the theory and the practice. The argument here is not 
about a theory's usefulness or appropriateness. Rather it is about the lack o f insightful 
research which has attempted to find out why companies do not plan or do not make 
use o f the techniques and principles o f marketing. When the characteristics o f  the 
small firm are taken into account, it becomes even more imperative that research 
should address the reasons for the discrepancy. The review o f the literature contained 
in this chapter only succeeds in shedding dim light on the matter.
In summary, this chapter has examined the wide and sometimes conflicting, literature 
on planning: marketing and the small firm. It has succeeded only in raising more 
questions than firm answers. A revisionist approach to planning has been identified in 
the literature: driven by Mintzberg at the forefront, but also by a number o f other
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researchers in the more specific areas o f marketing planning and the small firm. In the 
main, such revisionist thinking has stressed the need for a more flexible, contingency - 
based approach to the planning process: one which allows for the idiosyncrasies to be 
found in organisations which militates against regularity, order, logic and sequence. 
The value o f planning has not been called into question. But the rather arbitrary 
manner in which many o f the textbooks lay down principles and procedures, has.
The consequences which arise from such conclusions have a profound impact on any 
proposed study o f how small firm utilise marketing within their planning activities. This 
issue forms the initial starting point for the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND 
METHODOLOGY
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding examination of the literature has revealed a number of potentially 
critical issues which have major import for the subsequent design and construction of a 
methodology for investigating the manner in which small firms utilise marketing in their 
planning processes and procedures. This chapter examines the implications of these 
issues for research objectives and hypotheses; the subsequent selection of the research 
methodology employed together with a detailed justification o f the logic and rationale 
behind that selection and concludes by pinpointing the possible limitations associated 
with such a methodology.
5.2. IN IT IA L  OBSERVATIONS FROM THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The extensive review of the literature in the areas o f the small, evolving firm and 
planning / strategy, has revealed a number o f issues and findings which only serve to 
highlight the subsequent difficulty associated with designing a research methodology 
which can adequately address the need to develop an understanding of the process and 
procedures which the small firm plans its business activities. These observations can be 
identified as follows:-
* A tendency to apply theoretical frameworks designed in the context o f 
the large, bureaucratic organisation, to the case of the small evolving firm. This 
presents a distorted perspective, at best, of the specific characteristics of the small firm 
and the personality of the owner - manager, and their respective ability to utilise, relate 
to or adopt the prescribed  approaches to planning and strategy development, as 
identified in the literature.
* A tendency for empirical studies into small business to focus on broad, 
macro issues (e.g. contribution to the economy, characteristics of small businesses) 
without a corresponding concentration on micro issues (such as the internal decision - 
making processes). This could be construed as "putting the cart before the horse"; 
where the bigger issues are being addressed without a clear or insightful picture of the 
internal mechanisms and procedures which exist in the evolving firm.
* A tendency on the part of researchers to concentrate on deductive 
approaches to research design: reflected in a concentration on quantitative methods 
with a focus on data collection. In essence, this creates a situation where such 
researchers attempt to provide answers to such questions as "how m uch?" and "how  
often?", at the expense of more fundamental questions such as "how?" and "why?"
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* A tendency to "impose" a rationalistic framework to the concepts of 
planning and strategy development. Thus when many studies subsequently demonstrate 
that many owner - managers / entrepreneurs do not "conform" to such a mind - set, 
they are highlighted in a negative context - specifically in the areas of managerial 
inefficiency and ineptitude. M ore specifically, Brytting (1) identifies the tendency on 
the part of researchers "to separate organisational phenomena in small firms from the 
thoughts, feelings and lives o f the individual human beings involved". This is often 
reflected on the stress which researchers and authors place on the formal, tangible 
aspects associated with planning: the documentation, the allocation of management 
time to the drawing up of the plan and the focus on yearly targets and "bottom - line" 
figures. By contrast, the literature is distinctly less helpful when it comes to providing 
an understanding o f the internal motivation, leadership quality, personality and decision 
- making skills of the individual owner - manager / entrepreneur. Thus it is argued that 
the "softer", more intangible aspects of plotting a firm's growth path are often ignored, 
at the expense of an over concentration on the "hard", more distinctly tangible issues, 
such as the production o f a marketing planning document. The existence o f such a plan 
in no way ensures that the company is effectively and systematically involved in 
planning: in the same way that the existence o f a marketing department does not 
guarantee that the company Ls "marketing oriented".
The gap between theory and practice which has been so clearly identified in the 
literature focuses ultimately on the twin issues of relevance and realism. Tibbits (2) 
provides a fuller discussion of this debate, largely relying upon a synopsis of 
Mintzberg's views. This has been comprehensively addressed in an earlier chapter and 
it is not proposed that the debate should be "re - visited" at this juncture. It is argued 
that the preceding observations highlight the dangers associated with designing a 
research methodology based on a single research technique: be it deductive or 
inductive. In order to obtain a clear insight into the planning practices and procedures 
which exist in the evolving firm, it is deemed necessary to construct a multi - stage, 
multi - method format, consisting of a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach; 
reflecting the need to achieve a balance between the collection o f statistical data (which 
provides a superficial picture) and an opportunity to go beneath "statistics" and acquire 
a more insightful understanding o f the processes, procedures and internal mechanisms 
which exist in the smaller firm. This combination of research approaches, it is argued, 
allows the researcher to explore the planning process o f the evolving firm at a number 
o f different levels: on the one hand plotting the systematic, formalistic planning 
procedures (should they exist in the first place) but also providing the opportunity to
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gain an insight into the informal, intuitive means by which the owner - manager / 
entrepreneur may plot the company's development and direction.
5.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH DESIGN
It is clear that the design of any proposed research into the planning practices of the 
small firm is not a simple one dimensional exercise. Romano (3) argues that the 
development of small business strategies should adopt an "open - ended approach 
because each individual small business varies in organisational structure and 
management control". Stanworth and Curran (4) in an earlier article, put forward the 
view that in order to more fully comprehend the detailed issues of small business, much 
greater attention needs to be paid to the social dynamics and character of the owner 
managers. Although written in the 1970's, the review of the literature in this study 
reveals that their observation is apposite in the 1990's.
This apparent conflict between the desire for conventional quantitative surveys to 
collect data which is o f a generalist nature, and the perceived need to utilise 
methodologies which provide an opportunity for the researcher to gain an insight into 
the internal logic which exists in the small firm (and which shapes the subsequent 
approach to decision - making and strategy development) needs to be resolved before 
consideration can be given to the more tactical issues concerned with information 
gathering. This requires debate on the different philosophies which influence research 
design.
5.4. THE TWO M AIN PHILOSOPHIES : PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
POSITIVISM
Traditionally the debate surrounding the most appropriate approach to designing 
research in the area of the social sciences, has focused on two viewpoints: positivism 
and phenomenology. Often, much of the writing has portrayed these philosophies as 
being at opposite ends o f the spectrum. However this is not necessarily an accurate 
reflection o f current thinking among researchers. Easterby - Smith et al (5) in an 
influential review of the debate on the philosophy of research design observe that in 
practice, even hardened advocates from either side do not hold consistently to one 
position or another. They further note that while there has been a trend away from 
positivism towards phenomenology in recent years, it is more common to see 
researchers in the management field who adopt a "pragmatic view by deliberately 
combining methods drawn from both traditions".
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In order to gain a clearer understanding of both philosophies, the key features of 
positivism and phenomenology are examined in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. THE TWO PARADIGMS
POSITIVIST PARADIGM PHENOMENOLOGICAL PARADIGM
Basic Beliefs: The world is external and 
objective
Observer is independent
Science is value - free
The world Ls socially constructed and 
subjective
Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is driven by human interests
Researcher
should:
Focus on facts
Look for causality and
fundamental laws
Reduce phenomena to
simplest elements
Formulate hypotheses and then
test them
Focus on meanings
Try to understand what Ls happening
Look at the totality of each situation
Develop ideas through induction from 
data
Preferred Operationalising concepts Using multiple methods
methods so that they can be measured to establish different views of phenomena
include Taking large samples Small samples investigated in depth or
over time
Source: Easterby - Smith et al. (1991) Management Research: An Introduction. Sage. London. p27.
The positivistic tradition rests on the assumption that the social world exists externally 
and that its properties should be measured through objective methods. The position is 
most accurately reflected in the views of the French philosopher, Comte (6 ) who 
observed that "all good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be 
no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts". This viewpoint has 
subsequently influenced and indeed guided much of the thinking with regard to 
research design.
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Not every upholder of the positivistic tradition would necessarily subscribe to each 
and every one. However the central tenet of this philosophy is that reality is objectively 
determined. What then are the implications for researchers in the management field, 
should they attempt to pursue the positivistic school of thought ?
Rubenowitz (7) notes that positivism represents the most prevalent tradition in the field 
of the social and behavioural sciences; consisting o f statistical analysis o f data by 
means of descriptive and comparative studies and experiments and more significantly 
assumes that only knowledge which is obtained by means of objective measurement 
and objective identification can be considered to possess the truth. He coins the term 
logical empiricism  to describe the results o f research which have been conducted in 
this fashion.
However researchers questioned the importance placed on the fact that reality can be 
objectively determined. Rather they began to argue that the starting point in terms of 
trying to understand reality, should based on the notion that it is socially constructed as 
opposed to being determined objectively. Easterby - Smith et al summarise the so - 
called phenomenological school of thought thus:-
"The task o f  the social scientist should not be to gather facts and measure how 
often certain patterns occur, but to appreciate the different constructions and 
meanings that people place on their experience. One should however try to 
understand and explain why people have different experiences, rather than search fo r  
external causes and fundam ental laws to explain their behaviour (8).
Easterby - Smith et al (9) provide a hypothetical example of the two different ways in 
which a positivist and a phenomenologist would attempt to study the area of 
managerial stress. Most likely the latter would be interested in the aspects o f work that 
managers consider to be "stressful" and perhaps in the strategies and procedures that 
they have managed to develop to help them overcome the problem. Thus the 
researcher would arrange to talk with a few managers about the nature o f their jobs 
and the specific aspects, both difficult and easy. The positivist would start with the 
assumption that occupational stress exists and would then try to measure the levels of 
stress experienced by managers and how these levels relate to a number of external 
variables such a organisational changes, inter - personal conflicts, negative appraisals 
and so on. These measures might be collected on the basis of standardised verbal 
reports or perhaps on physiological factors such as blood pressure or glandular 
secretions.
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The kernel of this hypothetical example is that researchers who are primarily influenced 
by the positivistic tradition, utilise a highly structured approach (e.g. a series of 
personal interviews) which lends itself to the orderly collection of data which can then 
be easily analysed by computer software packages such as SPSS or SNAP. However, 
potentially important considerations as well as useful sources of information are 
ignored. Gummesson (10) points to non - verbal signs o f communication such as body 
language, the physical environment or unexpected events which may occur during the 
interview as important influencers on the response o f the interviewee and perhaps more 
importantly on how such a response can be interpreted. It is the emphasis on 
registering such cues and how they are subsequently interpreted which tend to 
delineate between the positivistic and phenomenological schools o f thought. 
Gummesson focuses on the word "interpret" in his writings and adopts the word 
Hermeneutic (derived from the Greek word hermeneuein = interpret). This, he argues, 
is going one step further than the traditional phenomenological approach o f attempting 
to understand the respondent and the physical environment. The Hermeneutic 
paradigm advocates that the researcher goes further and "interpret the immediate 
events in the light o f previous events, private experience and whatever else they find 
pertinent to the investigation under consideration" ( 11)
The preceding discussion provides a level of synthesis regarding the two predominant 
and largely opposing philosophies o f research design. While both appear at opposite 
end of a spectrum, it would be inaccurate to suggest that researchers are to be found in 
one camp only. Easterby - Smith et al point to the need for compromises to be made 
on the part o f researchers. This is reflected in the tendency to develop methods and 
approaches which provide a middle ground between the two schools of thought. The 
choice of method is further complicated by what Easterby - Smith et al (12) label a 
number of "political" influences. Examples of this would be the attitude of academic 
institutions to phenomenological research, and the inherent prejudice of many academic 
journal editors - it is only recently that many journals in the management area have 
begun (grudgingly) to accept articles based on non - positivistic research design.
It is however too simplistic to suggest that there are only two broad schools of 
thought, if there Is a tendency on the part of researchers to seek compromises or a 
refinement in approach to research design.
Thorpe and Moscarola (13) provide an illuminating insight into the various styles 
which pertain in designing management research strategy. They use the analogy o f the
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great fictional detectives to illustrate the alternative styles and approaches which are 
possible in research. While this creates (if read quickly) a somewhat whimsical and 
superficial treatment of what is a complex topic, more careful reading suggests that it 
provides a good insight into the selection o f a research strategy. They identify the 
following approaches.
1. The Theoretical, Rational Approach:- this follows a process of logical 
deduction. Here the example of Hercule Poirot is used. In the novels, he listens to 
witnesses o f the crime, withdraws and reflects. Then he goes over their behaviour, 
routines, habits and motives, searching for contradictions. By reconstructing in theory 
the information, and by deductive reasoning he discovers by logic, the guilty party. In 
terms of management research this approach would be reflected in collecting all 
sources of relevant information, having a thorough understanding of the models and 
theories in the field in which you wish to understand or interpret, applying your own 
knowledge and expertise and analysing what you find out and deducing answers.
2. The Scientific Information Approach:- it could be said that the great fictional 
detective, Sherlock Holmes, behaved in the true manner of a scientist with regard to 
the manner in which he solved crime. In his quest for evidence, the instruments of 
observation and analysis (in the form of test tubes and chemicals) play an important 
role. It is arguable that without such tools at his disposal, Holmes would be unable to 
help the clues emerge. In relation to management research, Thorpe and Moscarola use 
the analogy of sampling methods - where a sample is selected in order that features 
about the whole population can be determined. This involves in many cases, minute 
and systematic observation made either by questionnaires or by structured interviews, 
repeated numerous times so that statistical accuracy can be derived. It also requires the 
researcher to make use of data processing tools and resultant elaborate statistical 
analysis.
3. The Empirical Intuitive Approach:- Maigret; the detective popularised in the 
crime literature by Simenon, is used as the example of this approach. In many of the 
novels, Maigret appears to place great emphasis on discovering the world within which 
the crime has been committed - a small, rural, French village for example. He meets 
people in the local hostelry and engages them in conversation. Following this focus on 
empathising with the people concerned, he follows his intuitions and feelings and 
begins to advance to an answer to the problem of who has committed the particular 
crime. This clearly calls for skills which allow him to empathise and gain the confidence 
of the people concerned. Relating this analogy to the management field, Thorpe and
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Moscarola pinpoint the following as being requirements: having physical contact with 
the field in question, accepting the need to listen to others and see them from their 
perspective, understand things in depth - without stopping at a prior judgement, give 
way to one's sensitivity, intuition and instinct and know how to find the real experts in 
the field so as to be able to benefit by winning their confidence and gaining their 
experience.
Thorpe and Moscarola (14) argue that the lesson from using the analogy of the 
different styles employed by the detectives, reinforces the view that there is a need for 
a range of composite skills in order to be a competent detective and / or researcher. 
These include the ability to reason logically, acquire a clear understanding the tools and 
techniques which are capable of collecting the data with scientific rigour, whilst at the 
same time never losing the quality o f empirical intuition that helps to provide some 
crucial insights into the problem. The television detective, Columbo is cited as a good 
example of a detective who portrays this amalgam of skills.
As a final contribution towards an understanding o f the requirements for detecting a 
research strategy, the character "Dirty Harry" as played by Clint Eastwood, is 
mentioned. This individual adopts the view that in order to bring about solutions and 
resolve problems, the best method is to try something - provoke a reaction and thus, 
through action, remove the uncertainty and understand or confirm the situation. This 
style of approach is gaining more acceptance in the area of management research - 
specifically through the adoption of action research. This approach is based on two 
premises :-
* a belief that the best way of learning about an organisation or social 
system is through attempting to change it and that this therefore should to some extent, 
be the objective of the action researcher;
* the belief that those people most likely to be affected by or involved in 
implementing these changes should as far as possible become involved in the research 
process itself.
Thus the researcher actually becomes involved as part of the change process.
The article by Thorpe and Moscarola provides a useful summation o f the key issues 
which need to be taken into account at the outset of the design of a major research 
study. They reinforce the view that a one - dimensional perspective o f how research
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should be conducted, is at best, simplistic and at worst, wrong. This would also appear 
to support the conclusions which have been drawn from the extensive review of 
previous research into small business development, carried out in earlier chapters.
While one might query the rather superficial manner with which they have treated the 
topic of designing research strategy and the rather whimsical use of "the great 
detectives" as a basis for drawing an analogy, it can be equally argued that such an 
approach is effective in conveying the nuances associated with research design.
Having considered the broad issues associated with designing a research strategy, it is 
now necessary to reconcile the main conclusions of the previous section with the aims 
and objectives of the study which provides the main focus for this thesis.
5.5. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
5.5.1. Introduction
The rationale for undertaking an investigation into the marketing planning approaches 
which the smaller firm adopts, is based on the initial prejudice that the prevailing 
literature and past empirical research do not do justice to the complexity and 
heterogeneity which exists in such enterprises. In essence it is felt that a large gap 
occurs between what the literature recommends such firms should do and what they 
actually do.
5.5.2. OVERALL DESIGN OF THE STUDY
The "gap" between theory and practice clearly presents warnings which need to be 
addressed when subsequently setting aims and objectives for a study into the 
approaches to planning which such firms adopt. Thus the following considerations 
were taken into account when designing the aims and objectives.
1. The need fo r  a phased approach given the discrepancy between theory and 
practice, and the questionable validity of previous empirical research, it was felt that a 
number of cascading objectives should be set in the research design for this study. This 
led to three phases of the study, each with a distinct objective. Likewise each phase 
moved from the general to the specific in terms of the focus o f the objective. This is 
highlighted in figure 5.1.
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FIGURE 5.1.
Phase One: - Objective. To gain an insight into general planning practices and 
procedures across industry types.
Rationale. It enhances the preunderstanding about the topic under 
investigation and provide a broad framework for designing the next stage.____________
Phase Two: - Objective. To identify parameters o f planning practice among
indigenous companies in a specific industry sector.
Rationale. It provides a basic assessment o f the general principles
and procedures of planning within firms in one sector and allows for some general 
comparisons to be made
Phase Three: - Objective. To isolate specific instances and examine the
internal mechanisms and procedures used in the context of planning., thus providing 
patterns (be they convergent or divergent) for subsequent evaluation.
Rationale. It allows for more closer interaction with the respondent 
and provides the opportunity for a "richer" depth of information to be collected.
2. The need fo r  a balanced approach between deductive and inductive research:- 
earlier discussion on the opposing philosophies has reinforced the view that the 
adoption of a purely positivistic or phenomenological approach would be unduly 
simplistic and ignore the reality of the situation where researchers are beginning to 
compromise between the two schools of thought. The contrasting properties 
surrounding deductive and inductive research are highlighted in table 5.2. This 
demonstrates how both approaches can complement each other and more significantly 
add to the richness of data collection and provide a clearer insight into the problem.
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ITABLE 5.2. PROPERTIES OF DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE RESEARCH
DEDUCTION INDUCTION
Identify Properties Isolate instances
Measure Note sequences and contexts
Specify Population and Sample
Select Situation to Study Select special instances to observe
Measure, Compare, Explain Variances Observe, interview, record
Interpret Find patterns, sort.
Prepare Tables and Charts Triangulate, Validate, Reinterpret
Report
Explanation - emphasising properties
Make Case Studies - with emphasis 
on particular phenomenon 
Understanding
Formalistic Generalisations Naturalistic Generalisations
3. The need to utilise a number o f  different methods o f  data collection and 
analysis: - in line with the argument that a balanced approach to research design is 
required, so too, it is submitted, is the need for triangulation - which refers to the use 
of multiple, but independent measures. The justification for such an approach is 
summed up by Abrahamson (15) who advances the view that a reliance on one 
particular tool or technique renders the research method - bound and as a consequence 
ignores the fact that the strength of each particular method is invariably flawed in some 
way or another. This means that the researcher can counterbalance the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method. Smith (16) indeed argues that this use of triangulation can 
extend beyond the use of data collection methods. It can allow for the borrowing of 
models and frameworks from different disciplines. Likewise, Todd (17) advocates the 
use of methodological triangulation - where the researcher uses both qualitative and 
quantitative methods o f data collection. For instance in his research, use was made of 
questionnaires, in - depth, unstructured interviews, telephone surveys and field studies. 
This approach, he argues, allows for an imaginative way o f maximising the amount of 
data collected and perhaps more importantly the richness and quality associated with it.
The precise manner of the methods used and the sample selection process is outlined in 
figure 5.3.
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TABLE 5.2. PROPERTIES OF DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE RESEARCH
DEDUCTION 
Identify Properties 
Measure
Specify Population and Sample 
Select Situation to Study 
Measure, Compare, Explain Variances 
Interpret
Prepare Tables and Charts 
Report
Explanation - emphasising properties 
Formalistic Generalisations
INDUCTION
Isolate instances
Note sequences and contexts
Select special instances to observe
Observe, interview, record
Find patterns, sort.
Triangulate, Validate, Reinterpret
Make Case Studies - with emphasis 
on particular phenomenon 
Understanding
Naturalistic Generalisations
3. The need to utilise a number o f  different methods o f  data collection and 
analysis: - in line with the argument that a balanced approach to research design is 
required, so too, it is submitted, is the need for triangulation - which refers to the use 
of multiple, but independent measures. The justification for such an approach is 
summed up by Abrahamson (15) who advances the view that a reliance on one 
particular tool or technique renders the research method - bound and as a consequence 
ignores the fact that the strength o f each particular method is invariably flawed in some 
way or another. This means that the researcher can counterbalance the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method. Smith (16) indeed argues that this use o f triangulation can 
extend beyond the use of data collection methods. It can allow for the borrowing of 
models and frameworks from different disciplines. Likewise, Todd (17) advocates the 
use o f methodological triangulation - where the researcher uses both qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data collection. For instance in his research, use was made of 
questionnaires, in - depth, unstructured interviews, telephone surveys and field studies. 
This approach, he argues, allows for an imaginative way of maximising the amount of 
data collected and perhaps more importantly the richness and quality associated with it.
The precise manner of the methods used and the sample selection process is outlined in 
figure 5.3.
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FIGURE 5.3. METHODS AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Phase One: - Methods Employed. An unstructured depth interview - following a 
series of broad themes and issues.
Sample Selection. Fourteen companies - selected randomly from a 
number of business sectors.
Phase Two:- Methods Employed. Hybrid telephone interviews, combining the CAT1 
Approach (Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing) with open - ended questions. All 
interviews to be taped to allow for more extensive analysis of data.
Sample Selection. 50 indigenous electronics firms participated from 73
invitations.
Phase Three: - Methods Employed. Hybrid - depth interviews, observation, formal 
and informal interviews, input of a research colleague. Case studies.
Sample Selection. 7 companies which comprise a representative picture 
of companies at various stages o f the company life - cycle.___________________________
5.6. THE SELECTION OF THE INDUSTRY SECTOR
In order to allow for some meaningful comparisons to be made between companies 
participating in the study, it was felt that it would be more appropriate to focus on one 
industry sector in phases two and three o f the project. It also would create a situation 
where the companies under investigation, particularly in phase three, would be 
representative o f indigenous companies in a particular sector, thus reducing the 
possibility for major heterogeneity occurring. For example it would not be considered 
pertinent to include a small indigenous company operating in the services sector with 
one from the agricultural sector, due to the vast differences which would be likely to be 
identified in the nature of their operations.
The detailed examination of the history of industrial policy development in the republic 
of Ireland, combined with an examination and appraisal o f the role of the small,
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indigenous sector revealed that successive governments, since the late 1%0's have 
concentrated on attracting foreign - owned firms to locate and establish operations in 
Ireland. The electronics sector has been one of the leading areas where US, European 
and Japanese companies have indeed come to this country. A leading report on this 
industry (18) has identified the additional emergence of increasing technological 
expertise and competence from the educational sector as helping to create a conducive 
environment where an Irish - owned sector can develop.
This study further identified 96 Irish - owned companies in 1989, o f whom 
approximately 55 per cent export their products to overseas markets.
5.6.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRONICS SECTOR
The indigenous sector in Ireland can be sub - divided into a number o f categories. 
Table 5.3. provides a breakdown.
In summary the majority of the more developed Irish - owned electronics companies 
are concentrated in the following areas:-
* Automation; computer based manufacturing automation, process 
monitoring and control, instrumentation and electronic test equipment
* Communications; modems, converters
* Security; control panels, sensors.
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TABLE 5.3.
1. OPTOELECTRONICS
- Semiconductor Lasers/LEDS
- Small Circuits
- Components for Telecommunications
2. SENSORS
- Smart sensor components
- Enhanced capability sensors
- Colour sensors
- X - ray detection
3. ELECTROMAGNETICS
- Electromagnetic components - filters, inductors
- Motors and Actuators
- Power Circuit Technology
- Transformers
- Electromagnetic compatibility testing /  consultancy
4. AUTO M ATIO N/M EASUREM ENT/CO NTRO L
- Meat Processing (Vision, Sensors, Automation)
- Vegetables grading(Vision, Actuators)
- Fish farming - Marine (Vision, Sensors, Actuators)
- Software and Communications intensive board level products
- Remote Data Collection Systems - Agriculture and Mariculture
5. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK INTERFACING PRODUCTS
- Terminal Adapters for ISDN
- Advanced Modems
- Network Terminals for Digital Leased Lines
- Special Interfaces
______- Digital Multiplexors___________________________________________
5.6.2. Justification for the Selection of the Electronics Industry
This sector was chosen ultimately for a number of reasons. Firstly the report on the 
electronics industry served as a very useful frame of reference for the identification of 
suitable companies which might participate in this study. Of the companies covered,
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most have received help from the various government sponsored initiatives and 93 of 
the 96 companies investigated were classified as being small or start - up operations. 
This statistic fitted in very well with the overall aim of the study; to investigate 
planning practices within the small, evolving firm. The electronics sector itself is 
characterised typically by being fast - moving, fragmented, open to penetration on a 
world - wide basis and having products with (relatively speaking) a very short life 
cycle. These features suggest that this is not an industry where companies, particularly 
evolving ones, could survive for very long without some conscious attempt to plan 
their activities and to utilise marketing as a facilitator to their business development. 
Specifically it would appeal- to be an industry where companies constantly need to 
consider the strategic question of new products and new markets, in addition to their 
existing product / market position.
The question of strategy takes on even greater significance, given that the electronics 
industry operates in a cyclical environment which is increasingly market driven. The 
report produced by the (then) Department of Industry and Commerce in 1989 notes 
that;-
" Companies not only need to be positioned in growth markets i f  substantial 
growth is to be achieved; they need in addition strong marketing and 
technical skills and require the support o f  a strong electronics oriented  
infrastructure. Furthermore strong business management ability is a 
prerequisite to achieve stable growth in companies to a size where profits are 
no longer ultra sensitive to industry cycles, cost fluctuations and the need to 
engage in substantial and continuing product development." (19)
While the study identifies a number of potential strengths associated with the Irish - 
owned electronics sector, such as a large pool o f suitably qualified technical graduates, 
(comparatively speaking) a very advanced telecommunications system - and the 
subsequent requirement for a range of additional services, and the existence of a large 
number of subsidiaries of multi - national electronics firms, there are also a number of 
constraints. These include difficulties associated with acquiring the necessary finance to 
allow for international expansion, the small scale of the home market and the 
subsequent difficulties facing evolving firms when it comes to "proving" their products, 
location and an insufficient number of managers with international marketing 
capabilities. Thus the priorities which need to be addressed for companies wishing to 
succeed in this industry revolve around the following areas:-
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market access / market development
* management
* product development
* capital
* better infrastructural supports.
As a consequence of the above observations, it was felt that this sector would provide 
a valuable backdrop to a detailed investigation of planning practices within evolving 
firms. Given that the vast majority (as noted earlier) of the indigenous electronics firms 
are to be found in the micro to small category and combined with the stated objective 
of successive governments with regard to the need to create a number of large 
indigenous companies, the strategic importance of this sector cannot be under - 
estimated.
5.7. SPECIFIC DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH STUDY
A general overview of the design of the study was presented in section 4.5. of this 
chapter. The rationale for adopting a study consisting of three phases, ranging from the 
general to the specific, reinforced the view that a multi - stage, hybrid methodology 
would be most effective in addressing the stated aims and objectives. It is now 
necessary to consider in greater detail, the justification for choosing the three main 
techniques for collecting the necessary data - the depth interview, the computer 
assisted telephone interviews and the case study.
5.7.1. Phase One: The In - Depth Interview.
It will be recalled that in the section detailing the overall design of the study, 
considerable emphasis was placed on the need, at the initial phase, to gain a deeper 
insight into the manner in which companies, irrespective of size, length of time in 
existence, or industry sector, go about the task of developing, implementing and 
monitoring plans. In order to achieve significant benefit from such an exercise, 
attention had to be paid to the particular data collection method which would yield 
optimum results. In order to achieve such a level of insight, it was felt that the 
traditional structured methods of collecting information such as mailed or personally
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administered questionnaires, would only succeed in providing a superficial grasp of the 
relevant issues, practices and procedures. Thus, it became clear, from a very early 
stage, that it would be necessary to employ a method which would succeed in giving 
the researcher access, in an open - ended manner, to the potential respondent's 
opinions and attitudes and experiences, this is perhaps best summed up by Burgess 
(20) who describes the interview as providing an opportunity "for the researcher to 
probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to 
secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience" (21). 
This open - ended approach to interviewing needs greater clarification. Burgess argues 
that such a "qualitative interview" encompasses a broad range of different types of 
interview covering a totally non - directive or open approach to one where the 
interviewer arrives with a series of prepared questions or themes. She further notes 
that the main purpose of such interviews is to "understand how individuals construct
the meaning and significance of their situations.............from.. the complex personal
framework of beliefs and values, which they have developed over their lives in order to 
help explain and predict events in their world". (22).
The choice as to whether to opt for a structured versus unstructured approach was a 
relatively easy one to make. Given the desire for a probing, exploratory approach, it 
became clear that a highly structured approach would be unsuitable because;-
a). it restricts the respondent from talking freely and openly,
b). it forces the researcher to adopt pre - conceptions about the questions 
which need to be asked,
c). it restricts the open - ended nature of exploratory research.
When the above observations are reconciled against the stated objective of gaining an 
insight into planning practices and procedures, then the depth interview appeared as an 
attractive, but more importantly, correct means of generating such information.
A number of companies were identified as being potentially relevant for inclusion in 
this phase of the study. The criteria used for their selection were as follows:-
* Nature of the product (industrial, consumer, services)
* Size of company (initially defined as number of people employed)
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* Nature of company ownership (Foreign - owned, result of a 
management buy - out, indigenous)
* Propensity to export.
Given that industrial policy emanating from successive governments, since the late 
1960's has concentrated on three main areas; overseas industry, medium / large 
indigenous industry and small industry, the sample of companies chosen was designed 
to reflect this position.
The Kompass directory was used as the main source for selecting companies which 
might participate is this phase of the research. Approximately five of the companies 
chosen were based on business acquaintances which were made through my 
involvement in the Marketing Institute of Ireland. It was felt that it was necessary to 
gain full access to a range of managing directors / owners / senior directors, in order to 
acquire a detailed, "full and frank" contribution. None of the acquaintances could be 
described as close; rather they were individuals with whom I had come into contact 
with, on various committees and activities during my time on the executive committee 
of the Marketing Institute. My contacts eventually accounted for eight of the fourteen 
companies which participated in this phase of the research.
Fifteen companies were initially contacted by letter - explaining the general background 
to, and objectives of the study. There were no refusals. Fourteen participated. It 
proved to be impossible to accommodate the fifteenth company into the schedule of 
interviews due to the Managing Director being on holiday during the period when the 
interviews were being conducted. Given that the researcher is based in Scotland and 
this company was based in Cork, it was not possible to include it within this phase. 
However the company participated in phase two of the study. The findings are 
presented in the next chapter.
5.7.2. Phase Two - Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing - Formulation of 
Research Hypotheses
The general objective of phase two was one of identifying the parameters of planning 
as practised by small indigenous companies in the electronics sector. The specific 
research hypotheses to be tested in this phase were determined from the review of the 
literature on entrepreneurship and strategy, development and planning carried out in
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the earlier chapters of this dissertation, and also from the general ideas gained from the 
interviews in phase one. They were identified as follows:
HI: the level o f form ality associated with the planning process w ill depend on
the size o f the customer base held by the individual company
With the null hypothesis taking the following format:
Hoi: There is no evidence to suggest that the level of formality associated with 
the planning process will depend on the size of the customer base held by the 
individual company.____________________________________________
H2: the sophistication o f the planning process w ill increase the longer a
company is in existence
With the null hypothesis taking the following format:
Ho2: There is no evidence to suggest that the sophistication of the planning 
process will increase the longer a company is in existence._________________
H3: as the individual company increases in size, it w ill be more likely to develop
a detailed and fo rm a l planning process
With the null hypothesis taking the following format:
Ho3: There is no evidence to suggest that as the company increases in size, it 
will be more likely to develop a detailed and formal planning process._________
H4: there w ill be a greater propensity fo r  companies to develop fo rm a l and
detailed plans, as they become more extensively involved in exporting
With the null hypothesis taking the following format:
Ho4: There is no evidence to suggest that there will be a greater propensity for 
companies to develop formal and detailed plans, as they become more extensively 
involved in exporting.___________________________________________
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H5: companies that prepare a fo rm al plan w ill be more likely to develop a
general business plan rather than a series o f functional sub - plans
With the null hypothesis taking the following format:
There is no evidence to suggest that companies that prepare a formal plan will be 
more likely to develop a general business plan rather than a series of functional 
sub - plans.__________ _________________________________
It was felt that the most appropriate method for accessing these companies (identified 
in the report produced by the Department of Industry and Commerce) was that of the 
telephone interview. A number of factors arose which led to this conclusion. Firstly the 
fact that the researcher lives in Glasgow militated against the possibility of attempting 
to interview a large number of electronics companies. A mail questionnaire was 
considered. However it was felt that in addition to the strong likelihood of a very low 
response rate, it would not be possible to capture information beyond that of a very 
superficial and basic nature. In this latter regard, the Computer Assisted Telephone 
Interviewing technique (CATI) was perceived to have a number of advantages. It 
allows for the integration of data entry and tabulation set - up stages, thus reducing the 
total survey time. The overall effect is that the fieldwork for a survey of (potentially) 
ninety companies can be completed far more quickly than is the case with personal 
interviews or mailed questionnaires.
Traditionally telephone interviewing has been regarded as effective only in situations 
where the topic under investigation is relatively simple to address and where the 
resultant information is straightforward and easy to encompass in a highly structured 
format. Indeed a study which compared telephone and face - to - face interviews (23) 
produced evidence that respondents tended to give fewer responses to open and 
unprompted questions over the telephone.
In addition this study pinpointed the limited length of time that a researcher can expect 
to have with a respondent in a telephone interview. Eborall (24) observes that a 
maximum of twenty minutes is often regarded as a rule of thumb for UK respondents. 
However she does note that this varies a great detail; on a country by country basis, 
the subject matter and the position of the respondent. Other drawbacks include 
pressure of time on the part of respondents, which may restrict opportunities for 
access.
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However it is submitted that much of the research into the efficacy of telephone 
interviewing has been carried out in consumer markets as opposed to industrial 
markets. It is further argued that the telephone can be utilised for acquiring information 
which can be richer in content than simply standard responses to basic questions.
Therefore when structuring the questions for the telephone survey, cognisance was 
taken of the need to structure the questions in such a manner as to allow for coding 
responses. However each interview was tape recorded and each question was asked in 
an open -ended fashion, i.e. the various options were not presented to the respondent. 
Instead the questions were delivered to the respondent and the responses were 
subsequently analysed afterwards and allocated to the appropriate options. The fact 
that the interviews were taped also meant that I was not distracted from the point 
being made, by having to take detailed notes, or risk the possibility of losing 
concentration during the interview.
The researcher was also helped by the fact that he had access to a "state - of - the - art" 
telephone interviewing laboratory in the Department of Marketing, at the University of 
Strathclyde. This allowed for the use of a headphone with an attached microphone, 
together with a tape recorder. While it may not sound very significant, it meant that the 
researcher could adopt a relaxed posture; not having to hold the telephone handset to 
my ear and be crouched over a note book, taking down detailed notes. This in turn 
meant that attention could be focused fully on the task at hand. Arising from these 
experiences it is strongly advised that anybody who is thinking of using the telephone 
should only do so if such facilities are available.
While it is acknowledged that a certain element of risk was taken with regard to the 
utilisation of this method, the experience demonstrated that the perceived weaknesses 
and drawbacks of the method were unfounded. From an initial list of 96 indigenous 
companies identified in the report of the Department of Industry and Commerce, 23 
companies had either ceased operations, been acquired by other companies or had 
changed names and could not be traced. Therefore 73 letters were sent out, inviting the 
managing director / owner manager (or chief executive in cases where the owner 
manager had left the company) to participate in the study. Exactly 55 companies 
agreed to co - operate in a telephone interview, this represented a response rate of 
approximately 75 per cent, and was deemed to be highly satisfactory; given the fact 
that this was not a standard method for collecting data. A copy of the letter is 
presented in appendix D.
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It subsequently transpired that five companies did not participate in the study. This 
happened for a number of reasons. A couple of the managing directors had agreed to 
participate at a certain time. When contact was made with the company, they were out 
of the country, due to either a crisis or the need to visit an important customer. Five 
further attempts were made to set up suitable times. For whatever reason, the 
individual was not available at any of those times. At this stage, a decision was made to 
leave that company out of the survey - mainly due to the fact that these attempts to re 
- schedule the interviews were taking place over a four week period and were, as a 
consequence prolonging the time allotted to this phase of the study. It also had to be 
accepted that in a couple of cases, it became clear that the individuals were not keen to 
participate and were using their respective secretaries to maintain their distance from 
the researcher. Sadly in one case, the managing director had just died.
Therefore a response rate of approximately 69 per cent (50 companies from a total of 
73) was achieved. The results of this stage of the study are presented in a later chapter. 
As might be expected, there was a great deal of variation in terms of the length of each 
interview. This ranged from a peremptory ten minute interview in a small number of 
cases (where the respondent gave brief responses to the questions) to one hour 
interviews in other cases (where the respondent was in an expansive mood and was 
quite prepared to engage in deep conversation).
While such variation might suggest a weakness in the methodology, in so far as it 
might be difficult to reconcile the responses and carry out meaningful comparative 
analysis, it should be remembered that the main purpose of this stage of the study was 
to gain an insight into the general parameters of planning practice in indigenous 
electronics firms. It was viewed as a means to an end: where a more detailed 
investigation of planning practices could be carried out in phase three, through the 
medium of case studies.
The telephone interviews also allowed me to identify companies which would be 
suitable as candidates for subsequent case studies. If a particular interview went well - 
in terms of trust being established at an early stage of the interview, and the respondent 
was relaxed and in an expansive mood, I would ask that individual on completion of 
the interview whether he or she would be prepared to take the exercise a stage further 
by allowing me to visit the company and carry out a more detailed study of their 
operations and specifically their approach to planning. As an aside, my experience 
suggested that the participants found the telephone to be a good means of
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communicating their ideas. While much of the success depends on how the interviewer 
handles the interview, it became clear that the telephone method was not perceived as 
being as formal or as time consuming as would be the case where an appointment 
would be made for a personal, in - depth interview. The latter situation creates the 
perception that the managing director has to consciously set aside time from a busy 
schedule, to facilitate somebody who will not offer much in return. By contrast the 
telephone is a more flexible tool. Respondent can be interviewed at home rather than 
the office, if required. They can be interviewed at a time which is convenient to them. 
In some cases interviews were conducted either late at night or early in the morning. In 
addition what commences as an initial ten minute quick interview, can become a forty 
to fifty minute detailed sharing of thoughts, experiences and opinions. The interview 
schedule is laid out in appendix C.
As a result, fifteen companies emerged as candidates for phase three of the research. 
They formed a basis for the main focus of the project: the case study.
5.7. 3 Phase Three: The Case Study.
The third phase of the study concentrated on an examination of a number of case 
studies in order to gain a deeper understanding of the process of planning and the 
differing procedures utilised by the small evolving firm. This met the original objective 
of the design of the study: namely to move from a general, quantitative survey of the 
sector to a more detailed and specific investigation. It was felt that the most 
appropriate research tool for achieving this objective would be the case study method. 
Given the sharp divergence between theory and practice, allied to the over - emphasis 
on positivistic approaches to research design, it was felt that there was a need to 
incorporate research tools which would allow for the development of theory. In this 
respect, researcher such as Eisenhardt (25) and Pettigrew (26) advocate the adoption 
of the case study as an appropriate technique. It is therefore necessary to justify the 
selection of this tool and evaluate its usefulness.
5.7.3.1. The Nature of Case Study Research
Gummesson (27) notes that there are two types of case study: one which attempts to 
derive general conclusions from a limited number of cases and the second which seeks 
to arrive at specific conclusions regarding a single case. A tighter definition is provided 
by Yin (28) who suggests that a case study is an empirical inquiry that:
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* investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real - life context; 
when
* the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which
* multiple sources of evidence are used.
Perhaps of more relevance to the researcher is the manner in which case studies can be 
used for research purposes. Yin (29) identifies three such types of uses: exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory. Traditionally in the field of business research, researchers 
have viewed case studies as a pilot study; in order to generate questions for subsequent 
hypothesis testing in a quantitative survey. By contrast a descriptive case study is an 
attempt to describe a sequence of events in a particular situation. For instance it can be 
used to describe how a particular product has been developed and launched in the 
market place, this is often regarded in low esteem by many people who evaluate it in 
contrast to predictive and prescriptive methods. This rests on he assumption that the 
material is generated from simple observation and reporting. However Gummesson 
(30) quotes the views of one researcher who suggests that in order to make 
descriptions in the first place, the researcher has to make choices and these choices in 
turn are based on analysis and interpretation. Gummesson takes the view that case 
studies can also be used for studying processes in companies and also for explanatory 
purposes. In similar vein, Kjellen and Soderman (31) suggest that case studies can help 
to generate theory and indeed as a means for initiating change in organisations. This 
latter view places great emphasis on the need for the researcher to concentrate on 
processes that are likely to lead to understanding - Verstehen - rather than simply as a 
search for causal explanations.
Gummesson picks up on this theme and argues strongly in his book that one of the 
important advantages with the case study (if used correctly) is that it can provide the 
opportunity for a holistic view of a process. He quotes the views of Valdelin who notes 
that :-
"the detailed observations entailed in the case study method enable us to study 
many different aspects, examine them in relation to each other, view the process 
within its total environment and utilise the researcher’s capacity for "Verstehen". 
Consequently, case study research provides us with a greater opportunity than other 
available methods to obtain a holistic view of a specific research project". (32)
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This is clearly viewed as the opposite of reductionism; where the emphasis is focused 
on breaking down the object of study into small, well - defined parts. It is clear when 
looking at the results from the second phase of the study that the process of planning 
within the smaller firm does not lend itself to a neat delineation of elements. It is much 
more fluid than that and as a consequence it is submitted that the case study method is 
highly appropriate in an attempt to gain a clearer insight into the process of planning.
5.7.3.2. Criticisms of the Case Method
It has to be acknowledged that the very nature of case studies as highlighted in the 
preceding section, has attracted a considerable degree of criticism. Hagg and Hedlund 
(33) identify three such criticisms:-
* Case studies lack statistical validity
* Case studies can be used to generate hypotheses but not to test them
* Generalisations cannot be made on the basis of case studies
The issue of generalisation is perhaps a critical one. Gummesson (34) provides a 
persuasive argument to suggest that researchers should be increasingly more dubious 
about the term. The emphasis on the need to be able to generalise, comes in part from 
the research tradition in the field of marketing, which has been limited to statistical and 
mathematical methodologies combined with survey techniques drawn from the 
behavioural sciences. This is changing somewhat. The influential article written by 
Bonoma (35) in 1985 for instance argues for greater use of qualitative methods in 
marketing research. In addition he adopts a pragmatic view by suggesting that while 
the primary objective of all researchers is to achieve a high level of both data integrity 
and currency, in most cases they will have to trade off one against another. An example 
would be where the researcher acknowledges the possibility of some bias, in an attempt 
to achieve a greater degree of generalisation. While this may appeal' to be a serious 
weakness, it is submitted that it is a realistic view of the process of, and outcomes 
associated with research. Bonoma indeed argues that the cause for this possible trade - 
off is " the inability of any single research method simultaneously to minimise multiple 
threats to both data integrity and currency" (36). If this view is accepted, then it 
reinforce the ever recurring theme which runs through this chapter: namely the need 
for triangulation.
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Gummesson himself states that his views have been heavily influenced by Normann 
who argued that provided the researcher has a good descriptive or analytical language 
which allows for a comprehensive grasp of the interaction between various parts of the 
system, possibilities exist to generalise from very few cases, or even one single case. 
The key to such a possibility exists in the ability of the researcher to "reach a 
fundamental understanding o f the. structure, process and driving forces, rather than a 
superficial establishment o f correlation or cause - effect relationships” (37)
Gummesson has refined this view and argues that "science is a journey; not a 
destination" (38). This is a simple but nonetheless a profound statement because it 
acknowledges that research should be viewed as a continuing process of understanding 
that never actually reaches the final truth. This sentiment would appear to be very 
much a driving force for the objectives behind phase three of the study.
5.7.3.3 Making Effective Use of the Case Study Method
Yin (39) identifies a number of required skills which can help to make the case study a 
more effective research tool. They include:-
* The ability to be able to ask good questions - and to interpret the 
answers.
* The ability to be a good listener and not allow predispositions or 
prejudices to influence the interpretation of the information collected.
* The ability to be adaptive and flexible so that newly encountered 
situations can be seen as opportunities, not threats.
* The ability to retain a firm grasp of the issues being studied.
* The ability to remain unbiased by preconceived notions.
Yin argues that most of these attributes are remediable and that any researcher who is 
lacking in one or some of the skills can work on them. However there is a fundamental 
requirement to carry out an honest assessment before embarking on the case study 
method.
185
Leavy (40) makes the astute observation that many of the classical exponents of case 
- based research (see Mills (41) , Van Maanen (42)) agree on the fact that there is a 
craft process attached to what they do. He also cites the views of Mintzberg (43) who 
draws the analogy of detective work or the tracking down of patterns as being of 
critical importance during the development and subsequent analysis of case studies.
The preceding observations reinforce the perception that the case study method should 
not be viewed as a simple, straightforward exercise. Leavy encapsulates this perception 
by noting that;-
". case - based qualitative studies consist o f 95% perspiration and 5% inspiration.
However that 5% element is particularly critical in qualitative research and is the 
product of a somewhat mysterious process of the imagination". (44)
5.7.3.4. Justification for the Selection of the Case Method
The purpose and nature of the case study method have been investigated in the 
previous sections, together with an outline of the criticism which have been made of it. 
It is necessary at this stage to put forward the main reasons as to why such a method 
was utilised for this study.
Firstly the case study provides for a situation where a variety of different methods can 
be used in the generation of data and subsequent analysis and interpretation. This 
approach ensures that the researcher does not become hidebound or dependent on any 
one technique. As has been stressed earlier, the case study method calls for a degree of 
flexibility in the approach of the researcher. While this can create problems, it is argued 
that it follows a more realistic approach than would be the case where a single data 
collection method is used. Thus triangulation is achieved through this mixing of 
methods.
Secondly the case study is viewed as being a suitable tool which allows the researcher 
to gain access to reality. It means that the level of personal involvement and amount of 
interaction is far higher than is the case with traditional research tools such as 
telephone interviews or mailed questionnaires. Thus the case study provides a logical, 
sequential development from the information gathered in phases one and two of the 
study. It can be argued that action research, where the researcher works in the 
capacity of a consultant / change agent, with a company or organisation, over a long
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period of time, provides a much greater level of interaction, understanding and access. 
However this was not possible from a practical or indeed logistical point of view.
Given that both the review of literature and the results obtained from phases one and 
two, highlighted the clear deficiencies between current theory and apparent practice, it 
became clear that there was a need to utilise inductive research. In this respect, the 
approach as advocated by Gummesson (45) was deemed to be most appropriate. Thus 
both inductive research and deductive research can work hand in hand. Initially, 
inductive work can generate data. This data can subsequently generate deductive 
research in an effort to arrange data in meaningful patterns, followed by new inductions 
and so on.
It has been constantly argued throughout this work that the study of how the evolving 
firm utilises planning is a complex one. It therefore behoves the researcher to gain an 
understanding of the procedures adopted, within a range of different contexts 
(depending on the stage of the life cycle). It is argued that this cannot be achieved 
through the positivistic paradigm. Instead it calls for a level of interaction and access 
which can only be found through the case method.
5.7.3.5. Utilisation of the Case Study Method in the Study
Fifteen companies were identified as being suitable candidates for further, more 
detailed investigation in the second phase of the study. A rapport had been developed 
with the managing director from the telephone interview. Therefore it was relatively 
easy to set up a series of company visits.
The first potential problem which had to be addressed was the question of how many 
cases should be conducted within phase three? The approach known as purposive or 
theoretical sampling as advocated by Gummesson (46) was finally adopted. Under this 
method, the principle of saturation is pursued. This means that the researcher adds 
cases until the marginal utility of additional cases is small i.e. a new case adds little to 
the understanding which has been already achieved. Thus while fifteen visits were 
made, only eight detailed case studies are presented in a later chapter. Arising from 
phase two of the study it became clear that in order to ensure a representative selection 
of companies which would reflect the diversity of approaches to planning the following 
considerations would need to come into play when deciding on the companies. These 
included:-
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* The length of time the company was trading
* The nature of the product offering (high - tech, mid - tech or low - 
tech)
* The propensity to export
* The management style of the managing director / owner - manager
* The position of the firm on the small firm growth cycle.
It was also felt that the analysis of the material generated from the studies would be 
improved if a research colleague accompanied this researcher on the visits to the 
companies. This is a stance which is strongly advocated by Pettigrew (47) who argues 
that it allows the case under investigation, to be viewed from the differing perspectives 
of multiple observers. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (48) have also made effective use of 
the variation in their research. In this way, a subsequent sharing of interpretation would 
farther add to the richness of the data and the subsequent interpretation. This colleague 
had been aware of the researcher's work in the earlier phases and was fully conversant 
with the subject matter prior to the company visits.
Every attempt was made to tape the interviews. For the most part, respondents were 
happy to comply with this request. The typical interview lasted one to two hours with a 
detailed tour of the factory. Most respondents provided access to documentation 
(business plans) so that the researchers could observe the tangible evidence. This part 
of the case study could be deemed to be the formal interview. Where possible 
(depending on the time available and the willingness of the respondent) both 
interviewee and interviewers went to lunch. This part of the investigation was not 
taped. Rather the objective was to create a relaxed atmosphere where both parties 
could unwind. It proved to be an effective means of "gaining access" to the respondent 
because it took place away from the "office environment". This in turn meant that 
information was shared which may not have emerged in the formal interview.
When the company visit and interviews were completed, both this researcher and his 
colleague remained in the hotel, where tune was spent sharing thoughts and 
interpreting / summarising the information which had been generated. This was 
"talked" into a tape recorder; thus providing a further level of data and more
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importantly ensuring that early impressions or thoughts were captured. It was felt that 
if such an exercise was not pursued, a number of ideas would be lost, through the 
passage of time.
This pluralistic view of method adoption and techniques employed greatly enhanced 
the quality and richness of data and supported the view of previous researchers such as 
Gummesson that it is better to use a strategy where the "problem recruits methods 
rather than the method recruits problems." The results of this approach can be 
examined in a later chapter.
5.8. Summary
This chapter has provided a detailed examination of the research methodology adopted 
in the study. The review of the literature in the area of small business development and 
entrepreneurship revealed a large discrepancy between the normative, prescriptive 
approaches which appear in the literature, and the practices which are adopted in 
reality. Thus it was of paramount importance that the research strategy developed for 
this study should take account of this feature.
The first stage of the study involved a series of in - depth interviews with fifteen chief 
executives / owner - managers, with the overall objective of providing the researcher 
with a pre - understanding of the converging and diverging approaches to planning 
which are employed by a broad spectrum of companies located in Ireland. This 
included fast moving consumer goods companies, services and industrial companies. It 
also covered multi - national corporations located in Ireland as well as small, medium 
and large Irish - owned companies. While not viewing this phase of the study as being 
central to the eventual aims and objectives, it is submitted by this researcher that it 
provides an initial insight into planning practices. This can subsequently be used to 
structure the remaining phases of the study.
The electronics sector in Ireland was chosen as the focus for the subsequent stages of 
the study. Successive governments have sought inward investment from foreign 
companies since the late 1960's, with the overall objective of persuading them to 
develop production facilities and later to locate key strategic business functions (such 
as marketing and research and development) in this country. In the longer term, there 
was the expectation that a viable, indigenous electronics sector would emerge as 
entrepreneurs spotted opportunities to either supply the foreign firms which had 
located in Ireland or started enterprises which addressed unexploited or undiscovered
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needs in the market place. A study by the Department of Industry and Commerce of 96 
Irish - owned companies in 1990, was used as the base from which companies would 
be selected for this study.
It has been argued that there is a need for a pluralistic approach to be adopted when 
designing the research methodology to be employed. Because of the lack of 
understanding of the nuances and processes associated with planning and growth in the 
small firm, an inductive approach is needed. This would allow the researcher to get 
closer to the specific environment than would be the case if a purely deductive research 
design was utilised. Given the idiosyncratic nature of the entrepreneur / owner - 
manager with regard to business planning and development, it was felt that the case 
study method would allow the researcher to investigate a number of companies to 
establish patterns and attempt to improve the level of understanding and generate 
theory.
Prior to arriving at this phase of the study, it was also submitted that a quantitative 
survey should be employed. This would allow the researcher to establish a general 
picture of current practices with regard to the utilisation of planning procedures within 
the indigenous electronics sector in the Republic of Ireland. This phase also allows the 
research to identify those companies which could subsequently be invited to participate 
in the final stage of the study.
In essence, a cascading approach to research strategy was adopted: moving a general 
investigation of planning practices in companies, irrespective of sector or size, to a 
detailed examination of a limited number of cases. The remaining chapters present the 
analysis of the data generated with conclusions and recommendations.
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PHASE ONE: EXPLORATORY INTERVIEW S
CHAPTER SIX
PHASE ONE: EXPLORATORY INTERVIEWS 
6.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the main findings from the initial phase of the research project. It 
was argued in the previous chapter that benefits could be obtained from undertaking a 
small number of exploratory interviews with companies operating in Ireland, with the 
primary objective of identifying the alternative approaches to planning in these 
organisations. The main justification for including this stage in the research design was the 
belief, largely established from the review of the literature in the area (in chapters two and 
three), that there is a major discrepancy between theory and practice. Given this 
divergence, this exploratory phase provides an initial pre - understanding of the critical 
factors and influences which impinge on the design and implementation of the planning 
process.
6.2. Selection of Companies
The companies which were included in this phase were selected on the basis of the 
following criteria:
* The nature of the product (industrial, consumer and services)
* The size of the company (number of employees)
* Nature of the company ownership (foreign - owned, as a consequence of a 
management buy - out, indigenous)
* Proportion of sales coming from export markets.
At this stage of the project, it was felt that the inclusion of a broad base of companies 
would generate a comprehensive picture of the various approaches to planning, rather than 
identifying a pattern which might be specific to any one sector or category of company. 
While the overall focus of the project is on indigenous companies in the electronics sector, 
this initial phase would help to identify different patterns and perhaps shed some light on 
why there is a discrepancy between theory and practice.
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A number o f  companies were selected from the Kompass Directory. These companies 
met the criteria outlined in earlier paragraphs. A small number o f  companies were 
included that were known to the researcher, based on his involvement with the Marketing 
Institute o f  Ireland. The approach adopted to sample selection could best be described as 
convenience sampling. Such an approach has the merit o f allowing the researcher to more 
readily identify companies that would be appropriate for the particular schedule o f  
interviews. It also allows for the inclusion o f  companies that the researcher can access 
more readily, due to prior knowledge o f the owner, or personnel from within the 
organisation. Clearly a form o f inherent bias can exist with such an approach: the
company may not be representative o f  the way in which a company which is randomly 
selected from the population might respond to a request for an interview. H owever it is 
argued that the objective o f  this phase o f  the research project was not one o f  arriving at 
any final conclusions about planning practices in Ireland: rather it was one o f providing the 
researcher with an initial pre - understanding o f the critical variables and influences on the 
planning process. These could subsequently be reviewed and incorporated into phases 
two and three o f the project.
6.3. Nature of the Interview
Because o f the exploratory nature o f this phase, it was felt that a series o f  in - depth 
interviews would allow the researcher to explore a number o f  themes. In order to identify 
a broad range o f  views and practices, it was argued that the interviews should not be 
undertaken solely with the owner or managing director o f the company in question. Thus 
the interview schedule featured personnel from the follow ing backgrounds:
* Managing Director
* Finance Director
* Group Product Manager
* Marketing Director
* Technical Director
The follow ing major themes were covered:
* The background and evolution o f the company
* The organisational structure
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* The role, background and responsibilities o f the C hief Executive Officer
* The approach adopted to strategic planning
* Level o f collaboration between the business functions
* The influence o f the marketing plan on the overall business plan
* The performance o f the company over recent years
* To probe the respondent on a number o f issues (see appendix B)
The average interview lasted between an hour and a half to two hours. An introductory 
letter was sent to eighteen companies. Due to time constraints on the part o f  the 
researcher, a two week time frame was available for the administration o f this phase. The 
recipient o f each letter was contacted by phone a w eek later with a view to arranging for a 
suitable time for the interview. Due to the heavy work commitments o f  three o f  the 
executives, they could not meet with the researcher duiing the timetable outlined to them. 
They agreed to participate at a later stage, if required. One other individual had moved to 
another company. Therefore fourteen companies participated in this phase. They are listed 
in table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1. LIST OF PARTICIPATING COMPANIES
Evode Industries 
Ashling Electronics 
Cornell Electronics 
Mohawk Europa 
Michelin Tyres 
Tivoli Spinners 
Datac Electronics 
Erictron
Clonmel Chemicals 
Nicholas Laboratories 
Abbey Life Assurance 
Prime Computers 
ICL Computers 
Memorex Telex Ireland
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6.4. Emerging Issues
1. The number o f  em ployees in the organisation is not an effective method for 
differentiating between companies. O f much greater importance was the way in which the 
company evolved and, more specifically, the manner in which the management structure 
within the organisation emerged: a large company (in terms o f numbers employed and 
containing a departmental structure) does not necessarily ensure that there is evidence o f  
detailed planning within the organisation.
2. There were clear differences in the approach to planning depending on whether the 
company was: a subsidiary o f  a foreign - owned company, an indigenous company, the 
result o f a management buy - out, or based on the nature o f  the relationship between the 
subsidiary and its parent.
3. One o f the participating companies: Prime Computers, which was a subsidiary of  
an American company, had the least responsibility for planning activities. It was solely a 
"box - shifter", responsible for manufacturing product as designated by central office. It 
was geographically separated from the other two global factories; manufacturing and 
marketing. It received a fortnightly manufacturing order from the marketing division.
4. Other subsidiaries o f foreign - owned firms had responsibility for developing long - 
term plans, usually taking a three to five year perspective and o f  a "rolling" nature. 
However this plan was monitored closely by the parent and in most cases the framework 
for the plan was provided by them; leaving the subsidiary to enter the relevant data under 
set headings.
5. The middle point o f  the extremes identified in points three and four occurred with 
subsidiaries where they took responsibility only for the annual, activity - based, operational 
plan.
6. A  number o f the participating companies emerged as a result o f a management buy 
- out (MBO). They exhibited a degree o f  proactiveness in terms o f planning which did not 
appear to be evident either in subsidiaries or indigenous start - up enterprises. Perhaps 
this is not so surprising, given that MBO's typically have to encounter a change in mind -
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set from that o f  a passive, protected subsidiary, to that o f an aggressive company which 
has to survive on market forces alone.
7. The role o f  the CEO cannot be understated. In nearly all cases, the Chief 
Executive, consciously or sub - consciously, ends up playing a proactive, strategic role in 
the planning process. The marketing function, in many o f  the cases, appeared to be 
subsumed into the overall strategic plan; particularly in the smaller companies. While 
many o f those interviewed came from a technical or non - marketing background. 
However the interviews identified with a strong belief that they had an implicit 
understanding o f what the marketing concept means and also that they were adept at 
implementing it.
8. The smaller company (defined in the context o f the management structure and not 
necessarily the number employed) makes decisions more flexibly and quickly and can 
adapt more readily to changing market circumstances. It also adopts a more informal 
approach to the planning process.
9. In small organisations, the Owner /  Chief Executive is much closer to the various 
business functions, the customers and the competition. There is also evidence o f a 
significant level o f  collaboration and sharing o f  job responsibilities e.g. marketing taking 
responsibility for production scheduling.
10. The more successful companies placed a strong emphasis on internal training and 
staff development.
6.5. Summary
This preliminary phase o f  the research project has allowed the researcher to develop a 
clearer insight into the alternative approaches to planning within Irish companies. It 
reinforced the previously held view that the small company exhibits a number o f  
characteristics which make it imperative to undertake more detailed and substantive 
research into the planning process (or lack of) which exists in such companies.
The emerging issues identified in the preceding paragraphs suggest that the approach used 
by the individual company can be placed in three categories: a minimalist approach, where 
the key structure and framework is provided by the parent company, a proactive,
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structured planning document (typically generated by M B O ’s) or an informal approach to 
planning, where no formal document exists.
Except for those subsidiaries which followed a planning document provided by the parent 
organisation, most companies subsume the marketing function into the overall business 
plan.
It was felt, at the end o f  this phase o f  the project, that the exercise had been worthwhile. 
It allowed the researcher to use the information to shape the direction o f  the research in 
phases two and three. This is examined in previous chapter and the results are presented 
in the follow ing two chapters.
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PHASE TWO: ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE 
DATA
CHAPTER SEVEN
ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE SURVEY - PHASE TWO
7.1. Introduction
Fifty companies participated in this phase o f the study. Forty seven o f  the respondents 
founded the company; three people joined the company at a later stage in its 
development. Only three respondents achieved an education level below third level. Of 
the remaining forty seven, three held a PhD, while seven held a masters qualification. 
Thirty respondents acquired a primary degree in science or engineering. Only one o f  
the fifty people interviewed was female.
7.2. Formation of Enterprise - General Findings
The initial section examined the circumstances which lead to the formation o f the 
enterprise. Table 7.1 shows that the fifty companies which participated in the survey 
follow the typical pattern experienced in the literature with the identification o f an 
opportunity cited as the most common issue which led to the establishment o f the 
enterprise.
Table 7 .1  Reasons leading to the formation of the company
REASON NO. OF MENTIONS %
Identification of opportunities 31 62%
Quest for independence 9 18%
Job dissatisfaction 8 16%
MBO 8 16%
Influence of colleagues 5 10%
Redundancy 4 8%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The initial task o f attracting customers in the initial stages o f  development reflects the 
importance o f  personal contacts and networking by the founder o f the company. By 
contrast the role o f advertising and other elements o f the promotional mix is relatively 
minor at this stage o f development. In addition to the utilisation o f such contacts, the 
role o f  proactive selling is stressed by many o f the respondents. Table 7 .2  demonstrates 
these points.
Table 7 .2  Methods used to attract customers
METHOD NO. OF MENTIONS %
customer pledges 31 62%
active selling 23 46%
customer pledges 9 18%
attending exhibitions 8 16%
media advertising 5 10%
offering a new product 2 4%
BASE: 50
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A crucial issue in the development o f the small firm is the length o f time taken before 
the founder introduces outside, professional expertise to the operation. This can have a 
significant impact on whether the company continues to grow, stagnates or runs into 
difficulties. Table 7. 3 identifies the findings from the survey.
Table 7 .3  Length of time taken to bring in outside expertise
Time No. %
colleagues already involved 21 42%
within 6 months 6 12%
6month - 1 year 5 10%
1 -3  years 15 30%
> 3 years 2 4%
not yet 1 2%
base: 50 wimp anies
These figures indicate that over 40 per cent o f  the companies already had brought 
expertise to the company at the outset: either through partners or by employing 
colleagues. While this would appear to be a positive finding, it should be borne in mind 
that 30 percent o f the company did not introduce professional expertise until after the 
first year o f operations. The main reasons offered for this were the financial constraints 
encountered by the company and the need to keep a tight control on the enterprise's 
activities during that crucial fust year.
Table 7.4 reveals that the production, R&D and finance functions were identified as 
being the most important areas to cover in the initial stages o f development. By 
contrast, the marketing and sales functions were given lesser prominence. This is 
explained perhaps by the fact that many o f the founders undertook these functions in 
the initial stages and recognised that, as orders began to emerge from prospective 
customers, it became critical to have som ebody else in charge o f  the day - to - day 
operations in the factory.
Table 7. 4 Initial functions filled by the company.
Function No. of mentions %
production 22 44%
R&D 14 28%
Finance 10 20%
Technical 4 8%
Marketing 3 6%
Sales 2 4%
everything in place 2
BASE: 50
4%
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IRespondents were also asked to indicate if their roles and responsibilities have changed 
much as the company has developed. This question was designed to provide som e  
evidence about whether or not the respondents encountered difficulties in relinquishing 
responsibilities as the company expanded. Table 7.5 shows that 70% o f  the 
respondents have either relinquished initial areas o f responsibility to others or have 
ceased to become involved in the day - to - day operations o f the business. The chief 
reason proffered for this latter position was the need for the founder to take a more 
strategic view o f  the business. If this were to be achieved, then it was perceived as 
being essential that the operational considerations needed to be devolved to other 
people in the company. Three respondents had set up holding companies to allow for 
this desire to only becom e involved in strategic decision - making.
Table 7. 5 Have your roles and responsibilities changed?
Respondents %
remained the same 15 30%
relinquished as professional
management is introduced 23 46%
ceased to become involved in
day - to - day considerations 12 24%
BASE: 50
7.3. Approach to Planning: General Findings
This section o f the general findings examines the approach o f  the companies to 
planning within their operations. The first question asked the respondents to identify 
the time -period which they consider when mapping out the future direction o f their 
business. The findings in table 7. 6. reveal that seventeen o f the fifty companies have a 
time - frame o f  less than one year. Issues such as unpredictability and the volatile 
nature of the industry were cited as being reasons for avoiding a longer time period for 
planning processes.
Table 7 .6 . Indicate the time - frame you apply when planning your activities?
PER IO D RESPONDENTS %
< 1 year 17 34%
1 - 2  years 6 12%
3 years 15 30%
3 - 5  years 10 20%
over 5 years 2
BASE: 50 COM PANIES
4%
These figures reveal that over half o f the companies take a time span o f three years or 
more when planning their business operations. The need to monitor the longer term 
trends in the industry was highlighted by many o f  the respondents as being the main
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Ireason for taking such a perspective. The fact that many sectors within the electronics 
industry are considered to be in a constant state o f change was also mentioned as being 
a critical factor for taking a longer term view o f  the business. It is interesting to see 
that this issue o f  volatility was also offered as a reason for not taking a long term view  
by seventeen o f the companies. It would appear that the attitude / personality o f the 
founder towards unpredictability influenced whether or not a short, or a longer term 
perspective was taken.
The next question asked if the respondent developed a plan, either formal or intuitive. 
Table 7. 7. presents the main findings.
Table 7. 7. The extent of planning? Formal, intuitive or none at all.
RESPONSE NUMBER OF COM PANIES %
no planning at all 3 6%
intuitive but not written 18 36%
formal, written by founder only 8 16%
formal, prepared by senior management 21 42%
BASE: 50 COM PANIES
The above figures show that the role o f the intuitive, informal plan features strongly 
within the firms surveyed. Interestingly, eight respondents indicated that while they 
developed a formal plan for circulation amongst the relevant personnel, they prepared 
it themselves without any formal involvement o f such personnel. This would appear to 
indicate a reluctance to relinquish control over decision - making to colleagues. As 
might be expected, firms that were longer in existence and which had already brought 
in outside, professional management, were more disposed to the concept o f  a formal 
plan. This w ill be examined in more detail in a later section o f this chapter.
O f the twenty nine companies which indicated that they prepared a formal plan, 
twenty five (87%) stated that they prepared a single business plan, while the remaining 
four companies prepared separate functional plans. They included sales, financial and 
production plans. These, albeit, general findings support the hypothesis that small 
films, if they prepare a formal plan, will do so in a general manner, taking a business, 
rather than a functional approach to the design o f the plan.
Table 7.8. examines the content o f the formal business plan as prepared by the twenty 
five companies.
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Table 7. 8. Contents of the Business Plan
ELEMENT No. OF COMPANIES %
Review of current business situation 23 64
Assessment of opportunities/threats 21 58
Mission statement 5 14
Sales objectives 31 86
Market share objective 24 67
profit objective 22 61
Targeted ROI 21 58
Other business objective 3 8
Expenditure - equipment, factory 32 89
Expenditure - promotion 28 78
Expenditure - training, education 8 22
Assessment of competition 13 36
Marketing strategy 8 22
Other 6 17
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
These figures reveal that the cohort o f companies that develop a formal business plan: 
twenty five out o f a total o f fifty (50% ), include many o f the typical elements outlined 
in the literature. Superficially, it would appear that such companies adhere to a rigid, 
sequential and logical approach which much o f the literature prescribes. The statistics 
however are deceptive. The open - ended nature o f  the questioning allowed for further 
probing, in an attempt to gain a better understanding o f  how  such business plans are 
utilised by the companies. In this respect, many o f the respondents stated that they saw 
such a planning exercise as useful for focusing either the founder's or senior 
management's attention on some o f the critical issues facing the company over the 
foreseeable future. Others however saw such an exercise as largely a cosm etic one, 
designed to attract loans from relevant lending agencies or as a mechanism for getting 
grants from government agencies such as Enterprise Boards or the Industrial 
Development Authority. This raises the question as to whether planning is viewed as a 
process, designed to be implemented within the enterprise, or something which is 
undertaken for external requirements, but irrelevant for the operations o f the company?
It is apparent from table 7.8. that companies take a partial approach to business 
planning. The most frequently cited elements revolve around one or two business 
objectives, allied to budget allocations for the com ing tw elve months.
Table 7.9. provides some evidence as to how the fifty respondents understand the term 
"marketing concept".
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Table 7. 9. What do you understand by the term 'marketing Concept?"
STATEM ENT No. O F MENTIONS %
Marketing satisfies customer needs 29 58%
Marketing means selling 20 40%
Marketing means advertising 4 8%
marketing equates to customer service 8 16%
Other 8 16%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The findings indicate that while many companies do not have a formal marketing 
function, the basic concept is understood by under sixty per cent o f the respondents.
The "other" statement is explained by the fact that som e respondents equated 
marketing with the management o f quality, or, in som e cases, new product 
development.
7.4. Approach to Planning: Impact of Size of Customer Base
Thus far the analysis has examined the general findings from an analysis o f  the fifty 
companies which participated in the survey. It was also felt to be appropriate if a more 
specific analysis o f the companies was undertaken. This section examines some 
findings which indicate the extent to which alternate hypothesis was supported or 
rejected. This stated that: the level o f formality o f planning will depend on the size o f  
the customer base. In other words, companies which have a low  customer base will 
follow the intuitive approach to planning because o f the closeness o f  the relationships 
with the customers. By contrast companies which have a broad custom er base will tend 
to adhere to a more formal planning approach in order to maintain control and 
direction over the business operations. Table 7.10. identifies the breakdown o f the fifty 
companies by the size o f the customer base. The Chi - square test was applied to 
determine whether real or significant differences exist among groups o f data, or 
whether the differences are merely due to sampling. The level o f  significance chosen 
was 0.05.
Table 7.10. Size of Customer Base
SIZE O F CUSTOM ER BASE COM PANIES
< 10 Customers 18
1 1 -2 0 20
> 2 0 12
The extent to which the roles and responsibilities o f  the owner have changed are 
examined in table 7.11. The findings reveal that there is a strong tendency for the roles 
to remained unchanged if the company has a relatively low  customer base. This would
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appear to support the view that it is easier for the owner o f  the business to retain 
maximum control over the direction o f the business if there are only a small number o f  
customers to manage. Over seventy three per cent o f the respondents with a customer 
base o f  under 10, stated that their roles had remained unchanged since the formation o f  
the company. By contrast only one respondent out o f twelve companies with a 
customer base o f over 20, indicated no change in the roles and responsibilities.
Table 7.11. Extent of Change in Roles and Responsibilities
SIZE OF CUSTOMER BASE
Issue < 10 1 1 -2 0 >20
Remained the same 15 
Chi: 13.12 (significant)
11 (73%) 3 (20%) 1 (7%)
Relinquished as professional management 
arrived 21 (Chi: 7.6, significant)
4 (17%) 13 (57%) 4 (26%)
Ceased to be involved in day - to - day
operations 11
Chi: 3.99: not significant
Other changes 3
Chi: 3.70 not significant
2 (25%) 4 (37.5%) 
1 (33.3%) 0 (0%)
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
5 (37.5%) 
2 (66.7%)
The next section examines the level o f  formality associated with the planning process: 
whether or not plans are developed at all, intuitively, but not written down or formally 
prepared and circulated within the company.
Table 7.12. Preparation of the Plan
APPROACH SIZE OF CUSTOMER BASE
< 10 11 - 20 > 2 0
No planning at all 3 3 (100%) 0 0
Chi: 5.67 not significant
Intuitive but not formally 
written down 18 9 (50%) 7 (39%) 2 (11%)
Chi: 3.50 not significant
Formally written by 
owner only 8 5 (62.5%) 2 (25%) 1 (12.5%)
Chi: 2.92 not significant
Formally written by
owner and senior management 21 1 (4.8%) 11 (52.4%) 9 (42.8%)
Chi: 16.56 significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The analysis contained in table 7 .12. show s that fifty per cent o f  the companies with a 
customer base o f  less than ten, develop intuitive plans which are not formally written 
down or circulated to other people in the company. A further three companies in this 
category stated that they do not undertake any planning activities whatsoever. When 
the companies in the > 20 customers category are examined, it can be seen that ten o f
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the twelve companies prepare a formal, written plan. This would again appeal- to 
support the proposition that companies with smaller customer bases are more likely to 
rely on the intuitive knowledge o f their requirements, both present and future, which 
the founder holds. Further probing o f  this issue during the interview revealed that many 
o f the respondents in this category stated that their ability to respond quickly to 
customer needs, allied to their frequent meetings, ensured that they were fully aware o f  
future trends and developments with each customer. This, in turn, negated the need for 
any formal written document.
Contents of the Plan
The next section examines the content o f  the plan, as outlined by the respondents. The 
first issue to comment on from the statistics presented in table 7 .13. is that fourteen 
non - responses were recorded. While three companies out o f  the fifty respondents 
reported that they do not engage in any planning activities at all (see table 7.8), it 
means that eleven o f the eighteen companies claiming to utilise intuitive planning did 
not engage in any o f  the activities outlined in table 7.13. The implication arising from 
this is that companies in this position, whilst claiming to plan intuitively, do so in a very 
vague and unclear manner. A  more cynical interpretation would suggest that they have 
no understanding o f what is contained in the planning process.
Table 7.13. reveals a consistent pattern whereby, on any one o f  the elements listed 
(except for three), less than twenty five percent o f  the companies in the < than ten 
customers category included it as part o f their planning activities. By contrast, if the 
other two categories are considered, it can be seen that the percentage increases 
substantially: in the case o f  companies with more than 20 customers, rising to greater 
than 80 per cent in many instances. This would suggest that the content and substance 
o f the plans varies, depending on the size o f  the customer base; a company with a low  
customer base will rely to a much smaller extent on a structured, developed plan. 
Likewise, the depth o f  the planning process, in terms o f the number o f  issues included 
in the plan, is much more likely to increase, as the customer base rises. Additionally 
table 7.13. show s that o f the eighteen companies in the < than ten customer category, 
eight made no response to the question, indicating that they did not engage in any o f  
these activities.
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Table 7.13. Contents of the Business Plan
Size of Customer Base 
Total (50 < 1 0 (1 8 ) 1 -2 0 (2 0 ) >20(12)
Element
No reply 14 8 (57%) 6 (43%) 0 (0%)
28% 44.4% 30% *
Chi: 7.12 significant
Review of current business 
situation 23 4 (17.4%) 10(43.5%) 9(39.1% )
46% 22.2% 50% 75%
Chi: S.28 significant
Assessment of threats and 
opportunities 21 4 (19%) 8 (38.1%) 9 (42.9%)
42% 22.2% 40% 75%
Chi: 8.28 significant
Mission statement 5 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (40%)
10% 5.6% 10% 16.7%
Chi: 1.00 not significant
Sales Objective 31 8 (25.8%) 13 (41.9%) 10(32.3%)
62% 44.4% 65% 83.3%
Chi: 4.75 significant
Market share objective 24 3 (12.5%) 11 (45.8%) 10(41.7%)
48% 16.7% 55% 83.3%
Chi: 13.47 significant
Profit objective 22 5 (22.7%) 11 (50%) 6 (27.5%)
Chi: 3.07 not significant 44% 27.8% 55% 50%
Target ROI 21 3 (14.3%) 10(47.6%) 8 (38.1%)
Chi: 8.26 significant 42% 16.7% 50% 66.7%
Expenditure /  equipment 32 9(28.1% ) 12 (37.5%) 11 (34.4%)
Chi: 5.66 not significant 64% 50% 60% 91.6%
Expenditure /  promotion 28 7 (25%) 10 (35.7%) 11 (39.3%)
Chi: 8.63 significant 56% 38.8% 50% 91.6%
Expenditure /  training 8 1(12.5%) 2 (25%) 5 (62.5%)
Chi: 7.87 significant 16% 5.5% 10% 41.7%
Assessment of competition 13 3 (23.1%) 4 (30.8%) 6 (46.2%)
Chi: 4.78 not significant 26% 16.7% 20% 50%
Marketing Strategy 8 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%) 5 (62.5%)
Chi: 7.87 significant 16% 5.5% 10% 41.7%
Other 6 1 (16.7%) 3 (50%) 2(33.3%)
Chi: 1.13 not significant 12% 5.5% 15% 16.7%
BASE: 50
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This section has demonstrated that the size o f the customer base plays an important 
role in determining the extent to which the planning process is formalised, and within 
that level o f  formalisation, the breath o f  content and structure contained in that 
process. Put simply, it is clear that companies that have a small customer base rely 
more on the closeness o f the relationship to interpret and understand present and future 
requirements o f  the individual customer. This, in turn, suggests that the founder relies 
to a much greater extent on the intuitive knowledge and understanding o f  the market 
place. As the customer base expands, it becomes more likely that the company will 
engage in formal planning, as it is more difficult to maintain a very close relationship 
with each individual customer.
It is also evident that companies with a low customer base are more likely to eschew  
the concept o f planning, whether it be formal or intuitive. H owever it would be 
dangerous in the extreme to assume that this practice constitutes an incompetent 
approach to managing the business operations o f  the enterprise. Closer probing o f  the 
respondents revealed that the ability to liaise closely with such a small customer base 
ensured that the company was capable o f acting proactively to the needs and 
requirements o f  the customer. This, in turn allowed the owner to project the way in 
which the enterprise would continue to expand, because many respondents perceived 
themselves to be working almost as partners with the customer. While there may be a 
marked absence o f  a formal business plan, there is a clear understanding, on the part o f  
the founder, as to where the company is going, and how its relationship with the 
individual customer will evolve.
In addition table 7.12. show s clearly that the roles and responsibilities o f the founder 
has a much greater tendency to remain the same if there is a low  customer base. This 
allows the founder to retain as much control as possible as, in many cases, it was he or 
she who instigated the initial contact with the customer in the first place. Therefore the 
null hypothesis that there is no evidence to suggest that the level o f formality o f  
planning will depend on the size o f the customer base is rejected.
7.5. Approach to Planning: Impact of Length of Time Established
The next section considers the relationship between the length o f time the enterprise 
was established and the approach to planning which is adopted by the individual
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company. The breakdown o f  the companies which participated in the survey was as 
follows:
less than 5 years 6 to 10 years more than 11 years
8 17 25
Table 7.14. shows how the respondents, engaged in the preparation o f  the planning 
process.
From the review o f the literature and, in particular, the growth models, the following 
alternate hypothesis was developed in the research m ethodology chapter:
The sophistication o f the planning process will increase the longer the enterprise 
has been established.
Table 7.14. Preparation of the Plan
APPROACH
YEARS ESTABLISHED 
< 5 YEARS (8) 6 - 10 YEARS (17) > 11 YEARS (25)
No planning at all 3 0 (0%) I (33.3%) 2 (fifi.7%)
Chi: 0.70 not significant
Intuitive - not formalised 18 2(11.1% ) 8 (44.4%) 8 (44.4%)
Chi: 1.50 not significant
Prepared by founder only 8 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%)
Chi: not significant
Prepared by senior management 21 4 (19%) 6 (28.6%) 11 (52.4%)
Chi: not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
As to the general question o f the general approach to planning, the results from table 
7.14. are inconclusive. Two o f the respondents who claimed that they engaged in no 
planning activities at all, came from that category o f  companies that were in existence 
for a period o f  greater than eleven years. This would appeal' to challenge the traditional 
view that the more established firms would have, at the very least, some evidence o f a 
planning process in existence. Further investigation revealed that the two companies 
had a low customer base (< than ten customers), which would suggest that this was a 
more critical influencing variable than the length o f time the company was established.
The extent to which the planning process was intuitive also produced som e surprising 
findings from the survey. O f the eighteen companies which stated that they used an 
intuitive approach to planning, only two were to be found in that cohort o f companies 
which were in existence for a period o f less than five years. It might have been 
expected that a higher proportion o f companies employing this approach would have 
been located in the more recently established companies. The other sixteen companies
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were evenly spread between the remaining two categories. This suggests that the 
length o f  time that the company is established, has little influence over the general 
approach to the planning process which is adopted by the companies.
Table 7.15. considers the content and structure o f the planning process, as outlined by 
the respondents. The results from table are again inconclusive. Allowance has to be 
made for the fact that there are fewer companies in the category o f < than 5 years: 
eight, as opposed to seventeen and twenty five, for the remaining two categories. The 
most frequently mentioned elements cited by the respondents were; sales objectives, 
expenditure on factory and equipment and expenditure on promotion. The latter two  
were the most mentioned for the more recently established companies. It is argued that 
this is to be expected, as companies in the early phase o f  development have to place 
investment in facilities at the top o f the business agenda, due, in many cases, to the fact 
that problems o f space and inadequate equipment mean that priority has to be given to 
upgrading these areas. In addition, the need to develop brochures and attend 
exhibitions and trade fairs plays a critical role in allowing the owner /  founder to make 
contact with prospective customers and engage in an "awareness" exercise.
Sales targets, as an objective, appeal’ to be given a higher priority by companies in all 
categories, than market share and profit, although it would be unwise to read to much 
into this statistic as the latter two objectives, were cited by fifty six per cent o f those 
companies which were in existence for over eleven years. The frequency o f  mentions o f  
these two objectives was lower in the case o f the more recently established companies.
The issue o f  formal development o f a marketing strategy also receives a very low  
frequency o f  mention. Only eight companies cited marketing strategy as something 
which was a formal part o f their overall business planning process. The surprising 
aspect o f this is that so few  companies which have been established for over six years 
have developed marketing strategies: two in the 6 - 10 category and six in the >  11 
year category.
Those elements which received the low est frequency o f mention included; marketing 
strategy, expenditure on training and education, mission statements and assessment o f  
the competition. It is to be expected that a mission statement might not feature too 
high an a small company's agenda, and this proved to be the case. However, although 
only five companies specifically identified it as an element o f their plan, two were to be 
found in the most recently established companies. Closer examination o f  the responses 
revealed that the five companies who answered in the affirmative were founded by 
people who had worked for large multi - national corporations and were clearly
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influenced by the planning procedures o f such organisations, where mission statements 
feature prominently.
Table 7.15. Contents of Plan
Element
Years Established 
< 5 years (8) 6 - 10 years (17) > llyears (25)
No reply 14 
28%
Chi: 4.8 not significant
1 (7.1%) 
12.5%
8 (57.1%) 
47.1%
5 (35.7%) 
20%
Review of current situation 23
46%
Chi: 1.7 not significant
5 (21.7%) 
62.5%
6 (26.1%) 
35.3%
12(52.2%)
48%
Assessment of threats/opportunities 21 
42%
Chi: 0.11 not significant
3 (14.3%) 
37.5%
7 (33.3%) 
41.2%
11 (52.4%) 
44%
Mission statement 5
10%
Chi: 2.43 not significant
2 (40%) 
25%
1 (20%) 
5.9%
2 (40%) 
8%
Sales objective 31 
62%
Chi: 0.97 not significant
5(16.1% )
62.5%
9 (29%) 
52.9%
17 (53.1%) 
68%
Market share objective 24
48%
Chi: 1.75 not significant
4 (16.7%) 
50%
6 (25%) 
35.3%
14 (58.3%) 
56%
Profit objective 22
44%
Chi: 3.06 not significant
3 (13.6%) 
37.5%
5 (22.7%) 
29.4%
14 (63.6%) 
56%
ROI 21 
42%
Chi: 4.46 not significant
3 (14.3%) 
37.5%
4(19% )
23.5%
14 (66.7% 
56%
Other business objectives 3
6%
Chi: 3.19 not significant
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 
6%
Expenditure - factory/equipment 32
32
Chi: 1.5 not significant
6 (18.8%) 
75%
9 (28.1%) 
52.9%
17 (53.1%) 
68%
Expenditure - promotion 28
58%
Chi: 2.85 not significant
6 (21.4%) 
75%
7 (25%) 
41.2%
15 (53.6%) 
60%
Expenditure - training 8
16%
Chi: 0.1 not significant
1 (12.5%) 
12.5%
3 (37.5%) 
17.6%
4 (50%) 
16%
Assessment of Competition 13
26%
Chi: 3.09 not significant
2 (15.4%) 
25%
2 (15.4%) 
11.8%
9 (69.2%) 
36%
Marketing Strategy 8
16%
Chi: 2.94 not significant
0 (0%) 2 (25%) 
11.8%
6 (75%) 
36%
Other 6 
12%
Chi: 0.98 not significant
1 (16.7%) 
12.5%
1 (16.7%) 
5.9%
4 (66.7%) 
16%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
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The allocation o f expenditure to training and development is low across the three 
categories. This suggests that many companies do not plan, in advance, to allow for 
expenditure on activities such as running training courses for their em ployees or 
funding, if  they wish to pursue studies for diploma or degree courses. Further probing 
during the telephone interviews revealed that more companies are willing to support 
employees, as, and when they receive a request for help, it can be concluded therefore 
that while pre - planning to allow for training is not build into the plan by many 
companies, this does not mean that the issue is ignored by companies in this sector. 
H owever it could also be argued that in a business environment such as that which 
influences the electronics sector, where the management o f  quality is consistently 
stressed as a strategic issue, it is worrying to see that training is not treated as an 
investment which must be factored into the planning process.
The issue o f assessing the competition as a formal element o f the planning process also 
receives a low frequency o f mention, with only nine o f  the twenty five companies 
established over eleven years citing it. This suggests that companies pay less attention 
to analysing the competition than they do to internal company - related issues. It also 
supports the view which is widely identified in the literature; that small companies 
simply do not know enough about their competitors, thus leaving them vulnerable to 
competitive m oves and developments in the market place.
While superficially these figures suggest that small companies in the electronics sector 
do not utilise marketing as an intrinsic part o f their planning activities it is argued that 
this is a dangerous interpretation. Further probing during the interviews revealed to the 
researcher that many companies are intuitively practising the marketing philosophy as 
advocated by the theorists: they are customer focused, they do respond to customer 
needs and requirements, they provide high levels o f customer service, they utilise 
selling, promotion tools, pricing etc., but in many cases it is done in an informal way, 
which is not laid down in a formal plan. These are issues which are difficult to study in 
a quantitative survey which is based on a telephone interview. It reveals a weakness 
associated with using a uni - dimensional approach and supports the view expressed in 
the research m ethodology chapter, that there is a need for a more qualitative approach 
to be included in the study.
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In summation, this section o f the analysis on the question o f whether the length o f time 
a firm is established affects the level o f sophistication and structure o f the plan proves 
to be inconclusive. The results show that, irrespective o f  the number o f years in which 
the company is in existence, the typical plan consists o f  a limited number o f  elements: 
most typically a review o f the current business situation, a couple o f business 
objectives and a series o f  budgets, commonly in the areas o f  expenditure on the factory 
and equipment and promotion.
Table 7.16. highlights the number o f  companies who develop separate functional plans 
as part o f the overall planning process. Only eight companies indicate that they follow  
this line o f  approach. Predictably, three quarters o f  these companies are to be found in 
the category o f companies that have been in existence for over eleven years.
Table 7.16. Nature of the Plan
Years Established
< 5 6 -1 0 > 11
8 (16%) 17 (34%) 25 (50%)
Category
No planning at all 3 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
Chi: 0.69 not significant
Overall approach 39 7 (17.9%) 15 (38.5%) 17 (43.6%)
Chi: 2.92 not significant
Production plan 8 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 6 (75%)
Chi; 2.55 not significant
Financial plan 7 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 5 (71.4%)
Chi: 1.69 not significant
Sales plan 5 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 4 (80%)
Chi: 2.94 not significant
Marketing plan 3 0 (0)% 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
Chi: 0.69 not significant
Other 3 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%)
Chi: 0.77 not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The above figures indicate that the vast majority o f companies prefer to utilise a 
general, as opposed to specific functional approach to the planning process. This 
suggests that the planning process lacks detail and substance, in terms o f the content o f  
the plan. H owever it can be argued that the size o f the company will also have an 
influence on the way in which companies approach the planning task. This is examined 
in the next section.
In summary it can be stated that the null hypothesis that there is no evidence to 
suggest the sophistication o f the planning process will increase the longer a 
company is in existence can neither be accepted or rejected, due to a lack o f  solid 
evidence.
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7.6. Approach to Planning: Impact of Size of Company
The survey o f  the fifty respondents identified three categories which were based on the 
size o f the company, as defined by the number o f employees: less than 15, 1 6 - 5 0  and 
more than fifty. This section examines the alternate hypothesis that as a company 
increases in size, it will be more likely to develop a formal, detailed planning
process. Table 7.17. exam ines the approach to preparing the plan.
Table 7.17.___________ Preparation of the Plan
Number of Employees
< 15 16-50 > 50
Approach
18 19 13
No planning at all 3 3 (100%) - *
6%
Chi: 5.67 not significant
16.7%
Intuitive, not formal 18 10 (55.6%) 6 (33.3%) 2(11.1% )
36%
Chi: 5.54 not significant
55.6% 31.6% IS.3%
Prepared by founder only 8 3 (37.5%) 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%)
16%
Chi: 1.03 not significant
16.7% 21.1% 7.8%
Prepared by senior man. 21 2 (9.5%) 9 (42.8%) 10(47.6%)
42%
Chi: 13.78 significant
11.1% 47.4% 77%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The above figures demonstrate that as companies increase in size, there is less 
likelihood that they will adopt an intuitive, informal approach to planning. Over 
seventy two per cent o f  companies who fall into the "less than fifteen" category either 
do not adopt any planning at all or do so in an intuitive, informal manner. By contrast, 
eighty five per cent o f companies employing over fifty people adopt a formal planning 
system which is prepared either by the founder or by senior management. In many 
respects, this result is predictable as companies which employ more people are also 
more likely also to recruit and develop professional management structures which lead, 
in turn, to a formal planning system.
The extent to which the plan is reviewed also show s up some interesting contrasts. 
This is examined in table 7.18.
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Table 7.18. Reviewing /  Monitoring the Plan
< 15 16-50 > 50
Frequency of Review
18 19 13
No review 3 3 (100%)
6%
Chi: 5.67 not significant
16.7% * -
Annually 3 1 (33.3%) *■ 2 (66.7%)
6%
Chi: 3.24 not significant
5.6% ■ 15.4%
Every six months 0 0 0 0
Chi:-
Quarterly 6 1(16.7%) 3 (50%) 2 (33.3%)
12%
Chi: 1.11 not significant
5.6% 15.8% 15.4%
Monthly 19 4 (21.1%) 8 (42.1%) 7 (36.8%)
38%
Chi: 3.42 not significant
22.2% 42.1% 53.7%
Weekly 3 0 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%)
6%
Chi: 1.91 not significant "
10.5% 7.8%
Ad hoc 16 9 (56.3%) 6 (37.5%) 1 (6.2%)
32%
Chi: 6.21 significant
50% 31.6% 7.8 %
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
A  monthly review o f the plan is the most frequently mentioned procedure in all three o f  
the categories. H owever only twenty two per cent o f the companies who employ less 
than fifteen people follow such an approach, in comparison to fifty four per cent in the 
category employing over fifty people.
Perhaps the most interesting finding from this table is the fact that two thirds o f  
companies employing less than fifteen people review the plan in an ad hoc, occasional 
fashion, or do not utilise any formal review procedure. It may be fallacious to assume 
that occasional, informal reviews o f  the planning procedures indicates an inefficient 
approach by such companies. Further probing o f the respondents elicited approaches 
such as weekend meetings, away from the office, where senior management would 
discuss the future direction o f the company in a relaxed, informal manner, and where 
business was mixed with pleasure e.g. rounds o f golf. A couple o f the respondents also 
indicated that they brought in consultants, from time to time, to provide an objective 
assessment o f performance. While such approaches were not widely prevalent among 
companies in this category, it underlines the fact that such informal methods can play a 
useful role.
Table 7.19. considers how  the content o f  the plan differs, depending on the size o f the 
company.
216
IThe findings reveal a high level o f consistency in that companies that employ over fifty 
people score much higher in each o f the elements than companies in the "less than 
fifteen" category. This is specifically highlighted by the following observations: ninety 
two per cent o f  companies employing more than fifty people mention the sales 
objective and expenditure on factory and equipment elements, by contrast, twenty 
eight per cent o f companies in the less than fifteen category mention sales as an 
objective and thirty nine per cent mention expenditure on factory and equipment. Less 
than a quarter o f the companies in the less than fifteen category mention any o f  the 
other elements; two thirds o f companies in the over fifty category mention six o f  the 
other elements. Companies in the middle category also show  a higher propensity to 
mention the elements o f the planning process when compared to those companies in 
the less than fifteen category.
What are the implications which arise from these observations? The first overall point 
to note is that companies which are smaller, in terms o f  size o f  em ployees are far more 
likely to either not engage in planning at all ( fifty six per cent), or do so in a partial 
manner, with very little content or structure to the planning process. On any given  
element o f the planning process which was mentioned in the question, an average o f  
twenty per cent o f  companies in the less than fifteen category stated that they included 
it in their planning process. This rose to just over thirty five per cent for companies 
employing between sixteen and fifty em ployees, and to fifty seven per cent o f  
companies employing over fifty em ployees. It can be seen therefore that there is a 
steady increase in the likelihood that companies which are larger in size will adopt a 
more formal, and comprehensive approach to the planning process. This supports the 
original proposition as mentioned in the research objectives for this phase of the study.
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Table 7.19. Contents of Plan
<15 16-50 >50
18 19 13
Element
No Response 14 10(71.4%) 4 (28.6%) 0 (0%)
28% 55.6% 21.1% 0%
Chi: 12.28 significant
Review of current
business situation 23 6(26.1% ) 8 (34.8%) 9 (39.1%)
46% 33.3% 42.1% 69.2%
Chi: 4.1 not significant
Assessment of threats
and opportunities 21 4 (22.2%) 8 (38.1%) 9 (42.3%)
42% 22.2% 42.1% 69.2%
Chi: 6.85 significant
Mission statement 5 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 3 (60%)
10% 5.6% 5.3% 23.1%
Chi: 3.34 not significant
Sales objective 31 5 (16.1%) 14(45.2%) 12 (38.7%)
62% 27.8% 73.7% 92.3%
Chi: 15.12 significant
Market share objective 24 4(16.7% ) 10(41.7%) 10(41.7%)
48% 22.2% 52.6% 76.9%
Chi: 9.31 significant
Profit objective 22 4(18.2% ) 8 (36.4%) 10(45.5%)
44% 22.2% 42.1% 76.9%
Chi: 9.21 significant
Targeted ROI 21 4(19.1% ) 7 (33.3%) 10(47.6%)
42% 22.2% 36.8% 76.9%
Chi: 9.61 significant
Other objectives 3 1 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (66.7%)
6% 5.6% - 15.4%
Chi: 3.25 not significant
Expenditure factory/ equipment 32 7 (21.9%) 13 (40.6%) 12 (37.5%)
64% 38.9% 68.4% 92.3%
Chi: 9.61 significant
Expenditure - promotion 28 6 (21.4%) 10 35.7%) 12 (42.9%)
56% 33.3% 52.6% 92.3%
Chi: 10.8 significant
Expenditure - training 8 2 (25%) 3 (37.5% 3 (37.5%)
16% 15.4% 15.8% 23.1%
Chi: 0.8 not significant
Assessment of competition 13 3 (23.1%) 4 30.8%) 6 (46.2%
26% 16.7% 21.1% 46.2%
Chi: 3.8 not significant
Marketing strategy 8 1 (12.5%) 4 (50%) 3 (37.5%)
16% 5.6% 21.1% 23.1%
Chi: 2.31 not significant
Other 6 2 (33.3%) 3 (50%) 1 (16.7%
12% 11.1% 15.8% 7.7%
Chi: 0.5 not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
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IIt can also be seen that very little priority is given to the inclusion o f  a marketing 
strategy as part o f  the overall business plan. This applies to all companies, irrespective 
o f size. Overall, only eight companies mentioned it as featuring in their approach. 
While only one company in the less than fifteen category mentions it, the other seven 
companies are spread evenly over the other two categories (twenty one per cent and 
twenty three per cent respectively). This is somewhat surprising as it might be 
expected that as a company grows and brings in some form o f  professional, functional 
expertise, a distinct marketing strategy may emerge as a consequence. The clear 
evidence from this survey is that companies tend to adhere to the concept o f a general 
business plan, rather than the inclusion o f discrete functional sub - elements. This issue 
is more closely examined in table 7.20..
Table 7.20. General versus Specific Approach to the Plan
< 15 16-50 >50
Approach
18 19 13
No planning 3 3 (100%) 0 0
6%
Chi: 5.67 not significant
16.7%
'
“
General plan 39 14 (35.9%) 17 (43.6%) 8 (20.5%)
78%
Chi: 3.51 not significant
Functional plans:
77.8% 89.5% 61.5%
Sales 5 0 1 (20%) 4 (80%)
Chi: 8.7 significant
0% 5.3% 30.8%
Marketing 3 0 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
Chi: 3.2 not significant
0% 5.3% 15.4%%
Production 8 0 2 (25%) 6 (75%)
Chi: 12.65 significant
0% 10.5% 46.2%
Financial 7 1 (14.3%) 2 (28.6%) 4(57.1% )
Chi: 4.3 not significant
5.6% 10.5% 30.8%
Other 3 0 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
Chi: 1.3 not significant
0% 5.3% 15.4%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
Table 7.20. shows that seventy eight per cent o f  the respondents adopt a generalist 
approach to the planning process, with the percentage dropping from seventy eight per 
cent o f  companies in the less than fifteen category to sixty two per cent in those 
companies employing over fifty people. As might be expected, those companies which 
utilise separate functional plans are to be found in this latter category.
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Table 7.21. Time Frame Considered
<15 16-50 >50
18 19 13
Period
Up to one year 17 10 (58.9) 5 (29.4%) 2(11.7% )
34% 55.6% 26.3% 15.4%
Chi: 6.23 significant
One to three years 21 3 (14.3%) 9 (42.9%) 9 (42.9%)
42% 16.7% 47.4% 69.2%
Chi: 8.92 significant
Three to five years 10 2 (20%) 6 (60%) 2 (20%)
20% 11.1% 31.6% 15.3%
Chi: 2.65 not significant
Other 3 3 (100% 0 0
6% 16.7% . -
Chi: 5.67 not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
This shows that companies employing less than 15 em ployees have a much higher 
tendency to take a more short term view o f  their business, with fifty six per cent taking 
a time frame o f  less than one year. In addition three further companies in this category 
made the specific observation that they operated on a day - to - day basis, as the 
business was too volatile to allow for a longer term perspective. By contrast, almost 
seventy per cent o f  the companies which employ more than fifty people adopt a one to 
three year time frame. The findings suggest that companies with fewer employees and 
being more likely to be at the early phase o f growth and development, are more likely 
to be preoccupied with immediate Issues as they strive to overcom e the initial hazards 
associated with business survival.
The fact that so few companies formally include marketing strategy in the overall plan 
(table 7 .19 .), or prepare a separate, discrete marketing plan warrants further 
investigation. Table 7.22. presents the findings from the question which asked the 
respondents to indicate what they understood the term "marketing concept" to mean. 
This question was asked in an open - ended manner, thus reducing the risk o f  
prompting a specific response if  alternatives were presented to the respondent.
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Table 7.22. What does the Marketing Concept mean to you?
< 15 16-50 > 50
18 19 13
Issue (No. of mentions)
Marketing means satisfying the
needs of the customer 29 11 (37.9%) 8 (27.6%) 10 (34.5%)
58% 61.1% 42.1% 77%
Chi: 3.95 not significant
Marketing equates to selling 20 8 (40% 9 (45%) 3 (15%)
40% 44.4% 47.4% 23.1%
Chi: 2.12 not significant
Marketing equates to advertising 4 I (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%)
8% 5.6% 10.5% 7.7%
Chi: 0.3 not significant
Marketing revolves around
customer service 8 1 (12.5%) 4 (50%) 3 (37.5%)
16% 5.6% 21.1% 23.1%
Chi: 2.31 not significant
Other 8 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%)
16% 11.1% 10.5% 30.7%
Chi: 2.85 not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The findings fail to show any clear differences in the interpretation o f  what the 
respondents understood the term " marketing concept " to mean, depending on the 
company size. While a range o f different interpretations are placed on the term, the 
most frequently mentioned issue was that marketing is perceived as satisfying customer 
needs. Eight mentions were made o f customer service as corresponding to the 
marketing concept. In the "other" category, respondents mentioned marketing 
research, creating customer awareness, quality management and product development. 
In two cases the respondent could not explain what the term marketing meant.
The findings suggest that there is a reasonable understanding o f what the marketing 
concept is about among the respondents, irrespective o f  company size. The typical 
misconceptions about marketing, such as narrowly defining it as advertising are in 
evidence, but it is submitted that many studies o f  companies in other sectors and 
contexts show exactly the same pattern. It also gives som e credence to the view that 
while marketing does not feature explicitly in the planning process o f many companies, 
there is nevertheless a clear understanding o f  its meaning and that many owner - 
managers intuitively practice it in both their day - to - day operations and in the long 
term considerations for the business.
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In summary, this section o f the analysis provides a reasonable level o f evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no evidence that as a company increases in 
size, it is likely to develop a formal and detailed planning process. At best, 
companies that employ less than fifteen people, adopt a partial approach to planning, 
including a fewer number o f elements in the plan than companies employing more than 
fifty people. At the other extreme, fifty six per cent o f  the companies employing less 
than fifteen people ( ten out o f eighteen companies) either do not undertake any 
planning at all (three) do so in an intuitive manner with no structure or substance to the 
planning approach. The reasons for this include the responses that companies were too 
pre - occupied with day - to day-issues, had a clear understanding o f  the customer 
needs and trends or saw no benefits which might accrue from devoting time and effort 
towards the formalisation o f the planning process.
7.7. Approach to Planning: Impact of Level of Exporting
This section examines whether the extent to which a firm engages in exporting 
influences its approach to planning. Specifically the alternate hypothesis states that 
there will be a greater propensity for companies to develop formal, detailed plans, 
as they become more extensively involved in exporting. This proposition is grounded 
on the premise that as companies develop their customer base and move into foreign 
markets, they will need to become more efficient and professional in both their* 
relationships with customers and within their internal operations and procedures.
The general survey showed that o f the fifty participating companies; eight operated 
only in the domestic market, thirteen had less than twenty five per cent o f their sales 
emanating from export markets, eleven with twenty six to fifty per cent from export 
markets and a further eighteen with more than fifty per cent o f sales from foreign 
markets. The time frame which these firms consider is examined in table 7.23.
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Table 7.23. Time Frame Considered
Domestic only <25% 26 - 50% >50%
Time frame
8 13 11 18
Up to 1 year 17 6 (35.3%) 4 (23.5%) 1 (5.9%) 6 (35.3%)
34%
Chi: 9.1 significant
75% 30.85 9.1% 33.3%
One to three years 21 1 (4.8%) 6 (28.6% 4 (19.0) 10 (47.6%)
42%
Chi: 4.45 not significant
Greater than three
12.5% 46.2% 36.4% 55.5%
years 10 0 (0%) 4 (40%) 4 (40%) 2 (20%)
20%
Chi: 5.67 not significant
" 30.8% 36.4% 11.1%
Other 3 1(33.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (66.7%) 0 (0%)
6%
Chi: 5.47 not significant
12.5%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
18.2%
There is little variation in terms o f  time frame considered between the different 
categories. The most notable statistic which emerges is that seventy five per cent o f the 
companies which operate in domestic markets only, take a short term perspective o f  
the business o f  less than one year. However, by the same token, one third o f the 
companies that have exports o f more than fifty per cent, also take a similar perspective. 
The three companies in the other category stated that their business was too volatile to 
allow for more than a day - to - day overview o f their business. It would be dangerous 
however to interpret too much into this as two o f the companies have exports o f  
between 36 - 50 per cent, while one operates in domestic markets only.
Table 7.24.__________ Preparation of the Plan
Domestic <25% 26 - 50% > 50%
Approach
8 13 11 18
No planning at all 3 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%)
6%
Chi: 0.77 not significant
• 7.7% 9.1% 5.6%
Intuitive only 18 6 (33.3%) 5 (27.8%) 4 (22.2%) 3 (16.7%)
36%
Chi: 8.23 significant
75% 38.5% 36.4% 16.7%
Prepared by owner 8 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%)
16%
Chi: 0.85 not significant
Prepared by senior
25% 15.4% 18.2% 11.1%
management 21 0 (0%) 5 (23.8%) 6 (54.5%) 10 (47.6%)
42%
Chi: 7.93 significant
■ 38.5% 54.5% 55.6%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The two most salient findings show that companies operating in domestic markets are 
more likely to rely on an intuitive approach to planning. This is partially explained by
223
the fact that they are more likely to be in the early stages o f development and are 
consequently smaller, in terms o f  people resources and market scope than their 
counterparts in the other categories. The second inter - connected point is that 
companies who derive over fifty per cent o f sales from exports have a management 
structure in place, which share the responsibilities for preparing the plan.
Table 7.25. Content and Structure of Plan
Domestic <25%  
8 13
Element
26 - 50% 
11
>50%
18
No reply 14 5 (35.7%) 4 (28.6%) 2(14.3% ) 3 (21.4%)
28%
Chi: 6.45 not significant
Review of current
62.5% 30.8% 18.2% 16.7%
situation 23 1 (4.3%) 5 (21.7%) 7 (30.4%) 10 (43.5%)
46%
Chi:5.94 not significant
Assessment of
12.5% 38.5% 63.6% 55.6%
opportunities 21 1 (4.8%) 5 (23.8%) 7 (33.3%) 8 (38.1%)
42%
Chi: 5.1 not significant
12.5% 38.5% 63.6% 44.4%
Mission Statement 5 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%)
10%
5.01 not significant *
7.7% 27.2% 5.6%
Sales objective 31 2 (6.5%) 8 (25.8% 8 (25.8%) 13 (41.9%)
62%
Chi: 5.97 not significant
25% 61.5% 72.7% 72.2%
Market share objective 24 0 (0%) 6 (25%) 7 (29.2%) 11 (45.8%)
48%
Chi: 9.72 significant
46.2% 63.6% 61.1%
Profit objective 22 1 (4.5%) 5 (22.7%) 8 (36.4%) 8(36.45)
44%
Chi: 7.06 not significant
12.5% 38.5% 72.7% 44.4%
Target ROl 21 1 (4.8%) 5 (23.8%) 7 (33.3%) 8 (38.1%)
42%
Chi: 5.1 not significant
12.5% 23.8% 63.6% 44.4%
Other Bus. objective 3 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (66.7%) 1 (33.3%)
6%
Chi: 4.24 not significant *
18.2% 5.6%
Budget - promotion 28 1 (3.6%) 7 (25%) 8 (28.6%) 12 (42.9%)
56%
Chi: 8.25 significant
12.5% 53.5% 72.7% 66.7%
Budget - factory, equip. 32 2 (6.35) 8 (25%) 8 (25%) 14(43.8%
64%
Chi: 7.15 not significant
25% 61.5% 72.7% 77.8%
Budget - training 8 1 (12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%)
16%
Chi: 2.82 not significant
12.5% 7.8% 18.2% 22.2%
Assessment of Comp. 13 0 (0%) 3 (23.1%) 6 (46.2%) 4 (30.8%)
26%
Chi: 7.58 not significant *
23.1% 54.5% 22.2%
Marketing Strategy 8 0 (0%) 3 (37.5%) 3 (37.5%) 2 (25%)
16%
Chi: 3.37 not significant
23.1%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
27.3% 11.1%
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A  number o f issues arise from an examination o f table 7.25. O f those companies that 
operate only in the domestic market, only three indicated that their approach to 
planning has any specific content or substance. The content appears to revolve around 
a couple o f basic business objectives, such as sales, and a budget or expenditure 
statement. By contrast, as companies increase their propensity to export, there is an 
increase in the likelihood that they will utilise many o f  the listed elements. However, 
the basic structure o f the plan is based on objectives and budget statements. There is a 
clear lack o f depth to the planning process.
Table 7.26. considers the extent to which companies undertake a general plan or a 
series o f functional plans, depending on their level o f exporting.
Table 7.26. General or Functional Approach to Planning
Domestic <25% 26 - 50% >50%
Approach
8 13 11 18
No planning at all 3 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%)
6%
Chi: 0.77 not significant “
7.7% 9.1% 5.6%
General Plan 39 8 (100%) 10 (25.6%) 9 (23.1%) 12(30.8%
78%
Chi: 3.7 not significant
100% 77% 81.8% 66.7%
Marketing plan 3 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (66.7%)
6%
Chi: 2.18 not significant *
7.7% * 11.1%
Sales plan 5 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (40%)
10%
Chi: 1.8 not significant ■
7.7% 18.2% 11.1%
Production plan 8 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%)
16%
Chi: 2.08 not significant *
15.4% 18.2% 22.2%
Financial plan 7 0 (0%) 2 (38.6%) 2 (28.6%) 3 (42.9%)
14%
Chi: 0.48 not significant
15.4% 18.2% 16.7%
Other 3 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
6%
Chi: 2.36 not significant
■ ■ 9.1% 11.1%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
The analysis o f the data presented in table 7 .26. show s that there is no clear evidence 
that companies will be more prone to developing functional plans as they expand their 
exporting activities. While all o f the companies which operate in domestic markets 
only, prepare a general plan, two - thirds o f the companies with over fifty per cent o f  
their sales coming from overseas markets, will develop one or some functional plans.
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However there is little difference in the percentages o f companies who fall into any o f  
the three categories, with regard to their propensity to utilise functional plans.
In summary the foregoing analysis from tables 7.23. - 7.26. partially supports the 
proposition that the approach to planning will become more detailed and formal as the 
level o f  exporting increases. There is a clear dichotomy between companies that 
operate in the domestic market only and those that engage in exporting. The former 
exhibit a much greater tendency to follow  an intuitive, informal and unstructured 
approach to the planning process, the latter are more prone to adhere to som e form o f  
structure and content. However there is little variation in behaviour between 
companies across the three categories o f exporting which was identified in the 
literature: <  25%, 26 - 50% and > 50%. As a consequence, the null hypothesis that 
there is no evidence that there will be a greater propensity fo r  companies to develop 
form al, detailed plans, as they become more extensively involved in exporting  can 
neither be rejected or supported. It should also be borne in mind that the propensity to 
export is not related to the length o f time that a company is in existence. While in some 
industry sectors, it may be logical to assume that a company will initially begin 
operations in the local market and move progressively on to opportunities in foreign 
markets, this is not necessarily the case in the electronics sector. A number o f  the 
companies in this phase o f the study, because o f the nature o f the niche or sector 
concerned, began their operations in export markets.
7.8. Approach to Planning: Impact of Product Category
This final section examines the relationship between the nature o f the product that the 
company manufactures and the approach to planning which is adopted by that 
company. One o f  the major problems in this form o f analysis is that it is extremely 
difficult to categorise companies into one or two market sectors on a product basis. 
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) covers a wide range o f productive 
activities ranging from computers through to scientific and industrial instruments, 
broadcasting and receiving equipment to electronic components.
Given that the number o f companies interviewed in this phase o f  the study was small 
(although still representing a large percentage from the population under investigation) 
it was deemed to be inappropriate to develop a wide range o f product categories. 
Instead two classifications were used: components and applications.
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The applications grouping deals mainly with the production o f  electronics goods to 
particular end user requirements and includes categories such as data processing, 
telecommunications, consumer goods, and industrial and commercial applications. The 
components sector is largely dominated by semiconductor materials, semiconductor 
components (such as transistors and integrated circuits) and passive components (such 
as resistors, capacitors and printed circuits).
The breakdown o f the companies which participated in the survey was as follows: 
components, nineteen ( 38%) and applications, thirty one (62%). It was not 
anticipated that there would be any significant difference in the approach to planning, 
irrespective o f  whether a company was located in the components or applications 
sector: no a priori evidence is presented in the literature to support such a view. 
Therefore, although no proposition was formally tested, an analysis was undertaken to 
see if, in fact, any major differences occurred. Table 7.27. presents the data which was 
collected on the structure and content o f the plan.
As can be seen from table 7.27, there would appeal- to be little variation in the 
approach to planning adopted by companies, irrespective o f  the sector / product 
category within which they operate. The only exceptions are in the assessment o f the 
competition and the utilisation o f  a marketing strategy. However it would be 
dangerous to over - interpret on these issues as no obvious reason com es to mind 
which might explain why there is variation in these areas.
In conclusion, it appears that the issue o f product category does not appeal" to have 
any effect on the approach to planning which is adopted by the individual company.
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Table 7.27. Content and Structure of the Plan
Components Applications
19 31
(38%) (62%)
Element
No reply 14 8(57.1%) 6 (42.0%)
28% 42.1% 19.4%
Chi: 3.03 not significant
Review of current
situation 23 8 (34.8%) 15 (65.2%)
46% 42.1% 48.4%
Chi: 0.18 not significant
Assessment of threats
and opportunities 21 6 (38.6%) 15(71.4%)
42% 31.6% 48.4%
Chi: 1.37 not significant
Sales objective 31 13 (41.0%) 18(58.1%)
62% 68.4% 58.1%
Chi: 0.55 not significant
Market share
objective 24 8 (33.3%) 16 (66.7%)
48% 42.1% 51.6%
Chi: 0.43 not significant
Profit objective 22 8 (36.4%) 14 (63.6%)
44% 42% 45.2%Chi: 0.05 not .significant
Target ROI 21 8(38.1%) 13 (61.9%)
42% 42% 41.9%
Chi: 0.0 not significant
Other objectives 3 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
6% 5.3% 6.5%
t'lii: 0.03 not significant
Budget - promotion 28 0(32.1%) 20 (64.5%)
56% 47.4% 64.5%
Chi: 1.48 not significant
Budget - Factory
equipment 32 12(37.5%) 20 (62.5%)
64% 63.2% 64.5%
Chi: 0.0 not significant
Assessment of Comp. 13 2(15.4%) 11 (84.6%)
26% 10.5% 35.5%
Chi: 3.84 significant
Marketing Strategy 8 0(0%) 8 (100%)
16% - 25.8%
Chi: 5.83 significant
Other 6 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%)
12% 10.5% 12.9%
Chi: 0.05 not significant
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
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7.9 General versus Functional Plans
Table 7.28. in particular, and previous analysis which presented in tables 7.16, 7.20 and 
7.26 show that the majority o f companies which participated in the survey undertake a 
general business plan as opposed to a number o f  functional plans. Table 7 .20, which 
examines the approaches to planning by companies depending on the number o f  
employees, show s the marketing and financial plan as being significant. This can be 
partially explained by the view that as companies increase the number o f  employees, it 
is reasonable to expect that areas o f  expertise will be brought into the firm, leading to 
specialised or functional plans. H owever a cautionary note has to be made however, as 
the number o f companies using marketing and financial plans represents a very small 
proportion o f  the total: three and seven respectively. There is a danger therefore of 
over - interpreting the significance in the differences. Table 7 .16 examines the impact 
which the length o f time a company is in existence, has on the approach to planning. 
No significant differences were identified.
The general findings which are presented in table 7.28. allow the null hypothesis that 
there is no evidence to suggest that companies adopt a general business plan rather 
than functional plans to be rejected.
Table 7.28. Type of Plan
Category No. of Companies %
No planning at all 3 6%
General plan 39 78%
Marketing plan 3 6%
Sales plan 5 10%
Production plan 8 16%
Financial plan 7 14%
Other 3 6%
BASE: 50 COMPANIES
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7.10. The Impact of Turnover on the Approach to Planning
The issue o f whether the sales generated by a company has an effect on the approach 
to the planning process was considered in this phase o f  the study. H owever only fifteen 
o f the companies that participated in the survey were willing to divulge this figure. The 
rest either refused or provided an evasive answer which did not appeal- to be truthful: 
in some cases two or three different figures were mentioned during the course o f  the 
interview. This led to the conclusion that any attempt to analyse such information 
would be inherently unreliable and with such a low  response to the issue, any 
conclusions would be spurious.
It is submitted however that any attempt to assess the impact o f  turnover on planning 
is fraught with difficulties. In the case o f  the evolving firm operating in the electronics 
sector, the level o f  sales generated is not necessarily linked to the size o f  the company 
or the length o f time that it has been in existence. A number o f the companies 
employed less than five people, yet were generating sales o f over 1 million pounds. 
Others, which had only been in operation for less than two years were also generating 
similar sales figures, while companies that were around for over ten years may have 
recorded sales o f  less than half this figure. A  lot depends on the particular sector or 
niche o f the market within which the individual firm competes.
7.11. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This phase o f the study set out to examine the overall approach to planning by 
companies in the electronics sector. The general analysis o f  the fifty companies that 
participated in the survey showed that the motives for starting the business, the 
methods used to attract customers in the initial phase and the ways in which external, 
professional management was brought into the company, were consistent with other 
empirical studies which were reviewed in an earlier chapter. Likewise in thirty per cent 
o f the companies, the roles and responsibilities o f  the founder have remained 
unchanged. This is also consistent with the literature which suggests that many 
founders encounter difficulty in delegating responsibility and relinquishing some 
elements o f control over the business.
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With regai'd to the time frame which is considered for planning the future development 
o f the company, fifty four per cent o f  the companies take a perspective o f  three years 
or more.
The role o f intuitive, informal planning is in evidence with eighteen companies claiming 
to use this approach. This is again consistent with the literature which suggests that 
many entrepreneurs /  owner managers fail to adopt a formal, rational and sequential 
approach to planning.
The size o f the customer base o f a company appears to directly influence the approach 
to planning. Companies with a small customer base rely more on the closeness o f the 
relationship with the customer to help them to plan both the present and future 
requirements. The fact that a company may only have less than ten customers means 
that many owner - managers see no need to formalise the future direction o f the 
company because, put simply, they have a very clear grasp o f what is happening in the 
relationship and adjust accordingly.
When the length o f time a company has been established was analysed against the 
approach to planning, the results proved to be inconclusive. Irrespective o f  the number 
o f years in existence, the typical content o f the plan consisted o f a limited number o f  
elements, mainly revolving around a couple o f objectives and a general projected 
expenditure statement covering issues such as equipment and promotion.
The number o f  people employed by the company was also examined as a potential 
influencing factor on the approach to planning. The results indicated that there is a far 
greater likelihood, as companies increase in size, that they will adopt amore formal, 
comprehensive approach to the planning process.
The extent to which a company engages in exporting partially supports the proposition 
that the approach to planning will becom e more detailed and formal. No evidence was 
found to suggest that a company's approach to planning will be influenced by the 
product category within which it is located.
In conclusion, the results from this survey indicate that the size o f the customer base 
and the company itself (in terms o f people employed) play a strong influence in 
determining the level o f  formality and sophistication associated with the approach to 
planning. It is also clear that the vast majority o f  companies think o f  planning in the 
context o f a general plan, rather than a plan which is made up o f  a series o f  functional
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sub - plans. The role o f marketing strategy in the formal planning process is notable for 
its absence in the cases o f all but eight or sixteen per cent o f  companies. That is not tot 
suggest that the marketing concept is ignored or not understood. Twenty nine 
respondents (58%) provided a classical definition o f  marketing which was unprompted 
by the interviewer and issues such as quality, customer service and responding to 
customer's needs proactively were cited by many as being the basis for giving them 
their competitive edge or advantage. This issue is not adequately examined through the 
mechanism o f  a telephone interview and needs to be investigated further in phase two 
o f  the research. It also became clear from the interviews that personality, background 
and outlook o f  the individual owner - manager has a direct bearing on the approach to 
planning. It is submitted that a quantitative approach such as that undertaken in phase 
one o f the study does not allow the researcher to probe the respondent sufficiently; 
thus substantiating the view expressed in design o f  the project (discussed in the 
research m ethodology chapter) that there is a need for further research which would 
be qualitative in nature and based on the case study method.
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PHASE THREE: ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER EIGHT
8.1
THE CASE OF CONNAUGHT ELECTRONICS LTD
(CEL)
8.1. T H E  C A S E  O F  C O N N A U G H T  E L E C T R O N I C S  Ltd. (CEL)
Introduction
Connaught Electronics Ltd was founded by Joe McBreen in 1982. Joe had worked as a 
Managing Director for a multinational firm in Tuam for a number o f years. This 
company engaged in a rationalisation exercise in 1981 and Joe decided that this would 
be an opportune time to set up a company to make car alarms, an idea which he had 
identified from his involvement with the multinational company, but which had lain 
dormant for a couple of years as his workload increased. During his years with the 
multinational, Joe had developed over fifteen different projects which he considered to 
be worth further investigation. He had carried out feasibility studies on many of these 
ideas, before deciding that they were not worth pursuing any further.
Joe McBreen's prime motivation for starting a business in the car alarm area stemmed 
mainly from his belief that this was a sector which would develop dramatically over the 
next decade. Already in Ireland, during the early part of the 1980's, insurance 
companies were beginning to express the view that the onus was on car owners to be 
more vigilant about car security in the wake of major increases in car theft in the large 
cities. This was a trend which was mirrored in most of the European countries, and 
was also expressed strongly by the Gardai in their crime prevention brochures.
In the longer term, Joe anticipated that car security systems would become an integral 
item in the design of cars in the 1990's. His basic research of companies currently 
making such systems was encouraging: there was no company in Ireland and only one 
small manufacturer in Britain. He identified two companies in Italy, along with a 
number of Asian companies which produced cheap, low quality product for the self - 
installation segment.
One o f his former colleagues from the multi national company; Frank Clancy also 
collaborated with him in terms o f design and product development. During the period 
when this company was engaged on its rationalisation exercise, Joe and his colleague 
worked in a part - time capacity with two operatives who had been recruited to 
manufacture the product.
In the intervening eleven years, Connaught electronics has grown to a position where 
over seventy five per cent o f business is export oriented and fifty five people are 
employed at the factory, just outside Tuam.
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Phase One:Networking - 1982 -1985
The company emerged from humble beginnings. In the initial months, following the 
launch of the company, Joe was faced with the perennial problem of how to generate 
business from products which were still being developed. He surmounted this obstacle 
by entering into a licensing arrangement with his previous employer, to manufacture 
on a sub - contract basis. This deal allowed the company to generate the necessary 
cash flow while at the same time being in a position to engage in some research and 
development. Joe quickly realised that defining his business as being exclusively in car 
alarms was too restrictive: he was actually competing in the automotive security 
market. In addition to the business generated from the licensing sector, CEL was 
bringing two other car alarm products to the market in this first phase of its 
development.
The part - time involvement of Joe and his colleague reflected the level of progress 
which was being made. The lead time involved from the development of the product to 
getting it distributed to the after - market was lengthy. During this early phase of 
growth, Joe McBreen highlighted the problem of being taken seriously by distributors; 
mainly due to the smallness o f scale arising from the modest size o f the enterprise (two 
part - time partners and two operatives).
He had invested a lot o f time and effort, along with his colleague in research and 
development. Although an industrial chemist by training, Joe had always perceived 
himself as a "technical boffin". Both Frank Clancy and he had analysed the existing 
range of products which were on the market at that time and they discovered a wide 
variation in both price and quality.
They recognised very quickly that two main segments existed: a standard DIY car 
alarm which could be installed by the purchaser, working from an instruction manual 
and a professional car alarm which necessitated professional installation by an electrical 
engineer. The main competition for the former category emanated from companies 
based in the Pacific Rim countries. They specialised in producing cheap car alarms 
which could be best described as being of variable quality. They benefited from 
cheaper labour costs and both Joe McBreen and Frank Clancy agreed that a company 
of CEL's size and cost structure could not compete effectively in this sector. They 
therefore directed their time to developing products which would be aimed at the 
professional car alarm sector. Both agreed on the need to concentrate on designing a
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product which would focus on quality. This segment provided just such an opportunity 
where customers would be willing to pay for the added value which better quality 
would bring to the product offering.
Thus, the first three years o f the company's existence revolved around Joe and Frank 
Clancy working in a part - time capacity along with two full - time operatives who 
serviced the licence arrangement with the company which Joe was still acting in the 
capacity of managing director. This company was reducing its operations in Ireland 
and Joe was in a strong position to encourage the company to switch this part o f its 
business to Joe's enterprise. He convinced them that such a licensing arrangement 
could provide CEL with the opportunity to establish itself and more importantly create 
employment in an under - developed area. He stressed also to senior management that 
it would additionally help to improve its public image in the eyes o f a small community 
which was expressing disquiet at the potential loss o f employment in what was a 
geographic "blackspot". Much of his spare time was spent in the laboratory working 
with Frank Clancy on a number of designs. By the end of 1984, the company had 
increased its number of employees from four to ten.
In 1985, CEL was in a position to take the designs and prototypes to a number of 
motor accessory distributors in Britain. Joe realised that in order to combat the 
perceived lack of credibility which emanated from the small size o f the enterprise, it 
would be necessary to visit a number of influential distributors who would be in a 
position to open up sales opportunities in an expanding market. Indeed Ireland and 
Britain mirrored each other in terms of rising crime levels and increased publicity about 
the need for car owners to be more vigilant about car security.
The response from the distributors was encouraging. They expressed satisfaction with 
the quality and price of the product and placed orders with CEL. Joe invited a number 
of the larger distributors to visit the factory in Tuam. He attributes much of his 
consequent success to these early visits. The distributors were intrigued by the unspoilt 
nature of Tuam and the surrounding countryside. They enjoyed the hospitality which 
Joe provided and strong relationships were established at an early stage. Having 
convinced them of the quality of the product ( a less difficult task than had been 
envisioned, due to the variation in quality standards), orders were secured.
Joe adopted the view that the critical task which had to be addressed during this initial 
phase of growth was one of "making customers aware of CEL's existence, its products 
and its ability to supply them." This involved a two - way process: Joe visiting them
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and then bringing the relevant people back to his factory. This latter exercise alleviated 
some of the potential doubts and misgivings which they might hold about the viability 
of CEL supplying the British market from such an apparently inaccessible place as 
Tuam.
Phase Two:Building the Customer and Product Base 1986 - 1989
The three year period following the initial acquisition o f orders witnessed a number of 
developments within CEL. McBreen realised the necessity o f establishing a presence in 
the British market. It was clearly going to be a growth market and having somebody 
based there would generate business from new potential customers as well as servicing 
the existing distributors more effectively. He recruited a marketing graduate from 
University College Galway and in Joe's words "pitchforked" him directly into the sales 
area. In 1987, McBreen widened this graduate's span o f responsibility by charging him 
with establishing a base in Holland. The European market was beginning to show 
evidence of significant growth and Joe acquired an office in Amsterdam from a 
colleague which served as an initial base. By 1989, five people were employed in the 
sales and distribution area.
McBreen acknowledged that he took a risk in expecting a raw graduate with no 
previous experience of working in the industry, to develop a sales and distribution 
base. However, he reasoned that small companies such as CEL do not have the 
financial resources available to them to recruit experienced marketing personnel. As a 
result, he places great emphasis on "growing people with the company" and 
encouraging them to acquire relevant degrees and diplomas. This, in his view, 
counteracts the inability to recruit from outside the company.
In 1986 he also recruited two graduates in electronic engineering from the local 
university. As the manufacturing output rose in response to the increasing demand for 
the product, McBreen identified the need for managerial expertise in engineering and 
quality. Because of their background, both graduates also became involved in the 
research and design process. Over this three year period, the product range grew from 
the initial two products, to over twenty five. The organisational structure has 
developed mainly from within. Only the purchasing manager and the accountant have 
been recruited from outside the company.
McBreen retained responsibility for developing new business along with the graduate 
who was based in Britain. However on closer discussion in this area it became clear
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that the graduate, during this phase was dealing to a greater extent with the existing 
distributor base, while Joe developed new business.
During this period o f growth, McBreen instigated a form of planning within the 
company. As the volume of business grew, he recognised the need for some control 
mechanism. His approach to planning is based on two contributions: a formal 
document which is sent out to each of the distributors, whether through the British or 
Dutch office, and an annual document which sets out budgets for expenditure in a 
number o f areas and which is measured against a three year projection o f where the 
company is going. The document which is sent out to the distributors acts as a 
guideline for projected sales targets. The distributor fills out the form based on his 
estimate of sales for the coming twelve month period. Either Joe or one of the five 
personnel employed in the sales /  distribution office would visit each of the distributors 
twice to three times during the year. This visit is designed to iron out any problem 
areas which may be occurring with the individual distributor; it also is seen as an 
opportunity to update the distributor of any new product developments. Sales 
brochures and sales support material are provided. It aiso allows the representative of 
CEL to pick up feedback from the distributors about competitive activities or any local 
developments which may have either a positive or negative impact on future sales in 
that particular region or city.
Once these forms have been returned to the sales / distribution offices, they are 
assessed and fed back to Joe and Frank Clancy. They, in tandem with the accountant 
take responsibility for formulating the annual budgets for expenditure. The projected 
expenditures are balanced against the projected sales revenue, which in turn is 
generated from the sales projections which are submitted by the distributor base.
Joe McBreen assumes responsibility for identifying the long term developments within 
the industry. He has always taken the view that the car security market can only be 
assessed over a two to three year planning cycle. He supports this view by observing 
that the industry has undergone rapid changes, due to alterations in legislation and the 
influence of strong lobbying by insurance companies.
He has expressed the view that the annual budget acts as a form of discipline on the 
company: key areas which may require expenditure have to be justified on the basis of 
their importance to the company's growth prospects and judged against the projected 
income for that one year period. For instance, he argues that advertising, exhibitions 
and trade fairs do not figure prominently as areas of investment: of more critical
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importance is the "word - o f mouth" factor which has generated much of the expanded 
business for CEL during the period to 1989. By contrast, the company has committed 
much of the available finance to investing in machinery and equipment as it has 
expanded the range and sophistication of the product offerings.
A three year time frame is employed by Joe McBreen when he reviews the industry. 
However, this is not committed formally onto any document. The focus is on the 
annual budget and monthly meetings to review sales and expenditure against the 
projected targets. Thus, the three year time frame resides in the mind o f Joe McBreen, 
acting as managing director /  owner, with responsibility for shaping the long term 
direction of the business.
It was in this capacity that he foresaw a major change in the nature of the car alarm 
market in 1988. From monitoring the trade press and speaking to the distributors it 
became clear to Joe that by the middle of the 1990's, a car security system would 
become a standard part of the car as opposed to the optional accessory which the car 
owner might wish to purchase. One o f the main features o f the automotive industry has 
been the constant desire on the part of the manufacturers to add on the number of 
accessories, in an attempt to seek that competitive edge and differentiate the product 
offerings. While many of these "add ons" might be perceived as being attractive, 
without necessarily making the model more efficient in the eyes of the customer, any 
developments which might improve the security of the car would have the effect of 
contributing positively to its well-being.
In essence, this meant that if CEL wished to remain competitive, indeed survive, as a 
viable operation in the coming decade, it would have to undertake a radical re - 
appraisal of its activities and processes. Of more fundamental importance was the fact 
that the market itself, together with the distribution structure was about to change. Joe 
reckoned that it was not going to happen quickly. Automotive manufacturers work to 
a long lead time in terms of car design and ergonomics: typically three to five years (as 
o f 1988). The car of the 1990's would have a security system as a matter of course. 
Therefore the bulk o f CEL's business over the next five years would shift from the 
after market to the original equipment manufacturers (OEM's). In the early part of 
1988, the main implications of this trends were being evaluated by Joe McBreen.
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Phase Three: The Management of Change - 1990 to 1993
The identification of the OEM sector sparked off a number o f developments within the 
operations of CEL. McBreen recognised that one o f the critical prerequisites necessary 
for getting placed on the "preferred supplier lists" was the approach to quality 
management. CEL embarked on the ISO 9000 process of certification. It did so in the 
recognition that this was a competitive necessity, not an opportunity for competitive 
advantage. Certification was received towards the end of 1990.
The OEM sector reflected a number o f developments which were taking place in the 
environment. There was a desire on the part the automotive manufacturers to reduce 
the number o f suppliers with whom they dealt with. They were beginning to focus on 
long term arrangements (LTA's). This in turn placed a great deal of emphasis on 
relationship management. McBreen held the belief that these developments would 
favour CEL. The company had originally gained its initial orders in the DIY sector 
based on its willingness to court the main distributors and establish relationships with 
them. His extensive experience gained from working with multinational companies and 
more significantly from the environment within which they operated, also meant that he 
"knew his way around the system". In particular, he was familiar with the purchasing 
procedures which operated in such organisations.
He recognised also that a large automotive manufacturer such as Ford, operated its 
own quality standards ( in the case o f Ford, it is referred to as the Q1 standard). This 
requirement of prospective suppliers was o f a higher standard than that reached by the 
ISO 9000 programme of certification. For example it extended into areas such as the 
sophistication of the equipment used by the supplier. McBreen recognised the 
limitations of his present operation and in 1991 drew up plans to invest in Computer 
Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacturing systems (CAD / CAM). By the end 
of 1991 these systems were up and running. Apart from addressing the demands of the 
automotive manufacturers, it also ensured that CEL was becoming more flexible in 
terms of the products which it could produce. During this period, the company began 
to develop radio telemetry products which had many applications. CEL received an 
order from Shell Oil Company for the purchase of such products on the oil fields. 
Radio telemetry provides a communications link between the oil rigs and the central 
communications point. McBreen saw many potential areas for development in this area 
and one of the engineers in the company was assigned responsibility to work on 
designing systems. This part o f CEL's operations however was seen as an area which 
would in the longer term, provide 15 to 20 per cent of the company's business.
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However the major focus during this period (1990 - 1993) was one of "courting" the 
OEM's and their first tier suppliers. In some cases it was the latter operator which 
supplied a range of ancillary product to the manufacturer.
McBreen viewed the "sea change" in the industry as one which demanded a culture 
change in the operations within CEL. The ISO 9000 programme resulted in a clear 
system of procedures. This could be visibly witnessed on a tour through the plant, 
where each section o f floorspace was clearly labelled and signposted. Weekly 
production targets and "actuais" were displayed at each point in the manufacturing 
process. Manuals were also very much in evidence. Although this may sound trivial, 
McBreen alluded to the discipline which this imposes on the workforce and the 
resulting pride which they take from reaching production targets and so on.
Perhaps the biggest culture change was demanded from the management team which 
he had in place. The five key figures: the Technical Director (Frank Clancy), 
Purchasing Manager, R&D Manager, Quality Manager and Production Manager had 
joined the company from the beginning or within a year or eighteen months since the 
company "went full - time". This was an advantage because each of the management 
team was comfortable with the rate o f development and the expected changes 
demanded of them in terms o f their workload and in the achievement of higher quality 
standards.
Another area of immediate concern to McBreen in early 1991, was the fact that up 
until now the company had sub - contracted out the manufacturing o f the mouldings to 
two local companies. CEL created the necessary designs but did not feel it necessary to 
produce the mouldings "in - house." However, from initial discussions with the 
OEM's, it became clear to him that CEL would have to invest in surface mount 
technology and bring this aspect o f the production process directly under their control. 
This was based on the observation that the OEM's would view with some suspicion, 
the capability of a supplier such as CEL to maintain consistently high standards of 
quality if such an important element of the process were to be placed in the hands of an 
external, independent company. This again was graphic evidence o f the changes which 
had to be made to the company's operations.
In 1992, McBreen recruited a young marketing executive with experience o f working 
in export markets and who was fluent in German. This latter skill was viewed as being 
critical in order to make inroads into the German market. Meanwhile McBreen himself 
concentrated on the OEM's. In this respect he has not limited himself to car
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manufacturers. He also began to set up meetings with other OEM's which would have 
a demand for security systems.
McBreen set himself the target of two contracts from OEM manufacturers during the 
period from 1991 to 1993. In May o f 1993 he received his first contract for supplying 
car security systems for the Mazda 323 range o f car. He also had expectations of an 
order from the Renault company but at the time of interview this was not yet 
confirmed. In fact on the morning o f our visit to his company, he was in the process of 
preparing for a two day visit from representatives from Nissan.
McBreen also addressed the issue o f logistics during this period. Conscious of the need 
to be able to guarantee reliable delivery of product, he established a forty eight hour 
policy from receipt of order to delivery to mainland Europe. In cases o f great pressure 
from the customer, CEL would use air freight to meet a required deadline. He was 
aware o f the perceptions which prospective customers might hold about the location of 
CEL, based as it was on the Western seaboard, with a road and rail infrastructure 
which might best be described as variable. However whilst acknowledging the possible 
disadvantages from having a base in Tuam, McBreen stressed the benefits which 
emerge from inviting representatives to visit the plant and spend a weekend in the area. 
He takes visitors to the local tourist "haunts" and this creates a positive impression 
and reinforces the perception which many European business people have o f Ireland as 
unspoilt and environmentally clean.
The question of labour costs posed problems for CEL. A comparative analysis of the 
cost structure revealed that CEL was returning labour costs which were thirty per cent 
higher than the competition. Clearly a continuation of this position would leave the 
company vulnerable in a competitive tendering situation, where the ability to deliver 
quality product at a keen price would be a crucial determinant in deciding whether or 
not the order would land in Tuam. A limited number of options were available to 
McBreen. He realised that if he wanted to operate in a "long term" business he would 
have to make long term investments. Together with his production manager, he drew 
up a budget for purchasing more updated, automated equipment. This would 
necessitate an initial amount of investment, but their analysis showed that there would 
be a two year - pay back period on this investment.
Consideration would also have to be given to the re - deployment o f duties within the 
organisation and subsequent lay - offs. The latter prospect was not a pleasant task, but 
McBreen argued that if the company was to survive and ultimately be in a position to
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recruit more people, it would have to reduce the workforce and drive efficiencies 
through more up to date machinery. This issue was about to be addressed by him at the 
time of the interview.
O V E R A L L  A P P R O A C H  T O  P L A N N I N G
This issue was addressed in some detail in phase two of the case study and it is not 
proposed to repeat the analysis here. However, some observations are made, it is 
submitted that McBreen has managed to achieve a balance between formality and 
informality in the planning process. Close attention is paid to the annual plan, which 
takes the form of a budget based on expenditure as against projected sales. The latter 
is formulated from the distributor reports which are submitted to CEL. This 
component of the planning process represents the formal input in the sense that 
information is collated, analysed, prioritised and committed to a formal document. 
Although McBreen does not use the term "tactical" to describe this activity, it is clear 
from his opinions on this subject that the annual budgetary plan is viewed as something 
which imposes a discipline on the expenditure of the company. When it comes to the 
longer term assessment of the company's future direction however, it is not treated 
with the same level of formality. Instead, this exercise resides with Joe McBreen, who, 
after consultation with his management team, takes responsibility for implementing the 
recommended strategy.
It is contended that this approach to planning reflects a position which is common in 
many small, evolving companies. It can best be described as "planning by doing": 
which refers to a situation where the apex of power resides with one individual. The 
short term, operational decisions are delegated to the management team (with a certain 
amount of indirect influence). Because that one individual is in a position of such 
power and influence, it is easier for that individual to overcome any latent conflict or 
frustration which may exist within the rest o f the organisation. After all, if that 
individual has founded the company, provided the seed capital for the enterprise and 
built up his management team from within, it becomes that much more difficult to 
demonstrate outright opposition to his recommendations for the future.
If one accepts that the traditional views of corporate planning (such as those examined 
in chapter five) broadly portray the exercise as essentially objective, sequential and 
rational, then the process which has been identified in this case study casts some doubt 
on the efficacy o f such a perception. While it can be argued that the annual plan
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identifies with some o f the aspects of such a traditional model, the manner in which the 
longer term decisions are taken is more difficult to assess.
In the case o f CEL, these latter decisions are made by one individual. It is submitted 
that this allows for quick, incisive decision making. M oreover, there is less risk of 
McBreen becoming embroiled in much of the political in - fighting which can occur in 
larger , more complex organisations. In such situations there is every likelihood that 
agents of change can find their recommendations blocked by other managers and may 
eventually settle for a compromise decision which may not necessarily be the best 
outcome for the organisation. That is not to suggest that McBreen is likely to take the 
correct option in every case (this assumption would apply to any organisation, 
irrespective o f size). Typically however, the number of critical events which need to be 
addressed, are far fewer in the evolving company. These events are outlined in Figure 
XXX in the case o f CEL. Thus, McBreen can drive change through the company by 
seizing the initiative and activating the "planning by doing" analogy. In this case the 
lead time between analysing the environment, assessing the options, making a decision 
and implementing it within the company, is very short. When McBreen identified the 
shift which was going to occur in the longer term, he took stock of the present position 
of CEL, recognised the clear areas of weakness and set about instigating the necessary 
changes in order to bring it up to the requirements of the OEM sector.
The "downside" of such an approach is that McBreen leaves the company in a 
vulnerable position should he be incapacitated for a period of time, or in the worst 
possible situation, if he was incapable of providing continuing input. It is evident that 
McBreen has delegated responsibility to his management team in the day to day 
operations; indeed, he has developed this management team internally. However, he 
does not appear to have involved them directly in the longer term decisions. It is 
debatable therefore if he has an organisational structure in place that could have the 
capabilities to make such decisions.
The personality of McBreen should not be underestimated in his determination to drive 
the necessary changes in the company as it moves to a position where it can target the 
OEM sector. He demonstrates a cautious approach to business development, coupled 
with the ability to analyse the trends and shifts in the car security market. The efficient 
manner with which he has effected change in the company can also be attributed to the 
empowerment which he gains from owninp the company. It partly explains the lack of 
emphasis which he places on he need to formalise the long term development of the 
company.
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C O N C L U S I O N S
Connaught Electronics has been in existence since 1982. During this period it has 
moved through three definable phases: the "part - time" company, manufacturing on a 
contract basis, then moving to a stage where CEL manufactured a range o f product for 
the professional car security sector and finally expanding its operations in response to 
market trends, to the OEM sector.
The company has experienced steady growth. However, it has now reached a stage of 
development which is difficult to assess in terms of the likely future growth prospects. 
Effectively, after eight years o f trading (1982 - 1990) CEL embarked on a major 
change of market direction, albeit within the same product category. This shift in focus 
has called for a fundamental re - appraisal o f the structure o f the company, the systems 
and procedures employed and an understanding of the purchase decision- making 
process which pertains in OEM's.
McBreen has attempted to drive the necessary changes with respect to the 
organisational structure and the systems and procedures. His own extensive experience 
of working for multinationals has provided him with an insight into the decision 
making process within the OEM. A strong argument therefore, can be put forward to 
suggest that CEL has made the necessary adjustments.
A number of conclusions can be made in respect o f CEL's approach to planning. The 
owner - manager; Joe McBreen, takes full responsibility for the decisions which affect 
the long term future o f the company. He consults with his management team but 
operates with a fundamental perception of where he wishes the company to be over a 
three year time frame. This vision is not committed to a formal document. It resides 
very firmly in the head of Joe McBreen. Critics would argue that such an approach 
does little for clarity of communication within the organisation. However, his decisions 
are taken in consultation with his management team during their monthly meetings. 
The simple organisation structure encourages an such an informal approach as there is 
a marked absence of layers o f management and bureaucracy which tends to exist in 
larger organisations. A formal mechanism does exist, however, for the operational 
management o f CEL's activities. This takes the form o f a "bottom - up" approach, 
where the relevant information necessary for sales projections and market shares are 
sent to the sales / distribution offices in Britain and Holland, by the distributor base. 
This information is then collated and built into an annual forecast which is used for
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budgeting purposes - where the projected sales are set against planned expenditure for 
the coming year. The annual projections are considered by Joe McBreen in the light of 
the next three years: he has stressed continuously in discussions, that the car security 
market is " a long term business".
It is submitted that this approach to planning represents an effective means of plotting 
the future course of CEL. It has allowed Joe McBreen to operate on a "planning by 
doing" basis: where is does not have to contend with lengthy delays and obstacles in 
his attempts to implement or effect the necessary changes. This ability to act quickly 
and incisively is helped to a great extent by the fact that CEL is a small company which 
is not heavily layered in managerial terms. It should be noted that this situation is not 
unique to CEL: it applies to many similarly evolving organisations. He is also helped by 
the fact that he is the owner of the company and therefore is able to deal with any 
conflict which might emerge on recommendations which he brings to his colleagues. 
Observations have been made in the previous section about the possible dangers which 
might emerge from being over dependent on any single individual: particularly in the 
area of long term decision making. However, the evidence to date suggests this is not a 
problem as long as Joe McBreen retains ownership of the company.
The future prospects for CEL are difficult to determine at this stage of its 
development. McBreen's target of two contracts from OEM's by the end of 1993 
would appear to be accurate. The first order had been placed with them at the time of 
the visit to the company. It has already been submitted that the essential pre requisites 
for doing business with these companies has been put in place by McBreen. Therefore, 
the prognosis is positive about the future.
The issue of the radio telemetry products is also unresolved. This is an area within 
which CEL have "dabbled": to the extent that they have supplied product to the Shell 
Corporation, in the oil field sector. There is a recognition from McBreen that 
significant investment in the necessary radio equipment, will have to be made in this 
area if CEL is to make inroads. At present, McBreen has "held shy", as he concentrates 
on the OEM sector. It is argued that the radio telemetry sector is a logical extension of 
CEL's core competence. Clearly, however, the bulk o f McBreen's efforts need to be 
directed to the OEM sector. This represents the long term future both for CEL and the 
industry in general.
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THE CASE OF THE CHIP COMPANY
8.2
8 .2 THE CASE OF THE CHIP COMPANY
Introduction
The Chip Company was established by Gerry Sweeney in 1986. He had graduated 
from University College Cork in 1983 with a degree in electronics engineering. He 
initially worked with an integrated manufacturing company for three years, but was 
keen to establish his independence and establish his own company. As a teenager 
Gerry had demonstrated an aptitude for repairing radios, television sets and other 
products which had a technical application. During this period he also started to sell 
machine tools to local small industry. This lead to the creation of a small enterprise 
which he operated in a part - time capacity. This continued when Gerry went to 
university.
When he joined his first company as a recent graduate, he identified a possible business 
opportunity which indirectly emerged from his continuing involvement in selling 
machine tools, whereby he could make use of his ability to repair damaged products, 
by acting in a service capacity. The further development o f this idea involved the repair 
of computer peripheral equipment, where such an enterprise would effectively act as a 
service provider to the computer industry. As he was based in Cork city, Gerry 
Sweeney sensed that this was a good location for serving companies such as Apple, 
Wang and Digital who were all located within a one hundred mile radius. In the longer 
term, he felt that such an enterprise could attract business from other com puter based 
companies such as those located in Scotland.
During the early to middle part of the 1980's, industrial policy had focused on the 
development o f a strong computer based industry in the Republic o f Ireland. The 
results of this strategy proved to be successful, with a number o f multinational 
corporations locating in Ireland. Sweeney sensed that this would be an opportune time 
to establish a repair and service provision to the industry. The rationale for developing 
such an enterprise rested on the belief that companies such as Apple would contract 
out the repair work rather than maintain an in - house facility. By adopting the former 
approach, Sweeney would argue that companies would benefits from a cost saving, in 
addition to any added value which his company would provide. As part o f his 
workload with the integrated manufacturing company, Sweeney had developed some 
contacts with the Apple company which was based in Cork city. He outlined his 
business ideas to senior management in the factory and as a consequence received a 
small contract from them to repair some peripheral equipment. The Apple corporation
246
were located in a small industrial estate on the outskirts of the city, and by a fortuitous 
coincidence, there was a small unoccupied business unit right beside the plant. 
Sweeney obtained a lease to this unit at very favourable rates and set up operations. It 
was in such circumstances that the Chip company was established in the middle of 
1986. By the end of 1993, the Chip company employed thirty five people and 
generated an annual turnover of £1.1 million.
Phase One: Establishing the C o m p a n y  - 1986 - 1988
The first year to eighteen months o f the company's existence witnessed a situation 
where Gerry and his colleagues were "snowed under" with enquiries and orders; 
mainly based on referrals and recommendations from representatives o f the local IDA 
to companies in the computer industry. The fact that the initial order which Gerry 
received from Apple was satisfactorily handled, allied to the relatively small number of 
potential customers in this area, ensured that the Chip Company quickly established a 
reputation for technical proficiency allied to an ability to meet the customer 
requirements efficiently and in a reliable manner.
At this stage o f development, Sweeney expressed the strong view that there was no 
need for an aggressive, proactive approach to sales and promotion. He was well aware 
of the dangers associated with growing the business too quickly: particularly in an 
environment where most o f his initial business was coming from large multinational 
corporations, who demanded high levels o f customer service from their supply base. In 
essence the success of the business during this phase was down to the technical ability 
of Gerry and his colleagues to deliver a service at a price which made it attractive for 
such companies to contract out this aspect of their business operations.
Sweeney originally started with just three employees and himself. As orders began to 
escalate, he recruited a number of people on a part - time basis to deal with the 
fluctuations in business. A basic induction programme ensured that they could cope 
with the routine repair problems which tended to occur with the computer peripheral 
equipment. M ore importantly, Sweeney was treating labour as a variable rather than a 
fixed cost.
Sweeney acknowledged that his competency was to be found in the technical aspects 
of the business. He had not managed to accrue any direct experience in the area of 
sales, marketing or indeed overall business development. While recognising that this 
perceived deficiency would not create problems in the immediate term (where
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enquiries and orders were arriving in an unsolicited fashion), the situation would occur 
where there would be a need to be proactive in the area of business development.
In order to redress this potential difficulty, Sweeney consulted a close friend o f his 
from university days: Pat Meehan for advice. Meehan has also graduated as an 
electronic engineer but had worked for a couple of years in export sales. Meehan 
presented Sweeney with some insights into the decision making process which 
pertained in large, multinational corporations such as Digital, Apple and IBM. He 
argued that the best means of devising a winning sales strategy was to categorise both 
the individual and the company.
In the case o f the former, Meehan expressed the view that typically such a person 
would fall into one o f four categories: analytic (with the focus on technical issues), 
expressive (where the emphasis is on pragmatism and a clear view of what is being 
sought), the driver ( applying to the managing director or chief executive, where that 
individual sees himself as being the catalyst for change in the company) and finally the 
amiable individual (who places great emphasis on the social aspects of doing business.
When assessing the manner in which individuals operated in the corporate context, 
Meehan again suggested four categories: the gates ( people who tended to be 
technically focused and acted as major influencers within the company), users (of the 
machinery / product /  process, and played only an insignificant role in influencing the 
decision), owners (who by definition had a controlling influence on the purchase 
decision), and the purchasing manager (who sought out the potential suppliers and 
processed quotations, but had little subsequent influence on the decision).
Sweeney felt that this pragmatic advice which he received from his friend, would prove 
to be invaluable during the next phase of development when he would have to "grasp 
the nettle" and actively solicit for business.
During this period, Sweeney also decided to actively pursue the ISO 9000 programme 
of certification. This stemmed from his own focus on achieving higher levels of 
technical proficiency and also from his discussions with Meehan, who impressed on 
him the need to meet the stringent standards o f quality and reliability demanded by the 
multinationals. This programme was introduced during 1988 and certification was 
achieved in the middle of 1989.
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In 1988, Sweeney appointed his second cousin, Dennis, who originally joined the 
company as a technician, to the post o f production manager. This was partially in 
recognition of the fact that Gerry could no longer expect to retain control over all 
aspects of the business and also due to the need to have a dedicated person in charge 
of this are, in order to meet the demands of the ISO 9000 programme.
Sweeney also continued with his original business - Chip Electronic Sales: where he 
continued to sell machine /  power tools from his new premises. This parallel business 
generated £50,000 worth of business during the first year. By the end o f 1988, it had 
grown to over £85,000.
Over the first eighteen months, Sweeney retained control over all aspects o f the 
operations o f the chip company. Due to the ease with which the first order was 
achieved and the subsequent number o f unsolicited enquiries, it meant that he did not 
have to spend much time "on the road" in a sales related capacity. In fact he was able 
to concentrate on his technical capability. However as the ISO 9000 strategy was 
being pursued, he began to put the semblance of an embryo management structure in 
place, with the promotion of his second cousin to the post of production manager. 
Thus there is evidence of an "emergent", "natural" organisational structure, as 
opposed to an imposed, rigid approach.
In summary, this fust phase of growth highlighted the unsolicited nature of the way in 
which enquiries and orders were received. The case highlights the potential dangers 
associated with growing the business too quickly. However it is argued that Sweeney 
adopts a pragmatic, common sense approach to this hazard. He also demonstrates an 
incremental approach to the acquisition of knowledge and expertise which is outwith 
his current range of abilities. He makes effective use of a colleague to acquire a basic 
insight into the nature of the relationship between the supplier and customer.
Phase Two: Consolidation and Further Growth 1989 - mid 1990
1989 represented a continuation of the success which was achieved initially. The Chip 
Company numbered Dell, Apple, Digital, Wang, Compaq, IBM and Bull among its 
client base. The latter three companies representing Chip's movement away from the 
domestic market. Over this period, orders were also coming from a number of dealers, 
who would send damaged or flawed equipment to Sweeney for servicing and repair. 
He described this segment of the business as the low volume end whereas the 
corporates provided the high volume sector. An example o f this would be the typical
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order emanating from the Bull Corporation in France, where on average 15 machines 
per day would be serviced at the factory. This translated into £1000 worth of business 
per day and provided "the bread and butter" for the company.
During 1989, Sweeney recruited an engineering manager and a financial controller to 
the company, following a policy o f strengthening the management structure as the 
operations of the company expanded. By 1990, this had evolved into what Sweeney 
describes as a "board of management". This is depicted in figure one.
Figure One
The term "sales /  marketing" does not appear anywhere on the organisation chart. 
Sweeney put forward the view that the Chip Company was still in the happy position 
of being able to attract business and maintain existing customer relationships, without 
having to actively pursue new business. Following the advice of his colleague, Pat 
Meehan, Sweeney looked after the personal contact with representatives from the 
customer base.
Approach to Planning
Since the company was established, Gerry Sweeney adhered to a form of planning 
which was based on a twelve month perspective and which was driven by financial 
considerations. In addition he took a three to five year perspective of the business. This 
revolved around the concept of where he would like to see the company positioned in 
the market place in the longer term. This in turn concerned such issues as price 
competitiveness, customer service standards and the category desired customer base. 
Sweeney labelled this level of planning as being the "strategic three to five year plan". 
He also made the point that this exercise is not formally written down in 
documentation format.
During this second phase o f development, further refinements were made to the 
planning process. However the basic structure remained in place: a three to five year
Managing Director (Gerry Sweeney)
Financial Controller Quality Man. 
Man.
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strategy plan and a twelve month plan which is reviewed monthly. The arrival of the 
financial controller had a significant influence on the way in which Sweeney and the 
Chip Company executives handled the planning process. The input o f an individual 
with financial expertise highlighted the need for a disciplined approach to the 
assessment of both the existing business operations and future developments. The 
structure of the twelve month plan based on a projected profit and loss statement and 
was monitored by the preparation of monthly management accounts statements. 
Sweeney placed great emphasis on the monthly accounts as "it allows me to make 
value judgements about the next couple of months". He insists that the monthly 
accounts are made available to members o f the board o f management by the 15th day 
of each month. This allows them to identify the likely cash flow position at the end of 
the month. Given that customers pay on the basis of a sixty days credit period, this 
exercise quickly identifies any likely problems which may arise, such as certain 
customers failing to pay on time or within the agreed time.
Sweeney justification for this focus on financial Issues is best summed up in the 
following quote from the interview.
"Sales orders and deliveries do not necessarily equate to hard cash: particularly 
for small businesses like ourselves w h o  are dealing form the most part, with large 
multinational corporations". The monthly management meetings allow us track 
the state of play with business which we have dealt with in the past couple of 
months, as well as the likely impact of orders we are currently dealing with over 
the next couple of months."
Longer term issues are discussed at such meetings where relevant. Sweeney takes the 
opportunity to "sound out" his colleagues views about ideas or projects which he has 
been considering. While he takes the final decision on such matters he expresses the 
view that he works within a "consensus framework" and would be unwilling to pursue 
an idea without firm support from his management colleagues.
In summary, this phase of growth identifies a number of issues which have relevance 
for evolving firms. Sweeney adopts a disciplined approach to the implementation of a 
short term planning procedure. However a number of weaknesses have been 
highlighted in the longer term strategic area. The initial success which the company has 
achieved since its inception has been placed in jeopardy by the failure, on the part of 
Sweeney, to put in place a strategy which is designed to anticipate likely future
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changes in the computer industry. The company operates in a reactive mode as a 
consequence.
Phase Three: The Struggling M o d e  Mid 1990 - the Present
The period of sustained and continued growth was punctuated sharply towards the 
autumn of 1990. The computer industry, which had enjoyed a period of major growth 
and expansion in the 1980's was beginning to experience problems. Essentially the 
main players in this industry encountered sharp price competition as the basic personal 
computer became a commodity product. This in turn forced the manufacturers to re - 
think their business strategy with an overall focus on providing a quality product at 
ever decreasing cost. Concomitant to this serious o f events was the harsh reality of a 
decrease in overall sales of personal computers.
The implications for the Chip Company were stark. Compaq, their largest customer 
cancelled the arrangement whereby they sent equipment to Cork for repair and general 
maintenance. The Compaq decision revolved around the option of making twenty five 
of their own employees redundant, or retaining them to service product in - house. 
They opted for the latter. At the same time, business from the established customer 
base began to decrease as other companies such as Digital, Dell and Apple assessed 
their position. Thus from being in a position of strength, the Chip Company slid into a 
downturn in business which, if not addressed, would lead to its eventual demise. 
Sweeney downsized the company by taking ten employees off the payroll.
He quickly realised that the company needed to move into a proactive mode within the 
overall area of acquiring new business. To this end he withdrew his second cousin, 
Dennis, from the role o f production manager and gave him responsibility for sales. At 
this time he established a facility in Holland to service mainland Europe more 
effectively. This was something which he had been working on for a number of months 
during the early part of 1990. He acquired a premises in Amsterdam through his 
contacts with Pat Meehan. Together with a local businessman and two employees, 
Sweeney developed a brochure which was designed for the European market. Within 
six months, this operation had generated £75,000 worth of business.
Sweeney viewed this venture as something which would offer both existing and 
potential customers a greater degree of choice. The Dutch operation offered quicker 
turnaround times to customers, but at a higher price (labour costs were estimated to be 
25 per cent higher than at the Cork plant. The latter facility was the cheaper option,
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although the longer turnaround times ensured that inevitably, customer service levels 
were lower.
His colleague, Pat Meehan had also at this time introduced Sweeney to SICA, a 
personal computer integration company, who expressed an interest in allowing the 
Chip company to put together the component parts of the product, under licence. This 
was a project which was given a much greater level of attention due to the downturn in 
the core business. This venture was finally established and by 1993 was generating 
over £200,000 worth of business.
Sweeney explained this shift in approach as follows:-
"The realisation has dawned on m e  over the past eighteen months..that 
customers are a scarce commodity and trying to find them is difficult. Marketing
is crucial in this respect I think if you get to the stage, where you are asked for
a quotation, and asked to tender for contract work....then....eh you've then
completed the marketing phase of what you want to do It's to be known and
to be thought of as a company to do business with finding customers....eh
potential customers is the essence of what marketing is about".
Sweeney placed great emphasis on the collection of information about likely 
customers, working on the assumption that before any contact should be made with 
them, it would be beneficial to have a very detailed profile developed which would 
identify their main operations, strategy, key personnel, current supply base and their 
customers. Thus the company subscribed to computer magazines such as Byte, trade 
magazines and the Financial Times. He recognised that the lead time from generating 
an enquiry to receiving an order could be anything from eighteen months to two years. 
Thus the value of utilising brochures and establishing close working relationships could 
not be underestimated.
A chance meeting with Don Kelly, the Director o f the Linkages Programme within the 
IDA, after a presentation which he gave to the local Chamber o f Commerce, generated 
a number of useful contacts for companies in the Far East. Kelly suggested to him that 
in the long term, the physical assembly of casings and equipment would occur in 
countries which offered a low labour cost, whereas the servicing and added value 
aspects of the process would offer opportunities to companies such as the Chip 
Company. Sweeney decided to check out any potential business from this quarter.
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The downturn in the computer industry also forced Sweeney and his colleagues to re - 
consider their approach to pricing. Prior to the difficulties which the Chip Company 
encountered, they tended to establish what their costs were; both variable and fixed 
and then add what could reasonably be described as a reasonable net margin. This 
approach encouraged a level of rigidity, in Sweeney's view, which worked effectively 
in a stable business environment, where orders were received from an established 
customer base, and were predictable. The subsequent pressures placed upon the Chip 
company by the customers, forced Sweeney to consider a more flexible approach to 
pricing. This primarily involved the company accepting certain contracts which might 
be loss - making, on the basis that it might "open the door" to larger and more 
lucrative business. The corollary of this position is that the company also had to look 
for new areas or niches where there was the possibility of adding value to the service 
and where extra margin could be achieved.. This change in direction is summed up in 
the following extract from the discussion with Gerry Sweeney:-
" Where we do find ourselves in a niche market, we'U try to make extra
margin pay for lost leaders....I think that's the difference really U p  until
quite recently, when we saw the business as being very...lively and where we
didn't have any difficulty in securing business....we looked upon ourselves as a
sub - contractor and worked for people as a  aaaa sub - contract
hourly rate type of basis. The lesson we learned was that........ there were lots
of people willing to work at 50p an hour less than us N o  matter how low you
go, you'll find someone of it's to find a type of
differentiation technology we've become fairly secretive about ho w  we
do what we do....and I think in the longer term that this approach is healthier for 
us".
At this stage in the company's development, Sweeney highlights the importance of 
diversifying away from a basic dependence on the servicing o f computer peripheral 
equipment. The development with SICA is seen as a positive step in this direction, 
where it moves the Chip Company into to a related area, but also one where there is an 
opportunity to add value to the basic product offering and more importantly provide a 
greater profit margin. He argues quite forcefully that the company has shifted its focus 
from being a technically driven operation (with emphasis placed on quality control and 
continuous improvement) to that of a firm which is driven by sales / marketing / 
customer considerations. This is evidenced by the changing role of his own span of 
responsibility as well as the deployment of his second cousin from a production role to 
that of a sales person.
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In summary, it can be stated that the Chip Company has made a number o f potentially 
difficult alterations to its operations, in response to the pressures brought about by the 
decline in business from the established customer base. These changes have not 
eliminated the difficulties, but have re - oriented the prevailing business philosophy of 
Sweeney. This has meant that the company has adopted a customer / market focus 
which has not been prominent during the previous stages of development which have 
been identified in earlier paragraphs.
The process of effecting change has not conformed to the conventional approach as 
outlined in chapter four. While the benefits of pursuing such "text book" formulations 
of strategy should not be ignored, it is argued that the process followed by Sweeney in 
this case is characteristic of similar enterprises and does contribute towards an 
understanding of the specific context within which such individuals operate.
Conclusions
The Chip Company has undergone a pattern of development which does not conform 
to the traditional pattern. Instead of encountering obstacles to growth (resulting in 
negligible to slow growth initially), the company experiences rapid growth during the 
initial two years. This in turn shapes the approach to planning and organisational 
development which is subsequently adopted by the company. Sweeney concentrates on 
technical, quality and financial considerations. There is no attempt to put in place a 
sales / marketing function as this is regarded as being unnecessary as enquiries and 
orders arrive in an unsolicited manner.
The expansion o f business encourages Sweeney to develop a management team: 
production, engineering and financial expertise is acquired. A disciplined approach to 
planning within a one year time frame is in evidence. The longer term considerations 
are more problematic: residing for the most part in the head of Gerry Sweeney. The 
company appears to operate in a reactive mode. While the weaknesses of this practice 
can be quickly identified, Sweeney circumvents many of the obvious pitfalls by 
appearing to be mentally attuned to the developments in the market place and the 
potential opportunities which are presented to him (largely through his business 
advisor - Pat Meehan). It is argued that the informal and flat organisational structure 
commonly found in the smaller firm, facilitates and encourages flexibility in decision 
making.
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It is argued that this case provides an insight into the approach to planning and the 
process through which decisions are implemented. That is not to suggest that 
conventional approaches are wrong or indeed that this approach is correct. There is no 
clear evidence that this company can successfully overcome the difficulties which it 
faces currently. However it does reveal the circumstances and context within which 
such a process evolves and thus provides a number o f outcomes from which students 
of small business management can learn from.
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THE CASE OF ASHLING ELECTRONICS
8.3
8.3 THE CASE OF ASHLING ELECTRONICS
Introduction
The origins of Ashling Electronics can be traced to Gerry Sottle who was engaged in 
some post graduate work at the National Institute for Higher Education in Limerick 
(now known as the University of Limerick) back in 1983. While based in the 
university Gerry was in the process o f developing a business idea and approached the 
local Shannon Development Authority for some advice. This body was placing great 
emphasis at that time, on the development o f local entrepreneurial development and 
indeed they developed a formal training programme to encourage local entrepreneurs 
during the winter o f 1982 and the spring of 1983: called Entrepreneurship and High 
Technology. This programme was designed with the objective o f stimulating interest 
among local people. The representative from the Shannon Development Authority 
advised Gerry Sottle that it was not sufficient to have a product idea and the technical 
skills to develop it; issues such as finance, experience and marketing were o f equal 
importance. He also advised him to attend their training programme.
Sottle met three other people on this course who were eventually to play a significant 
role in the formation of Ashling Electronics. Gerry Joyce, a former class mate of 
Sottle, signed up for the enterprise programme because he had just returned from 
Germany, where had worked with an engineering company. He was keen to become 
involved with an interesting project and was prepared to place his savings in a suitable 
venture. Michael Healy had worked for ten years in the telecommunications industry 
focusing specifically on telecommunications product development, both in Ireland and 
in America. He moved to Limerick in 1980 to work for Wang Corporation. He was 
also looking at a specific project in the electronic mail area. He outlined his idea to 
some people at the N.I.H.E. who advised him to participate on entrepreneurship and 
high technology programme. The fourth individual: Brian Lindsay had worked 
previously in the sales area with International Business Machines.
During the course o f the entrepreneurship and high technology programme, the four 
individuals got together and worked on the preparation of a business plan. Sottle took 
on board the comments of the advisor at SDA and realised the need to bring in 
expertise and synthesise the concept into a business strategy, before any attempt 
would be made to approach potential investors.
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What was this business idea ? It was firmly grounded in the microprocessor 
development systems sector. The idea was not to manufacture such systems but to be 
viewed as an adjunct to the microprocessor industry. The concept would apply to any 
design engineer who is involved in designing a product which uses microprocessors 
e.g. (video machines, personal computers, ATM's electronic petrol pumps). He has to 
write a software programme and develop a piece of hardware surrounding a 
microprocessor. This involves a complex sequence; involving de - bugging, 
development, modification, testing and further refinement. In essence software and 
hardware tools are needed to facilitate this process. Thus the micro processing systems 
are a combination of these two components.
Sottle's unique selling point lay in the manner in which the previous generation of 
microprocessor development systems operated. Since such systems in themselves, do a 
lot o f processing, they could be regarded as computers in their own right. All of the 
previous generation had been based on each manufacturer of microprocessor 
development systems (MDS's) effectively developing his own computer. The 
keyboard, screen and other parts of the MDS were different from each other 
manufacturer's MDS. Thus MDS manufacturers had of necessity, to be in the 
computer business also. At this time also, MDS's were regarded as being esoteric and 
complex. This meant that they were being introduced to the market by companies with 
a vested interest in their success: namely the manufacturers o f microprocessors such as 
Intel and Motorola.
Sottle's idea stemmed from the belief that it was not a clever idea for MDS 
manufacturers to develop their own computer. This was because initially Apple and 
later, IBM manufactured personal computers of common currency. So if a 
manufacturer was making equipment which involved the computer it would not make 
financial sense to make his own. It would be far more sensible to buy one "off the 
shelf'.
Sottle saw an opportunity to base MDS's on standard off the shelf personal computers. 
Originally this was to be based on the Apple 11 machine. However as the business plan 
was being prepared, it became clear to the his colleagues and himself that IBM was 
going to be the dominant system. This is still the case today where it is common 
practice to see an electronic design laboratory with numerous IBM personal 
computers. Therefore this was built into their business plan. There were also tentative 
indications at this stage, that the semi conductor companies were thinking about 
leaving the MDS business and leaving it to specialised companies. This would provide
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the main opportunity for Sottle and his colleagues as they saw themselves as 
specialists. On completion o f the Entrepreneurship and High Technology programme 
in the spring of 1983, they had refined their ideas into a formal business plan, detailing 
projected cash flows, levels o f investment required and so on, over a three year period. 
They were thus in a position to bring their idea to the lending institutions.
Phase One: Acquiring Financial Support -1983 - 1985
The business plan was targeted at a number of potential lending and funding 
institutions such as venture capitalists, banks and the Shannon Development 
Authority. The latter institution operated an Enterprise Development Programme 
which was directed towards individuals who had experience o f working with multi 
nationals or in such a business environment, and who needed financial assistance for 
projects. A major application was made to this programme which was accepted. They 
also applied for product development finance from the same authority and this was 
also successful. The initial injection o f cash was a sum of £10,000 which was given to 
them by the Innovation Centre based in Plassey Park. This allowed the company to 
buy desks and chairs for the business unit which was in the industrial estate in Plassey 
Park.
The partners encountered a major obstacle however when it came to acquiring major 
sources o f finance. They made a large application to the Enterprise Development 
Programme. However funding from this programme was conditional on the company 
being financed as it included a significant guarantee against bank borrowing. This 
could only happen if the company was actually financed. The banks in turn were 
unwilling to loan on the basis o f guarantees which had not already come into effect. 
They encountered similar problems with venture capitalists. Typically they were 
reluctant to invest, unless the company was established; products developed and 
people in place. This was in stark contrast to the position in the United States, where 
similar venture capitalists would be prepared to invest, on the basis of a well 
developed business plan. Therefore the four founders of the company were faced with 
the classical problem of having identified potential sources of funding but being unable 
to meet the requirements of two lending institutions who appeared to have 
incompatible standards.
After some discussion, the two original founders, Sottle and Joyce approached the 
Bank of Ireland and the Shannon Development Authority and explained the problem 
to them. An agreement was reached whereby the latter organisation agreed to allow a
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partial and immediate draw down of the loan guarantee element of the EDP scheme. 
The Bank of Ireland was then prepared to provide adequate funding for the company 
against these guarantees, until such time as venture capital was won.
A detailed business plan was prepared and Sottle and Joyce, together with Healy and 
Lindsay, make detailed presentations to eight venture capitalists during the month of 
September in 1984. In February o f 1985 a deal was signed with one of the venture 
capitalists which brought £500,000 into the company.. By this stage all of the 
conditions contained in the Enterprise Development Programme were met.
The company had already commenced manufacturing and marketing and was using the 
revenue to pursue research and development. The acquisition o f the £500, 000 venture 
capital ensured that further developments could take place quickly.
Phase Two: Preparing for and Sustaining Rapid Growth - 1985 -1989
Upon receipt of the major capital injection from the venture capitalists, Ashling 
Electronics set in motion a number o f activities which were designed to move the 
company to a position where it could capitalise on the opportunities which were 
opening up; particularly in Europe. The key to this route to growth was the 
establishment of a distributor base. Therefore Ashling signed a distribution agreement 
with a German company which would cover four markets: Germany, Switzerland, 
Britain and Spain. In September of 1985, a sales office was opened in North America. 
Meanwhile back in Limerick, a product development programme was drawn up and 
implemented. By the end of 1985, mainly driven by the orders which were emerging 
from both the distributor and the sales office in America, Ashling had moved from one 
-of pilot manufacturing to, if not quite volume production, then certainly serious 
manufacturing.
In October 1985, a technical support centre was established in Munich. This was 
designed to service the distributor and the customers in Germany, which was turning 
out to be a lucrative market for Ashling.
Throughout the remainder of 1985 and 1986, the focus was on firming up a number of 
distributor arrangement within every country in mainland Europe. During this period 
the following additional countries were handled by distributors: Belgium, Holland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Portugal and France.
2 6 0
In 1987, in order to gain more control over the sales operations, a sales subsidiary was 
established in Britain, which replaced the original distributor. A similar exercise 
occurred in the French market in 1988. Healy and his colleagues realised from an early 
stage in the development of the company that there was a critical need to structure the 
organisation in such a way that it would be in a position to avail o f the market 
opportunities.
From its inception in 1985 through to 1989 the structure o f the organisation was put 
in place. The activities were split into four functions: manufacturing, marketing, 
research and development, and finance.
The manufacturing team took responsibility for production, shipping, material 
acquisition and order processing, and certain marketing related aspects such as 
product testing and sales promotion. The latter two activities referred more to the 
execution of marketing activities rather than the design / planning components. An 
example of this would be in the circulation of mail - shots to both existing and 
potential customers.
The marketing team take responsibility for the design o f the adverting and sale 
promotion programmes and play a strong role in the product specification element of 
the new product development process. The sales subsidiaries report directly to 
marketing. This team also take responsibility for motivating, controlling and evaluating 
the distributor base.
Research and Design take charge o f the full new product development process; from 
product specification to product development, with strong input from marketing at the 
initial stages. When the product is designed, responsibility is handed over to 
manufacturing and product maintenance. In Healy's view, the research and design 
department have the additional responsibility for handling the flow o f product ideas 
within the organisation; whether they may come from marketing, sales, customers or 
indeed the workforce. This focus on new product development is reflected in the 
requirement on the part o f R & D to hold a "Product Ideas" meeting which is held 
quarterly. This meeting involves senior management from all areas within the 
organisational structure. If there are indications that the company needs to move more 
quickly with the development o f a product idea, R & D are given responsibility for 
raising it on the agenda at the weekly management session. The product ideas meeting 
has a basic objective to establish whether there are ideas out there and to see how
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Ithese ideas can be progressed to a business decision. They are held in a informal 
manner and people are encouraged to contribute their views.
The finance department is charged with looking after the management information 
system, accounts payable and receivable, and where possible, much o f the 
administrative tasks for the sales subsidiaries and technical support units. These latter 
assignments would include VAT management, payrolls, invoicing reconciliation 
statements and ingoing collections. The centralisation o f these duties is seen by Healy 
as being critical to the control o f the overall business. Moreover, it reduces the 
likelihood of delays and errors in the order cycle process. By 1992, the organisation 
had grown to fifty four employees: twelve of which are based in the foreign 
subsidiaries in Britain, France and Germany.
As stated earlier, the fulcrum for the management of the new product development 
process is channelled through the R & D group. It reflects the strategic importance of 
being at the forefront of developments within the industry. The product ideas meeting 
which is chaired by the research and development division, effectively decides whether 
that idea is feasible, compatible with the capabilities of the company and is likely to 
generate business. If the answer is no. then it is aborted at that stage. If a positive 
response emanates from these meetings then the idea is progressed to a business 
decision and a formal process is pursued. Healy and his colleagues designed an 
approach for handling this product development process at the very beginning of the 
company's existence. It is a procedure which typically lasts from twelve to eighteen 
months, although in some cases it has run for a period of over two years. Healy argues 
that such a disciplined approach to product development means that management have 
an established system for making decisions. This provides a formal mechanism for 
assessing the progress o f the project from the initial concept through to testing and 
eventual launch on the market place
The details of this process are outlined in figure 1.
During this phase, Healy and his colleagues put in place a formal mechanism for 
planning the company's development. A detailed description o f this process is outlined 
in the following paragraphs.
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The business plan takes a three year perspective and its sole strategic objective is 
couched in the following terms:
"The objective o f  A sh lin g  E lectron ics is to run a pro fita b le  a n d  du rab le  business  
The achievement of this objective is based on three main platforms;-
• Continual reinvestment in new product development
• Development of marketing capability within the major market - to be where the 
customer is and
• Co - operation with the major semi - conductor vendors (based on the belief that 
Ashling needs to be closely linked to the main players in this industry)
Healy observes that "the three year perspective does little more than state the general 
direction and gives a general indication o f the numbers we need to achieve and the 
numbers we will have to invest to get there"
This aspect of the plan is by definition general and contains only the basic parameter 
figures and is designed to provide an indication of what the company is about and 
where it expects to be in three years time.
The detailed information for the next level of planning is contained in the annual 
budget. This spells out in great detail, the expected amount of business together with 
the revenue which Ashling hopes to generate, on a country by country and on an 
individual distributor /  subsidiary basis. The costs for developing new product 
development are clearly delineated in this document and is heavily influenced by the 
projected revenue, trends in the semi conductor industry and competitive activity.
The task of putting the annual budget together, commences in December or January of 
each year with the requirement that it be submitted to the board and put in place for 
the start of the financial year in April. This exercise Is carried out by an integrated 
management team, composed o f representatives from each of the main divisions: 
marketing, manufacturing, finance and research and development. During the period
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from December through to March, the plan would typically encounter a number of 
revisions, before it is finally presented to the Board in mid - March.
The market information which is utilised in the formal planning document is generated 
from primary as opposed to secondary data. Ashling places great emphasis on three 
main areas which are, in order of priority: the customers (regularly visited by the 
subsidiaries and distributors), the large semi conductor companies such as Intel, 
Motorola and Hewlett Packard, and the semi conductor vendors, who tend to be the 
small, specialist operators who would be similar to Ashling in terms of size and scale 
of operation.
Healy places great importance on the need to monitor the developments within 
companies such as Hewlett - Packard and, to a lesser extent, Intel, who still are heavily 
involved in t he microprocessor industry, and who show little evidence that they are 
willing to hand over this area to the smaller, specialist companies.
The interactive, integrated organisational structure highlights one o f the main strengths 
of Ashling electronics. Such an approach was instigated at the very beginning o f the 
company's existence; in the mid 1980's. It is only in recent years that the general 
marketing literature has recognised the benefits which can accrue to a company which 
implements this arrangement. This focus has emerged mainly from studies o f the 
Japanese style of management: where the emphasis is placed on inter - disciplinary, 
multi - functional teams which tackle new product development. It is not suggested 
that Healy and his colleagues in Ashling, have consciously attempted to replicate the 
Japanese approach: there is no evidence that Healy is even aware of the marketing 
literature or a knowledge of Japanese management practice. On the contrary, it is 
argued that the use of inter - disciplinary "management teams" is based on a pragmatic 
attempt to remain proactive in the area of project development. It is also designed in 
the recognition that a small company can benefit from such interaction and integration 
as it minimises the possibilities of bureaucracy and "functional empires" emerging from 
within the organisational framework. The channels o f communication within the 
company are also shorter as a result. In essence, Ashling has managed to imbue a 
culture of co- operation, shared involvement and participation which larger 
organisations are only now beginning to try and put in place.
Phase Three: Refining the Internal Organisation: Cementing Relationships, 
1990 - the Present
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Ashling Electronics addressed a number of essential Issues at a very early stage in its 
evolution. Thus, by 1990, a formal procedure for handling new projects had been put 
in place, the distributor base was established and a technical support service was 
located in Germany. Healy however was aware o f the need to address a couple of 
other issues in an attempt to improve performance. One such concern lay in the 
encouragement of self - development among the staff. He recognised that skills are not 
in ready supply in Ireland. Therefore if a company such as Ashling wants to compete 
effectively in the international arena, it needs to improve the level o f knowledge and 
aptitudes o f its management team. In this respect, three main techniques are used. 
Firstly, marketing staff are actively encouraged to attend technical marketing courses, 
or telephone sales programmes, where appropriate. Likewise, the R & D team may 
spend a week with one of the main microprocessor companies, learning a new 
computer language. Younger managers are also sent to the sales subsidiaries or 
distributors to learn "at the coal face". In - house training is also organised by the 
directors, where appropriate.
Healy sees major weaknesses in the area of technical marketing in Ireland. He draws a 
very sharp distinction between general marketing skills and those which are required 
for a specialised, sophisticated such as the one which Ashling operates in. Ideally, it is 
his opinion that the most suitable technical marketer is someone that has qualified and 
worked as an engineer, and who has moved into the sales area: thereby combining a 
good understanding of the technical nature of the product, selling skills and a 
knowledge of the decision making process and distribution structure of the market. In 
addition this individual also needs to be fluent in one or a number of the major 
European languages. Ashling have been luckier than most in the latter area, as two of 
the founders: Sottle and Joyce worked for a number of years in Germany. This has 
been put to good effect as Germany is now the major market for its products. In 1990, 
Ashling recruited a recent electronics engineering graduate who had worked for a 
couple of years in France, and developed a fluency in that language. He was placed in 
the French market to develop business there. Another graduate has also been deputed 
to the German market.
Healy has also targeted the logistics and distribution function for gaining efficiencies. 
One of the marketing team is charged with responsibility for dealing with the shipping 
companies and working on the requisite documentation. This can be a problem for 
shipments to non E.C. countries, where complex documentation needs to be 
processed. If errors are made during this exercise, then delays can occur, with the
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result that the order is held up at dockside. The end result is a dissatisfied customer. 
The marketing individual allocated to this task, has attended a number o f courses on 
logistics and in Healy's view, has reduced the amount o f delay and errors in shipping. 
Cost benefits have also accrued because the shipping industry has itself, become very 
competitive, with typically over twenty companies tendering for business with Ashling.
During this period, Healy has placed great emphasis on building up strong personal 
relationships between Ashling and its distributor and customer base. Twice yearly, the 
Ashling Sales Meeting is held at one o f the sales subsidiaries offices, on a rotating 
basis. The Ashling marketing staff are invited to this event. It allows the sales 
subsidiaries to bring a number o f their customers along to meet with members o f 
Ashling's marketing team, thus providing an opportunity to discuss matters o f mutual 
interest.
The company also organises an annual international sales conference in Killaloe, a 
small village just outside Shannon. This brings together the sales subsidiaries and the 
distributors and an intensive programme is organised including new product 
demonstrations, marketing topics, announcements of forthcoming product 
developments. A social programme is organised over the weekend to provide a 
relaxed environment which is conducive to the building and cementing of relationships.
A P P R O A C H  T O  P L A N N I N G
Ashling Electronics has instigated a formal, structured approach to planning from its 
inception. This has been based on the involvement of the founders in a training 
programme which was organised by the Shannon Development Authority. Part of this 
course covered planning issues for would be entrepreneurs in the high technology 
sector. The subsequent need to have a plan in place to attract venture capitalists to 
invest in the project also helped to create an environment whereby the founders were 
comfortable with a structured approach to planning.
It is submitted therefore that this represents a proactive approach which is in direct 
contrast to many similar evolving enterprises which operate on an ad hoc basis initially 
and eventually move to a reactive approach to planning.
The focus o f Ashlings' planning is driven by the need to develop new products and 
projects. This reflects the nature of the microprocessor systems development industry;
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where specialist high technology companies need to be constantly at the forefront of 
product innovation and development.
The interactive nature o f the involvement o f executives from a number o f different 
business functions is another observation which is worthy o f comment. The 
participation of marketing, research and development and manufacturing personnel in 
the new product planning process is something which larger companies are now 
attempting to introduce to their organisational structures. Healy concedes that it is 
easier for small companies such as Ashling to implement such a structure. The benefits 
of such an approach extend to the situation where the internal communication 
structure is shorter; which facilitates quick decision making and also to thè external 
customer who, upon encountering a problem, can gain easy access to the person who 
has actually designed the system.
In addition to the formal tiered approach to planning: ranging from the three year, 
indicative business plan down to the annual budget, it should be noted that Ashling has 
put in place, an organisational structure to implement and co - ordinate the plan. This 
is a critical issue when it comes to determining the success or otherwise of such a 
formal plan. Some companies pursue the notion o f developing a plan: indeed many do 
so; however the question of implementation is not considered to any significant extent. 
The result in such cases can lead to companies paying "lip service" to the plan, at best, 
or in the worst possible case, conveniently ignoring it. One of the key lessons to be 
learnt from Ashling's approach is the interdependence o f planning and structure. 
Without the latter, the former cannot be effectively implemented. Healy's approach 
indicates that a considerable amount o f thought has been given to designing an 
organisational structure which is compatible with the desired approach to planning. 
This was achieved very early in the development o f the company and it is submitted 
that the subsequent success of its operations can be attributed to such a proactive 
stance in the area of planning.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Ashling Electronics represents one o f the few indigenous electronics companies in 
Ireland to have made a significant impact in the high technology sector of the industry. 
Many local companies having entered the low technology to mid technology sectors. 
The sophisticated nature of the high technology sector combined with the 
requirements of such a customer base, partially explains the proactive approach to 
planning which has existed since the formation of the company in 1984.
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The company has a sharply defined customer focus and attributes much of its success 
to the fact that tries to establish a direct presence in the key European markets. This is 
reinforced by the practice, where possible, of centralising all o f the administrative 
aspects at the head office in Limerick. This ensures that the personnel are not caught 
up with such bureaucratic details and can devote much more o f their time to sales and 
marketing issues.
New product development plays a central role in the company's stated objective of 
"running a profitable and durable business". Indeed it can be said that it is the main 
driving force behind the planning process; forming one of three main platforms on 
which such profitability and durability can be attained.
This provides for a very clearly articulated development o f the various levels of 
planning which exist in the company: from the mission statement, through the three 
year business plan and down to the detailed annual budget. Much o f the information 
comes from the "bottom up", via the distributor base and the sales subsidiaries in the 
relevant key markets. In addition, the phased approach to the new project 
development process provides further structure and formality to the process. Healy 
perceives a number of advantages to the development of projects which are tightly 
organised and well run". They have been identified in the preceding sections, and in 
summary they allow the company to react quickly to customer demands; thus 
providing better levels o f customer service, and can allow the company to get a 
project more quickly through the stages of development.
The above approach has worked well for Ashling. That it may continue to do so in the 
future is dependent to some extent on the company being in a position to retain the 
"flat" organisational structure: thus minimising the potential for bureaucracy. This is a 
worry to Healy and his fellow directors. However they counter this by arguing that the 
team approach to management which has been inculcated into the corporate ethos of 
the company, provides the flexibility and sharpness in decision making that is absent or 
less in evidence in similar companies. The nature of the company is such that it is not 
heavily labour intensive, as much o f the work revolves around product design and 
development.
In summary, Ashling Electronics achieves a good balance in the formalisation of its 
planning process, where much of the detail is channelled upwards in the organisation, 
from the distributors and the senior management team: thus providing the essential
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material for the directors to base their decisions. In addition, Healy and his fellow 
directors have provided the necessary organisational structure to ensure that the plan 
is fully implemented. This latter issue is one which a number o f similarly evolving 
companies fail to consider to any significant extent.
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THE CASE OF E.I. ELECTRONICS
8.4
8.4 THE CASE OF E. I. ELECTRONICS
Introduction
E. I. Electronics was originally set up by the General Electric Company in 1963. Based 
in Shannon, this company represents one of the oldest established companies in the 
electronics sector. Indeed it was one of the "first wave" companies to emerge from the 
emphasis on attracting foreign investment by the government o f the day. Originally this 
company produced electron guns for the parent company in the States. Virtually all of 
its output was directed towards General Electric, with a limited number of orders 
manufactured for other companies. In the mid 1970's, the company also began to make 
smoke alarms for the North American market.
During the period from 1963 to 1987, the company proved to be a major employer in 
the Mid - west region, with numbers fluctuating from 150 to 350.
Throughout the 1980’s the parent company- General Electric was experiencing a 
number o f changes to its global operations. In 1985, it purchased RCA, and this 
prompted a radical re - appraisal o f its broad network o f companies. This inevitably 
included a review of the E.I. company. In November of 1986, senior management 
from General Electric, on one of their regular visits to the plant, informed Michael 
Guinee that they would be closing the plant at some point over the next year or so. 
Guinee, who had worked in a number o f sales and marketing positions for other multi 
national corporations was under no illusions about the future prospects both for the 
company and for himself.
He realised that the present set up would struggle to survive in a competitive market - 
place. The company had to all intents and purposes operated as a "box shifter" for the 
parent company. Orders for production schedules were sent over from the States, and 
subsequently were shipped back. These were guaranteed orders and more importantly, 
the local plant in Shannon had no proactive responsibility for seeking orders or 
marketing the end product. Inevitably, this led to a complacent attitude among the 
work - force.
However despite these reservations, Michael Guinee identified a number of 
opportunities. Firstly the company was well equipped (by international standards), had
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a well trained, experienced workforce (if not necessarily that motivated), had just 
invested in injection moulding facilities and had established a strong reputation for 
reliability and quality. The smoke alarm product, in Guinee's view, represented strong 
possibilities. E.I. had been manufacturing a range of these products for General 
Electric since 1975, and was one of only five or six such manufacturers world-wide. Of 
more significance was the fact that the only market for such products during the 1980's 
was North America. Guinee reasoned that with tighter impending legislation and 
pressure from insurance companies, this market would open up; particularly in Europe 
over the next ten years. The company had also aced in the past as a contract 
manufacturer. This was a trend which he perceived would continue, as companies 
would see benefits from "farming out" this function.
He spoke to two of his colleagues in the company: the engineering manager and the 
operations manager, with a view to seeking their attitudes to the possibility of a 
management buy - out. General Electric had been negotiating with potential 
international buyers, but had been unsuccessful to date. However tentative opening 
discussions with General Electric suggested that they would be predisposed to the idea 
of such a buy - out.
Armed with this knowledge and the fact that he would be given a reasonable period of 
time to put the financial package together, Michael Guinee approached a number of 
lending institutions. He encountered a number of negative reactions, which annoyed 
him intensely, as he was bringing a well established and profitable project to the table. 
Eventually he acquired a bank loan, but only when the proposal was accompanied by a 
loan guarantee from the Shannon Development Authority.
On the first of February 1988 the factory closed as a General Electric subsidiary. On 
the third of February, however, it reopened. Although it had a different legal identity, 
the company retained the same name in order to capitalise on its previous reputation in 
the market place.
Phase One: Rebirth and Regeneration
The initial challenge facing Michael Guinee as the managing director of the new 
company was the management of change. W hereas heretofore a paternalistic, 
comfortable structure pertained, a new dawning (in more ways than one) was about to 
occur. The removal of guaranteed orders and the need to actively solicit business could 
not be underestimated. The fact that General Electric did not rush the management buy
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out meant that Guinee could communicate to the workforce the changes which would 
occur under the new regime. The redundancy payments (relatively speaking) were 
generous at the time and ensured that employees did not harbour any strong bitterness 
to General Electric or to the existing senior management. Those who wished to leave 
the company were allowed to do so. When they had left, it meant that 99 per cent of 
the existing workforce were invited to remain on in the new structure. However a 
different wage structure would have to apply. In a highly price competitive sector such 
as the smoke alarm market, it would be impossible to maintain the same wage rate as 
before. This was pointed out to the workforce. The generous redundancies meant 
that all of the remaining workforce were prepared to take a "leap into the unknown" 
and support the new company.
The management structure which pertained in the "old" firm was effectively delayered. 
The three individuals who organised the buy out - Michael Guinee, Mick O'Brien and 
Declan Murphy carved up the key business functions. Guinee remained as managing 
director and also assumed responsibility for marketing and sales. O'Brien had already 
responsibility for manufacturing and likewise, Murphy retained control over the design 
and engineering functions. Middle management, which existed in the previous 
company were dispensed with. Apart from the added costs which they would bring to 
the payroll, Guinee felt that a "leaner and meaner" organisational structure would be 
more appropriate.
The opportunities in the smoke sector lay in the export markets. The first decision 
which Guinee made was to seek ISO 9000 approval. He reasoned that this would be a 
prime pre - requisite in the medium term and might indeed give the company a 
competitive edge in the short term. This certification was awarded towards the end of 
1988.
E.I. also benefited from orders which were still placed with them by General Electric. 
This in effect provided a cushion effect and allowed a lead time for Michael Guinee to 
chase new business. This should not be underestimated in terms of its contribution to 
the smooth manner in which the company moved through the first phase of 
development. M ost companies in such a situation are under extreme pressure to bring 
in business and thus ensure that cash enters the company. The orders from General 
Electric made sure that the company avoided any cash flow problems in the first year.
Guinee's anticipation that the European market would open up were justified. In 1988. 
various newspaper articles highlighted the benefits of smoke alarms. The government
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of the day began to instigate legislation and insurers were also putting pressure on 
householders to purchase smoke alarms. In short, orders began to appear from the UK. 
Guinee was proved right. More importantly the loan which he had secured to enable 
the buy out to happen, was cleared within six months o f trading under the new format.
Phase T w o  Redirecting the Business 1988 - 1990
At the end o f 1988, the company was in a stronger position than it could have 
anticipated. The upsurge in demand from the UK market ensured that the bank loan 
was cleared within six months. Thus the company was not dependent on outside 
lending institutions and was free from the constraints of having to answer to an 
external owner. On the other hand investment had to be made in the area o f product 
design and development. Likewise the company had to address the question of 
improving customer service levels to the large DIY operators in the UK which were 
proving to be the main source of business.
Guinee continued to act as managing director with overall responsibility for the 
direction of the company. He also assumed responsibility for finance, human resources 
and sales. The first two areas came under his span o f control during the preparation 
for the management buy out, when he negotiated with each member of the workforce 
individually. Likewise he was fully responsible for negotiating with the Shannon 
Development Authority and the lending institutions. On the resumption o f trading 
under the new ownership, he simply retained control over personnel and financial 
matters.
Guinee was faced with a critical decision at an early stage during this period of growth. 
The initial orders placed by the parent company for the North American market began 
to dissipate. This was mainly due to the highly price competitive aspect o f this market. 
Quite simply, General Electric was in a position to source its supply from a local 
company. Guinee had, through his own efforts, secured some orders with one of the 
large DIY retailers in the U.K. - Texas Homecare. This could generate much larger 
orders, provided E.I. could demonstrate the ability to meet the demands of this 
company. It would require the company to become involved in research and design in 
an attempt to stay ahead of the latest developments in this sector. Another option was 
for E.I. to strengthen its position in the sub - contract market: where it would 
manufacture products to order for customers, without having to worry about 
developing new smoke alarm products.
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Guinee was o f the firm opinion that it would be a mistake to concentrate on the sub - 
contract sector. While financially less risky, it would make the company very 
dependent on one or two large customers, who could withdraw their business at a 
moment's notice if a better deal was presented to them by a competitor. Previous 
business with Black and Decker in this area, still remained a possibility. The injection 
moulding facility also presented opportunities with IBM: with whom they had supplied 
on a contract basis previously.
After a careful analysis o f the respective sectors, Guinee made the decision to attack 
the retail sector and keep the sub - contract side of the business to between 15 and 20 
per cent. This is a policy which he has retained to the present moment in time.
Larger orders were secured from Texas Homecare and other players in the DIY 
sectors in the U.K. - such as Wilkes. The customer service levels demanded from 
these companies was high. Guinee established a warehouse facility in Liverpool to 
service the individual stores throughout Britain, on a daily basis. This means in effect 
that orders are received from the central offices o f the large DIY retailers and are 
shipped on a daily basis, with an order cycle (as of 1989) of forty eight hours.
Guinee recognised that the orders from this retail sector provided for large volumes, 
but relatively low margins. As a consequence, he decided to address the semi - 
professional sector of the smoke alarm market. This would involve investment in R & 
D: specifically in the area o f infra red technology. Products which would emanate from 
this area would open up opportunities in sectors such as commercial offices, small 
factory outlets etc. It would also mean that it would not be possible to supply directly 
to these organisations. The channel structure for this sector was longer; involving 
selling to electrical wholesalers and installed by builders. He also recognised the need 
to branch out further from this area to the professional segment. This would bring 
airports, hotels, banks and rail stations into the picture.
He saw this strategy as "sticking to the knitting" and remaining within E.I.'s core area 
of business, but at the same time taking cognisance of the wider scope for defining this 
market and more importantly moving into areas o f technology which would be 
indicative of where the competition would be adopting in the near future. In line with 
this approach, Guinee added products such as fire extinguishers and fire blankets to the 
range. These latter products were sourced from the far east and were not manufactured 
at the Shannon plant.
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During this period, over 70 per cent of E.I.'s business was emanating from the British 
market. While recognising the vulnerability which might occur from such a position, 
Guinee realised that the rest of Europe still had not become fully "smoke alarm" 
aware". Countries such as Germany and Scandinavia were predicted to expand 
dramatically as impending legislation would force both the home and commercial 
segments to adopt smoke alarms.
It would not be possible however to simply transfer the same product offering to these 
markets. Different technologies existed in Germany as opposed to Britain. In the 
former country, because o f stricter environmental legislation, it was anticipated that an 
optical technology would be the most acceptable one. By contrast, in Britain the 
accepted technology was based on ionisation.
The company was in a strong position to develop products within these technology - 
based areas: it has already acquired surface mount technology, was largely automated 
and injection moulding facilities were in place.
For much of this period therefore, Guinee spent his time monitoring developments in 
Europe and essentially steering his company in the R & D area. This meant that he 
needed to "get the organisation structure in place". One o f his fellow directors, who 
had taken charge o f the design and engineering had argued for the need to "beef up" 
the number of personnel in this area. Over a six month period during 1989, Guinee, 
together with him, recruited six individuals to the company. Two supervisors were 
promoted from within the company to take responsibility in managing the production 
line. Three people were recruited to the financial section. They were charged with 
clerical and book - keeping responsibilities, with Guinee retaining control over the key 
decisions in this area. A personnel administrator was put in charge of payroll and 
personnel liaison. A marketing manager was charged with responsibility for liaising 
with the main retail customers and monitoring competitive activities in this area. 
Guinee retained power to make long term decisions in all of these areas.
As stated earlier, Guinee did not adhere strictly to the formal three year plan which was 
developed in conjunction with the Shannon Development Authorities a couple o f years 
earlier. Instead, he placed a great deal of emphasis on regular meeting o f management. 
This was particularly the case in the area o f new product development where the focus 
was on a multi - disciplined effort: with design, engineering and marketing coming 
together to progress planned new product for the coming year. These meetings would
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refer to the new product statement which was contained in the plan and discussion 
would always be focused on the longer term i.e. going through the exercise of 
examining whether the company should stay within the smoke alarm sector or move 
into the broader security sector. Guinee advocated a cautious approach in this area and 
this view has influenced the decisions at this meeting, with his managers tending to be 
guided by his advice. All along, Guinee has felt that the main strength of the company 
lies in its technological competencies: both from a people and equipment point o f view. 
This has been the main influence on the business philosophy which he has expounded 
to his management team.
His reluctance to adhere rigidly to a detailed, long term formal plan stemmed from his 
experience with the original parent company; General Electric. He argued that such a 
formal approach was not appropriate for a developing company which needed to be 
able to make decisions quickly and flexibly. When taking such a strategic focus, Guinee 
uses the word "positioning".
This is perhaps best summed up in the following extract from the interview:-
"You w ould .....you  co u ld  g e t very inflexible. I  believe th a t we are po sitio n in g  
ourselves....as I  say, f o r  the profession a l sec tor.....u sin g  o u r tech n o logy...an d  we 
w ill have fo r  E urope (sic) a  sligh tly  d ifferen t technology than is generally  u sed  in
the U .K.  The U.K. is m ain ly ionisation  technology So we use a d ifferen t
technology f o r  G erm any - an optica l technology  I  am  n o t a believer in havin g  a
very tigh t f iv e  y e a r  p la n  a n d  i f  I  p resen ted  the th ing  in the m orn in g  a n d  said,
look we're go in g  to be ...I  don 't even know  i f  G erm any is g o in g  to open up in sm oke  
a larm s...an d  eh ....I  do n 't know  w hether legisla tion  is g o in g  to change in B ritain  
n ex t year. B u t we are  p o sitio n ed  fin an cia lly , to in vest in tech n o lo g y ."
Guinee also adopts a policy of "management by inspection". Every morning he quickly 
moves through the plant, meeting the supervisors individually and picking up on 
problems and issues as they arise on a daily basis. Likewise he operates an "open door 
policy" where colleagues call in with specific queries and questions which may need 
quick answers.
He supplements the formal review meetings and the informal daily "management by 
inspection" by circulating a weekly newsletter to all employees - management and 
those on the factory floor. This is designed to keep everybody abreast of the latest 
developments and to clarify decisions which have been made at the formal meetings.
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Phase Three: Continuous Improvement: Storms in the W ind ? 1991 -1993
The last two years of the company's evolution have primarily focused Mick Guinee's 
attention on refining operations within the organisation, with an overall objective of 
driving a policy o f continuous improvement. This latter term was not consciously 
articulated by Guinee in the interview. However it is an ever present message which 
comes through. The following passage in indicative of his business philosophy:-
 quality o f  p ro d u c t a n d  quality o f  service is very very im portant. A gain  we
m easure ourselves on the quality  o f  service as m uch  as on th e  quality  o f  ou r  
product.... Q uality o f  service is w here you  can sligh tly  d ifferen tia te  yourself. I f  you  
can, righ t through the organisation . We go o u t o f  ou r way a n d  in cu r expense in 
term s o f  fre ig h t costs, w here necessary, i f  the cu stom er dem ands it".
In this two year period, E.I.'s involvement with the large DIY retailers has continued to 
develop. However the company has been obliged to improve its lines of 
communication with them. Specifically it has invested in an electronic data interchange 
system in response to Texas Homecare's avowed policy of reducing paperwork and 
speeding up order cycles and lead times. The adoption o f this system has led to 
significant improvements in the level of service provided. Orders from Texas 
Homecare are received overnight and are immediately inputed into E.I.'s system at 
9.a.m. each morning. The order is delivered to the individual store within forty eight 
hours of receipt of order. Guinee acknowledges that the company had no choice in the 
matter as Texas Homecare were operating a penalty clause with its suppliers if they fail 
to comply with their demands.
While it cannot be argued that Guinee has been proactive in the adoption of EDI, it has 
led to improvements in the level of service provided. More significantly has improved 
the company's competitive capabilities with respect to tackling new customers / 
markets.
Another key preoccupation facing Guinee has been the need to prepare for the 
European markets, as they begin to open up. In this respect, he has recruited two 
international marketing graduates from the University o f Limerick who have 
competencies in languages and marketing skills. Germany is the targeted market as 
Guinee anticipates that it will open up over the next couple o f years. He has recently
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started to learn German in the belief that this will help to cement relationships with 
prospective German customers in the middle to long term. Likewise his design and 
engineering team are working on product developments which will comply with the 
legislation in that country. He has also targeted the North American market for future 
development.
At the time when this case study was being researched, E.I. was experiencing some 
difficulties with the high value o f the Irish pound relative to the British market. He 
estimated that over a four month period (with 70 per cent o f the business going 
through the U.K. market) a loss of £500, 000 was incurred due to the currency 
fluctuations. This dependency on the British market was acknowledged by Guinee but 
he pointed out that the European markets had not opened up sufficiently to allow E.I. 
to expand its operations.
His disregard for planning is evidenced by his observation that during the period from 
September 1992 to February 1993, the company has experienced major downswings 
and upswings in business orders for its smoke alarm products within the retail sector. 
He argues that the efficacy of preparing a five year plan is tarnished by the 
unpredictability o f such factors as fluctuations in the currency. His ability to adhere to 
a rigid plan is also severely handicapped by the fact that Texas Homecare only gives 
him forty eight hours notice from order placement to order fulfilment. Thus he has to 
comply with their policy. At the beginning of this period eighty people were laid off 
due to cutbacks in orders. However in January, he had to recruit ninety people to 
handle a large upsurge in orders. He is in a position to handle this cyclical aspect of 
the operations because of the ready availability of a local workforce.
The dependence on the British market and in particular a limited number of DIY 
retailers has forced Guinee to expand the semi - professional and professional range of 
smoke alarms. They have tentatively moved into this area in the second phase of 
development, but have failed to significantly develop opportunities in the area, because 
of the success which they have experienced in the retail sector. The former two sectors 
at present only account for 12 per cent of total turnover.
In summary this present phase of development reflects a policy o f refinement and 
improvement within the organisation. Guinee has continued to retain control shaping 
the long term direction of the company, whilst at the same time recognising the need to 
restructure the marketing section and penetrate the European and North American 
markets.
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O V E R A L L  A P P R O A C H  T O  P L A N N I N G
It must be stated at the outset that Mick Guinee is not a strong proponent o f the belief 
that a formal, long term plan is central to shaping the direction o f E.I.'s future. 
Surprisingly this attitude has been formed because rather than in spite o f  his 
experience o f working with a large multi - national corporation such as General 
Electric. His unease with the rigidity of applying a five year perspective to business 
operations is evident from his perception of E.I.'s business operations as being cyclical 
and unpredictable in nature.
In common with many evolving companies: particularly those which are in the early 
stages of growth or (in the case o f E.I.) rebirth, a formal three year plan is a necessary 
pre - requisite if a cogent case is to be presented to the lending institutions or state 
agencies. During the buy out phase which was examined in greater detail at the 
beginning of this case study, it was clear that the formal plan was designed for external 
consumption only. Mick Guinee pursued his own agenda for internal corporate renewal 
and change.
This is not to suggest that he did so in a haphazard, ad hoc manner. On the contrary, 
his experience and knowledge of the market place, helped him to identify the critical 
tasks which had to be addressed in order to place the revamped company on a sounder 
footing.
It is further submitted that Guinee had a clear strategy in place for the company, 
although this was not formally articulated in documentation form. Instead, his 
colleagues were fully consulted and briefed about the proposed developments: ISO 
9000 approval, proprietary product development and management delayering. His 
ability to implement these proposals was helped in no small measure by his decision to 
delineate between the day - to - day operations of the business and the long term 
decision which had to be made.
It is argued that this approach could be described as the adoption of an informal, 
parallel plan. In other words, the notion of a explicitly stated plan which is acted on 
and implemented at all levels of the company is eschewed; mainly for the rigidity which 
it imposes on personnel. However a clear course is plotted and implemented by the 
chief executive and majority owner of the company: Mick Guinee. It is also discussed
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on a regular basis with the management team and moreover is communicated to 
everyone working in the organisation through a fortnightly newsletter which is 
circulated to each individual.
A superficial appraisal of Guinee's views would suggest that this company is typical of 
many evolving firms who do not plan their business: because they do not have a formal 
planning document. A more detailed examination reveals however that informal 
planning takes place: more critically, it is implemented.
Another feature o f this process is the holistic manner in which the critical decisions are 
made: in this case the main areas being technical, financial and quality. The decisions 
which were made in these areas were in turn heavily influenced by the long term 
direction which has been mapped out by Guinee. The long term direction in turn 
focuses on the product(s) - market (s) relationship and the manner in which Guinee 
wishes the company to be positioned vis - a - vis the competition. It can be argued that 
Guinee implicitly utilises core marketing strategy concepts such as positioning and a 
product - market focus.
Mick Guinee's personality and leadership abilities cannot be understated in any 
assessment of the planning approach. He quickly established a level of trust with the 
workforce during the buy - out phase: to such an extent that workers voted against 
having a union under the proposed new structure. While Guinee expressed the view 
that he personally did not worry about this issue, he did make the point that this vote 
was a complement to the competent and equitable manner in which the negotiations 
were handled.
Guinee frequently refers to the informal lines o f communications which exist in the 
company. The following passage illustrates this point more graphically:-
"It's a very short com m u n ica tion  cycle: everybody in the p la ce  
(sic)...anybody can w ander in to m e a n d  say  "Mick, w hat are we do in g? ....A n d  
that's the way we run it, m aybe it's a b it p a tern a listic  a n d  m aybe it's o.k. f o r  200  
odd  people, a n d  m aybe it w ou ldn 't w ork f o r  500 o r 600, b u t it works. We enjoy  
it.....It's n o t easy, b u t w e've h a d  no regrets" .
The above excerpt from the interview is revealing in that it highlight the "father figure" 
role which Guinee perceives himself to be projecting to everybody within the 
organisation: a structure which employs close to two hundred people. While much of
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his power resides in his majority ownership and his virtually single-handed 
development of the management buy out plan, it still requires a strong and determined 
personality to drive the necessary changes in the company. This is a common theme 
within many of the companies under investigation in this section of the study.
C O N C L U S I O N S
E.I. Electronics has been forced to re - orientate its operations from that of a passive 
supplier o f product to its parent company - General Electric to a self - sustaining, 
independent company. It was initially aided by the parent company through a number 
o f orders. This provided a buffer for Mick Guiñee and his colleagues during the crucial 
first year o f trading following the management buy - out. The company also benefited 
from the assets which it acquired from the parent company in terms of a modern 
factory, advanced technology and a well trained workforce.
Over the intervening five years since the buy out, Mick Guiñee has overseen the 
transition and for the most part has succeeded in putting in place the necessary 
requirements for capitalising on opportunities which have presented themselves in the 
market - place.
Hr has resisted the idea of running the new company along the same lines as those 
which operated during the General Electric era. His approach to planning has been 
assessed in some detail in the previous section. An informal parallel plan was 
identified.
Guiñee has consistently put into practice the belief that there are strong merits in 
"running a tight ship". This means that he retains a very control over the critical 
decision areas which are likely to impact on the future direction of the company.
This ubiquitous presence o f Guiñee in all long term issues, and his apparent 
unwillingness to strengthen the management team; particularly in the marketing area 
does highlight potential problems which might arise during the next phase of 
development: as E.I. seeks to reduce its dependence on the large volume, low margin 
DIY smoke alarm segment. M ore specifically he has demonstrated a reluctance to 
delegate responsibility. More significantly, he has not "trained up" people from within 
the organisation to take on added responsibilities: they remain essentially "good 
housekeepers", capable of implementing and administering "tried and trusted" systems 
and procedures. In the worst possible scenario, if Guiñee were to die suddenly, it is
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very doubtful if the present management team could make the transition from being 
efficient administrators to strategic thinkers. In essence there is a void which needs to 
be addressed.
It is submitted that the company demonstrates some weaknesses in the marketing area 
which will need to be remedied sooner rather than later, if opportunities in the 
European markets are to be grasped. Guinee has recruited two international marketing 
graduates but he recognises that it is unreasonable to expect them to contribute 
directly to generating customers. He expressed the view that their initial contribution 
has been disappointing as they have struggled to make the transition from the 
classroom to the market place. While Guinee can be expected to make the necessary 
negotiations with European distributors, his areas o f responsibility continue to widen. 
Likewise his management time is further diluted.
In summary, Guinee has overcome many of the difficulties associated with change. 
Much of this has been driven along by his own efforts. He has achieved sales of £10 
million and the company is trading profitably. However during the next phase, careful 
consideration will have to be given to the problems which can accrue from being over 
dependent on a single large retailer. These problems are compounded by the amount of 
power which resides at this source. The technical capabilities are within the company 
to produce a range o f products for the European markets and for the semi professional 
and professional sectors. At the time of the interview, these products were already in 
production. The reluctance of Guinee to delegate responsibility may lead to difficulties 
in terms of exploiting these markets. Although it must be said that he has not made 
many mistakes to date.
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8 .5 THE CASE OF EUROPLEX TECHNOLOGY
C o m p a n y  Background
Europlex Technology was formed by two brothers; Paul and David Tatterstall, in 
1977. The company's initial product was an intruder control system. This was a hard 
wired system designed for houses or small businesses. It functioned by controlling 
various zones in the building, bringing that information back to a central controller, 
which activates the alarm if one of the zones is opened or penetrated. The company 
operated from an attic over an office in Dorset Street in Dublin, during the early years. 
One of the brothers (Paul) had a marketing /  sales background. The other, David had a 
background in engineering, and was the technical "boffin" within the partnership. Faced 
with constant pressure from Paul about the need to constantly improve the design of 
the product to meet the ever - changing demands o f the customer, he decided that it 
was necessary to develop a new technology. This led him into the area of multiplex 
technology. In essence this approach meant that the designer did not have to wire each 
individual detector - infra red, magnetic contact etc., back to the control panel. Instead 
one ring main is employed and modules are subsequently joined into that one ring 
main. This allows for one cable covering the building which feeds back to the 
controller. Because multi - plex technology is based on a two way communication 
system, it facilitated the concept where at the control panel end, it could be software 
driven. David devised a system whereby the control system was developed with a 
software base. This could subsequently be modified and customised, as the needs of 
the customer changed e.g. if the building was extended. It meant that each individual 
controller did not have to be wired separately.
This development led to the launch of the world's first range o f multi - plex control 
panels in the early part o f the 1980's. Thus, it represented a unique breakthrough in the 
field o f intruder alarm systems. It also meant that Europlex moved very rapidly from 
being an insignificant player in this market to a position where the prospect of rapid 
growth was likely to ensue. The company currently employs 130 people worldwide - 
100 of whom work in the Republic of Ireland.
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Phase One - Coping with "Rapid Growth Syndrom e”
The unique nature of the product meant that Europlex Technology could brace itself 
for an initial period of rapid growth. In the space o f the first two years the company 
moved premises on two occasions as the demands of production meant that it quickly 
outgrew its existing premises. The "leading edge" nature o f the product led to 
Europlex addressing the niche, upper end of the market. This meant that instead of 
addressing the domestic house / small business sector, the company had to consider the 
demands of the financial services sector (large banks, building societies, insurance 
companies), the airport authorities, railway stations and post offices. Given the 
sophisticated nature of the product allied to the ability to customise and upgrade 
existing features on the control panel, there was clearly a big potential demand at this 
end of the market.
Paul Tatterstall (the marketer) took responsibility for establishing contact with the 
relevant organisations. The superiority of the product, (when compared to competitive 
product offerings), ensured that orders were placed with Europlex. In order to cope 
with the rapid growth, David and Paul invited their sister, Pamela to join the company 
and act as production manager. Although she had no direct experience o f handling 
production, it reflected the desire to keep the company within the family. At the same 
time, Cyril Tatterstall, the father also joined and acted as the financial controller. This 
was the management structure which was employed in the early 1980's and continued 
throughout that decade.
In 1986, Paul reactivated contact with some business colleagues he had met when he 
had worked in Canada. As a result of discussions, a subsidiary office was opened in 
Canada. Further offices were opened in the U.K., in 1987 and in America in 1988. 
During the last three years o f the 1980's European countries such as Germany, 
Holland, Italy, Spain. France and Portugal, were penetrated. Two methods of market 
access were used: distributors or joint ventures.
The company also established a computer distribution company in 1984. This came 
about through the fact that Pamela married Jed, a computer expert, who was working 
for IBM at the time. He convinced the other family members that there was an 
opportunity to be seized through the setting up of a distribution company.
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However, despite the rapid success experienced during the 1980's, problems were 
gathering on the horizon. Paul had acted as managing director throughout this period: 
David was content to work away on the technical issues in the background. As the 
number of foreign offices and representatives grew, Paul realised that the existing 
family structure could no longer hope to manage the business in a capacity 
commensurate with the increasingly complex demands being placed on it. Cyril had 
given way to a professional accountant. An outside production manager quickly 
followed and they in turn put pressure on Paul to employ a marketing person.
At this time also, Paul was becoming restless and uncomfortable with the pace of 
change which was taking place. He began to make serious noises about leaving the 
company. Clearly his shares would have to be bought out. He was never a person that 
responded easily to systems and procedures and the arrival of outside, professional 
managerial expertise exacerbated this perceived problem.
Phase Two: Managing the Internal - External Influencers
Malcolm Lewis (the present Chief Executive of the company) had been working for a 
number of years in Ireland with multi national companies. In the course of this period, 
he had liaised on a number of occasions with the Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA) on issues such as grant - aid and so on.
The period from mid 1989 to mid 1990 witnessed a number of clashes and conflicts 
within Europlex Technology. The position was exacerbated when Paul stormed off and 
ceased his involvement as managing director. This left the company in a quandary, 
David took over as managing director, but it was clear from early on that he was 
uncomfortable in this position. He had always acted as the technical person, quite 
content to operate in the background and free of the constraints of having to make 
decisions and management.
The IDA had some indirect involvement with the company during the past two years. 
However they had many unhappy experiences with the "mercurial" Paul Tatterstall. 
They advised him to attend a number of courses and workshops which would provide 
him with an opportunity to take a more strategic, longer term view of the company's 
operations. He persistently refused to become involved in any of these activities.
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At this stage external investors had joined the board. Faced with the need to raise 
substantial finance which would allow them to invest in the company and buy out the 
shares of Paul Tatterstall, the company approached a corporate finance company. This 
company subsequently put together a package which led to them taking a place on the 
board. Thus the combined pressure of an external investor plus the involvement o f the 
IDA ensured that the board were forced to look for someone who would act as a non 
- executive chairman.
They approached Malcolm Lewis, with whom the IDA had built up a strong working 
relationship over the past decade. He got permission from his company and joined the 
board as a non - executive chairman, with responsibility for advising the company on 
its structure and long term strategy.
After three months it became clear to Lewis that David was not up to the task o f acting 
as managing director. Quite simply, in his view, the company was going no where...fast! 
The company was stagnating in its own growth. While it was achieving ten per cent 
growth annually, it was little more than just inflationary growth. The R&D function 
had stalled: no new products were coming out. The company was not being managed 
correctly at the operational level. It certainly had no strategic thrust in his view. Faced 
by these problems, he strongly urged that the company appoint a managing director / 
chief executive.
The company advertised extensively but failed to find someone who could meet the 
demands of the situation. Having acted as non - executive chairman for the past nine 
months, the rest of the board approached Malcolm Lewis and encouraged him to take 
the position. After much deliberation, he accepted the position and started in August 
1991.
Phase Three: Management of Change - the First Nine Months
Malcolm Lewis realised at the onset of his appointment as Chief Executive Officer in 
August 1991 that the company had to shape a strategic plan which would provide 
guidance for its future development. Due to the family influence which predominated 
the company in its previous form, there had been no attempt to address the long term 
issues which might affect the company. In addition, it was also clear that the company 
would have to address operational issues. Quite simply there had been a haphazard
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approach to the management of new product development, quality control and at a 
more basic level, simple systems and procedures for production scheduling.
Malcolm Lewis embarked on a three year strategic plan for the company. Apart from 
the impact which it would have on the personnel, it was also designed to attract the 
IDA to put together an investment package. Without evidence of a plan, it was unlikely 
that they would provide such help to Europlex.
The first task was to bring the executives together: the marketing director, the financial 
controller (who also acted as company secretary), the production director and the 
technical director (Paul Tattterstall, who had resumed this position after Lewis took 
over as Chief Executive). This involved the company preparing a detailed plan which 
included an analysis of present performance, a mission statement, detailed sales and 
market share targets (by country) and financial projections and capital investment 
requirements over this period. His experience with multi - national corporations and his 
past involvement in negotiations with the IDA for grant packages, heavily influenced 
the structure and format of the business plan.
This exercise proved to be a difficult one. The other executives had not experienced 
this level of formality before and tended to regard such brainstorming sessions ( of 
which there were plenty during the first six months of Lewis's appointment) as a 
meaningless exercise which took them away from the "nitty - gritty" aspects o f running 
the business. It required Lewis to drive on regardless and eventually they had a three 
year plan in place. Although it covered a three year perspective, the company used a 
one year focus as the operational aspect of the plan.
The two key weaknesses which Lewis identified as being critical and in need of direct 
action during the first twelve months were the lack of any systematic approach to new 
product development and the lack o f any formal quality control procedures. The first 
problem arose because Paul Tatterstall was never formally encouraged to develop new 
products as the company had prospered on the strength of the original technology 
developed a decade earlier. This was not an easy task and is encapsulated in the words 
of Lewis when he stated that:-
It's been very tough trying  to g e t procedu res w orking in an ....essen tia lly  non - 
procedu ra lised  co m p a n y"
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As a consequence, the plan instigated the launch o f a programme which was called 
Management Control o f New Product Introduction Procedure.
This involved Paul Tatterstall and his team of ten engineers working towards a planned 
launch of a number of new products over a three year period. The nature and direction 
which such product development would take, would be identified in the overall 
strategic plan.
At the same time, the company embarked on the acquisition of the ISO 9000 quality 
standard. This was deemed by Lewis to be an essential pre requisite for doing business 
within many market sectors, over the coming years.
Lewis spent the first six months engaging on a range of meetings with personnel and 
establishing the steering committee to implement the plan (made up o f the team of 
executives as discussed earlier). The next three months involved travelling to the 
subsidiary companies, joint venture partners and distributors throughout Canada, The 
U.S. and the European countries. This allowed Lewis to get valuable feedback from 
people at the "coalface". On a more pragmatic level, it allowed him to gain a sharper 
insight into an industry which differs dramatically on a country by country basis ( there 
is a veritable raft o f differing standards and legislation, both existing and pending, 
within different geographical regions).
Nine months into his appointment, Lewis had put together a plan. This attracted the 
necessary finance from the IDA which allowed the company to move to a larger plant 
on the outskirts of Dublin Airport. This was a significant move because it took the 
company from a run down factory to a "state of the art" layout, on a prestigious 
industrial estate. This ensured that many of the demands o f implementing the ISO 9000 
programmes were easier to address in such a facility.
Phase Four: Management of Change - the Last Nine Months
Malcom Lewis realised that if the recommendations contained in the plan were to be 
implemented, he would have to make changes to the management structure. The 
Production Director and Quality Control Manager were phased out of the company. 
Lewis shunted them sideways in the hierarchy. Both executives took the hint and left. 
Lewis who holds a production engineering degree, took over responsibility for 
production management, scheduling and the implementation of the programme for 
gaining ISO 9000 recognition. His rationale for taking over these functions was
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grounded in the belief that if the inherent weaknesses were not addressed, the 
company, in the longer term, would not be a viable proposition. His training in the area 
also meant that he had a clear grasp of the nuances, methods and techniques associated 
with production management.
During this period Lewis was also pursuing an MSc degree in management (by 
research), at Dublin University. This course was designed to allow practising managers 
to engage in a form of action research - whereby they could use their own company as 
a framework for research: company analysis, strategy development and so on. As part 
of the programme, Lewis attended various seminars, lectures and workshops. These 
sessions exposed him to strategists such as Michael Porter, Kenichi Ohmae and Larry 
Greiner. Thus, he was in a strong position to implement some of the theories covered 
on the course and apply them to his direct work within Europlex Technology. His 
views on the relevance of such theories and concepts is revealing.
I  th ou gh t it was g rea t (P orter - C om petitive A dvan tage) a n d  in the  
m ulti - n a tion al environm ent, I  f e l t  it w orked extrem ely well. C om ing to a
 em ..less organ ised  arran gem en t in E uroplex, it was in itia lly  I  think, less useful.
In the early stages there were so m any th ings wrong, th a t it was very d ifficu lt to 
concentrate on the stra tegic issues. I t was so rt o f  keep ing  the fin g e r  in the hole o f  
the d ike to stop  the w ater com ing out. A n d  a lo t o f  tim e was sp en t d o in g  that.
H owever, in p u ttin g  the p lan  together , the th ings I  learn ed  helped . It's only
usefu l i f  yo u 've  g o t o th er p eo p le  a rou n d  yo u  who can ta lk  the sam e language. 
E h....because I  do n 't th ink  anybody really  p u ts  a strategic p lan  togeth er them selves. 
Som e, certa in ly in com in g  to the com pan y f o r  the f ir s t  tim e, ju s t  d o n 't know  
enough a bou t the p ro d u c t range, the m arket, the p eo p le  involved, the cu ltu re "
His interpretation of the Porterian concept o f sustainable advantage forced him to 
concentrate on the future manner in which Europlex might retain its edge. This led to a 
critical strategic decision which involved the reduction of its total dependence on the 
niche market, and a movement downwards to the professional domestic area. This did 
not move the company into the "cheap and nasty" segment; it still required 
professional installation.
The rationale behind this shift in strategy was twofold. Europlex was experiencing 
formidable competition in their traditional sector. Companies were introducing multi - 
plex products that were more powerful in terms of their capabilities. Europlex, by 
contrast, had not really maintained its edge and needed breathing space necessary to
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"leapfrog" the present competitive offerings and bring out the next generation of multi 
- plex products. In order to do this, manufacturing costs had to be kept in line and the 
necessary volume to achieve these economies could only come from a movement into 
the larger segment of the market. The second reason emanated from the fact that there 
was an indigenous company in Ireland - Stoketronic which produced this portfolio of 
products. It was ripe for acquisition. The assets of this company were purchased by 
Europlex. Of the 34 people which were employed in Stoketronic, 24 were retained.
The move to this sector of the market would entail major changes in marketing 
strategy. Whereas hitherto sales and distribution tended to be direct to the ultimate 
customer, the professional domestic segment was based on the classical distribution 
system: manufacturer to distributor to installer to end user.
This move caused some conflict in the company: David Tatterstall, the technical boffin 
was horrified at the thought of the company moving into the less sophisticated, cheaper 
end of the market. However, Lewis convinced the Board of the need to move in this 
direction.
During this period, Lewis felt that there were a number of weaknesses within the 
marketing department of Europlex. This was evidenced in the lack of market 
information and market research about the competition. The Marketing Director in his 
view essentially acted as a Sales Manager: with two people in customer services, they 
would spend their time visiting customers and ensuring product availability and co­
operative advertising and so on . They would also visit customers on site, if there was 
any problem with product. These areas tended to be operational aspects of marketing 
rather than strategic in nature. The latter issues, such as the move to the "professional 
domestic" end of the market, would be discussed at the weekly management meeting, 
which would be chaired by Malcolm Lewis.
He expressed the view that ultimately he puts forward the ideas and recommendations 
for the strategic development of the company. However he recognises potential 
dangers in his approach to running the business. They are summed up in the following 
quotation:
", I suppose I am involved in everything, because we do have weekly
meetings and I insist on a weekly meeting where everybody sits down. So things do
tend to get put on the table . But eh we serve a very wide area, and.....although
I am involved and I do direct I guess what the major decisions are the executive
290
does report to a board and I'm the chairman o f the board as well, but there is a
board which sits and so we do have to justify where we are going, strategically,
and we get the opportunity to ...eh discuss that. Em..but...at the moment I think
I'm spending far too much time on the operational issues - trying to get the 
company running....in manufacturing fo r  instance is more than a fu ll time jo b ."
THE APPROACH TO PLANNING BY EUROPLEX TECHNOLOGY
Four phases were identified during the course of this analysis. The initial phase of 
development mirrors the experience of many similar enterprises: an opportunity is 
spotted, the skills of the people involved, technical and sales, are capitalised upon, and 
the company achieves a limited level of success - relying on personal contacts. The 
rapid growth phase commenced when David developed a break through product. The 
resulting success experienced by the company can be attributed to the uniqueness of 
the product and the "hustling " style of Paul Tatterstall, as he set about establishing 
contacts with the main potential customers in the sector: banks, airports and rail 
stations. He must also be given credit for identifying the opportunities in both the rest 
of Europe and Canada. Utilising contacts and establishing relationships with 
distributors, he ensured that Europlex, within a short period of time, had achieved a 
"critical mass" in terms of market penetration and coverage.
In common with similar enterprises, there was no attempt to formally or informally 
develop a plan for the business at this stage in its development. It could be argued that 
the ability to satisfy demand for the product superseded the need for planning. In other 
words there would be no time on hand for both brothers to "take time out" to appraise 
the company's future. The development of the organisational structure happened in a 
"piecemeal" fashion: family members were recruited as the need for certain skills arose 
- the father taking responsibility for book - keeping and their sister acquiring 
responsibility for the production function. However the growth rate of the company, 
combined with the family frictions which were beginning to emerge, led to a situation 
where the company could no longer hope to function effectively, unless some attempt 
was made to implement systems and procedures.
It is debatable if the company could have survived without the arrival of an outside 
person who could provide the required objectivity and judgement. Malcolm Lewis was 
that person. It is at this stage of the company's evolution that the first attempt is made 
to develop a plan. Lewis employed what might be described as a "textbook" approach
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to this particular task. This occurred because of his ongoing studies for the award of an 
M Sc degree. Participants on this course were required to use their companies as a 
focus of study for their dissertation. Lewis utilised the opportunity to design a strategic 
plan for Europlex while at the same time basing his dissertation around the company.
This represents an unusual situation, where the chief executive has both private as well 
as corporate motives for establishing a business plan. The remaining two phases of the 
company's evolution (to date) present a revealing insight as to whether such an 
approach can be translated into an implementable set of actions which are acceptable to 
the executive.
The management of change is portrayed as being a difficult exercise for the chief 
executive. It is not sufficient to put forward a basis for a three year plan. It requires a 
strong "championing of its merits, over a prolonged period of time, in order to gain its 
acceptance. It demands a great deal of the "champion" in that harsh decisions have to 
be taken quickly and executed in a clinical fashion. In the case of Europlex, Lewis had 
to move aside two members of the executive - in the manufacturing and quality control 
areas.
During the eighteen month period whilst Lewis has been in charge, he has managed to 
effect many of the actions which have been detailed in the plan. Progress has been 
slower than first envisaged - due in the main, to the difficulties in bringing the rest of 
the executive around to his way of thinking. His own assessment of the usefulness and 
relevance of the approach to planning which he adopted, is contained in the following 
quotation
" My own feeling is that there is a need fo r  a plan. But only as a  sort o f route
map. It shouldn't...eh your plan shouldn't show you one road. You know your
plan is going to be like a map of the country it's got roads all over the place. And
you continually have to be checking it out, to make sure whether you turn left or 
whether you turn right, or whether you could go straight on. So you have 
something to measure it by..."
The key to the success of his approach to planning lies in his strong attempt to get the 
basics right first. This means that before the strategic change in direction towards the 
"professional domestic" segment can be effected, it is necessary to address the 
fundamental problems which existed in both manufacturing, quality control and
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product development. Once procedures and systems were instigated, then, and only 
then, could the longer term issues be addressed with any confidence.
Conclusions
The case of Europlex Technology presents an opportunity to chart the development of 
the company's progress over a couple of critical phases. This company has been in 
existence for sixteen years, so it cannot be categorised as a start - up enterprise. On the 
contrary, it is a well established operation, which has experienced a large measure of 
success - particularly in its formative years. In this respect, it mirrors the experience of 
many similar firms in the electronics sector. A successful development of a product 
concept can rapidly move it into the rapid growth syndrome. The company came 
through this phase, but eventually ran into a "stagnation" phase, brought about by the 
complacency which such success can create. It was aiso exacerbated by the "cosy" 
family controlled nature of the enterprise - until, inevitably, friction emerged between 
the two principals.
The case study then traces the influence of the external investors and the arrival of 
Malcolm Lewis. Much of what emerges subsequently can be examined under three 
headings: the management of change, the development of a business plan and the 
attempt to implement it.
Credit must be given to Lewis for the forthright manner with which he drove change in 
this company. Without this input, it is submitted that the company would have 
continued for a while longer, but due to competitive pressures and the lack of 
substantial investment, it would be an unlikely candidate for survival. Lewis was the 
"catalyst" which spawned the subsequent re- direction of the company.
Despite the success achieved by Lewis, a number of weaknesses need to be addressed. 
The main area of concern would appeal- to surround his reluctance to relinquish control 
of what might be termed "the day to day", operational aspects of running the business. 
Although it is logical that he should have taken command of the manufacturing 
function (due to his background in this area), and while it can be argued that during the 
initial nine months of his tenure as chief executive, he adopted the correct course by 
taking responsibility for strategy marketing, and financial matters, it is submitted that 
he should now relinquish control of the operational aspects. Otherwise, his efforts will 
be diluted, at a time when there is still a need for him to act as a champion. This is 
evident in the rather muted response of David Tatterstall to his decision to re - direct
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the company to the broader segment of home security. Clearly, latent conflict still 
exists from this quarter. This is a potentially dangerous scenario - at a time when David 
Tatterstall will need to be strongly motivated to develop further "leading edge" 
products which will allow Europlex to "leapfrog" the ever threatening levels of 
competition. Lewis is aware of the dangers of retaining too much control. He does 
need to act upon this matter however.
In summary, Euoplex Technology has overcome many of the problems associated with 
the management of change. It has emerged from an organisational structure ( family - 
based) which was singularly inappropriate for its continued success (survival?) to one 
which provides a solid basis for future growth and development. Much of this success 
can be attributed to the efforts of Malcolm Lewis. However, weaknesses have been 
identified which need to be addressed.
A "text - book" approach to planning was adopted by Lewis. However, he quickly 
realised that there can be a large gap between theory and practice. In particular, 
problems revolved around the question of implementing the core components of the 
plan - in an environment which was initially hostile to change, and which still harbours 
some resentment at the direction in which the company is going.
It is submitted that the case highlights the difficulties of attempting to provide a level of 
formality ( in terms of a business plan and systems and procedures) in a "non - 
proceduralised" enterprise. This in turn reinforces the notion that the "hard", rational, 
sequential approach to planning, as advocated in the textbook, needs to be weighted 
against the softer, more intangible aspects of implementing the plan. It can be argued 
that for the most part, Malcolm Lewis has succeeded in this delicate balancing act.
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8.6
THE CASE OF M IDLAND  
TELECOM M UNICATIONS
8.6 THE CASE OF M IDLAND TELECOM M UNICATION
Introduction
Midland Communications was founded in 1982, by Gerry Griffin. Gerry had previously 
worked for a number of large companies in England; the main one being General 
Electric. Subsequently he joined Telectron, a company which was originally based in 
Dublin. He was initially employed as a test engineer (by training he is a radio officer). 
Over a fourteen year period, he moved into a number of positions within this company 
- commissioning manager, contracts manager, and finally working as the production 
controller. This company grew from a workforce of around eighty people to eight 
hundred and fifty, with four factories in Ireland. The company encountered cash flow 
difficulties due to the rapid growth rate. The managing director was also reluctant to 
relinquish control over certain business functions. The company eventually was taken 
over by an American company - AT & T.
During the period when the company was running into difficulties, Gerry Griffin was 
becoming restless. He was particularly frustrated by the fact that he had little 
opportunity to influence the direction in which the company was going. He knew that 
he had a contribution to make with regard to the products that Telectron should be 
involved with and market sectors which were not being currently addressed. Thus 
numerous clashes occurred with the managing director. When AT & T took over he 
stayed on to see if there was any perceptible change.
This company encountered a problem which was common to many operating in Ireland 
in the 1970's: the power of the trade unions. This led to situations where orders were 
not being delivered on time, due to the bureaucracy which existed in the company, 
based on the demarcation lines which were drawn up by the unions. This situation 
created innumerable delays in order processing. As contracts manager, Gerry found it 
to be very frustrating.. He would fill out the necessary forms for ordering various 
materials, only to find that a week later they would still be lying on somebody's desk. 
Matters came to a head one weekend, when the factory was broken into and his office 
was wrecked. When Gerry went in the next day and began to re - arrange the office, he 
was informed by a union official that it was not his job and to wait until he organised 
somebody to take charge of the situation.
This experience prompted Gerry to consider the possibility of starting his own 
business- where he would be in charge of his own destiny and free from such
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restrictions and petty bureaucracy. He discussed the possibility of manufacturing 
transformers with a colleague of his at A T &T - Nick Delaney. At this time, a number 
of executives, including Gerry, were offered a redundancy package. He decided that 
this was a timely offer and fitted in with his ambitions to start up his own enterprise. 
He accepted the package, handed in his resignation and immediately contacted the IDA 
and various other lending authorities about possible grant aid and loan facilities. He 
received a negative response from the IDA; being told that there were companies 
already supplying such a product. It was not the policy of the IDA to provide aid in 
such unpromising circumstances. At that time the main focus of the IDA was on 
helping companies which had products which would replace imports. He was 
undeterred by this setback and purchased second hand machinery, moved to Athlone 
and moved into his mother's news agency business. He made his first transformer in the 
back garden shed. Mick Delaney gave him some help. For the first six months Gerry 
and his wife lived on a barge just outside the town on the river Shannon. They 
developed a couple of products and began to make some coils for a couple of contacts 
which they had made the acquaintance of, during their time at A T & T. It was from 
such an unpromising beginning that Midland Telecommunications emerged.
Phase One - Developing an Initial Customer Base : 19981 -1983
During the summer of 1981, another range of redundancy packages was offered to 
employees at Telectron. Mick Delaney and Pat Doyle invested their redundancy in the 
transformer business and joined Gerry Griffin who had left earlier. They moved the 
manufacturing operations to a cheap site which they acquired from a contact in Dublin. 
However, Gerry Griffin was in negotiations with the Westmeath County Council. They 
had already built a number of business units in a small industrial estate outside Athlone. 
In November of 1981, Gerry and his colleagues moved into one of these premises. 
Their three wives helped out and a couple of local girls were taken on to handle basic 
clerical duties.
Gerry Griffin quickly realised that they needed to build up a customer base which 
would place the company on a more comfortable footing. A list of potential customers 
was drawn up. The Golden Pages provided the main source, and a couple of trade 
directories were acquired from the local IDA representative. Contact names were 
drawn up from the county councils and a systematic telephone exercise was 
undertaken by Gerry, Mick and Pat. From this, a "hit list" of companies was 
established. This was based on the perceived reception which they received from the
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contact name during the telephone conversation. The companies on this list were 
subsequently visited by either Gerry, Pat or Mick.
Thus, a number of contracts were received and the company was on its way. At the 
end of the first year, the company generated £40,000 worth of business and fifteen 
people were employed. Gerry Griffin was quite happy during this period to expand the 
company's involvement into other areas. Frequently, both existing and new customers 
were also asked if they made coiled, cables, telephone filters and so on. Likewise, as 
small indigenous, niche operators went out of business or struggled to provide the 
required level of service, Midland Telecommunications would move into these areas. It 
has been a conscious decision on Gerry Griffin's part, to spread the product mix from 
the very beginning. He reasons that it is dangerous for a small indigenous company to 
"lock itself" into a niche market. In the event of a downturn in business or the loss of a 
major customer, it leaves such a company in a circle of vulnerability. Provided the 
opportunity is there and it falls within the company's capabilities, then Gerry will "go 
for it".
In the first two years of operations, the company experienced the problem of out - 
growing their existing premises. They were lucky in that the adjoining unit became 
available and they simply knocked out the wall and doubled the capacity.
Gerry operated on a basic division of labour between the three founder members 
during this period. Mick Delaney had worked as an after - sales manager with 
Telectron and he assumed responsibility for sales operations and customer 
development. Pat Doyle acted as general manager - with responsibility for ensuring 
that production schedules were maintained and met the demands placed on it by the 
customer. Gerry Griffin acted as managing director, with responsibility for making the 
long term decisions for the company. Having experienced the difficulties associated 
with outgrowing the business premises, he realised that growth would have to be 
tackled in a planned manner, as opposed to allowing uncontrolled growth to occur, 
without having the required infrastructure. The fortuitous manner in which they 
acquired the adjoining business unit did not hide the fact that no thought had been 
given to the implications of growth. Thus at the end of 1983, Gerry began to address 
the question of a business plan. In his view he saw this exercise as being essential if the 
company was to achieve growth in subsequent years. During this early stage of 
growth, Gerry also addressed the issue of quality.
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Phase Two - Planning Growth: 1984 - 1987
Gerry Griffin recognised two areas which needed to be addressed: the preparation and 
implementation of a business plan and the management of quality. Having received 
little or no encouragement from the first person from the IDA with whom he dealt 
with, Gerry subsequently received a more favourable response from the new local 
representative. He advised Gerry of the need to develop a broad business plan. Which 
would be a necessary prerequisite if the company wished to be considered for grant aid 
or employment grants and so on. Griffin had consciously eschewed the option of 
seeking loans from the lending authorities. He believed that all growth should be 
funded internally through profit generated, and has maintained this policy to the 
present day. However he did recognise the need to recruit employees into the firm as it 
expanded. In order to qualify for the employment grant (approximately £5,000 per 
person), he realised that a plan would be essential.
In this regard, the influence of the IDA on the format and content of the plan cannot 
be underestimated. The plan adopts a three year frame of reference and is finance 
driven. The growth of the company is measured in terms of turnover targets, profit 
targets and employment targets. It is presented to the IDA and agreed by them. While 
Gerry Griffin outlined its usefulness to the company, it was also clear that the main 
initial motivation for going through with such an exercise was the money which could 
be generated from the employment grants.
He encountered many difficulties with the local IDA representative when developing 
the plan. He referred to the bureaucracy and "paperwork" mentality which appears to 
permeate throughout the IDA. This was at odds with Gerry's view of the entrepreneur
"someone who likes to be generating ideas and who likes to be doing things, 
whereas they (the IDA) insist on putting you through the hoops".
The guidelines and layout were provided by the IDA, the input by Gerry Griffin. As 
stated earlier, the major focus is on financial matters. A full - time accountant was 
recruited to the company in 1985 and Gerry credits him with putting a semblance of 
structure and order to the plan. The operating plan is driven by monthly management 
accounts which are presented to the four partners at their monthly board meeting. In 
Gerry's words, this puts down on a document every month:
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" all o f the activities - the income coming into the company, and the cash 
going out. These can be compared with the previous month's figures and indeed 
corresponding figures fo r  the same month in previous years. This eliminates the 
opportunity fo r  surprises at the end o f the financial year (July - July). This tended 
to happen in the early years, where we could go through the year without really 
assessing monthly sales or where the revenue or costs were coming from. Thus we 
could be left in a quandary, wondering where some of these surprises were coming 
from and trying to guess why certain things were happening. The monthly 
management accounts impose a certain level o f discipline".
Griffin places great importance on the monthly accounts. It allows him to maintain a 
strong control over the activities within the company. In particular, the monthly 
accounts pinpoints in a graphic fashion, the current trading position. Unexplained 
increases or decreases in sales for a particular month are analysed at the monthly 
meeting and may be explained either by seasonal influences, or the acquisition of a 
new customer. In any event, the directors address the issues.
The other strategic issue which Gerry Griffin addressed during this phase of 
development was quality management. One of the positive learning outcomes from his 
time spent with large multi - national corporations such as GEC was the concentration 
which they placed on systems and procedures for managing quality. Although not 
enamoured with formality in general, Gerry recognised the benefits from having a 
systematic approach to managing quality. Having dealt with a number of small, 
indigenous companies, he realised that this was a major weakness within Irish industry. 
Midland Telecommunications was one of the first Irish companies to go through the 
ISO 9000 approval exercise. This was achieved in 1987. In addition to making the 
company more professional in its systems, the exercise also identified a number of 
weaknesses in the area of product development and record keeping. In response to 
this, Griffin commissioned Eolas, the Science and Technology Board to carry out a 
technological audit of the company's operations. This involved an assessment of all the 
business functions within the company: research and development, finance and sales. 
The fee which Midland paid to Eolas was recouped in the first month of operations 
after the exercise. This further improved the professionalism within the organisation in 
Gerry's view. Above all else, it raised the awareness level of the employees and 
management within the company.
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As stated earlier, a conscious decision was taken by Gerry Griffin to fund growth 
internally. A profit has been made in each year of the company's trading. These profits 
have either been invested or ploughed back into the company in terms of machinery, 
training etc. This allows a certain "amount of fat" to be built around the company. 
Thus in times of recession, Midland can absorb reductions in margin more comfortably 
than similar sized competitors who may have relied to a greater extent on external 
borrowing. He cites the fact that a number of such companies have ceased trading and 
Midland has been in a position to pick up their business.
During this period, the company also moved into the cable harnessing market, 
ironically as a result of an indigenous company going out of business. Due to their lack 
of expertise in this area, Griffin recruited an engineer to the firm. He was given 
responsibility for overseeing the development of this line of product and the 
development proved to be successful.
Despite the sound state of their finances, Gerry Griffin outlined that Midland still face 
difficulties in getting credit and so on from the banks and the larger companies. Despite 
the flexibility which comes from being small, the credibility factor still poses problems.
Stage Three "Copper - Fastening" Systems and Procedures: 1987 - 1993
The third phase of development which can be identified, effectively seeks to build on 
the successful outcomes from the decisions taken in the previous stage. During phase 
two, the company increased its workforce from around twelve to twenty five people. 
From 1987 to the present, this number has further increased to the extent that at the 
time when the company was visited, the forty eighth person had just been recruited. In 
line with these developments the organisational structure has also changed. In addition 
to the three original partners another couple of layers of management have been added. 
Peter Doyle has changed his role from production manager to that of general manager 
and now has four people reporting to him directly, including a quality manager and a 
training manager. Also reporting to him, is the administrator, the product manager 
(recruited in 1987) and the cable products manager. Interestingly, Gerry Griffin also 
reports to him in his second capacity as design engineer.
Gerry Griffin also decided to split the company into two sections: the production 
facility which remains at the plant in Athlone and the trading / sales company which is
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based in Dublin. Mick Delaney, as Commercial Director, runs this second operation. 
The rationale for creating two divisions was based on taxation advantages which could 
accrue. In the case of the manufacturing plant, they benefit from the 10 per cent 
corporation tax.
In an effort to drive "continuous improvement" throughout the company, Gerry Griffin 
embarked on the ISO 9002 qualification programme. This is a follow on from the first 
programme and is designed to further refine and upgrade the systems and procedures 
within management of the quality function. In order to expedite this exercise, he 
recruited a quality manager to oversee the implementation of the programme. In order 
to attract the right individual, Gerry Griffin offered a salary which was £5000 more 
than that which he earned as managing director / chief executive. This is reflective of 
the approach to salaries which pertains in Midland Telecommunications. The focus is 
on the value which an individual can add to the company’s operations; not on the 
perceived status which one might associate with a specific job title. In this respect, 
there is little emphasis placed on the perks, style and trappings; rather it is on the 
tangible contributions which people can bring to the company. For instance, no person 
within the company has a company car.
They achieved ISO 9002 certification in 1990. In further pursuit of continuous 
improvement within the organisation, Gerry has set in motion procedures which will 
lead to the next level of standards which can be achieved under this programme. The 
company has also achieved the Underwriting Laboratory Certification as well. This 
represents further tangible evidence that total quality management is both actively 
pursued and achieved.
There is a strong emphasis placed on employee empowerment and flexibility. These are 
related issues which Gerry Griffin has worked on over the period 1987 - 1993. He has 
stressed the need for all employees, from the telephone receptionist right through the 
organisation, to be "customer focused". Thus, if an emergency order comes through at 
five past five on a Friday evening as Gerry and the workers are about to adjourn to the 
pub for a pint, people will have no qualms about spending an hour or so preparing the 
order and if necessary, coming in on Saturday morning to expedite the order. Only a 
week previous to the order taking place, this had in fact happened and Gerry loaded 
the order into the boot of his car and delivered the product to the client by noon on the 
Saturday. On the Monday morning, Nick Delaney would contact the customer to see if 
there were any problems. This approach has been a constant "maxim" which Gerry has 
instilled into the workforce:-
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"People have to be available, at all levels in the company, to the customers "
He is helped in this regard by the fact that no union exists in the company. Given his 
own experiences with large companies, most notably at Telectron, it is not surprising 
that he has pursued this policy. Employees are paid bonuses as and when sales and 
profit targets are achieved.
Open lines of communication are encouraged by Gerry Griffin. He insists on first 
names within all sections of the management and workforce. He encourages freedom 
of thinking. This is exemplified by the tendency for workers to keep newspaper 
cuttings on articles about companies which may turn out to be potential customers. If 
that company has not been approached before, then it is targeted for a visit.
Gerry and his partners also make a point of visiting other companies who have been 
highlighted in the media as exponents of world class manufacturing techniques. By 
walking through the production lines, they can often gain ideas which they might 
incorporate into their operations.
His utilisation of marketing is worthy of examination. Although by training Gerry 
Griffin is a radio officer, he has become an active member of the Marketing Institute of 
Ireland and sits on the Midlands Regional Committee. He identifies two aspects which 
are fundamental to the marketing function: a customer focus and promotion. He argues 
that while there is no formal marketing function within the company, he takes 
responsibility for product design and development and everyone has the customer 
focus maxim at the forefront of their activities. As stated earlier, this extends to 
identifying potential customers, through to coming in on Saturdays to fulfil an 
emergency or unexpected order. Great emphasis is placed on sales visits and trade fairs 
and exhibitions have been used extensively to promote the company's product range. 
The company has also allocated £500 to develop a series of poster boards which depict 
the company's offerings.
His perception of marketing therefore can be assessed as tactical in nature: with the 
major focus on sales / promotion. This apparently narrow view is defended by him on 
the grounds of pragmatism: "you can have a well designed product, but without a 
professional sales approach, it will stay on the factory flo or." The question of 
"customer focus" is more difficult to identify from interviewing Gerry Griffin. 
However he justifies this approach by citing the open communications which can
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operate in a small enterprise. In terras of the long terra strategic decisions, Gerry 
makes little distinction between overall business and marketing issues. This is 
symptomatic of many evolving enterprises where functional activities tend to merge 
into overall business considerations.
For instance, in the recessionary climate experienced by the company during 1991 and 
1992, serious attention had to be given to the question of dropping prices in order to 
retain business. Griffin cited the example where recently Midland had absorbed a drop 
of 10 per cent on a contract worth £80,000. This in essence represents a loss of £8000. 
However, Midland is still making a small profit on this order and the savings which 
have been invested by the company (during the "good years") has cushioned the loss in 
revenue. The main competitors by contrast, have pursued a "suicidal" policy of below 
cost selling in an attempt to attract business.
The question of export markets was an issue which was addressed by Gerry Griffin 
during this phase of growth. As of 1991, 97 per cent of Midland's business was based 
in the Republic of Ireland. Within the business plan, it is a stated objective to move 
export sales from its present share of 4 per cent to 15 per cent over the next three year 
period.
The small proportion of sales coming from the export area can be partially explained by 
two factors: the opportunities to satisfy the home market have been large and lack of 
importance which has been placed on attending U.K. trade fail's by Midland. The fact 
that an advanced level of certification has been acquired by Midland means that it is 
beginning to appear on lists of "approved suppliers". He instanced the fact that 
representatives of Ferranti Aerospace were due to visit the plant to gauge the 
capability of Midland to act as a supplier. The development of sales in the export area, 
therefore, is seen as a key priority for the company over the next three year period. 
Gerry argues that the objective of 15 per cent of overall sales is achievable on the basis 
that the fundamentals have been put in place: quality standards, (ISO 9002 and the 
Underwriting Laboratory Certification), and a flexible and proven management 
structure. This commitment to the cultivation of export markets has witnessed Midland 
attending trade fail's at Reading and at Birmingham at the National Exhibition Centre in 
1992 and early in 1993.
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THE APPROACH TO PLANNING BY M IDLAND  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
A number of observations can be made about the planning procedures as implemented 
within Midland Telecommunications. Firstly, the company appears to conform to the 
stereotypical approach as outlined in many textbooks, namely the adoption of a three 
year rolling plan which is driven by the annual budgetary component. However, a 
closer examination reveals that Gerry Griffin, as the majority owner / chief executive, 
selectively focuses on a limited number of aspects of the plan: mainly in the area of 
finance and in particular, the monthly accounts. This reflects the preoccupation which 
Griffin holds about the need to internally fund future developments. This, he achieves, 
through a tight control over expenditures.
The company focuses almost exclusively on the operational component of the three 
year plan: namely the annual budget. Thus, while reference is made to sales targets 
and projections over a three year period, the rationale for taking the company in a 
certain direction, e.g. ISO 9000 certification, resides for the most part, with Gerry 
Griffin. He uses the monthly management meetings to inform his fellow partners of 
strategic decisions which he is about to make. Thus, the personality of the majority 
owner / chief executive cannot be underestimated when it comes to assessing the 
approach to planning in this company. The potential dangers associated with such a 
stance have been examined in a preceding section. As long as Gerry retains his 
influence over his fellow partners then all is well. However, the potential threat of 
conflict is likely to arise should a particularly contentious decision appear on the 
horizon. The uncompromising nature of Griffin's approach is reflected in his statement 
that he is "responsible for taking the hard, long term decisions for the company, 
and that if push comes to shove, I am the one that calls the shots”.
However, it would be wrong to categorise Midland Telecommunications as a 
company which is run in a dictatorial manner. Griffin encourages flexibility and 
freedom of thinking within the organisation. For example, employees are encouraged 
to keep newspaper cuttings from the business press about new companies which have 
recently entered the market or about those who are expanding their product portfolios 
and which might prove to be potential customers for Midland. If they are recognised as 
likely prospects then they are marked down for contact, either by Griffin or one of his 
partners.
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Griffin also exhibits a level of cynicism about the potential benefits which might accrue 
from a three year business plan. It is clear that he has only prepared such a document 
due to pressure from the local representative of the Industrial Development Authority. 
The actual influence of this document on the future direction of the company is 
negligible. In reality, the business plan is tailored for external consumption rather than 
as a conduit for internal change or development. This is a feature of many similar 
indigenous companies and raises questions about the rationale for undertaking such an 
exercise in the first place. It also highlights the gap which can exist between 
formulation and execution. Clearly the funding agencies and lending authorities 
demand a business plan encompassing a three year time frame. Thus a plan is 
formulated: in many cases it goes no further. In the case of Gerry Griffin, this time 
frame is used as an indicator of targets (such as sales revenue) which the company 
attempts to achieve over that period. The responsibility for major decisions which will 
have a long term effect on the company (such as a move into a new product area) rests 
with Griffin. The rationale for making such decisions is not explicitly articulated in the 
planning document: it resides in the mind of Gerry Griffin.
CONCLUSIONS
Midland Telecommunications has grown from a £40,000 business, operating out of a 
garden shed, to a £1 million operation as of 1993. Griffin identifies three basic issues 
which have contributed to this success: a commitment to customer service, a 
competitively priced product range and a focus on quality. It has funded its operations 
internally, from its profits and has not over extended itself with the lending agencies. 
This has meant that Midland has been in a stronger position than many of its 
competitors in recessionary times, where the pressure has been placed on margins.
Griffin represents the "implicit marketer" which has been identified in the literature. 
That person intuitively addresses the fundamentals such as customer service and 
quality, which form the basis for effective marketing in the first place. Griffin has 
received no direct training in the area of marketing. However, he has learned from his 
experience of working with multinational corporations. When asked what he 
understood by the term "marketing", he focused on the end objective of selling the 
product. However, a study of his company identifies a much broader embrace of the 
marketing functions, reflecting a situation where he may not be able to demonstrably 
identity the main characteristics of the marketing concept, but is adept at practising the 
fundamentals.
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The approach to planning has been analysed in preceding sections. It is submitted that 
the mechanisms employed by Griffin are typical of many similarly evolving indigenous 
companies. It is selective in its content, focusing in this case on the monthly 
management accounts as a mechanism for providing a discipline within the company. 
The three year business plan is designed for the external audience. However, it would 
be erroneous to assume that the longer term "strategic" issues are ignored as a 
consequence. Griffin has succeeded in delegating responsibility for the operational 
management issues to his two junior partners (supported by a number of executives) 
and has taken full responsibility for mapping out the strategic vision of the company. 
This clear delineation between strategic and operational considerations allows Gerry 
Griffin to devote his energies to the former issues.
It is submitted that this has played a considerable part in the subsequent success which 
Midland Telecommunications has achieved. It is unusual to see a chief executive being 
in such a position. Typically he or she is inevitably caught up in a number of day to day 
issues, which have the unfortunate effect of deflecting attention away from the long 
term developments in the business environment, and which may influence the 
company's future position. In other cases there may be a reluctance on the part of the 
chief executive / owner manager to delegate responsibility to other people. Griffin has 
managed to avoid both of these situations.
In summary, Midland Telecommunications, by focusing on central issues such as 
customer service, finance and quality has maintained its competitive position in this 
sector. While potential problems may occur as a result of Griffin retaining full 
responsibility for the decisions which affect the long term future of the company, they 
have yet to emerge. Despite using a selective approach to planning and retaining a 
cynicism about the merits of a formal three year business plan, the company has 
achieved success.
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THE CASE OF W ESTERN AUTOM ATION
8.7
8.7 THE CASE OF W ESTERN AUTOM ATION LTD.
Company Background
Western Automation was established by Pat Ward in January 1985. The company 
currently employs 26 people. It has specialised in RCD technology and specifically 
designs products which help to detect electric currents and thus provide protection 
against electric shock or electrical fires. Pat Ward had worked for a multi national 
company which had specialised in RCD technology and he spotted the need for an 
independent design house which could provide the appropriate technology to firms. 
When he assessed the market and the potential competition, he found that the existing 
products were weak from a technology viewpoint. Most were based in the electro 
mechanical area, whereas the coming technology - RCD, was very much an 
electronically based product. Pat's initial entry into the market revolved around the 
design of a customised microchip, which contained the specific design for an 
individual customer. This provided two benefits: protection from possible copying by 
competitors, and an overall reduction in package size. This latter feature ensured that 
the technology would fit into very small spaces in the factory. In essence, therefore, the 
technology is the same, but many variations could be built into the microchip which 
would reflect the differing standards throughout Europe, America and Asia.
Phase One: Developing an Initial Customer Base
Pat Ward adopted a very pragmatic approach to seeking potential customers for his 
business. He quickly recognised that his business offering was one of providing 
solutions to individual problems experienced by companies in the area of current 
detection. Therefore, when he had developed the initial prototype, he identified six 
U.K. companies in the RCD sector. He approached each one and outlined the benefits 
which would accrue to them, if they adopted his design. One company had a very large 
dependence on RCD products and was sufficiently impressed to give Western 
Automation an initial prototype order worth £60,000, leading to a full scale production 
order worth £660,000.
In adopting this approach, Pat followed the principle of firstly spotting an opportunity, 
developing a product to meet the requirements of the perceived customers, and then 
visiting them to convince them of the benefits. In many ways he exhibited the typical 
characteristic of the inventor or "technological boffin" - a preoccupation with all 
matters to do with the product, with little or no thought given over to the demands 
which would be placed on the company, upon receipt of an order. In his defence, he
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exhibited the "street wise" approach to marketing which is to be found in many similar 
owner - managers. Pat refers to this as the displacement principle: where weaknesses in 
the existing product offerings are identified, improved prototypes are developed, a 
prospective customer is approached and shown how the improved product can benefit 
their operations. If successful, then a competitor is displaced in the market place. In 
essence, this means that the company focuses on the need to convince potential 
customers of the benefits and the fact that Western Automation would be bringing 
solutions to problems. At this stage of the company's development, no plan either 
formalised or intuitively derived, existed.
Phase Two: The Valley of Death
The acceptance of the full scale production order of £660,000 created enormous 
problems for Pat Ward. He fully recognised that such an order would generate cash 
which would help to clear a lot of the initial investment costs which had already been 
incurred. It would also provide the basis for further investment in new designs, leading 
to new customers. The downside was that the order was given on condition that it was 
an exclusive - Western Automation could not supply anybody else with the RCD 
technology. This meant that Pat would be dependent for his survival on a single 
customer. He was fully aware of the potential dangers associated with this position, but 
felt that the benefits outweighed the disadvantages. In addition, because he had 
incurred high levels of debt already - his house was in danger of being re - possessed, 
in the event of the business not succeeding, he felt that such an opportunity may not 
present itself again. This was an important consideration because typically companies 
in this sector can take months to make up their minds about changing suppliers. Here, 
Pat reasoned, was a company with a contract on the table, requiring only a signature to 
generate business. He signed the contract.
The first problem arose because Pat Ward did not have a manufacturing facility to 
handle the order. This meant that he had to sub - contract this task to three sub - 
contractors. All three let the company down very badly. Orders consistently arrived 
late, quality was variable and the sub - contractors on many occasions, shoved Western 
Automation's products to one side, while they fulfilled larger, more profitable orders. 
This meant that throughout 1986, Pat Ward was living on a knife edge. The customer 
was becoming more and more angry with the situation. A massive debt loss was 
incurred in that first year of trading. In October of that year, he realised that the 
company was in grave danger of going out of business. A critical decision had to be 
made: whether to remain as a design house and rely on sub contractors to assemble the
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printed circuit boards or to set up a manufacturing facility. There really was no choice. 
In January 1987, the company purchased a soldering machine and commenced 
manufacturing in a small business unit in Bridge Street in Ballinasloe.
Over the course of 1987, the company moved through the learning curve of production 
very effectively. There were some minor quality control problems, but orders were 
being delivered on time. They were still in serious trouble however. The British 
customers' sales took off because of the technology designed by Western Automation 
and on the back of much favourable publicity in the trade journals. This ironically 
created problems for Pat Ward. From a position where they were projected to produce 
around 200,000 per year, they were now producing 500,000. The customer at the 
same time began to exert pressure on Pat Ward to drive the margins down. Because of 
his dependence on this company, he was forced to adjust the prices accordingly. The 
compensatory effect of higher volumes did not eliminate the losses. They were just 
making more product - at a small loss.
However, a far more serious problem was about to occur. In December 1987, the BBC 
programme, Watchdog, ran a feature on current detection products and identified the 
U.K. customer's product as being flawed. This was because in the event of a faulty 
reverse wired socket, the product was only disconnecting one pole of the mains - the 
live one. This would be acceptable if the socket was wired correctly but in the event of 
faulty wiring it would not provide any protection against electric shock. This 
programme went out in early 1988. The company's sales dropped dramatically as a 
result.
At the same time, this company was working on a redesign. They found an American 
company which could provide a triple mechanism. This was an area which was outside 
the domain of Western Automation as it concentrated on the electronics only. As part 
of the deal, the American company insisted that the U.K. customer also would have to 
buy their electronics as part of the overall package, along with the triple mechanism. In 
May of 1988, Western Automation was dropped. This left it with a mountain of debt 
and unused stock. They were firmly trapped in the "valley of death".
Phase Three: Survival - Retrenchment
In July 1988, all 25 employees were made redundant. Pat Ward decided that the only 
way to approach the situation was to be open and honest with his creditors. Over
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twenty companies were owed £150,000. He visited each company to explain the 
situation. He found that this proactive approach was well received. Their experience 
was that a managing director in such a perilous position would simply disappear or 
make no attempt to contact creditors. Each of the companies agreed to support Pat 
Ward - except for one. This company was owed £400. They took Western Automation 
to court. However, Pat's solicitors succeeded in delaying the action for over a year.
Bolstered by the encouraging support which he received from his suppliers, Pat Ward 
called back to the original five companies he had approached in 1985. One of those 
companies remembered him. The timing was fortuitous because they realised that their 
product was becoming obsolete and they needed a.......solution! An order was
received and in the middle of 1989, Western Automation was back in production.
The company recruited people again. It was in a good position because it had a large 
amount of stock. It was possible therefore to get "up and running" quickly. As cash 
came into the company, suppliers could be paid, credibility restored and thoughts could 
be given to the possibility of seeking new customers.
The personality of Pat Ward contributed in no small measure to the survival of the 
company during this phase. This was also combined with an element of luck: it is 
unusual to encounter a situation where virtually all of the suppliers continued to 
support him, running the risk of receiving no payment in return.
Pat still exhibited the characteristics of the street fighter - reacting intuitively to the 
unravelling chain of events. The objective here was simply survival- nothing else. The 
lack of planning, vision and deliberation about what the company was about and where 
it was going created this situation in the first place. Pat Ward, with no basic business 
training, was learning the hard way. On the positive side, it could be argued that there 
was still a need for an independent design house. The customised microchip which Pat 
had developed, clearly did offer a viable solution for many companies. Through a 
combination of "error and experience", the company had survived a couple of 
potentially crippling obstacles. However, it was still bedevilled by the lack of any 
formal attempt to place the organisational structure of the company on an "even keel". 
This, allied to the absence of any kind of planning, needed to be addressed 
immediately.
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Phase Four: Sowing the Seeds
As the company responded to the requirements of the initial customer, Pat began to 
recognise that he had severe limitations when it came to the question of whether or not 
the company could continue to survive. His experiences over the past two years 
convinced him that he was deficient in a number of critical areas. He had no knowledge 
of even the basics of finance: cash flow projections, balance sheets and profitability. 
Apart from a fundamental belief in his product offering and a tremendous desire to 
survive, he had no other skills which would help the company to grow.
On the advice of a colleague, he enrolled with the Open University. They offered a 
number of course modules for managers. Pat initially took finance and accountancy for 
managers. Immediately he was able to transfer the skills and knowledge to his 
company. On completion of this module, Pat quickly moved through five other 
courses; including marketing for managers. This latter course forced him to prepare a 
business plan. This addressed such fundamental questions as where was the company 
going to go in the future? What changes would have to be made to the organisational 
structure? The management of existing customers? The approach to acquiring new 
customers? The management of employees?
This series of modules moved Pat from a position where he was literally managing by 
"the seat of his pants" to a situation where he was beginning to acquire a semblance of 
control over his actions. It is encapsulated by the following transcript from the 
interview:
"I almost couldn't learn fast enough. There was that kind o f situation where I 
needed the information now, but 1 had to wait six months to finish the course ",
The first decision he made was to divorce himself from the day - to - day running of 
the company's operations. This effectively meant that he delegated responsibility for all 
aspects of production to a colleague of his, who had joined him at the beginning. Pat 
looked after three areas: product development, customer acquisition  and the 
monitoring o f  international standards. He recognised in addition that being small 
meant that the company was going to struggle on two fronts. It needed expertise in a 
number of areas: production, inventory management, supervisory management and 
electronics engineering. However, lack of finances meant that such individuals could 
not be recruited - particularly in the managerial area. He resolved therefore to establish
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a policy whereby such skills would be acquired through internal staff development. 
When he completed the Diploma in Management, Pat registered to do an M Sc degree 
through the auspices o f the Irish Management Institute. His production controller 
registered for a B Sc in electronic engineering. Other em ployees registered for studies 
in the areas o f quality control and supervisory management.
The initial business plan which he developed, focused on the need to only produce 
product which would generate profitability for the company. In the previous phase, 
loose profit projections were made which indicated that a profit o f around eighty per 
cent could be achieved. In the event, the order generated a potentially disastrous loss. 
The plan identified a targeted gross profit figure o f forty per cent as the minimal 
position. Under the detailed projections, developed by Pat, this would allow for a net 
profit margin o f  approximately fifteen per cent. This has continued to be the position 
for the company.
Phase Five: Planned Growth
Subsequent to the completion o f his Diploma for Managers course, Pat registered for 
an M Sc. This programme o f study was particularly suitable as it forced the course 
participants to relate the theories and concepts to their own companies and industry 
sectors. He quickly foresaw the need to plan for growth. This need to identity the best 
routes for growth was driven by his experiences when the company was small. This led 
to vulnerability, particularly if the major /  only customer does not pay on time. Thus, 
planned growth can reduce this level o f  encumbrance. His attitude to growth was not 
one which was consumed by the need to establish an "empire" or "feed" his ego.
He therefore took a three to five year view o f the business. Over the initial three year 
period he set a sales target o f  £3 million. This would represent, (if achieved), a 
doubling o f turnover. He anticipated that a doubling o f the workforce from twenty five 
to approximately fifty, would be needed to achieve this target.
The need to strategically develop a limited number o f customers was viewed by Pat as 
central to the success o f the plan. In the period since he acquired the initial customer 
which allowed him to survive, the company established business relationships with five 
others. The interesting aspect o f  Western Automation's approach is the focus on the 
existine customer base. Initially a strong focus is placed on establishing a comfort
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factor with each one. He describes two aspects o f this strategy which in his view  
relates to the essence o f marketing.
" It's vital that customers never fee l nervous about doing business with us....that
they fee l very comfortable to the extent that it would break their heart to leave
us....We've got to try to engender that kind o f feeling amongst customers. And we 
have it...with the exception o f that one customer that dumped us back in '88, we've 
never lost a customer"......
" The other thing that's come out o f  this is that I  identified an avenue o f growth fo r
them  I  was looking fo r  increased sales (from them) and one o f the avenues I  fe lt
was that i f  you had a very great satisfied customer...eh you were supplying him
with a specific product, then....if the comfort level was very good, you could tease 
out the possibility with that customer that you could supply other products....in the 
product range....and use that as an avenue to get into other areas ".
" Amazingly this is happening........ we are seeing an actual explosion in our
product base, without seeing a sim ilar explosion in our customer base The great
thing about coming from  being a small company is that we are still dealing with the 
same number o f customers, so we are not over stretched, in terms o f customers, but 
are getting a ll the benefits o f  growth ".
This ability to grow with the customers was helped by the fact that the customer tends 
to provide the direction as to where Western Automation was to spend the money on 
research and development. In addition, Pat's involvement on the international 
standards committee meant that he too could be proactive in terms o f providing advice 
to the individual customer. Thus, high risk, speculative product development can be 
avoided.
Pat adopts the attitude that there is no need to seek new customers at present; despite 
many knocking on his door, due to the reputation he has developed. The reinforcement 
o f the comfort factor is accentuated with frequent visits to each customer - at least 
quarterly. In addition, the German customer com es over to the new factory which 
Western Automation has recently m oved into.
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THE APPROACH TO PLANNING BY WESTERN AUTOM ATION
Five phases o f development were identified during the analysis o f  this company. In the 
start - up phase there was no conscious or sub conscious effort to map out the 
direction which the company should be following. It was simply a case o f  identifying an 
opportunity and then seeking to attract interest from potential users o f the technology. 
Here was som eone with an idea, a belief that there was a market for it, a determination 
to follow it through from conception to birth, the propensity to take a risk and invest in 
the necessary research and development costs, and above all else a strong, forceful 
personality to drive the idea through. During this phase, Pat Ward worked on the 
principle o f  displacement. This concept was borne from the realms o f intuition and past 
experience rather than the application o f any pre - learned theoiy or training.
Phase two was labelled the "valley o f Death". It can be argued that the series o f  drastic 
problems which ensued as a result o f  locking into one customer can be attributed to 
one major factor: the lack o f any managerial expertise. Above all else, this explained 
why there was no semblance o f a plan in place. The consequences o f this are depicted 
in figure b. This phase is characterised by a total lack o f  control over events, a 
movement away from a position where a customer has been acquired, to a position 
where Western Automation is working exclusively for the customer - at a loss! The 
key decision which saved the company was the move from sub - contracting the 
manufacturing function to the setting up o f such a facility in - house. This meant that 
the customer was retained, quality problems were redressed and delivery dates began 
to be met. It is submitted that two critical decisions had to be made in this phase. 
Firstly where Pat had to decide whether or not to accept the large order and supply 
exclusively to the one customer and secondly, the decision whether to manufacture or
This raises interesting issues for the evolving business. Because o f  the limited size o f  
the company and the limited nature o f its business operations, (particularly at such an 
early phase o f  development), such firms typically are faced with a very small number 
o f  critical events which have to be addressed. The management o f such critical events 
can be handled more effectively if  som e pre - planning exists. H owever the existence 
o f  such a plan or strategy does not give any firm guarantee that the correct decision 
will be made. In this case, Pat Ward presented some compelling reasons for locking 
into an exclusive arrangement with one supplier. He did not have the luxury o f time to 
dwell on the possibility o f  waiting for other potential customers to put business 
contracts his way.
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It can be argued that if Pat apportioned a better balance o f time between developing 
the technology and considering the practical problems o f  establishing a business, he 
may have eschewed this offer and developed other customers. It is submitted that this 
view is not all that convincing, however, when placed in the context o f this case study 
and particularly in the light o f  the views expressed by Pat Ward about his commitments 
to the banks and other creditors.
The strong personality o f  Pat Ward, combined with the positive response from the 
creditors to his "open and honest" stance, and o f  course luck ( in attracting the interest 
o f a company which he had contacted a couple o f  years previously) allowed the 
company to continue.
This phase o f  evolution reflects the classic "reactive", "fire fighting"  approach to 
business which is evident in the case o f many entrepreneurs /  owner - mangers. What 
they lack by way o f  managerial skills and expertise, they make up for by their ability to 
respond quickly, decisively and intuitively to events. Three critical events can be 
identified here: the closure o f  the plant ( and subsequent lay - o ff  o f  all personnel, visits 
to the main suppliers and visits to potential customers with whom previous contact had 
been made. There is simply no time for planning at this stage. Survival and 
retrenchment are the key objectives.
Phase four - "Sowing the Seeds", represents the first time that any semblance o f  
emergent planning appears on the horizon. Pat has learned from the past experiences 
and recognises the folly o f not having addressed some o f  the fundamentals. He focuses 
on financial issues initially, understanding terms such as profitability, cash flow, 
balance sheets etc. He explicitly recognises that he does not have the pre requisite 
skills which would allow him to make decisions in these areas. Therefore, he embarks 
on a course o f study which will help him to develop this expertise. At the same time, 
he makes another crucial decision: to relinquish control over the day - to - day 
management o f the production scheduling and quality control functions. This frees him 
to plan the longer term aspects o f the company's business operations. These twin 
developments represent the first occasion where Pat Ward begins to move into the 
proactive planning mode. Although he focuses on only one aspect o f  the business, 
namely, financial matters, it is contended that this is appropriate. He only has one 
customer. His immediate requirement is to fulfil an order for this customer at a profit. 
He therefore has to construct a detailed costing o f the process involved in meeting 
such an order. Likewise, he has to address the implications o f  taking on other orders
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and the demands which this will place on the manufacturing facility, the purchase of  
raw materials etc. The completion o f such an exercise gives Pat greater leverage and 
confidence when it com es to negotiating contracts with customers. More strategically 
it presents a clearer picture o f  the capability o f the company.
The role which marketing plays in this exercise cannot be underestimated. It should be 
highlighted, however, that such a function plays no visible, direct role in Pat's planning 
activities. His plan is concerned solely with financial issues. It is developed partly with 
the banks and financial institutions in mind - (they have put pressure on him to develop  
such a plan). However, the management o f  the relationship with the initial customer 
and the other customers which he acquires is within the bailiwick o f  the contemporary 
understanding o f the term "marketing". However, Pat does not explicitly use such a 
term - until it is used by me in the interview. He applies the broad principles o f  
marketing in an intuitive, pragmatic manner.
The present phase o f evolution - the planned growth stage, represents a continuation 
and expansion o f  the business plan which Pat Ward has instigated. He has reached a 
stage where the company is on firmer ground. He has grown the company to six 
customers. He recognises that there is no need to expand this customer portfolio as 
there are opportunities to grow with the existing customer base through product 
development. This can be referred to as strategic customer management. He has 
broadened the planning horizon from the initial one year, financial focus, to that o f  a 
three to five year perspective. He has set a target o f doubling the turnover o f the 
company, and has set a ceiling for expansion by not wishing to move beyond fifty 
employees.
This phase o f  planning can be best described as contextual. It adopts a flexibility and 
fluidity which is notably absent in the rational, textbook approach to such an exercise. 
There is a level o f focus, tied into a longer - term perspective, which none the less 
would appear to have a narrow content - strategically managing the customer base. 
There is an absence o f  rigidity and structure which may not meet with the approval o f  
the theorists. However, it is submitted that it is precisely such an approach which has 
allowed Western Automation to enter a planned growth phase of development.
CONCLUSIONS
The future prospects for Western Automation are more difficult to assess. For now, 
Pat sees the route to growth as being one where he can grow with the existing
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customer base. He acknowledges that at som e stage in he future, he will have to 
consider broadening the base o f customers. The possibility for moving into related 
technology areas also may loom  large on the horizon.
Western Automation has arrived at a stage in its evolution where it has som e degree o f  
control over the pace o f  development. The inherent strengths associated with being a 
small company are still in evidence: it responds quickly to customer requirements, it is 
proactive in putting forward ideas for further improvements to the existing product 
offering, it is flexible and able to take decisions quickly. Pat Ward's continued 
presence on the standards committee means that the company can pick up the "winds 
o f potential change" and react to these expeditiously.
More significantly, the company has moved through a number o f  stages with respect 
to its approach to planning: non - existent to emergent to contextual in nature. This 
clearly does not follow  the conventional, rational manner in which the planning process 
is represented in the literature. There is a degree o f  flexibility and fluidity associated 
with Pat Ward's approach that is not easy to describe.
It should be stressed that the inherent weaknesses o f  his attitude to planning cannot be 
understated. Put simply, he has approached the planning process in reverse: only 
adopting a minimalist stance based on the sharp lessons he learned from phase one and 
two. This can be mainly attributed to his com plete lack o f  managerial understanding 
and expertise. It is clear that he m oves swiftly and proactively to redress this imbalance 
when he enters the survival /  retrenchment phase o f the company's evolution.
This case highlights the potential grave consequences which can accrue from such a 
lack o f prerequisite training and development in the fundamental functions o f running a 
business: financial knowledge, production management skills, resources management 
etc. Many companies in a similar situation would have undoubtedly folded in such 
adverse circumstances as those faced by Pat Ward. Due to a combination o f tenacity, 
perseverance and luck, he managed to save the company from going under. The 
lessons learned from this experience moved him to adopt a different approach in phases 
four and five.
It can be equally argued that Pat Ward represents much o f what is positive about 
entrepreneurship. The basic belief that he had a product offering which could provide 
solutions to problems still lives on. He has a pragmatic understanding o f  the marketing 
function which is not so clearly as evident in many larger companies.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
9.1. Introduction
The previous two chapters presented the main findings from the quantitative phase o f  
the research and the analysis o f  the seven cases which were undertaken in the 
qualitative phase. The results from the former indicate that the size o f  the customer 
base and the size o f  the company (based on the number o f  people employed by the 
company) influence the extent to which companies will adopt a more formal, 
structured approach to planning. It is also evident that the majority o f  companies 
which participated in the survey, utilise a general business plan as opposed to a series 
o f  functional plans. The explicit role o f  marketing strategy in the formal planning 
process is absent in all but sixteen per cent o f  the companies. It was submitted at the 
end o f  chapter six that a reliance on such a quantitative survey at best, only sheds 
partial light on planning practices within indigenous electronics firms in Ireland. It was 
also argued that far more probing on the part o f  the researcher is needed if  a greater 
insight is to be presented on the factors which impact on the planning process.
This chapter attempts to synthesis the main findings from the case studies which have 
been analysed in some detail in the previous chapter. The main issues which arise are 
set out in appendix E (see part 2, page 416). It also discusses the main themes in 
relation to the conclusions which were derived from the quantitative survey. From this 
analysis, a framework for assessing the main approaches to planning within the 
evolving firm is put forward. In the final sections, the limitations o f  the research are 
examined and some areas for future research in this area are identified.
9.2. Managing Critical Events
It became clear from the case studies, that in every case, a small number o f  critical 
events occur as the company develops. Typically these incidents have a considerable 
impact on the future o f  the company and they require a decision to be made on the part 
o f the founder and / or partner(s). The net effect o f  this decision may be positive or 
negative: a wrong decision can lead to a disastrous situation, a successful outcom e can 
produce a period o f  sustained or rapid growth for the company. The ability o f  the 
owner - manager to take the correct decision was a common feature. This was not 
dependent on the existence o f  a formal approach to business planning, except in the 
case o f  Ashling Electronics; instead it was influenced by the knowledge o f  the market 
and the ability to understand future trends in the industry. In all o f  the cases, but one,
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the founder was in a position to retain control over the strategic decisions; those issues 
which affect the long term direction o f  the business.
The number o f  critical events facing a small firm are typically few  in number. Thus by a 
combination o f  knowledge, anticipation and monitoring o f  the business environment, 
the founder can make a quick, incisive decision. The evidence from the case studies 
and the results from the survey suggest that formal planning does not influence or play 
any significant role in this exercise. That is not to suggest that i f  a company has such a 
formal process o f  planning in place, it will not be o f  any use to the company. Rather it 
acknowledges that the informal approach plays a very significant part, although it is 
not formally committed to a document. It also supports much o f  the literature on small 
business growth (examined in chapter three) which suggests that the intuition is a 
critical factor in decision - making.
9.3. Contextual Planning and Selective Focusing
The case studies also reveal that the approach to planning is influenced by the context 
or specific situation facing a company at a particular point in time. This is at odds with 
much o f  the prescriptive literature which assumes that a company or individual adopts 
a constant view o f  the efficacy o f  designing and implementing a planning process. In 
other words there is an unspoken assumption that planning, by definition, is 
intrinsically "good" for a company and that it should be undertaken at all times in its 
development.
The cases show that the reality may be different. In the majority o f  cases the attitudes 
and approach to planning is determined by the specific situation facing the company at 
a particular point in time during its development. For instance, in the cases o f  the Chip 
Company, Europlex Technology and Western Automation, the period o f  initial rapid 
growth meant that the owners were far more pre - occupied with addressing the 
immediate issues and problems caused by such a situation. D ue to a lack o f  resources 
and / or lack o f  expertise, there was simply no time available to consider the 
preparation o f  a plan to deal with the future direction o f  the business. The context or 
situation then changes as the company develops: it can be seen that much greater focus 
and attention is paid to managing the financial position o f  the company. In the cases o f  
Western Automation, CEL, the Chip Company and Midland Telecommunications, 
there is a need to address the budgets and monthly cash flows. This then typically 
shapes the approach to planning. Put simply, a certain formality is introduced to the 
approach, with the development o f  monthly financial reviews. A  number o f  the owners
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cited the focus on financial matters as imposing a discipline on the organisation and 
making people accountable for their activities or expenditures.
In addition, it is evident that the attitude o f  the founder to the potential benefits o f  
engaging in planning varies during the evolution o f  the company. In the early phase o f  
development, the majority o f  the owners in the case studies eschew  planning; arguing 
that as orders appear, either from referrals, networking, contacts and so on, the 
immediate task is to address and satisfy these demands, rather than worrying about the 
future. There is a tendency to adopt the attitude o f  "let's worry about the present and 
let the future take care o f  itse lf . While this is at odds with the traditional view  that 
companies must actively plan for the future, it is understandable in the context o f  the 
specific situation and context facing an individual at that point in time.
By contrast, as the organisations m oves through the initial phase o f  gaining a customer 
base, the focus shifts to specific issues such as quality management, relationship 
management or new product development. These may or may not be incorporated 
within a formal planning context.
There is also a tendency on the part o f  some o f  the owner - managers to treat the 
formal part o f  planning i.e. committing the contents to a formal written document, both 
for internal and external consumption. This was most evident in the case o f  Midland 
Telecommunicatrions, where Gerry Griffin was quite candid in his comments. While 
the company has consistently funded its development from internal resources, he had to 
produce a business plan for the local agencies which were responsible for providing 
employment grants: without the submission o f  such a plan, an application would not be 
considered. An accountant was employed to develop such a plan, but it w as purely for 
external consideration: little, if  any use was made o f  it within the confines o f  the 
organisation. Further probing during the first phase o f  interviews also revealed that a 
number o f  owners held similar views about the role o f  a formal business plan. Where 
funding from state agencies or lending institutions was sought, a "text - book" plan was 
prepared. It is a m oot point as to whether, in such circumstances, the lending 
institutions have an understanding o f  how the evolving firm operates in practice: rather 
they appear to be applying the same principles and criteria for funding such companies, 
as they do in the case o f  large corporations.
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9.4. Relationship Management
Perhaps the most significant finding which has emerged from both the quantitative and 
qualitative phases o f  the study has been the focus placed on managing relationships 
between the evolving company and its customer base. The survey o f  fifty companies 
showed that companies which had a low customer base were much more likely to rely 
on an informal approach to planning. Further examination o f  the seven companies in 
the case studies provided a more detailed picture o f  how such relationships are 
managed.
In the case o f  Western Automation, Pat Ward stated clearly that, at the present stage 
o f  development, he preferred to "grow the business" with his existing customer base, 
rather than seek additional customers. He justified this on the basis that it was easier to 
gain more lucrative contracts from such customers as the level o f  trust and confidence 
was built up. This in turn allowed for greater profitability to be generated by his 
company, which could then be re - invested back into the business. The customer also 
gains by being able to operate in a much closer way with a company that can provide a 
personal and flexible level o f  service, and where there is high, indeed almost constant 
contact with the owner - manager: not a middle manager, or not with a company that is 
continuously changing its personnel.
The focus on building customer relationships is further emphasised by Joe M cBreen o f  
CEL, when he makes a strong point o f  inviting over both existing and potential 
customers to visit both his factory and the hospitality on offer in the surrounding area 
(the west o f  Ireland). In his view, this plays a strong role in breaking down any initial 
misconceptions which a company might have, about doing business with a small 
company in a geographically isolated part o f  Europe. In essence it helps to break down  
any credibility gap which might exist. Subsequent visits cement the relationship.
This focus on relationships is not just at that point o f  external contact between the 
owner and the company. The Midland Telecommunications case study demonstrates 
the emphasis which is placed by Gerry Griffin on the need to have a fully motivated, 
competent and customer - focused employees. This creates an environment where the 
employee "will go the extra mile" for the customer, by coming in on a Saturday to 
meet an emergency order for instance.
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The ability to react quickly, incisively and in a flexible manner is also an issue which 
emerged as a critical area where a competitive advantage can be gained by the 
company. This also reinforces the trust factor and can lead to long term relationships.
The emphasis on managing relationships supports the view which was identified in the 
literature review in earlier chapters that many owner - managers inherently practice 
marketing within their organisation. The results from the survey showed that a low  
level o f  priority was attached to the formalisation o f  marketing within the planning 
process. The case studies have demonstrated however that, almost without exception, 
owners proactively adopt the most basic tenets o f  marketing as identified in the 
literature.
9.5. Strategic and Operational Decisions: A Dichotomy
The qualitative phase o f  the study revealed that in all cases the owner - managers 
successfully addressed the question o f  how best to manage decision - making. This is a 
critical issue because, as the company m oves through the various phases o f  growth, the 
roles and responsibilities o f  the owner are likely to change. In the early stages, the 
cases demonstrated that the owner tended to take responsibility for almost all o f  the 
decisions, whether they be day - to - day, operational issues, or those most likely to 
affect the long term direction o f  the business. The possible exception to this pattern 
was Ashling Electronics, where four partners carved out responsibility for the various 
functional activities and long term issues were decided more formally, at management 
meetings.
As the company continues to grow however, it becom es evident that the owner can no 
longer maintain control over all activities: they simply becom e to many and varied and 
also, professional management may be recruited.
In the specific cases o f  CEL, Midland Telecommunications, E l Electronics, Western 
Automation and Europlex Technology, the owner - manager quickly delegated 
responsibility for operational decisions to other partners or managers. Typically this 
revolved around responsibility for daily production schedules. This freed up more time 
for the owner - manager to concentrate on the critical strategic decisions which would  
have to be made: either those with a longer term perspective, like how  the company 
might be positioned in the market place in three years time, or the management o f  
those activities involved in gaining ISO 9000.
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In some cases it appeared as though the respondent was actually taking on a broader 
range o f  activities: M ick Guiñee (E l Electronics), M alcolm L ew is (Europlex 
Technology) and Gerry Griffin (Midland Communications). In the specific instance o f  
Malcolm Lewis, the case study identified that in addition to acting as Managing 
Director, he also took over responsibility for production and quality management. 
While he acknowledged the dangers o f  such a pursuit, it w as also clear that he 
undertook such activities because, in his view, they were pivotal to the future direction 
o f  the company: if  they were badly managed then the company would run into 
difficulties in the market place.
In the cases o f  Mick Guinnee, Joe M cBreen Gerry Griffin and Pat Ward, it was also 
clear that although they delegated the operational decisions to others, they still retained 
control over the strategic issues. Although they claimed to consult, make decisions by 
consensus and be open to the view s o f  others, it is a m oot point as to whether they 
allow others to usurp their authority. This suggests that a possible conflict can occur, 
particularly in a situation where the owner - manager attempts to steer the company in 
a direction which is not supported by other members o f  the management team or the 
partners concerned. In the cases which were investigated, the personality and 
leadership qualities o f  the owner overcame any potential opposition.
9.6 "Emergent" Structures and Planning
With the exception o f  Ashling Electronics which put a coherent structure in place at 
the commencement o f  its activities, the other companies provide strong evidence that 
structures tend to emerge rather than be imposed. Functional areas evolve in response 
to either internal or external developments. Likewise, the approach to planning is likely 
also to emerge in response to specific conditions which face the company. This was 
demonstrated clearly in the case o f  Western Electronics, where Pat Ward put in place a 
production manager and started to develop a limited business plan in response to the 
need to provide "planned growth" for the company.
This further reinforces the view  expressed in section 7.2. that planning is contextual in 
nature and flexible, in that responds to situational influences. It does not follow  a 
pattern o f  consistency with regard to planning activities, as advanced in the literature.
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9.7. Developing the Customer Base
Both the quantitative and qualitative phases o f  the study highlighted the importance o f  
contacts and personal networks when gaining initial customers to provide a starting 
point for the companies. The case studies demonstrated that, in addition, five 
companies proactively developed the customer base in the early stages by using a series 
o f  pragmatic, but effective methods. Pat Ward (Western Automation) identified 
weaknesses in the existing products on the market, developed a prototype and made a 
series o f  presentations to a small number o f  likely customers. In effect he operated on 
the "principle o f  displacement": where by demonstrating the superiority o f  his designs 
over the competition, he displaced the existing supplier. In the case o f  Midland 
Telecommunications, Gerry Griffin made extensive use o f  cold telephoning calling, 
leading to a personal call to a number o f  companies (based on the level o f  interest 
encountered on the telephone). Likewise, in the case o f  CEL, Joe M cBreen made a 
number o f  sales presentations to likely customers in the OEM sector.
These observations partially support the literature which contends that networking 
plays a significant role in the early stages o f  a firm's development. The Chip Company, 
E l Electronics and Europlex Technology com e into this category. H owever the role o f  
"cold calling" cannot be underestimated either, as witnessed in the cases o f  Western 
Automation, CEL and Midland Telecommunication.
In none o f  the cases, with the exception o f  Ashling Electronics, w as there any evidence 
presented which suggested that activities such as networking and proactive selling, 
were pre - determined or identified in a plan. Typically the owners followed a 
consistent pattern whereby:
* an opportunity was identified
u
* a product was designed and refined
u
* potential customers were identified
u
* orders were generated either through contacts, referrals or sales presentations / 
demonstrations
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This approach is notable once again for the implicit manner in which it follow s the 
traditional marketing- oriented approach which is highlighted in the literature. The 
main areas o f  divergence would appear to be the absence o f  any formal marketing 
research undertaken by the founders o f  the potential customers. In the majority o f  
cases, the owner - managers carried out a review o f  existing products which were on 
the market ( Pat Ward - Western Automation), or relied on the fact that there was no 
competitive product currently on the market ( the Tatterstall brothers - Europlex 
Technology), or an absence o f  any competitor (Joe M cBreen - CEL). In the cases o f  
the Chip Company and E l Electronics, referrals and orders placed by the old parent 
company provided the initial stimulus for the first phase.
It could also be argued that the initial impetus for starting the business w as grounded in 
a "product - led" approach: where the product was developed and then som e thought 
was given to the potential market /  customers. H owever it is submitted that this is an 
unduly simplistic perception. The fact that the opportunity was identified in the first 
place meant that virtually all o f  the respondents in the case studies engaged in some 
form o f  assessment.
9.8 Internal Development and Action Learning
A recurring feature which was observed in the case studies w as the strong emphasis 
placed by the respective owner - managers on the need to develop the skills and 
competencies o f  the employees and managers within the company. This was somewhat 
at odds with the survey o f  the fifty electronics companies, where only a small 
percentage stated that they explicitly set aside funding for training employees. This 
inconsistency may be explained by the phrasing o f  the question in the latter survey: 
where respondents were asked if  they directly set aside funds for training. The case 
studies reveal that investment, by way o f  subsidising em ployees on various courses, is 
provided when the need arises. Five o f  the companies studied in the qualitative phase 
strongly articulated the importance o f  development and training. Joe M cBreen and Pat 
Ward argued that by investing in the workforce, a company could prevent valued 
workers / managers from moving to other companies. In both companies people were 
actively encouraged to further their studies on diploma or degree programmes. It w as 
also seen by them as a visible indicator that their efforts were recognised. It also meant 
that the lack o f  financial resources which w as preventing them from recruiting skilled 
staff in various functional areas could be overcom e to som e extent, if  existing 
personnel acquired extra skills as the company continued to develop.
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In tw o o f  the cases: Western Automation and Europlex Technology, the owner - 
managers participated in programmes o f  study which they were directly applying to the 
problems encountered in their respective companies. Pat Ward enrolled for an Open 
University programme because the early disasters which he experienced, highlighted 
his total lack o f  knowledge about fundamental business principles such as book - 
keeping. Malcolm Lewis was pursuing a Masters degree in Dublin University and used 
his company as a focal point for his dissertation: in effect a form o f  action learning and 
research.
The inception o f  Ashling Electronics was to be found in a programme on enterprise 
development in which the four founders were participants. The business plan was 
conceived and developed throughout the duration o f  the course. Thus, it could be 
argued that this was the most extreme and successful form o f  action learning.
The ability o f  the owners to engage in such a learning environment in these three cases 
highlights the role o f  internal development and shows how  it can act as a catalyst for 
shaping the future direction o f  the business. Firstly it improved the competencies o f  
each individual and allowed them to redress some o f  the obvious weaknesses which 
they were experiencing (W estern Automation).
In each case also, it allowed the owner to get the benefit o f  third - party objective 
opinions and perspectives (fellow  students and lecturers) and incorporate these ideas 
into their own thought processes.
It has to be acknowledged that three cases out o f  seven is not a representative sample 
at all, and, as stated earlier, only a small percentage o f  the participating companies on 
the survey indicate that they have a stated policy on training. Thus it would be 
disingenuous to make any generalisations. H owever it is submitted that both internal 
development and action learning can play an important role in shaping the future 
development o f  the evolving firm. It can also specifically focus the attention o f  the 
owner - manager to the need to incorporate a more formal approach to planning, 
particularly when the initial phases o f  development have been experienced and the 
company is expanding in terms o f  employees and professional management.
9.9 Understanding and Applying the Marketing Concept
The results from the quantitative survey demonstrated that 74% o f  the fifty companies 
interviews equated the term "marketing concept" with satisfying customer needs or
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relating to customer service. This contrasts with the general finding that out o f  the fifty 
companies, only eight developed a specific marketing strategy into the overall business 
plan. O f those companies which developed specific functional plans: eight, only three 
indicated that they prepared a specific marketing plan.
These figures suggest, at face value, that while many o f  the respondents understand 
the concept o f  marketing, they do not implement it in any meaningful manner. This 
would appear to support the literature which suggests a similar pattern within the 
realms o f  small business enterprises. The question arises therefore as to whether the 
qualitative information collected from the case studies further supports this or provides 
an alternative picture?
It is submitted that the case studies demonstrate that, not alone is the marketing 
concept understood, but that it is implemented in an effective manner, albeit not strictly 
in "textbook" fashion. The focus on relationship management and customer service 
have already been examined in earlier sections o f  this chapter. In addition, the virtually 
all o f  the companies have placed a major emphasis on the management o f  quality. In 
some cases this is because o f  competitive pressures and customer demands; in others it 
is in anticipation o f  future trends in the industry sector.
One o f  the key learning points to emerge from the case studies is the manner in which 
the marketing concept is implemented. It is treated in an integrative way, with little 
attempt being made to treat it as a separate business function, as is the situation in 
many large corporations. While it could be argued that this is because such companies 
are too small to contemplate functional structures and plans, it can be equally stated 
that the customer base is the central focus for the companies which featured in the 
qualitative phase o f  the study.
It can be witnessed, in the case o f  Ashling Electronics, that a situation occurs where 
great emphasis is placed on the utilisation o f  multi - disciplinary teams to develop new  
products. While this company is arguably the biggest and most structured o f  those 
under examination, it is also clear that they are practising what many academics and 
practitioners are preaching: that companies should stop treating marketing as a 
functional, departmental variable and instead, use it in an integrated manner which 
transcends boundaries within the company. This, is perhaps one o f  the key learning 
points to emerge from the study. Combined with the focus on internal development o f  
employees and management and allied to the central focus o f  the customer, it identifies 
how  the evolving firm can plot a successful route to growth and development.
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A framework which presents the main features o f  the planning process, as identified 
from the quantitative and qualitative phases o f  the study is presented in figure 9.1.
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MANACiftiKNT
Figure 9.1 A Framework for Understanding the Planning Process
THREE TEAK PERSPECTIVE
I N T U I T I O N
INFORMAL
ONE YEAR FORM ALISED
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This framework attempts to draw together the critical issues which emerged from the 
primary research. It identifies both a formal and informal approach to planning and 
also demonstrates that in such evolving companies, the planning process refers to the 
overall business: not separate functional areas.
The inner box represents the central focus on the one year perspective, which in most 
cases is formalised and consists o f  some business objectives and a series o f  budgets. 
This represents the core formal activity with regard to planning in virtually all o f  the 
cases under investigation. The inner circle identifies the typical content o f  this annual 
plan. The gap between the inner box and outer box identifies with the fact that the
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companies tend to adopt a three year perspective o f  the future direction o f  their 
business. The critical learning point would appear to be that this time frame is largely 
driven by four influences: knowledge o f  the market /  competition /  industry trends, 
feedback, intuition and a long term vision o f  where the company should be going. It is 
informal in nature: it is not formally committed to any document such as that o f  a 
strategic plan. These are more difficult to assess as they reflect the personality and 
leadership style o f  the owner - manager. N one the less they play a critical role in the 
manner in which strategic decisions are made. The circles which surround the outer 
and inner box represent the situational factors which influence the overall approach to 
planning. Some are inter - linked: action learning has a high level o f  interaction with 
the development o f  the skill and aptitudes o f  both management and em ployees within 
the company, whereas relationship management and the more specific focus on 
strategic customer management are indicative o f  the implicit approach to marketing 
which all o f  the companies examined in the case studies demonstrated. These are 
highlighted in the diagram by a continuous, heavy (bold) line. The broken line linking 
the circles to the outer box are indirect variables which affect the overall approach to 
planning by the individual entrepreneur /  owner /  manager. The skills and aptitudes 
required to succeed in these area will vary; dependent as they are on the overall 
personality, leadership style and ability to delegate, on the part o f  the individual 
entrepreneur. The seven cases featured in this study indicated, to a greater or lesser 
extent, that the respondents were proficient in these areas.
9.10 C ontribution o f the Study to K now ledge
The objectives o f  this study have been shaped from the outset, by the belief that much 
o f  what has been written on the process o f  planning in general, and marketing planning 
in particular, does not equate with reality. This is particularly the case in relation to the 
evolving firm. Thus the resulting design o f  the study, including both a quantitative and 
a qualitative phase, has set out to examine the accuracy o f  this observation. The review  
o f  the literature on small business and entrepreneurship, strategy and planning, together 
with small firm policy in the Republic o f  Ireland, identified a number o f  discrepancies 
between theory and practice.
It is further argued that the quantitative phase o f  the study both supported the view  
that small business owners approach the planning process in a different manner to that 
which is prescribed in the literature. Perhaps the most interesting and significant finding 
to emerge is the relationship between the size o f  the customer base and the intuitive, 
informal mode o f  planning. This is perhaps best evidenced by the findings contained in
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table 6.12 in the previous chapter which shows that fifty per cent o f  the companies 
with a customer base o f  less than ten, develop intuitive plans which are not formally 
written down or circulated to other people in the company. When the companies in the 
> twenty category are considered, it can be seen that ten o f  the tw elve companies 
prepare a formal, written plan.
The case studies identify a number o f  influencing factors which impinge on the 
approach to planning, many o f  which are not discussed in any meaningful way in the 
existing literature. These have been laid out in the preceding sections and are 
represented in appendix F (see part 2, page 460). it is argued that these findings 
provide a deeper level o f  insight into the specific characteristics o f  owner - managers / 
entrepreneurs and, more importantly, have relevance for policy makers in the area o f  
the small firm. The framework goes some way towards improving the level o f  
knowledge about the role which planning plays in small firm growth and development. 
It is further submitted that the tendency o f  such government agencies and lending 
institutions to treat the evolving firm in the same manner as the large corporation, is 
based on the prejudice that the characteristics are similar in each case. Evidence that 
this is not unique to Ireland is presented in empirical research undertaken by Bannock 
(1), European Banker's Small Business Seminar (2), and the Forum o f  Private 
Business (3) The findings from the case studies indicate that a number o f  influencing 
factors challenge this perception. In essence the assumption that the potential for 
business venture growth and development should be dependent on a "rational", 
prescribed approach to planning is flawed. The factors which have been identified in 
this study indicate that the situation and circumstances which face many evolving firms 
is more complex, contextual and flexible than has been hitherto acknowledged in the 
literature and among policy makers. The research presented is not applicable to all 
sectors; focusing as it does on the electronics sector. It also does not set out to be 
prescriptive in nature: the primary objective being one where a greater level o f  insight 
and understanding is reached at the end o f  the study.
It is submitted that the hybrid nature o f  the data collection methods which were utilised 
in the study also contribute to the achievement o f  this clearer insight into planning 
practices in small, evolving firms. Much o f  the existing empirical work in this area has 
relied on a uni - dimensional approach to research design. The incorporation o f  both 
quantitative and qualitative methods has overcom e this weakness to som e extent. The 
study also demonstrated how the telephone method can be used more in an innovative 
and proactive manner than has been the case to date.
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9.11 Limitations of the Study and Areas for Future Research
As stated earlier, much o f  the analysis and assessment which has been carried out in 
this study has been exploratory in nature. It is also limited to one industry sector and it 
is debatable as to whether the same findings and issues would be identical i f  the same 
study was carried out across a number o f  sectors. An opportunity arises therefore for 
more extensive work to be carried out on a multi - sector basis, making use o f  both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. It is argued that the latter area provides 
an interesting route for further research: specifically, more exploratory work needs to  
be carried out to generate a theory o f  business planning, growth and development, 
before a theory can be tested. As stated earlier, this study goes some o f  the way only.
I f  the level o f  theory generation is to be extended further, it is argued that researchers 
should consider making greater use o f  action research. By working more closely and 
for a longer period o f  time with an individual enterprise, it should be possible to glean 
more detail from the research exercise and explore, more extensively, som e o f  the 
findings which have been generated in this study. While this would not allow for 
generalisations to be made, it would take the researcher further along the continuous 
journey o f  knowledge, working on the basis that there is no final destination.
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